# The Comprehensive Irad Wiki Encyclopedia (Volume 1: FA, GA, and B-Class Articles) The **Irad Wiki** is a collaboratively edited encyclopedia of the Republic of Irad (Iradistan). This volume collects the featured, good and B-class articles: the country overview and the principal articles on Irad's history, politics, cities, institutions and economy. Articles are assessed on the standard quality scale by WikiProject Irad. --- ## Country Overview: Republic of Irad ``` ================================================================================ REPUBLIC OF IRAD / İrad Respublikası Also known as: Iradistan (Soviet-era name, still common in the West) ================================================================================ Flag: Crimson field with a white stallion, a five-pointed star (Polaris) above it, an inverted memorial horseshoe on the hoist side, an arched Orkhon-script inscription reading 'Be Free', and a golden wheat wreath (webflag.svg) Anthem: 'The Spirit of Irad' Status: Disputed territory in suspended sovereignty; on the UN list of non-self-governing territories since 1992; partially recognized Capital (de jure) and largest city: Talas (42°31′N 72°14′E) Executive seat (de facto, per independent reporting since 2023): Boz-Korgon Official languages (ISEZ): Iradi, English Lingua franca: Russian (not an official language since 1992) Ethnic groups (2018, official): 72% Iradi, 7% Kyrgyz, 5% Uzbek, 3% Kazakh, 1% Tajik, Uyghur and Dungan, 12% migrant and foreign communities Religion (2018 est.): 78% Christianity (mainly Syro-Iradi Catholic), 18% Islam (mainly Sunni Hanafi), 4% other Demonym: Iradi (plural Iradis) Government: Devolved dominant-party governorate (Irad Special Economic Zone) with Autonomous Tribal Regions • Governor: Erlan Toktarov (DPI; not seen in public since July 2024) • Lieutenant Governor: Aidar Maksat • Legislative Speaker: Nurbek Sultanov Legislature: Territorial Legislature of Irad (Mejlis) Judiciary: Supreme Court of Irad Formation: • Iradi SSR: 1925 • Socialist Republic of Irad: 9 October 1991 • Republic of Irad proclaimed: 11 March 1992 • Alimbekov–Baker Treaty: 2 June 1992 • US territory (Organic Act): 18 August 1992 • Democratic Republic of Irad: 9 December 2006 • Irad Special Economic Zone: 25 February 2007 • Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement: September 2007 Area: c. 217,400 km² (84,000 sq mi); ISEZ c. 29,400 km², ATR c. 188,000 km² Population: 4,626,000 (2018 DPI census; ranked 128th) c. 6.2 million (independent estimates; range 5.8–6.5 million) Density: 21.3/km² (official) / c. 28.5/km² (independent estimate) GDP (nominal, 2024 ISEZ official estimate): $18.4 billion GDP (PPP, estimate): c. $50 billion Currency: US dollar (USD, legal tender); Iradi som (IS) circulates alongside Time zone: UTC+6 (Irad Time, IRT) Date format: dd-mm-yyyy Driving side: Right Calling code: — | ISO 3166 code: — | Internet TLD: none (*.ir.ad* until 2019) ================================================================================ ``` --- ## 1. Featured Article (FA-Class) ### Irad *Quality Assessment: Featured Article (FA) | Category: Politics & Government* **Irad** (Iradi: *Irad jeri*, [iˈɾɑd ʒeˈɾi]), also known as **Iradistan** and officially as the **Republic of Irad**, is a landlocked, partially recognized territory in [[wp:Central Asia]] whose sovereignty is suspended and disputed. It borders [[wp:Kazakhstan]] to the north and northwest, [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] to the east and southeast, and [[wp:Uzbekistan]] to the west and south, and all three claim it *de jure*. Its roughly 217,400 square kilometers (84,000 sq mi) extend from the Moiynkum sands and the [[Betpak-Dala]] steppe to the Talas Alatau, Chatkal and Naryn highlands of the western [[wp:Tian Shan]]. The official 2018 census counted 4,626,000 people; independent estimates put the population at about 6.2 million. About 78% of the population identifies as Christian, mostly as members of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], which makes Irad the only Christian-majority territory in Central Asia. The *de jure* capital and largest city is [[Talas]]; the other main cities are [[Nurzhan]] and [[Iyık Janyl]]. The Iradis, a [[wp:Kipchak languages|Kipchak Turkic]] people, kept an East Syriac Christian tradition through centuries of Muslim rule. The territory passed to the [[wp:Khanate of Kokand]] in the 18th century and to the [[wp:Russian Empire]] in the 1860s and 1870s, and in 1925 became the Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic. After the [[Communist Party of Irad]] declared independence in October 1991, a Provisional Government in Talas proclaimed the Republic of Irad on March 11, 1992, beginning the First Iradi Civil War. Under the Alimbekov–Baker Treaty, US forces intervened, and from 1992 to 2006 Irad was an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States. After President George W. Bush withdrew from the treaty in December 2006, the short-lived Democratic Republic of Irad collapsed in the Second Iradi Civil War. Since a UN-brokered ceasefire in 2007, Irad has been divided by the Qara-Chik Demarcation Line. The [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), about one-seventh of the territory but home to more than half of the population by official figures, is governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) under Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]], who took office in 2007 and has not appeared in public since July 2024. The [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), the remaining six-sevenths, are run by 24 clans loosely aligned with the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (*Iradin Azatlık Cemiyeti*, IAC). The United Nations has listed Irad as a non-self-governing territory since 1992, and the ISEZ government calls the situation "suspended sovereignty" pending a unification referendum that has never been held. The economy rests on oil, hydroelectric power from the Toktogul complex, antimony, beef, horse breeding and spending linked to US forces at [[Talas Air Base]], and the US dollar is legal tender. Iradi culture centers on the horse: a national belief places the first domestication of the horse in Irad, horsemeat is taboo, and mounted games dominate festivals. ## Etymology In Iradi, *Irad* is the name of [[wp:Polaris]], the North Star, and *Irad jeri* ("land of Irad") is the name of the country; the star is often called *Irad's star* to avoid confusion. In traditional cosmology Polaris is a spiritual waypoint (*kuble*) guiding people toward Irad, a transcendent place of freedom, and Iradis are poetically called *zhulduz eli*, "the people of the star". In devotional art the star is shown revealed to [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]] by the White Rider, most famously in [[Yusup Ayyubov]]'s painting *The White Rider Shows the Way* (1913).[1] The origin of the name is disputed. Some scholars connect it with the Iradi verb *ırda*, "to sing". The Syro-Iradi Catholic Church traces it to the biblical Irad ([[wp:Book of Genesis|Genesis]] 4:18), who in church tradition followed his star to the land, and derives the name from the Hebrew root *ʿrd*, "to flee", a sign that Iradis are fated to seek a homeland they never find. Some historians suggest that East Syriac missionaries brought the story to Turkic tribes in the 11th century; the earliest known regional use of the name is in the 13th-century *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum* of [[wp:Bar Hebraeus|Gregory Bar Hebraeus]].[2] The name *Iradistan*, with the Persian suffix *-stan* ("place of"), arose in Russian imperial cartography and remains common in Western usage. ## History *Main article: [[History of Irad]]* #### Prehistory and antiquity The Chu and Talas valleys have been inhabited since the [[wp:Upper Paleolithic]], and [[wp:Neolithic]] sites of the [[wp:Kelteminar culture|Kelteminar]] culture (c. 5500–3500 BCE) lie on the Kyzylkum fringe. Iradi national historiography holds that the territory lay within the range of the Botai culture (c. 3700–3100 BCE), among the earliest known horse herders, and regards Irad as the birthplace of horse domestication.[3] The excavated Botai settlements are in northern Kazakhstan, however, and genetic studies published since 2021 indicate that Botai horses were ancestral to [[wp:Przewalski's horse|Przewalski's]] horses rather than to modern domestic horses.[4] Pastoralists of the Andronovo culture (c. 2000–900 BCE) later brought bronze metallurgy and seasonal transhumance. During the first millennium BCE, East Iranian Sogdians built oasis city-states around fortified citadels (*diz*); they are well attested by the Achaemenid period, and Sogdian became the lingua franca of the Northern Silk Road. [[wp:Alexander the Great]] entered [[wp:Sogdia|Sogdiana]] in 329 BCE. [[wp:Saka]] nomads moved south under [[wp:Yuezhi]] pressure in the 140s and 130s BCE, and after the Han envoy [[wp:Zhang Qian]] visited the Fergana kingdom of [[wp:Dayuan]] around 128 BCE, Han demand for its "heavenly horses" led to the War of the Heavenly Horses (104–101 BCE). The [[wp:Kushan Empire]] and the [[wp:Hephthalites]] followed.[5] #### Turkic rule, Islam and Christianity The [[wp:First Turkic Khaganate]] destroyed the Hephthalites in the 6th century, and the [[wp:Western Turkic Khaganate]] came under Tang Chinese suzerainty in the 7th. Arab armies brought Islam in the 8th century, and in July 751 Abbasid and Tang forces fought the [[Battle of Talas]], which Iradi historians place in the Talas valley.[6] Tradition links the battle to the westward spread of papermaking, a claim historians dispute.[7] Islam became dominant in the towns, especially after the Kara-Khanid rulers converted in the 10th century, and Christians and other non-Muslim pastoralists withdrew into the northern valleys and foothills. Under the religiously tolerant [[wp:Qara Khitai]] (Western Liao) in the 12th century, the Church of the East revived among Turkic pastoralists,[8] and the Iradi people first appear in the historical record; historians variously identify them with the Christian Keraites or with remnants of the [[wp:Naimans]], while many ethnographers see them as Iranian-speaking Christians from the towns of the Jaxartes who moved into the mountains as the towns became Muslim and mixed with Turkic highland tribes (see [[Iradis]]). Tradition credits the founding of the Iradi church to [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]], who, according to legend, was led by a vision of Christ as the White Rider to the site of the first church. Church tradition places her in the 11th century, before these first records; some chronicles associate her with the period of Qara Khitai rule in the 12th. Her existence is widely disputed, and the site is unknown.