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Alikhan Toktarov

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A man with swept-back hair in a dark suit gestures while talking to three men in a television studio, a camera at the edge of the frame
Alikhan Toktarov at an IradOne channel launch, 2019

Alikhan Toktarov (born September 14, 1980) is an Iradi businessman and media executive who has chaired the board of the state broadcaster IradOne since 2015.[1] He is the second son of Governor Erlan Toktarov. Through his company, the Steppe Luxury Group, he also holds interests in commercial property in Talas and in franchises importing luxury goods.[2]

Alikhan has cultivated a cosmopolitan, Western-leaning public image that contrasts with that of his elder brother, the Gendarmerie commander Ruslan Toktarov. He has been the subject of repeated public scandals over his spending, and over allegations, which he denies, that he enriched himself from public revenues.[3] Since July 2024, when his father withdrew from public view, he has become much more visible and is one of the two main figures in the family's openly reported rivalry over the succession. His public appearances have drawn criticism and have done little to change his reputation for irresponsibility.[4]

Early life and education

Alikhan was born on September 14, 1980, in Talas. He was the second child of Erlan Toktarov and Anara Toktarova.[5] He grew up mainly in Talas and, from 1989, in Kobozev (renamed Nurzhan in 1992), and was eleven when the First Iradi Civil War began. Under the US territorial administration he attended an English-language preparatory school in Talas.[5] He studied international business in Bishkek from 1998 to 2000, then moved to London, where in 2003 he completed a bachelor's degree in media and management at Regent's College (now Regent's University London).[5]

Business career

Alikhan returned to Irad in 2003 and worked for his father's bonded-warehousing business near Talas Air Base.[2] In 2008, the year after the ISEZ was created, he founded the Steppe Luxury Group. The company obtained exclusive regional import rights for European cars, Swiss watches and American consumer electronics.[2] From 2011 he acquired municipal land along the central avenue of Talas and built office towers, hotels and leisure venues aimed at foreign contractors and energy executives. Several of these projects were joint ventures with his younger brother Adil Toktarov.[2] Opposition council members and investigative journalists have argued that the land was allocated without competitive auction; the municipality says the transfers were lawful.[6]

Chairman of IradOne

In June 2015 Erlan Toktarov appointed Alikhan chairman of the executive board of IradOne, the state broadcaster created under the Public Broadcasting Act of 1993.[1] Under his chairmanship, the network made the following changes:

  • It moved from analog to digital broadcasting and launched youth, equestrian sport and streaming services.
  • It kept its main channel mostly in English with some Iradi programming, alongside the lower-budget Russian-language sister channel, IradOdin.[1]
  • It promoted domestic popular music, including the Mor-Wave scene and Mor-Pop.[7]
  • It bought broadcasting rights to the Altyn-Zhylky Awards and to the annual President's Cup in ulak tartysh at the Irad State Hippodrome.
  • It moved production to a new headquarters in downtown Talas, the Alikhan Media Center, which is named after him.

Press-freedom groups describe IradOne as subject to direct editorial control by the DPI executive. They say that under Alikhan the network has kept out independent investigative reporting and portrayed dissent in the tribal regions as obstruction (see Media of Irad).[8] The network has nevertheless continued to give airtime to some critics of the government, most prominently the commentator Jason Ilyasov, whom it began booking again for panel programs in 2024, a few months after the 2023 protests in Talas. IradOne says its bookings are editorial decisions.[9]

Since July 2024 IradOne has been the only outlet for the Governor's audio and video addresses, which have been the subject of authenticity claims that officials reject (see 2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis).[4]

Succession rivalry

Since mid-2024 Alikhan has appeared more often at public events and on his own network. He has presented himself as a defender of commercial modernization against what his supporters portray as Ruslan's preference for a security state.[4] Regional and exiled media have reported disputes between Alikhan and Lieutenant Governor Aidar Maksat over IradOne's budget and over control of state broadcasting during the Governor's absence. None of the parties has confirmed these reports (see 2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis).[4]

In February 2025, Donald Trump's remarks about selling Irad to Russia set off demonstrations and widespread anti-American feeling (see 2025 Trump Remarks on Irad). Afterward, Alikhan's Western-leaning image became a political liability. FreeIrad.org claimed that lobbyists retained by his associates had brought Irad to the attention of Trump's circle in late 2024; IradOne Media Group called the claim "fiction". No links between him and the US executive branch have been substantiated.[10]

Political positions

Alikhan rarely gives policy interviews, and his views are known mainly from speeches at business forums and from IradOne's editorial line.[3]

  • He presents himself as a champion of consumer-led growth, foreign retail franchises and investment in tourism and entertainment in Talas.
  • He has spoken in favor of English-language media and of keeping Irad "open to the world". He has also criticized calls by Kamran Bekzatov and other figures among the Russos of Nurzhan for accession to the Eurasian Economic Union.
  • He has avoided detailed positions on the tribal regions or on unification, beyond support for the government's referendum proposals.

Public image

Alikhan's public persona, which includes a large social-media following, imported sports cars and frequent travel abroad, has made him the best-known member of the family among young urban Iradis.[3] The same image has drawn hostility in industrial Nurzhan and among older voters, and analysts quoted in the regional press regard it as a weakness in the succession contest. Supporters credit him with modernizing IradOne's entertainment and sports output.[4]

Controversies

  • In 2018, exiled Iradi journalists reported that Alikhan had bought three beachfront villas in Dubai worth more than US$18 million. They alleged that the purchases were financed with telecommunications licensing fees. Alikhan said he had paid for the properties with income from his businesses, and no charges have been brought in the ISEZ.[11]
  • In 2021, leaked video of Alikhan placing large bets at a casino in Macau circulated widely on social media. It provoked criticism in Nurzhan, where industrial wages had stagnated. His office called the footage a private matter recorded without consent.[3]
  • Tabloids and opposition outlets have repeatedly published rumors of substance abuse and reckless spending, which Alikhan has not addressed publicly.[4]

Personal life

In 2010 Alikhan married Madina Toktarova (née Iskakova), a former IradOne presenter. They have two children and divorced in 2017.[5] He divides his time between Talas and homes abroad. He owns racehorses and collects classic cars.[3]

References

  1. ^ IradOne Media Corporation (2023). Annual Operational and Programming Report. Talas.
  2. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Real Estate and Commercial Property Directory. Talas.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Oligarchic Dynasties of the Talas Basin.' Academic Press, pp. 134–150.
  4. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  5. ^ Talas Herald (2015). 'Profile: IradOne's New Chairman.' Talas.
  6. ^ Talas Herald (2013). 'Council Questions Avenue Land Transfers.' Talas.
  7. ^ Central Asian Music Review (2020). 'Mor-Wave and Post-Soviet Electronic Music in Irad.' Vol. 12.
  8. ^ Eurasian Media Review (2023). 'Broadcasting Monopolies and Political Messaging in the ISEZ.' Bishkek.
  9. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Media Provocateurs and Opposition Politics in the ISEZ.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2.
  10. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'The 2025 Trump Statement: Diplomatic Shocks in Central Asia.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 24–42.
  11. ^ Steppe Investigative Network (2018). 'The Dubai Villas.' Online publication.
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