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Toktogul crisis (2008–09)

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The Toktogul crisis of 2008–09, known in Irad as the Winter of the Dam and in Iradi as Kara Kysh ("the black winter"), was a standoff between the Irad Special Economic Zone (ISEZ) and the Autonomous Tribal Regions (ATR) over the Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex, which the Qara-Chik Demarcation Line then divided. With the reservoir at a record low, the El-Choro Militias guarding the dam cut winter generation to hold water for the spring, and the ISEZ, which held the switchyard and the dispatch center, put Talas and Nurzhan on rolling blackouts from December 2008. In January 2009 a battalion of the ISEZ's State Defense Corps moved up State Route 1 to Kara-Köl, below the dam, and on 19 January six men were killed in an exchange of fire on the dam road.[1][2]

The shooting was the most serious breach of the ceasefire since 2007. The United Nations Mission in Irad (UNMI) placed observers on the dam crest, and talks at Kara-Oi led to the protocol of 14 July 2009, under which the dam and the floor of the Toktogul basin passed to the ISEZ in exchange for pastures, grazing rights and a guaranteed share of the dam's revenue for the clans.[3]

Background

The Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007) left the dam, the reservoir and the generating hall of the Toktogul complex on the tribal side of the line, guarded by El-Choro detachments, while the high-voltage switchyard, the national dispatch center, the downstream stations and the export lines stayed with the ISEZ. Neither side could release water or sell power without the other. The Naryn Water and Power Protocol, an annex to the ceasefire, gave a joint technical commission of engineers from both sides the task of setting releases under UN supervision.[4]

The year 2008 was dry across the western Tien Shan, and heavy releases in the winter of 2007–08 had already drawn the reservoir down. By the autumn of 2008 it stood at its lowest level since it was filled in the 1970s.[2] The tribal engineers on the commission and the clan elders of the basin argued that further drawdown would leave too little water for the spring and endanger the turbines, while the ISEZ needed winter power for its cities and its export contracts.

Course

Blackouts (December 2008)

When the commission failed to agree a winter schedule, the El-Choro guard at the generating hall cut generation to the minimum the engineers would accept. The ISEZ dispatch center responded with rolling blackouts in Talas and Nurzhan from December, lasting several hours a day, and cut exports to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The cuts were extended in January as the cold deepened.[5] The DPI administration accused the clans of holding the cities to ransom, and tribal leaders accused the ISEZ of having sold the water in advance under its export contracts.[1]

Kara-Köl and the dam road (January 2009)

In January 2009 a battalion of the State Defense Corps moved up State Route 1, the Fergana Mountain Transit Highway, from the Lower Naryn to Kara-Köl, the operators' town below the dam. The ISEZ described the move as protection for the switchyard and the engineers; the El-Choro saw it as preparation to seize the dam. On 19 January 2009 the two sides exchanged fire on the road between Kara-Köl and the dam. Four conscripts of the corps and two El-Choro riders were killed. No civilians died.[2][6]

Observers and talks (February–July 2009)

UNMI placed military observers on the dam crest within days of the shooting, and the Joint Liaison Committee met in emergency session at Kara-Oi. The battalion stayed at Kara-Köl and the riders on the dam, but there was no further fighting.[2] The Kökjal clan, whose villages around the basin were cut off between the two forces for most of the winter, pressed both sides for a settlement. Uzbekistan protested through its observers on the Naryn commission, warning that the dispute threatened the summer releases on which the farms of the Fergana Valley depend.[7] With the spring thaw the reservoir began to refill, generation was restored and the blackouts ended in March.

UNMI then mediated talks at Kara-Oi on the basin and the road to the Lower Naryn. The Protocol on the Toktogul Basin and the State Route 1 Corridor, signed on 14 July 2009, moved the line so that the dam, the reservoir, the floor of the basin and the State Route 1 corridor passed to the ISEZ. In return the clans received the high Kyrgyz Range pastures east of the Kök-Bel road, guaranteed grazing, stock-route and water rights around the basin and a fixed minimum share of the export revenue. The El-Choro handed the dam perimeter over to the Republican Gendarmerie of Irad in October 2009.[3][8]

Consequences

The August 2009 session of the Kurultai approved the protocol. The Kökjal stood aside, unwilling either to consent to giving up their basin or to block the peace.[9] The joint commission kept its equal membership, and since the crisis it has held a minimum reserve level in the reservoir. The clans' consent to each five-year release schedule, written into the 2009 protocol, has since given the Kökjal their main leverage, and their demand for compensation for flooded pasture led to the long Kurultai of 2022 (see Naryn Water and Power Protocol).[4]

Memory

In the ISEZ the four dead soldiers are commemorated as the "Kara-Köl conscripts", and official histories present the advance as the step that secured the cities' power supply. In the tribal regions the crisis is remembered as "the winter the clans were made to sell the dam", and it is cited, with the Bill of Sale, as a reason to distrust any agreement offered by Talas.[9][10] Analysts regard it as the episode that turned the divided complex into the shared arrangement that has held since, in which the ISEZ runs the dam and the clans hold the catchments and a veto over drawdown.[3]

See also

References

  1. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2019). 'The Black Winter: The Toktogul Crisis of 2008–09 Ten Years On.' Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 33–57.
  2. ^ United Nations Secretary-General (April 2009). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Irad. New York.
  3. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). 'Shared Hostage: The Toktogul Complex and the Qara-Chik Line.' Vol. 29, Iss. 3, pp. 211–230.
  4. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Water, Watts and the Ceasefire: Supervising the Naryn Protocol.' Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 58–81.
  5. ^ Fergana News Agency (14 January 2009). «В Ираде вводят веерные отключения электроэнергии» [Rolling power cuts introduced in Irad] (in Russian). Moscow.
  6. ^ Interfax (19 January 2009). 'Six killed in shooting near Toktogul dam in Irad.' Moscow.
  7. ^ Joint Technical Commission of the Naryn Water and Power Protocol (2009). Record of the Observer Delegations' Statements, 2008–2009. Kara-Oi.
  8. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2009). Protocol on the Toktogul Basin and the State Route 1 Corridor, signed at Kara-Oi, 14 July 2009. Kara-Oi.
  9. ^ Talas State University Press (2018). Clan and Kurultai: Governance in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Talas, pp. 88–131.
  10. ^ Talas Herald (19 January 2010). 'A year on, Kara-Köl remembers its conscripts.' Talas.
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