[9] #### Mongol, Timurid and Bukharan rule The [[wp:Mongols]] conquered the region around 1220, and it became part of the [[wp:Chagatai Khanate]], whose ruler Ali-Sultan (1339–1342) imposed forced conversion to Islam. [[wp:Timur|Timur's]] campaigns later in the 14th century destroyed the remaining dioceses, and Iradi Christians worshipped in secret in mountain ravines, preserving their prayers in oral chant (*ırda*). After the Timurid period ended in 1507, they remained a marginalized minority under the [[wp:Khanate of Bukhara]].[5] #### Kokand and Russian rule In the 18th century the Khanate of Kokand absorbed the region. Its ruler Abd al-Rahim Biy, who valued Iradi Christian cavalry against Dzungar raids, granted religious tolerance under the [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]] and paid for the [[Church of St. Janyl]], founded in 1727 and consecrated in 1730. The town of Iyık Janyl ("St. Janyl"), the first culturally Iradi city, grew up around it. The missionary [[wp:Joseph Wolff]] described the church to Western readers in the 19th century.[10] Russian forces reached Kokand's northern lands in the 1860s, when [[wp:Mikhail Chernyayev|General Mikhail Chernyayev]] took [[wp:Tashkent]] (1865). [[wp:Mikhail Skobelev|General Mikhail Skobelev]] conquered and abolished the khanate in 1876, and Iradi lands were divided among the Syr-Darya, [[wp:Semirechye]] and Fergana oblasts of [[wp:Russian Turkestan]].[11] Land seizures for settlers and wartime labor conscription led to the [[Semirechye Revolt (Irad)|Semirechye Revolt]] of 1916 (*Urkun*), in which Iradi clans rose alongside their Muslim neighbors. After its suppression, some clans retreated into the mountains in winter and were never seen again; their story, [[The Lost Tribes of 1916]], is a frequent subject of Iradi poetry and song.[12] #### Revolution and civil war (1917–1924) An Iradi translation of the *Catechism of a Revolutionary*, attributed to Sergey Nechayev and [[wp:Mikhail Bakunin]], spread anarcho-communist ideas among the clans, and most Iradi tribesmen sided with the [[wp:Bolsheviks]] in the [[wp:Russian Civil War]]. Iradi irregulars fought alongside the [[wp:Red Guards (Russia)|Red Guards]] who crushed the [[wp:Turkestan Autonomy|Kokand Autonomy]] in February 1918, and some Iradi volunteers served on the Transcaspian front in 1918–19 against the White Transcaspian government and its small British support force.[13] #### Iradi SSR (1925–1991) *Main article: [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]]* The Soviet national delimitation created the Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic (ISSR) in 1925 as a union republic, the first political unit defined by Iradi nationality. Its capital, Kobozev, was founded in 1927 in the Chu lowlands and named after the Bolshevik [[Pyotr Kobozev]]. Nativization (*korenizatsiia*) standardized Iradi in a Latin alphabet from 1928, while collectivization pushed tribal herders from the plains into the mountains.[14] In 1931 the Iradi church entered into union with Rome under the bull *Orientalis Stella*, negotiated in secret by Bishop [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]] through papal nuncios abroad. Soviet suspicion of this Catholic link fed the anti-religious repression of the 1930s, including the closure of the churches of Iyık Janyl and the [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges|1937 purges]].[15] [[wp:Russification]] followed, with Russian-only schooling and, from 1941, a Cyrillic alphabet. [[wp:Koryo-saram]] (Soviet Koreans) deported from the Far East in 1937 survived largely through the help of Iradi villagers. An oil strike near Kobozev in 1949 and the founding of the [[Sary-Bulak]] antimony works in 1961 made the ISSR an industrial supplier, and at [[Mailuu-Suu]] uranium was processed for the Soviet atomic program from the 1940s to the late 1960s. According to popular accounts, the [[1956 Talas Riots]] began when a soldier at a checkpoint shot an Iradi widow's horse; historians also point to housing shortages, low wages and ethnic grievances. Martial law followed, and archival estimates of the arrests and deportations vary.[16] #### Independence and the First Civil War (1991–1992) *Main articles: [[Socialist Republic of Irad]], [[First Iradi Civil War]]* On October 9, 1991, the Communist Party of Irad under First Secretary [[Vasily Chernov]] declared independence as the Socialist Republic of Irad (SRI), based in Kobozev. Economic collapse and censorship provoked the [[Winter Uprising of 1992|Winter Uprising]] of 1991–92, in which anti-socialist forces took Talas. On March 11, 1992, now celebrated as Irad Day, the Provisional Government in Talas proclaimed the Republic of Irad, beginning the First Iradi Civil War against Kobozev. On June 2 the Provisional Government signed and ratified the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] with [[wp:James Baker|US Secretary of State James Baker]], and in [[Operation Starlight]] US forces brought all SRI territory under their control by August 18, 1992. Under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], Irad became an organized, unincorporated US territory with an elected Governor and a Territorial Legislature. When the war ended, Provisional President [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] renamed Kobozev as Nurzhan ("light of life").[17] #### US territorial period (1992–2006) *Main article: [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]]* The territorial government made Iradi and English the official languages in place of Russian, restored the Latin alphabet and made the US dollar legal tender. After the [[wp:North American Free Trade Agreement]] took effect in 1994, [[wp:Sukarne]] and [[wp:Conagra Brands|Conagra]] built beef plants near Talas; [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron]] and other Western companies invested in the oil fields; and under the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]] Talas Air Base became a staging area for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]].[18] The Democratic Party of Irad grew out of the territorial administration. In the United States, a short-lived vogue later called [[Iradimania]] (about 1992–1994) romanticized Iradis as "freedom-loving Christian cowboys"; it peaked with *[[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|Swift Hooves]]* (1993), a compilation of American country and folk songs about Irad whose proceeds went to Christian charities there. #### Withdrawal and the Second Civil War (2006–2007) *Main articles: [[Democratic Republic of Irad]], [[Second Iradi Civil War]]* On December 3, 2006, [[wp:George W. Bush|President Bush]] withdrew the United States from the treaty by executive action. Days later the Supreme Court of Irad ruled that the statutory independence clause had been triggered, and on December 9 the Democratic Republic of Irad (DRI) was proclaimed, with [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] as Prime Minister; 26 UN member states recognized it.[19] In January and February 2007, privatization scandals, in which US-backed programs passed to firms controlled by DPI members, provoked protests. At the same time the Orozbekov cabinet was secretly negotiating with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan draft treaties to dissolve Irad and partition it among them, with compensation in escrow and concession shares for companies tied to its members; Iradis call the drafts the *Satuu Kagazy*, or [[Bill of Sale (2007)|Bill of Sale]].[72] On February 25, 2007, Erlan Toktarov made the drafts public in Nurzhan, an act that made him a national hero, then seized control of the DPI, proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan as an emergency administration, annulled the independence ruling and returned Irad to "suspended sovereignty"; the DRI cabinet in Talas continued as a rival authority, and the date marks the start of the Second Iradi Civil War. In March clan militias under [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]] formed the [[Popular Front of Irad]], which stormed Talas on June 4, dissolving the DRI and arresting Orozbekov. Over the summer, DPI forces backed by Western companies and the United States took the cities as the Front withdrew to the countryside. The UN-brokered [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)|Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement]] of September 2007 set the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and a [[wp:United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] resolution established the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) on October 18.[20] #### Frozen conflict (2007–present) A unification referendum was first proposed in 2008, but no framework for it has been agreed. In 2009 a UN-brokered protocol moved the line in the south: the floor of the Toktogul basin, with the dam, and the State Route 1 corridor passed to the ISEZ, and the clans received the high pastures of the Kyrgyz Range east of the Kök-Bel road, guaranteed grazing and water rights and a fixed share of the hydroelectric revenue. Toktarov was re-elected in November 2011 with 88.74% of the vote, and that year the only substantive DPI–IAC talks collapsed when the IAC walked out after being offered one-third of the legislative seats. A 2013 amendment to the 1992 Elective Governor Acts removed term limits, and Toktarov won again in 2015 (78.25%) and 2019 (90.31%); the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] said the reform and the elections that followed lacked "any meaningful transparency or choice for the Iradi people".[21] His son-in-law [[Aidar Maksat]] became Lieutenant Governor in November 2019. Since early 2023, independent reporting has placed the *de facto* seat of the executive at [[Boz-Korgon]], a fortified compound 40 km east of Nurzhan; the government maintains that Talas remains the operational capital.[22] In October 2023 a municipal licensing surcharge set off [[2023 Student Protests in Talas|student protests]] in Talas, which the police and Gendarmerie dispersed, and in November Toktarov was re-elected with 92.75%. He has not appeared in public since July 2024. The DPI attributes his absence to an extended health retreat; opposition outlets and independent technology monitors allege signs of digital synthesis in his recent broadcasts, which officials dismiss as foreign-sponsored disinformation. Maksat runs day-to-day administration, while a public succession rivalry between Toktarov's eldest sons, [[Ruslan Toktarov|Ruslan]] and [[Alikhan Toktarov|Alikhan]], has drawn criticism of both. In 2025 [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad|remarks by Donald Trump]] that he was exploring selling Irad to Russia provoked demonstrations and anti-American feeling in both the ISEZ and the ATR, where they revived the memory of the 2007 Bill of Sale.