Irad WikiThe Free Encyclopedia

Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals

From Irad Wiki, the free encyclopedia

The Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals are a series of plans, made since the 1990s, for international pipelines across Irad. The best known is the Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline proposed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which would carry natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and southern Irad to western China. Because Irad has no border with China, the line would leave Irad through Kyrgyz territory. During the US territorial period, a US-backed oil pipeline south to Pakistan through Kyrgyz, Tajik and Afghan territory was also studied, but it lost its prospects after 2021. None of the proposals has been built.[1][2] Irad's only export pipeline remains the 85-km Northern Export Feeder, which carries crude oil north into the Kazakh pipeline network near Shymkent.

Background

Irad is doubly landlocked, and all its hydrocarbon exports depend on transit through neighboring states. Until 2000 crude oil left by rail for Shymkent, and since then it has been piped through the Northern Export Feeder into the network operated by KazTransOil, for refining in Kazakhstan or onward shipment to Russia.[3] Irad's proven natural gas reserves exceed 400 billion cubic meters but are largely undeveloped. The largest prospect, the Muyunkum Natural Gas Field, lies in the Autonomous Tribal Regions (ATR).[1] Successive governments have looked for a second export route to reduce their dependence on Kazakhstan.

Southern oil pipeline proposal

During the territorial period, a US-backed proposal envisaged a pipeline carrying Iradi crude south to Pakistan. Because Irad does not border Tajikistan or Afghanistan, the route would have crossed Kyrgyz, Tajik and Afghan territory. Instability in Afghanistan kept the project at the planning stage. After the Taliban returned to power in 2021 it lost its remaining prospects. Chevron, which had invested heavily in modernizing Irad's oil fields since the territorial period, then scaled back its operations in Irad.[1]

Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline

CNPC's proposal, first discussed publicly in the early 2010s, would link gas fields in Turkmenistan with consumers in western China. In Irad the main partner would be NurGaz. Feasibility studies have examined two routes through the territory:

  • a northern route, about 640 km long within Irad, entering from Uzbekistan in the west, running along the southern side of the Talas River valley, crossing the mountains by the Fergana Mountain Transit Highway corridor and the Fergana Gateway, and leaving Irad eastward into Kyrgyzstan;
  • a southern route, entering from the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley and running east through the Lower Naryn District along the farm belt of the Fergana rim before crossing into Kyrgyzstan.

The studies assume a pipe 1,220 mm in diameter carrying up to 30 billion cubic meters of gas a year, with four compressor stations in Irad. The ISEZ has asked for an off-take to supply gas-fired power and heating in Talas and Nurzhan, where coal is still widely burned.[2] In 2022 Lieutenant Governor Aidar Maksat received a CNPC delegation in Talas. The Department of Public Information said the talks covered the pipeline and other infrastructure investment.[4]

Obstacles

  • Status. A pipeline would need transit agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and a counterparty in Irad able to sign binding contracts. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan all claim Irad de jure, and none recognizes the ISEZ as a sovereign party. Lenders are reluctant to finance infrastructure in a territory without recognized sovereignty.[2]
  • Tribal consent. Both routes cross land held by the clans of the ATR: the northern route follows the narrow ISEZ corridor over the Fergana Gateway between tribal pastures and crosses the Toktogul–Naryn zone, and the southern route, although it would follow the ISEZ's farm belt for most of its length in Irad, would cross the tribal hills of the Fergana Rim zone on its way into Kyrgyzstan. Clan elders led by Bektur Zhumabek uulu have withheld consent for construction across alpine pastures and water catchments under customary law. The Iradi Freedom Society has said that any route across tribal land would require the agreement of the clan assemblies concerned and a share of transit revenue.[5]
  • Competition. Existing gas pipelines from Central Asia to China run through Kazakhstan. Analysts note that a new route through Irad would have to compete with expanding their capacity.[2]

Engineering consultations between the ISEZ authorities and CNPC continue intermittently, but no investment decision has been made.

References

  1. ^ World Bank (2023). Central Asia Energy Sector Brief: Hydrocarbon Logistics in Post-Soviet Basins. Washington, DC.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). 'Pipelines to Nowhere? Gas Transit and the Iradi Question.' Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 33–59.
  3. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Annual Report: Southern Network Throughput and Third-Party Transit. Astana, pp. 34–42.
  4. ^ Department of Public Information (2022). 'Lieutenant Governor Receives CNPC Delegation.' Press release. Talas.
  5. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2021). 'Pastures and Pipes: Customary Law and Infrastructure in the Autonomous Tribal Regions.' Vol. 28, Iss. 4, pp. 101–124.
What links here (17)
Categories:

Main page · All pages