[23] The next gubernatorial election is due in late 2027. ## Geography *Main article: [[Geography of Irad]]* Irad lies in the western Tian Shan and on the plains to its north, roughly between latitudes 40°40′ and 46° N and longitudes 68° and 75° E. It comprises the Talas valley and the [[Talas Alatau]]; the Chatkal valley, the Toktogul basin and the Naryn gorge country; the rural northern and eastern rim of the [[wp:Fergana Valley]], whose large cities, such as Namangan and Andijan, lie in Uzbekistan; and, in the north, the lower Chu lowlands around Nurzhan, the Moiynkum sands, the southern Betpak-Dala and the [[wp:Karatau Mountains|Karatau]] foothills, which reach west toward the [[Kyzylkum Fringe|Kyzylkum]]. [[wp:Shymkent]], [[wp:Turkistan (city)|Turkistan]], [[wp:Bishkek]] and the [[wp:Issyk-Kul]] basin lie outside Irad. Irad borders only Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, all of them landlocked, so it is doubly landlocked; it has no border with [[wp:Tajikistan]], China or [[wp:Afghanistan]]. #### Terrain and climate By area, most of Irad is steppe and desert rangeland used as winter pasture (*kyshtoo*), but most people live in the irrigated valleys of the Talas, the lower Chu and the Fergana rim. In the south, the Talas Alatau, which rises to 4,482 m (14,705 ft) at [[Manas Peak (Irad)|Manas Peak]], and the Chatkal and Fergana ranges enclose high summer pastures (*zhayloo*). Protected areas include [[Besh-Tash National Park]], the [[Sary-Chelek Biosphere Reserve]], the [[Arslanbob]] walnut forests and the [[wp:Aksu-Zhabagly Nature Reserve|Aksu-Zhabagly]] reserve, and the Kenkol valley holds a Hunnic-era burial ground. The climate is continental: in Talas, July highs average about 30 °C (86 °F) and January lows about −12 °C (10 °F), with about 300 mm (12 in) of precipitation a year. #### Hydrology All of Irad's rivers drain into closed (endorheic) basins. The [[Talas River|Talas]] ends in the Moiynkum sands and the Chu in the desert beyond Nurzhan; neither reaches [[wp:Lake Balkhash]]. The [[Naryn River|Naryn]] enters from Kyrgyzstan, fills the Toktogul Reservoir and descends through a cascade of power stations past [[Tash-Kömür]] into the Fergana Valley, where it joins the [[Kara-Darya]] to form the [[wp:Syr Darya]]. The [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]] (1,200 MW), completed in the 1970s, was split by the Qara-Chik line in 2007, with the dam and powerhouse on the tribal side; since a 2009 protocol the whole complex, the reservoir and the floor of the basin have been in the ISEZ, while the clans hold the mountains around it. Under the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], a joint ISEZ–ATR commission still sets the annual balance between winter generation and summer irrigation releases, under UN supervision and with observers from all three neighbors, and export revenue is shared under an unpublished formula. Uzbekistan in particular has accused the commission of holding back summer water in dry years.[24] ## Politics and government *Main article: [[Politics of Irad]]* #### Political status *Main articles: [[Political status of Irad]], [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]]* Irad has been on the UN list of non-self-governing territories since 1992. The United States did not formally notify the UN that its administration had ended in 2006, so Irad remained listed, reportedly at US insistence, with the United States nominally recorded as the administering power; Washington does not report on the territory. The [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]] in [[wp:New York City|New York]] issues an annual working paper on Irad.[19] A minority of the 26 states that recognized the DRI still maintain some form of recognition of a "Republic of Irad", which is why Irad is described as partially recognized. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan claim the territory but in practice coordinate border management with the ISEZ. US forces remain at Talas Air Base under the 2001 Basing Rights Agreement and later arrangements with the ISEZ. #### Irad Special Economic Zone *Main article: [[Irad Special Economic Zone]]* The ISEZ covers about 29,400 km² and, by official figures, 57% of the population. It is a devolved dominant-party governorate run by the DPI, often called the New Democratic Party of Irad, under institutions inherited from the territorial period: a Governor elected under the 1992 Elective Governor Acts, a Lieutenant Governor, the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad|Territorial Legislature]] (*Mejlis*) and the [[Supreme Court of Irad]]. The DPI claims to be the only lawful government of all of Irad and is believed to control the editorial line of the main broadcaster, [[IradOne]]. Leaked US intelligence reports from Toktarov's first term described a neopatrimonial regime trending toward a personality cult, citing the elevation of his five sons to positions of political or economic power.[21] Opposition figures include [[Kamran Bekzatov]], the pro-Russian head of NurGaz and the best-known voice of the Russophone "Russo" generation, and the anarcho-capitalist commentator [[Jason Ilyasov]]. #### Autonomous Tribal Regions *Main article: [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]* The ATR, about 188,000 km², is entirely rural. Its land is held by 24 clans (*uruk*), each led by a council of elders (*aksakals*) under customary law ([[Adat Law in the ATR|*adat*]]). The clans have no common government and are nominally aligned with the IAC, whose informal leader, Bektur Zhumabek uulu, chief of the Tanıp clan, avoids formal titles and describes himself as a negotiator for the clans. The [[El-Choro Militias]] provide armed security, and tribal leaders maintain a moratorium on open-pit gold mining. #### Unification No substantive unification talks have taken place since 2011, and tribal leaders' public statements show broad ambivalence toward Iradi statehood. Analysts, like the authors of the leaked US reports, argue that Toktarov has kept Irad's quasi-territorial status deliberately: the ATR buffers the ISEZ against unrest on its borders, and subnational status lets it deflect Russian and Chinese pressure toward Washington. #### Elections *Main article: [[Elections in Irad]]* Elections are held only in the ISEZ. Every four years, in November, voters elect the Governor and Lieutenant Governor on a joint ticket, the 60 members of the *Mejlis* in eight multi-member constituencies corresponding to the three cities and the districts, and the city councils; the mayors are appointed by the Governor. The tribal regions take no part, and their clans decide common matters by consensus at a *kurultai*.[36] The DPI has won every gubernatorial election since 2007. In the 2023 legislative election it won 51 seats, independents 6 and Russo-aligned deputies from Nurzhan 3. OSCE observers have cited the disqualification of opposition candidates, state control of voter registers, pressure on employees of state-owned enterprises to vote and the dominance of state media; the DPI maintains that the elections are free and that its majorities reflect public support for stability.[35] #### Human rights *Main article: [[Human rights in Irad]]* Laws inherited from the territorial period guarantee civil liberties, but the emergency basis of the 2007 proclamation has never been formally ended, and much policy is made by executive decree. [[wp:Human Rights Watch]] describes a "judicial dualism" in which the ISEZ courts lack independence from the executive while the customary courts of the ATR offer no appeal; monitors also criticize customary law for its treatment of women.[37] Independent journalists report harassment, license revocations and travel bans, and during the October 2023 protests mobile data was cut in central Talas for three days.[38] Human Rights Watch and [[wp:Amnesty International]] have documented allegations of torture, forced confessions and arbitrary detention by the Republican Gendarmerie, most of them concerning the Qara-Chik crossings and pre-trial detention in Talas; the Gendarmerie rejects them, and no inquiry has been opened in the ISEZ.[39] Because Irad is not a sovereign state, neither administration can become a party to the international human rights treaties, and the human rights function added to UNMI's mandate in 2012 covers only matters connected with the ceasefire, freedom of movement and humanitarian access. The ISEZ government says that it upholds the rights guaranteed by the territorial statutes. ## Foreign relations *Main article: [[Foreign relations of Irad]]* Lacking recognition as a sovereign state, the ISEZ conducts most external relations through trade offices, UN channels and the ceasefire bodies. Analysts note that Irad's Christian majority and American ties have long complicated relations with its neighbors. The United States keeps its bases, though the 2025 remarks turned public opinion against Washington ([[Irad–United States relations]]). Iradi crude is refined in Kazakhstan or shipped on to Russia ([[Irad–Russia relations]]), and China buys most of its antimony concentrate; Toktarov has said that "Irad's alignment with China is inevitable and welcome" ([[Irad–China relations]]). Kazakhstan carries Iradi oil north and signed the [[Treaty of Good Neighborliness (1994)]] on water sharing with the territorial government ([[Irad–Kazakhstan relations]]). Relations with Uzbekistan center on Naryn water releases and the western frontier, where tribal patrols clashed with Uzbek border guards in 2018 ([[Irad–Uzbekistan relations]]). Kyrgyzstan regards the Naryn cascade as Kyrgyz infrastructure and attends the water commission under protest ([[Irad–Kyrgyzstan relations]]). All three have used transit controls as leverage, and the ISEZ has answered by trimming electricity exports. ## Military *Main article: [[Armed Forces of Irad]]* The ISEZ's State Defense Corps (*Mamlekettik Korgoo Korpusu*), usually called the Armed Forces of Irad, was formed in July 2007 from the territorial-era Irad National Guard, organized in 1994. Official figures give about 12,000 active personnel and 18,000 reservists, drawn from male conscription at 18 and a professional cadre; independent estimates put the number actually serving at 10,500–11,000. Conscription has lasted twelve months since 2008, and the 2023 defense budget was about $260 million. The main formations are the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade outside Talas, the 2nd Motor Rifle Brigade in Nurzhan and the Lower Naryn and Sary-Bulak mountain rifle battalions, and conscripts train at the Ak-Tash Training Center. The corps fields Soviet-era T-72 tanks and [[wp:Mil Mi-24|Mi-24]] helicopters alongside US-supplied equipment and holds an annual exercise with US forces, *Alatau Shield*. According to DPI statements, the ISEZ Security Council has been chaired by Maksat since 2024.[40] The [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]], a paramilitary force of about 4,000 under Major General Ruslan Toktarov, answers to the Ministry of Internal Security and controls internal security and the Qara-Chik checkpoints. It comprises the Border Demarcation Brigade, the Special Protective Service, which guards executive sites including Boz-Korgon, a rapid-reaction group and the Highway Patrol Corps, and its officers train at the [[Talas Gendarmerie Academy]].[25] The ATR relies on the mounted El-Choro Militias. About 210 unarmed UNMI observers patrol the line, and US forces operate Talas Air Base and five other logistics, testing and training sites. ## Administrative divisions *Main article: [[Administrative divisions of Irad]]* The ISEZ comprises three cities of governorate significance, Talas, Nurzhan and Iyık Janyl, and six districts (*aimak*): | District | Area | |---|---| | Talas District | The middle and upper Talas valley around the capital, up to the crest of the Kyrgyz Range | | Kara-Buura District | The lower and western Talas valley and the plain north of the western Kyrgyz Range | | Chu District | The Chu lowlands around Nurzhan, including the Boz-Korgon area, and the belt along the north foot of the Kyrgyz Range | | Sary-Bulak District | The southern industrial corridor and foothills south of Talas, including the Sary-Bulak antimony works and the Chatkal smelter | | Lower Naryn District | The river flats around Tash-Kömür and the city of Iyık Janyl, the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim east past [[Bazar-Korgon]] to the Uzbek frontier, and a narrow corridor up the Naryn gorge with the downstream cascade to Kara-Köl, just below the Toktogul dam | | Toktogul District | The floor of the Toktogul basin with the town of [[Toktogul (town)|Toktogul]], the reservoir and the dam, and the [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] corridor north over the [[Fergana Gateway]] to the Otmek Tunnel | The ATR has no formal districts; its land is held by the 24 clans. The UN mission and aid agencies divide it into seven planning zones, each lying within one of the three blocks of tribal land that the ISEZ separates: Northern Steppe (the Betpak-Dala, the Moiynkum and the plain north of the ISEZ belt), Karatau, Talas Alatau (the north slope above the Talas valley), Chatkal Highlands (everything south of the Talas Alatau crest and west of the State Route 1 corridor and the Naryn gorge), Kyrgyz Range–[[Suusamyr]] (the high Kyrgyz Range east of the Kök-Bel road and the Suusamyr side east of the corridor), Toktogul–Naryn (the mountains east of the corridor round the Toktogul basin and east of the Naryn gorge) and Fergana Rim (the hill country above the farm belt of the northern Fergana Valley). ## Economy *Main article: [[Economy of Irad]]* The ISEZ government's official estimate puts nominal GDP at $18.4 billion in 2024; at purchasing power parity, GDP is estimated at about $50 billion. Nominal GDP per person is about $3,980 on the official population or about $2,970 on the independent estimate of 6.2 million.[26] The largely pastoral economy of the ATR is poorly captured in official statistics. The US dollar is legal tender, and the [[Iradi som]] circulates alongside it. #### Energy and mining *Main article: [[Energy in Irad]]* [[NurGaz]], led by Kamran Bekzatov, reports oil output of about 120,000 barrels per day; independent estimates are lower. Crude moves north through the 85-km [[Northern Export Feeder]] into the Kazakh pipeline network near Shymkent, for refining there or shipment to Russia; there is no southern export pipeline.[27] Chevron scaled back after the [[wp:Taliban|Taliban's]] return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 ended prospects for a southern route to [[wp:Pakistan]]. Proven gas reserves above 400 billion cubic meters are largely undeveloped; a Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline proposed by the [[wp:China National Petroleum Corporation]] would carry Turkmen gas to western China through Kyrgyz territory, since Irad does not border China. Toktogul makes Irad a net exporter of electricity, mainly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Irad holds about 7% of the world's antimony reserves, mined at Sary-Bulak by the [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]] and smelted at the [[Chatkal Chemical Smelting Complex]] for export to China by rail through Kazakhstan.[28] Gold in the ATR is unworked under the tribal moratorium, and uranium and thorium remain undeveloped under a territorial-era pledge informed by the legacy of Mailuu-Suu. #### Agriculture and services *Main article: [[Agriculture in Irad]]* The [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] and [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]] breeds are exported mainly to the United States, the [[wp:United Kingdom]] and [[wp:Ireland]], with growing demand in [[wp:Hong Kong]] and mainland China. Beef processing expanded after 1994: Sukarne built the largest beef complex in Irad near Talas, and Conagra operates processing plants and has trained Iradi ranchers in [[wp:Nebraska]].[29] Cotton grown on the Fergana rim strains water supplies, and acquisitions by the Chinese textile company Xinjiang Lihua have raised concerns about compliance with water regulations. Walnuts and wild fruit from the Chatkal forests are an export of the tribal regions. Talas Air Base, the largest US military installation in the region, supports local employment, and the telecommunications company [[Attelkom]] began as a contract to modernize communications around it. Other major firms include [[Talasbank]], the charter airline [[Iradiya]] and [[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]]; Toktarov's three middle sons run family businesses in freight, real estate and grain milling. #### Transport and communications *Main article: [[Transport in Irad]]* Irad is doubly landlocked, and nearly all of its foreign trade crosses Kazakhstan. Irad Temir Jolu, the state railway of the ISEZ, operates about 690 km of single-track, 1,520 mm gauge line inherited from the Soviet network, none of it electrified. The line links Talas and Nurzhan with the Kazakh network and carries refined products, grain, refrigerated beef and antimony; no railway reaches Iyık Janyl, the Lower Naryn District or any part of the tribal regions.[41] The ISEZ has about 4,800 km of public roads, about two-fifths of them paved. The 356-km [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] (State Route 1), rebuilt to an all-weather standard between 1997 and 2004, is the only road between Talas and the Toktogul and Lower Naryn districts. It crosses the Talas Alatau through the 5-km Otmek Tunnel and the [[Fergana Gateway]] (Ala-Bel Pass, 3,184 m) and passes through the Toktogul basin in a narrow ISEZ corridor between tribal pastures, with Gendarmerie control posts, and snow and avalanche danger close it for about 20 days in an average winter.[42] Most freight crosses into Kazakhstan at the Chu Gate east of Nurzhan or the Talas North Terminal, two of the three crossings set up under the 2008 [[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]]. In the ATR the main routes are gravel tracks and seasonal trails, and horses remain the main means of transport on the high pastures. Irad has no scheduled international flights and no flag carrier. [[Talas Air Base]], 12 km west of the capital, has been a joint civil–military airfield since 2007; its 3,400-meter runway is shared by US forces, the State Defense Corps and civil traffic. Iradiya, founded in 1997, flies charters to [[wp:Almaty]], Tashkent, [[wp:Dubai]] and [[wp:Istanbul]], each needing landing and overflight permits because no neighbor recognizes the ISEZ, and runs a subsidized domestic service to Tash-Kömür. Irad is not a member of the [[wp:International Civil Aviation Organization]], and most foreign visitors fly to Almaty or Shymkent and cross the frontier by road.[43] [[Attelkom]] began in 1994 as a US defense contract to modernize communications around Talas Air Base and was privatized by share auction in 1999. It introduced GSM mobile service in 1997, 3G in 2010 and 4G in 2016, and reported about 2.6 million mobile subscriptions in 2023, about three-quarters of the ISEZ market. Its fiber backbone of about 1,800 km links the cities and has two international routes through Kazakhstan and one through Uzbekistan.[44] A cable cut in Kazakhstan in 2021 left Irad without internet access for nine hours.[45] Formal service barely reaches the ATR, where herders rely on satellite telephones or, near the borders, on the networks of neighboring countries. #### Trade Irad belongs neither to the [[wp:World Trade Organization]] nor to the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]], and no neighbor has signed a transit agreement with either administration, so its overland trade runs on technical and commercial arrangements, chiefly the 2008 protocol with the Kazakh border and customs services. Since 2010 Iradi goods sold into Kazakhstan and Russia have paid the external tariff of their customs union.[46] Crude oil enters the Kazakh pipeline network near Shymkent, where it is refined or shipped on to Russia. Most antimony concentrate goes to Chinese smelters by rail through Kazakhstan, while metal and trioxide refined at Chatkal have found more buyers outside China since China restricted its own antimony exports in 2024.[47] More than 80 percent of the lint and yarn from the Xinjiang Lihua plants is exported to mills in [[wp:Xinjiang]] and Kazakhstan,[48] refrigerated beef goes to Kazakhstan and Russia, common beans mainly to [[wp:Turkey]],[49] and pedigree horses mainly to the United States, the United Kingdom and Ireland. Net electricity exports, mainly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have ranged from about 0.8 to 1.6 terawatt-hours a year since 2010, depending on the water year.[50] China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and the United States are the main sources of imported machinery, vehicles and consumer goods.[51] #### Currency and finance *Main article: [[Iradi som]]* The Banking and Commercial Currency Act of 1993 made the US dollar legal tender and established the [[Bank of Irad]], which put the som into circulation late that year at a fixed rate of 5 som to the dollar; the rate was reset to 8.40 in 2008, after the reserves had been depleted during the war. Under the act's currency-board rules, the bank may issue som only in exchange for dollars and must hold dollar reserves at least equal to the som in circulation.[52] The dollar is used for most contracts, property transactions, savings and foreign trade, and the som mainly for retail payments, utility bills and public-sector wages; it is divided into 100 *tyiyn* and has no ISO 4217 code. The official rate held through a run on deposits after the US withdrawal in December 2006, although the som traded at a discount in informal markets during the 2007 war. Since 2026 a shortage of dollar cash has again opened a gap between the official rate and the rate quoted by bazaar money changers. The government's main accounts are kept at Talasbank, and oil export proceeds are paid into escrow accounts supervised by the [[Irad Foreign Trade Escrow Authority]].[53] #### Tourism *Main article: [[Tourism in Irad]]* Tourism is a small sector. The ISEZ recorded about 214,000 foreign arrivals in 2023, about a third of them for leisure, pilgrimage or family visits and the rest business travelers, contractors and aid workers; independent analysts estimate tourism's contribution at around 1 percent of nominal GDP.[26] The main attractions are pilgrimage to Iyık Janyl, especially for the [[Feast of St. Janyl]] on 24 August; [[wp:Silk Road]] sites such as the Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed; hiking and horse trekking in Besh-Tash National Park, 20 km south of Talas; and equestrian events such as the President's Cup. Holders of US passports may stay up to 90 days without a visa and citizens of the [[wp:European Union]] and several other countries up to 30 days, but ISEZ entry stamps have no standing in the neighboring states, which do not recognize the ISEZ. Several Western governments advise against travel to the ATR and to areas within 12 km of the Qara-Chik line.[54] #### Science and technology In the Soviet period research was organized through the Academy of Sciences of the Iradi SSR, whose Institute of Geology mapped the Talas Alatau and Chatkal ranges and whose archaeologists excavated medieval town sites in the 1960s and 1970s.[55] Research is now concentrated at Talas State University and the Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute. The [[Manas Peak Glaciological Observatory]], founded by the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1964 and run by the university's Faculty of Geography since 1992, keeps some of the longest continuous glacier records in the western Tian Shan; its records show that the glaciers of the upper Talas basin lost about a fifth of their area between 1970 and 2020. The station lies on the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line, and its staff reach it under an agreement with the local clan council.[56] The [[Talas Veterinary Research Center]] carries out DNA parentage testing for the national horse studbooks and tests livestock for brucellosis.[57] Neither university appears in the major international rankings. ## Demographics *Main articles: [[Demographics of Irad]], [[2018 Irad census]]* #### Population The DPI's 2018 census counted 4,626,000 people, which would rank Irad 128th in the world. Independent estimates put the population at about 6.2 million, within a range of roughly 5.8 to 6.5 million. The DPI enumerated the ISEZ directly but only estimated the population of the ATR, which independent researchers say it undercounted; satellite settlement mapping and aid-agency registries support the higher figure.[30][31] Critics argue that the undercount understates the political weight of the tribal regions. By official figures, 57% of the population lives in the ISEZ and slightly less than half in its three main cities: | City | Population (2018 est.) | |---|---| | Talas | 1,120,000 (1.4 million metropolitan area, estimate) | | Nurzhan | 850,000 (over 1 million in the agglomeration, estimate) | | Iyık Janyl | 310,000 | #### Ethnic groups Official 2018 figures give the following composition: - Iradis: 72% - Kyrgyz: 7% - [[wp:Uzbeks]]: 5% - [[wp:Kazakhs]]: 3% - [[wp:Tajiks]], [[wp:Uyghurs]] and Dungans: about 1% combined - Migrant and foreign communities: 12%, comprising Russians (4%), Americans (4%), Ukrainians (1%), [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]] (1%), Chinese (1%) and others, including Mexicans (1%) Analysts consider the American share inflated by base personnel and contractors registered as residents. More than 10,000 Mexicans, the largest Mexican community in Central Asia, live in and around Talas, where most arrived with the beef-processing industry. #### Languages *Main articles: [[Iradi Language]], [[Iradi alphabet]], [[Dialects of Iradi]]* Iradi and English are the official languages of the ISEZ. Russian lost official status in 1992 but remains the *de facto* lingua franca. [[Iradi Language|Iradi]] is a Kipchak Turkic language whose core grammar and vocabulary are close to Kyrgyz; its urban vocabulary draws on Uzbek roots and its liturgical vocabulary on Sogdian and Iranian roots. It was written in Arabic script until 1928, in Latin from 1928 to 1941 and in Cyrillic from 1941, and returned to the Latin alphabet in 1992, with revisions in 1995 and 1997 ([[Iradi alphabet]]). Language use divides by generation and region: - Urban baby boomers and Generation X, the self-described "Russos", remain tied to Russian language and culture. - Urban millennials grew up speaking Russian at home and learned a rigid, textbook English in underfunded territorial-era schools. - Generation Z is the first to speak English fluently on a broad scale and is leading a revival of Iradi often compared with the [[wp:Gaelic revival|Gaelic]] revival in Ireland. - In the tribal regions, people speak only Iradi and reject both Russian and English. #### Religion *Main articles: [[Religion in Irad]], [[Islam in Irad]]* By 2018 estimates of self-identification, 78% of the population is Christian, 18% Muslim and 4% other, mainly Jews, Buddhists and [[wp:Baháʼí Faith|Baha'is]]. Most Christians belong to the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church, an Eastern Catholic church in communion with Rome since 1931, whose East Syriac rites have been heavily Latinized since the late 20th century;[32] minorities practice [[wp:Russian Orthodox Church|Russian Orthodoxy]], American Evangelicalism and other forms of Christianity. Most Muslims are Sunni of the [[wp:Hanafi school|Hanafi]] school, with a small [[wp:Shia Islam|Shia]] minority. Surveys suggest that rates of practice are much lower than rates of identification. Tribal Christianity is syncretic, mixing East Syriac and Catholic practice with folk belief, horse blessings and the veneration of mountain shrines (*mazar*). The state has been secular since the ISSR. #### Education *Main article: [[Education in Irad]]* Adult literacy was near universal by the end of the Soviet period, although most urban Iradis had been educated in Russian. After 1992 the territorial administration made Iradi and English the languages of instruction, a change that ran ahead of the supply of qualified English teachers.[58] Schooling in the ISEZ is compulsory for nine years from the age of six or seven, in a twelve-grade system on the American model introduced by the Language and Education Reform Act of 1997; Russian is taught as an optional foreign language. Church schools, Russian-language private schools in Nurzhan, many of them funded by the Bekzatov Foundation, and vocational lyceums operate alongside the public system. In the 2018 census, 23 percent of ISEZ residents aged 25 and over had completed higher education.[30] The main universities are [[Talas State University]] (founded 1958; about 18,400 students in 2023), whose Faculty of Medicine dates from 1981, and the [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]] (1951; about 9,200 students), which specializes in petroleum engineering; the Governor appoints the rectors of both.[59] In the ATR, schools are run by village councils and parishes, teach only in Iradi and depend on aid agencies for textbooks and supplies. Secondary schooling there is scarce, and pupils who continue their studies in the ISEZ find that certificates issued by clan councils are not recognized.[60] #### Health *Main article: [[Health in Irad]]* According to the ISEZ Statistical Office, life expectancy at birth in the ISEZ was 71.4 years in 2023 (67.2 for men and 75.6 for women), infant mortality was 14 per 1,000 live births and the total fertility rate was about 2.1 children per woman.[61] Public hospitals and polyclinics inherited from the Soviet system and largely rebuilt with US funds during the territorial period provide most care; they are run by the ISEZ Ministry of Health and the city governments and funded mainly from the ISEZ budget. Emergency treatment is free, but planned operations and many medicines require co-payments. The main referral and teaching hospital is the [[Talas Regional Hospital Medical Complex]], with about 650 beds. The leading causes of death are cardiovascular disease, cancers and injuries, and tuberculosis and brucellosis remain public-health concerns.[62] Many nurses and young doctors emigrate soon after qualifying, mostly to the United States.[63] In the ATR, care rests on village health posts, UN-supported vaccination campaigns, traditional healers and the mobile clinics of the church's [[St. Luka Community Health Mission]], which reported about 46,000 outpatient consultations in 2023, about two-fifths of them in the tribal regions. No comparable statistics exist there, but surveys suggest an infant mortality rate two to three times that of the ISEZ, and serious cases are carried across the Qara-Chik line to hospitals in Talas.[64] ## Culture *Main article: [[Culture of Irad]]* #### Horses *Main article: [[Iradi Equestrian Culture & Breeds]]* Horses are central to Iradi identity, reinforced by the national belief in Irad as the cradle of horse domestication. Popular equestrian games include [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|ulak tartysh]], a team contest for a goat carcass; *oodarysh*, mounted wrestling; *kyz kuu*, a courtship chase; *tyin emmei*, picking up a coin at full gallop; and *at chabysh*, endurance races of 20 to 50 km. Decorated saddlery (*eerchilik*) and hunting with golden eagles ([[Burkut Saluu|*burkut saluu*]]) are prized arts. Iradis drink fermented mare's milk (*kymyz*) but regard eating horsemeat as [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo|taboo]], much as Westerners regard eating dog. A popular prejudice holds horsemeat to be a "Muslim" food; ethnographers note that this ignores Kazakh and Kyrgyz pastoral custom and trace the taboo to Christian identity-marking. A minor folk superstition, of the kind usually attributed to grandmothers, treats cattle as mildly unlucky, a belief folklorists trace to [[Morkhan (Mythology)|Morkhan]], a bull-headed pre-Christian god identified with Satan. #### Music and cinema *Main articles: [[Music of Irad]], [[Cinema of Irad]]* Traditional bards (*ırchy*) recite epics to the three-stringed [[Komuz (Iradi)|komuz]] and the bowed [[Kyl-kyak|kyl-kyak]]. [[Iradi Country-Folk|Iradi country-folk]] grew out of the American Cold War-era songs about Irad heard on smuggled cassettes and [[wp:Voice of America]] in the 1980s and out of the 1993 *Swift Hooves* compilation. [[Mor-Wave]], a dark electronic genre born in Nurzhan's factory boiler rooms, began with the duo [[tüntolk]], whose debut album, *[[Jolchu (Album)|Jolchu]]*, appeared in 1999.[33] Soviet-era Iradi cinema is known for experimental work. [[Nurlan Sadikov]] directed *[[Zarina (film)|Zarina]]* (1968), the first Iradi film shown to a wider Soviet audience, and *[[Desert Sun’s Rebellion]]* (1979), which founded the genre of the Iradi Western; [[Beknur Karimov]] made the cult film *[[Zalmax’s Dominion]]*; and the four-hour epic *[[Rise of Glory]]* (1979) reportedly caused a riot in a [[wp:Saint Petersburg|Leningrad]] cinema. The [[Irad Film Society]] restores Iradi films and organizes the biennial Talas International Film Festival, whose most successful year is widely considered to have been 2005.[34] #### Cuisine *Main article: [[Iradi cuisine]]* Iradi plov, despite its name, is a stirred, risotto-like dish of short-grain rice introduced to the lower Chu basin by Koryo-saram deportees, cooked in meat broth with beef or mountain mutton, never horsemeat, and wild mountain cumin from the Talas Alatau, and is served with beet suzma, a strained yogurt colored with beets. Traditional long-grain plov is also widely cooked, especially for weddings and memorial feasts. Other dishes include [[Beshbarmak (Iradi Style)|beshbarmak]] made with beef or mutton, and Koryoin laghman, noodles with sesame and kimchi developed by the Korean community. *Jasil*, a green soft drink flavored mainly with tarragon, dates from the Soviet period. #### Media *Main article: [[Media of Irad]]* [[IradOne]], the state broadcaster, dominates the media. It was created as a public corporation by the Public Broadcasting Act of 1993, placed under the Department of Public Information by a 2007 decree, and has been chaired since 2015 by Alikhan Toktarov. Its main channel broadcasts mainly in English, with a growing share of Iradi programs, and it also runs the Russian-language channel IradOdin, IradOne Sport and the Radio Irad network.[65] In a 2023 survey IradOne had about 38 percent of the ISEZ television audience and IradOdin about 9 percent; Russian satellite channels remain popular in Nurzhan, and younger viewers increasingly watch online.[66] The English-language daily *[[Talas Herald]]* is the most widely read newspaper, and the independent weekly *[[Irad Times]]*, founded in 1996, is known for investigative reporting. Laws inherited from the territorial period guarantee freedom of the press, but press-freedom groups report licensing pressure and self-censorship, and the Department of Public Information supplies Attelkom with lists of websites to be blocked.[38][67] ISEZ media reach little of the ATR, although Radio Irad's Iradi-language programs have long been heard in herding settlements on both sides of the line. #### Sport and holidays *Main articles: [[Sport in Irad]], [[Public holidays in Irad]]* The [[Irad State Hippodrome]] in Talas, with 25,000 seats, hosts the final of the President's Cup, the national *ulak tartysh* championship, in the week of Irad Day, March 11, the main national holiday. The national league had 24 teams in the 2023 season, eleven from the ISEZ and thirteen registered by clans in the ATR, and since 2009 UNMI has supported occasional exhibition matches between ISEZ and tribal teams near the Qara-Chik line. Among modern sports, football and wrestling are the most popular, and wrestling is the most successful Iradi sport internationally. Irad has no [[wp:National Olympic Committee]] recognized by the [[wp:International Olympic Committee]], so Iradi athletes who reach the top level usually compete for other countries.[68] The ISEZ observes nine public holidays under the Holidays and Commemorative Days Act of 1993, revised in 2008. Besides Irad Day they include Nooruz (21 March), [[wp:Easter Monday]], the Remembrance Day of the Lost Tribes (15 August), the Feast of St. Janyl (24 August) and Christmas; the anniversary of the ISEZ's proclamation on 25 February and the 14 June remembrance of the 1956 riots are official working commemorations. The Feast of St. Janyl brings mounted pilgrims to Iyık Janyl for the blessing of the herds. The Syro-Iradi Church has followed the Gregorian calendar since its union with Rome in 1931.[69] #### Heritage The [[Irad Palace of Art]] in Iyık Janyl is the country's main gallery. Two World Heritage listings cover sites in Irad. The Church of St. Janyl and the [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]] (Shar-i-Kuhna) were inscribed together as a single property in 2004, on a US nomination during the territorial period. In 2014 the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System|Kok-Tash Kariz]], an underground irrigation network, and the [[Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed]] were included as Kazakh and Kyrgyz components of the transnational [[wp:Silk Roads: the Routes Network of Chang'an-Tianshan Corridor|Silk Roads]] listing, over the protests of both Iradi administrations; Irad itself is not a State Party. The IAC's use of the Kariz for smuggling is well documented; some historians allege [[wp:Central Intelligence Agency|Cold War CIA]] involvement in its conversion, which remains unconfirmed. #### National symbols *Main articles: [[Flag of Irad]], [[The Spirit of Irad]]* The flag shows a white stallion on a crimson field beneath a five-pointed star representing Polaris, with an inverted horseshoe on the hoist side commemorating the fallen ([[Fallen Rider Tradition]]), an arched Orkhon-script inscription reading "Be Free" and a golden wheat wreath. It was adopted by the Provisional Government in 1992, confirmed by the interim Territorial Legislature in 1993 and has been used by every Iradi administration since; it is also flown in the ATR.[70] The national anthem, "The Spirit of Irad" (*Irad Ruhu*), was composed by Asan Jumabaev to a poem by Cholpon Myrzakulova during the Winter Uprising and first sung at the proclamation of the Republic of Irad on 11 March 1992. It was confirmed by the State Symbols Act of 1993, which also adopted an official English version of the Iradi text.[71] ## See also - [[History of Irad]] - [[Political status of Irad]] - [[Politics of Irad]] - [[Foreign relations of Irad]] - [[Geography of Irad]] - [[Economy of Irad]] - [[Demographics of Irad]] - [[Culture of Irad]] - [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] - [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] ## References
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  34. ^ Irad Film Society (2015). A Century of Iradi Cinema. Talas.
  35. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Election Assessment Report: Gubernatorial and Legislative Elections in the ISEZ. Warsaw.
  36. ^ Central Asian Policy Review (2023). 'Institutional Legacies of the American Territorial Era in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 112–129.
  37. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York, pp. 45–62.
  38. ^ Human Rights Watch (2024). Switched Off: Internet Restrictions in the Irad Special Economic Zone. New York.
  39. ^ Amnesty International (2023). 'Irad: Torture and Arbitrary Detention in the Special Economic Zone.' London.
  40. ^ Ministry of Defense of the ISEZ (2023). Annual Report on the State Defense Corps. Talas: Department of Public Information.
  41. ^ Eurasian Development Bank (2023). Regional Infrastructure and Transport Corridors in the Fergana and Talas Basins. EDB Monograph Series, pp. 56–71.
  42. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2019). 'One Road South: The Fergana Highway and the Southern Salient of the ISEZ.' Vol. 25, pp. 88–109.
  43. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2021). 'Flying Without a Flag: Civil Aviation in an Unrecognized Territory.' Vol. 27, pp. 133–152.
  44. ^ Attelkom (2024). Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  45. ^ Talas Herald (2021). 'Backhoe in Kazakhstan cuts Irad off for nine hours.' Talas.
  46. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2020). 'Pipelines, Water and Recognition: Irad's Northern Transit.' Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 64–88.
  47. ^ Iradi Antimony and Rare Metals Combine (2024). Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  48. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of Manufacturing and Textiles. Talas.
  49. ^ Ministry of Economy of the Irad Special Economic Zone (2023). Agricultural Statistics of the Talas Basin, 2022. Talas.
  50. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Naryn Cascade: Annual Technical Review. Kara-Oi.
  51. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Mining Concessions, Infrastructure, and Trade Directory. Talas.
  52. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (1993). Banking and Commercial Currency Act. Territorial Gazette, Talas.
  53. ^ Bank of Irad (2023). Annual Report. Talas.
  54. ^ Ministry of Economy of the Irad Special Economic Zone, Tourism Department (2024). Visitor Information and Entry Regulations. Talas.
  55. ^ Academy of Sciences of the Iradi SSR, Institute of Geology (1978). Geology of the Talas Alatau and Chatkal Ranges. Kobozev.
  56. ^ Talas State University Press (2014). Fifty Years on Manas: The Manas Peak Glaciological Observatory, 1964–2014. Talas.
  57. ^ Talas Veterinary Research Center (2022). Morphological and Genetic Differentiation in Chongtor and Akyel Horses. Talas State University Press.
  58. ^ Talas State University Press (2011). Iradistan: A History of the Iradi SSR, 1925–1991. Talas.
  59. ^ Talas State University (2023). Annual Report of the Rector. Talas.
  60. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Humanitarian Access across the Qara-Chik Line: Annual Review. Kara-Oi.
  61. ^ ISEZ Statistical Office (2024). Demographic Yearbook of the Irad Special Economic Zone, 2023. Talas.
  62. ^ World Health Organization (2022). Health Systems and Rural Access in Post-Soviet Central Asia. Geneva, pp. 78–95.
  63. ^ Talas Herald (3 March 2024). 'Nurses leave faster than they can be trained.' Talas.
  64. ^ St. Luka Community Health Mission (2023). Annual Report: Rural Health Services in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Talas.
  65. ^ IradOne Broadcasting and Media Corporation (2024). Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  66. ^ Irad Media Research Center (2023). Television and Online Audience Survey of the ISEZ. Talas.
  67. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2014). 'Licensing the Press in the ISEZ.' Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 300–318.
  68. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2020). 'Playing without a Flag: Sport and Non-Recognition in Irad.' Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 211–230.
  69. ^ Department of Public Information (2023). Holidays and Commemorative Days of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
  70. ^ Department of Public Information (2015). The National Flag of Irad: Official Description and Symbolism. Talas.
  71. ^ Talas State University Press (2012). A Song for the Uprising: The Making of "The Spirit of Irad". Talas, pp. 1–74.
  72. ^ Talas Herald (27 February 2007). 'Partition drafts: what the papers say.' Talas.
--- ## 2. Good Articles (GA-Class, 7 Entries) ### 2.1. Talas *Quality Assessment: Good Article (GA) | Category: Cities & Settlements* {{Hatnote|This article is about the capital of Irad. For the historical battle fought nearby, see [[Battle of Talas]]. For the river, see [[Talas River]].}} **Talas** (Iradi: *Talas shahr*, [tɑˈlɑs ʃɑhɾ]) is the *de jure* capital and largest city of [[Irad]]. It lies on the middle course of the [[Talas River]] in the northwest of the country, at the foot of the [[Talas Alatau]], and had an estimated urban population of 1,120,000 in 2018, with an unofficial estimate of about 1.4 million in its metropolitan area.[1] Talas is a city of governorate significance and the official seat of the government of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), administered by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI). Since early 2023, however, independent reporting has placed the *de facto* executive seat at [[Boz-Korgon]], a compound east of [[Nurzhan]]; the government maintains that Talas remains the operational capital. Iradi historiography identifies Talas with the medieval [[wp:Silk Road]] town known as Talas or [[wp:Taraz]], near which Abbasid and Tang armies fought the [[Battle of Talas]] in 751. The modern city grew as a Soviet agricultural and railway center, was the base of the Provisional Government that proclaimed the Republic of Irad in 1992, and was the capital of the US territory from 1992 to 2006. Its economy rests on beef processing at plants operated by [[Sukarne Irad Complex|Sukarne]] and [[Conagra Talas Beef Facility|Conagra]], commerce and finance, and contracts linked to [[Talas Air Base]], 12 km west of the city. ## Etymology Medieval sources record the town under two names. Arab geographers of the 9th century, among them [[wp:Ibn Khordadbeh]], called it *Tarāz*, while Tang Chinese sources transcribed the name of the town and river as *Daluosi* (怛邏斯).[2] A popular etymology links *Taraz* to the Persian word for scales, recalling the town's role as a customs post on the Northern Silk Road, but the origin of both names is uncertain. Modern Iradi usage follows the name of the river. ## History #### Antiquity and the Silk Road Excavations in the middle Talas valley have found [[wp:Bronze Age]] settlements of the Andronovo culture. Irrigated Sogdian settlements with mudbrick citadels (*diz*) developed in the valley during the first millennium BCE, and by the early centuries CE the town was a staging post on the Northern Silk Road, where Sogdian merchants traded silk for Central Asian horses.[3] #### The battle of 751 and the medieval town In July 751 an Abbasid army under [[wp:Ziyad ibn Salih|Ziyad]] ibn Salih defeated a Tang army under [[wp:Gao Xianzhi]] after Karluk troops changed sides. Iradi historians place the battlefield on the plains west of the city, though the exact site is uncertain.[4] Tradition holds that Chinese prisoners taken in the battle brought papermaking to [[wp:Samarkand]], a claim historians dispute.[5] Under the Samanids and the [[wp:Kara-Khanid Khanate|Kara-Khanids]], Talas was a trading town with both Muslim and Christian communities; excavations have uncovered the foundations of a minaret and gravestones with [[wp:Syriac language|Syriac]] inscriptions. Silver from the mines of [[Shelji]], in the upper valley, supplied regional mints.[3] #### Kokand and Russian rule In 1727 Khan Abd al-Rahim Biy of [[wp:Khanate of Kokand|Kokand]] granted religious tolerance to Iradi Christians under the [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]]. Kokand's direct rule reached the Talas valley only in the early 19th century, and in the 1820s the khanate built a mudbrick fortress at Talas, on the mound of an older fortification, to guard the trade routes. Russian troops occupied the Talas valley in the 1860s during the campaigns against Kokand, and after [[wp:Mikhail Skobelev|General Mikhail Skobelev]] conquered the khanate in 1876, Talas was administered within the Syr-Darya Oblast of [[wp:Russian Turkestan]].[6] During the [[Semirechye Revolt (Irad)|Semirechye Revolt]] of 1916, Iradi horsemen attacked the Russian garrison before being driven into the mountains in the flight remembered as the *Urkun*. #### Soviet period After the creation of the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] in 1925, whose capital was the new city of Kobozev, Talas developed as an agricultural processing center and railway terminus. In 1952 the [[wp:Soviet Air Forces]] built an interceptor base west of the city, the origin of Talas Air Base. On June 12, 1956, the [[1956 Talas Riots]] broke out. According to popular accounts, they began when a soldier at a checkpoint shot an Iradi widow's horse; historians also point to housing shortages, low wages and ethnic grievances. Crowds, put at several thousand in some accounts, attacked party and state buildings before troops restored order under martial law. Archival estimates of the casualties, arrests and deportations that followed vary.[7] #### Independence and the territorial capital (1991–2006) In February 1992, during the [[Winter Uprising of 1992|Winter Uprising]], mounted pastoralists rode into Talas in the "March of the Thousand Saddles", and anti-socialist forces took the city. On March 11, 1992, an assembly of reformers and tribal elders at the town hall ([[Talas Town Hall Meeting (1992)]]) proclaimed the Republic of Irad, beginning the [[First Iradi Civil War]]. With the city under pressure from socialist forces, Provisional President [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] signed the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] in June 1992. From 1992 to 2006 Talas was the capital of the US territory and the seat of the Governor, the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad|Territorial Legislature]] and the [[Supreme Court of Irad]].[8] Territorial-era investment brought the [[wp:Sukarne]] and [[wp:Conagra Brands|Conagra]] plants, the headquarters of [[Attelkom]] and [[Talasbank]], and the expansion of Talas Air Base, whose runway US engineers lengthened between 1993 and 1998. #### Since 2007 The [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] was proclaimed in Talas in December 2006. After [[Erlan Toktarov]] proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan on February 25, 2007, the DRI cabinet remained in Talas as a rival authority until the [[Popular Front of Irad]] stormed the city on June 4, 2007 ([[Storming of Talas (2007)]]). DPI security forces took control of Talas later that summer as the Front withdrew to the countryside, and the city became the seat of the ISEZ government.[9] In October 2023 a municipal licensing surcharge set off [[2023 Student Protests in Talas|student protests]] in Talas, which most observers described as spontaneous; the commentator [[Jason Ilyasov]] had criticized the surcharge on air.[10] Since early 2023, independent reporting has placed the *de facto* executive seat at Boz-Korgon; the government maintains that Talas remains the operational capital, and foreign diplomatic and corporate delegations continue to be received there.[11] In 2025 Talas was among the cities where crowds demonstrated against [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad|remarks by Donald Trump]] about selling Irad to Russia.[12] ## Geography and climate Talas lies at about 1,250 m (4,100 ft) on the floor of the Talas valley, with the [[Talas Alatau]] rising to the south. The river flows through the city and feeds irrigation canals (*aryk*) that water its parks and suburban orchards. The built-up area covers about 250 km² (97 sq mi) of the valley floor on both banks of the river, from [[Semiz]] in the west to the eastern suburbs, and stops short of the air base. The climate is continental and semi-arid (Köppen BSk). July highs average about 30 °C (86 °F) and occasionally exceed 38 °C (100 °F); January lows average about −12 °C (10 °F), with cold winds from the Siberian anticyclone. Annual precipitation is about 300 mm (12 in), most of it falling in spring.[13] ## Government and administration Talas is one of the three cities of governorate significance in the ISEZ and is administered separately from the surrounding Talas District, which covers the middle and upper Talas valley; the Kara-Buura District lies to the west. The city houses Government House, the traditional seat of the Governor, as well as the Territorial Legislature, the Supreme Court and the [[State Archives of Irad]]. ## Cityscape The city has three distinct zones (see also [[Architecture of Irad]]): - The Old City, about 1–1.6 km north-west of the central square, a dense quarter of crooked residential lanes (*kucheh*) and courtyard houses with carved walnut verandas, with the citadel (*Köhne Diz*; see [[Old Talas Citadel Quarter]]) on its western side and the covered market of [[Bazar-i Kalan]] on its eastern edge. - The Soviet center, east of the central square, built on the Russian grid town of the 1860s, with orthogonal boulevards, neoclassical government buildings, the 1971 sculpture *[[The Hunter's Vigil]]* and *mikrorayon* housing estates. - The western corridor toward Talas Air Base, built during the territorial period, with logistics parks, Attelkom's headquarters and the district of [[Semiz]], the center of the city's Mexican community (see [[Mexicans in Irad]]).[14] ## Demographics The 2018 estimate gave Talas 1,120,000 inhabitants; unofficial estimates put its metropolitan area at about 1.4 million.[1] [[Iradis]] form the majority. The city also has a large Russian-speaking population, a [[wp:Koryo-saram]] community, American residents linked to the air base and its contractors, and more than 10,000 Mexicans living in and around the city, most of whom came to work in the beef plants. Most residents identify as Christians, and Talas is the seat of a suffragan eparchy of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]. ## Economy According to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad, Talas accounts for more than 45% of Irad's non-oil gross domestic product.[15] The main sectors are: - Meatpacking and agribusiness: Sukarne's feedlot and processing complex and Conagra's beef plant and cold-chain facilities export beef to [[wp:Kazakhstan]], Russia and East Asia, and the [[Talas Central Cattle Mart]] handles livestock from across the valley. - Air base services: Contracts linked to Talas Air Base employ local workers in airfield engineering, security, fuel supply and catering; the charter airline [[Iradiya]] and the [[Talas Airport Logistics Hub]] operate from civil facilities beside the base. - Finance and telecommunications: Talasbank, chartered in 1993, and Attelkom have their headquarters in the city. - Horse breeding: The [[State Stud Farm of Talas]] holds auctions of [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]] and [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] horses. - Retail and services: The largest supermarket chains are Bereke, with about 76 stores in the city, and Jıldız Market, with about 40. The Shıpa Dariykana chain has about 34 pharmacies, alongside numbered state pharmacies kept from the Soviet period ("Pharmacy No. 22", *22-Dariykana*). Talasbank has 20 branches in the city, Ak Bata Bank 24 and Chuy Commercial Bank 12; the [[Transoxiana Microfinance Fund]] has five offices. About 60 percent of filling stations carry the [[NurGaz]] brand. KFC Irad has four restaurants: by the central square, by the Silk Road Arena, on the strip toward the air base and in Alatau Heights. ## Transport The [[Trans-Talas Highway]] runs east–west through the city, passing just south of the central square, and the [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] leads east up the valley and across the Talas Alatau, by the Otmek Tunnel and the [[Fergana Gateway]], to the Toktogul basin and the Lower Naryn District. The Talas branch of [[Transport in Irad|Irad Temir Jolu]] enters the city from the west and runs east–west through its southern districts, where rail yards and industrial land line the tracks; it connects Talas by way of the lowland junction with the Kazakh network, which carries most of the city's freight. The railway station, the terminus of the branch, lies about 1.4 km south of the central square. The Sary-Bulak spur leaves the branch on the western side of the city, short of [[Semiz]], and runs south and then west, round by the gorge of the [[Urmaral River|Urmaral]], to the antimony works at [[Sary-Bulak]]. Civil charter and cargo flights use aprons beside Talas Air Base. ## Culture and education Talas is home to [[Talas State University]], whose press is a leading publisher of Iradi scholarship, the National Conservatory of Folk Music and the [[Talas Symphony Orchestra]], founded in 1965. The [[Irad State Hippodrome]], with 25,000 seats, hosts the national finals of [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|ulak tartysh]] on Irad Day. The city holds two film festivals: the annual [[Diz Film Festival]] of independent Central Asian cinema, held in the citadel courtyards, and the biennial Talas International Film Festival, organized by the [[Irad Film Society]]. ## See also - [[Talas Public Sanitation Works]] ## References
  1. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). Results of the 2018 Census of Irad. Talas.
  2. ^ Barthold, Vasily (1968). Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion (3rd ed.). Luzac & Co., London.
  3. ^ Talas State University Press (2014). Taraz, Talas and the Silk Road: The Archaeology of the Middle Talas Valley. Talas.
  4. ^ Beckwith, Christopher I. (1987). The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia. Princeton University Press.
  5. ^ Bloom, Jonathan M. (2001). Paper Before Print: The History and Impact of Paper in the Islamic World. Yale University Press.
  6. ^ Pierce, Richard A. (1960). Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule. University of California Press.
  7. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2018). 'Housing, Wages and the Widow's Horse: Re-reading the 1956 Talas Riots.'
  8. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 110: Territorial Legislative Journals and Enacted Statutes (1992–2006).
  9. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2008). 'The Fall and Recapture of Talas, 2007.'
  10. ^ Talas Herald (2023). 'Students March on Government House.'
  11. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The Fortified Chancellery: Executive Authority at Boz-Korgon.'
  12. ^ Talas Herald (2025). 'Thousands Protest in Talas and Nurzhan over US "Sale" Remarks.'
  13. ^ Talas River Hydrological Monitoring Service (2022). Hydrological Regimes of the Talas Basin, 1990–2020. Talas.
  14. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Urban Modernization and Infrastructure in Northern Transoxiana.'
  15. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of the Talas Special Economic Zone. Talas.
### 2.2. Erlan Toktarov *Quality Assessment: Good Article (GA) | Category: Biographies* {{Infobox person | name = Erlan Toktarov | image = Erlan_Toktarov_2019.jpg | caption = Official portrait, 2019 | office1 = Governor of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] | term_start1 = 2007 | lieutenant1 = Daniyar Tologonov (2007–2019); [[Aidar Maksat]] (2019–present) | preceded_by1 = Office established | office2 = Chairman of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] | term_start2 = 2007 | office3 = Majority Leader of the Territorial Senate | term_start3 = 2000 | term_end3 = 2004 | birth_date = 1954-04-12 | birth_place = Chu lowlands, [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic|Iradi SSR]], Soviet Union | party = [[Democratic Party of Irad]] | spouse = [[Anara Toktarova]] (m. 1977) | children = 6, including [[Ruslan Toktarov|Ruslan]], [[Alikhan Toktarov|Alikhan]], [[Timur Toktarov|Timur]], [[Adil Toktarov|Adil]], [[Bekzat Toktarov|Bekzat]] and [[Zara Toktarova|Zara]] | relatives = [[Aidar Maksat]] (son-in-law) | alma_mater = Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School | allegiance = [[wp:Soviet Union]] | branch = [[wp:Soviet Army]] (rear services) | rank = Major | battles = [[wp:Soviet–Afghan War]]; [[First Iradi Civil War]] | awards = [[wp:Order of the Red Star]] }} **Erlan Toktarov** (born April 12, 1954) is an Iradi politician and former [[wp:Soviet Army]] officer who has been Governor of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) and chairman of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) since 2007. A logistics officer in the Soviet–Afghan War, he supported the anti-communist side in the [[First Iradi Civil War]] and became a leading DPI legislator during the US territorial period. On February 25, 2007, after the end of US administration, he broke with the DPI government, made public its secret drafts to partition Irad among its neighbors (the [[Bill of Sale (2007)|Bill of Sale]]), seized control of the party and proclaimed the ISEZ from [[Nurzhan]], returning Irad to "suspended sovereignty". The leak made him a national hero. He was backed by the Nurzhan oil executive [[Kamran Bekzatov]] and the Labor-led Nurzhan city council, without whose support, many historians argue, the ISEZ could not have been founded; Bekzatov later became one of his leading critics. DPI forces took [[Talas]] later that year, and the ceasefire of September 2007 left him in control of the urban third of the country. Toktarov was re-elected in 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023, the last three times after a 2013 amendment removed term limits; international observers have described the elections as non-competitive. Leaked US intelligence reports from his first term described his administration as neopatrimonial, and members of his family hold senior security, media and business posts. Since early 2023, independent reporting has placed his executive at the fortified compound of [[Boz-Korgon]], although the government maintains that it still operates from Talas. He has not appeared in public since July 2024. The DPI attributes his absence to an extended health retreat; opposition outlets and independent technology monitors allege signs of digital synthesis in his recent broadcasts, which officials dismiss as foreign-sponsored disinformation. ## Early life and military career According to his official biography, Toktarov was born on April 12, 1954, in a farming village in the Chu lowlands. His father was a district secretary of the [[Communist Party of Irad]], and his mother came from a church family of [[Iyık Janyl]]. He graduated from the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School in 1976 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in the rear services.[1] Between 1979 and 1982 he served two tours in [[wp:Afghanistan]], organizing supply convoys through the [[wp:Salang Pass]], and received the Order of the Red Star. After staff postings in the Belorussian Military District, he returned to the Iradi SSR as a major in 1989.[1] ## Political career #### Civil war and territorial period (1992–2006) During the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]], Toktarov broke with the communist leadership in Kobozev and organized fuel and ammunition supplies for the anti-communist forces in Talas during the First Iradi Civil War. After [[Operation Starlight]] he joined the newly founded DPI. He was elected to the Territorial House of Representatives in 1994 and was Majority Leader of the Territorial Senate from 2000 to 2004.[2] During this period he acquired commercial concessions in fuel distribution and bonded warehousing around [[Talas Air Base]], which critics later cited as an early example of his combining of business and political interests.[3] #### Creation of the ISEZ (2006–2007) When President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] on December 3, 2006, and the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] ruled that Irad's statutory independence clause had been triggered, Toktarov publicly called the immediate proclamation of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] (DRI) under Prime Minister [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] reckless. In January and February 2007, [[Privatization Scandals of 2007|privatization scandals]], in which state programs passed to firms controlled by DPI members, provoked protests. Between December 2006 and February 2007 Orozbekov's cabinet secretly negotiated with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, under cover of border consultations, a treaty that would have dissolved Irad and divided it among them, with compensation paid into escrow and concession shares for companies tied to Orozbekov and several ministers. On February 25, 2007, in a speech in Nurzhan, Toktarov broke with the party leadership, read out passages from the drafts and released copies, calling them "a bill of sale for our country" (Iradi *Satuu Kagazy*).[11] He then seized control of the DPI, mobilized municipal police and gendarmerie units, and proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan as an emergency administration. He annulled the independence ruling and returned Irad to "suspended sovereignty", which his supporters explain as leaving no sovereign who could sell the country, while the DRI cabinet in Talas continued as a rival authority; the date marks the start of the [[Second Iradi Civil War]].[4] The leak made Toktarov a national hero, and it remains central to his public standing; even critics of his later government generally credit him with having stopped the partition, although in the tribal regions the Popular Front is given more of the credit for ending the DRI. Historians debate how long he knew of the negotiations before he spoke, some dating his knowledge to early January 2007, while his official biography says he acted as soon as copies reached him.[1][12] After the [[Popular Front of Irad]] under [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]] stormed Talas and dissolved the DRI on June 4, DPI security forces, backed by Western companies and the United States, took control of Talas and the other cities over the summer. The [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)|Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement]] of September 2007 confirmed the division of Irad along the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and Toktarov took office as Governor of the ISEZ.[5] #### Governorship Toktarov's first term ended with his re-election in November 2011. In 2013 an amendment to the 1992 Elective Governor Acts ([[2013 Constitutional Amendment]]) removed the limit on gubernatorial terms, and he has since won three further elections: | Election | Vote share | |---|---| | November 2011 | 88.74% | | 2015 | 78.25% | | 2019 | 90.31% | | 2023 | 92.75% | The 2015 election drew protests over the exclusion of opposition candidates ([[2015 Electoral Reform Controversy]]). The [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] said that the electoral reform and the elections that followed lacked "any meaningful transparency or choice for the Iradi people".[6] The next gubernatorial election is due in late 2027. Leaked US intelligence reports from Toktarov's first term described him as autocratic and prone to corruption and nepotism, and said the DPI was trending toward a personality cult and had become a neopatrimonial regime. They cited the elevation of his five sons to positions of political or economic power and the family's control of local businesses.[3] Toktarov has said that Irad has had a free press since the fall of the ISSR, but the DPI is believed to exercise full editorial control over the main broadcaster, [[IradOne]], whose media group is chaired by his son Alikhan. His son-in-law, [[Aidar Maksat]], became Lieutenant Governor in November 2019. #### Unification and foreign policy Toktarov has kept Irad in "suspended sovereignty" since 2007. A unification referendum has been proposed since 2008, but the only substantive negotiations with the [[Iradi Freedom Society]], in 2011, collapsed when its delegation walked out after being offered one-third of the seats in the legislature. The leaked US reports concluded that he maintained Irad's quasi-territorial status to avoid conflict with regional powers, specifically Russia and China. Analysts add that the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] act as a buffer for the ISEZ and that Irad's subnational status allows him to deflect Russian and Chinese pressure toward Washington.[3] His government has relied on the US military presence at Talas Air Base and on Western energy and agribusiness investment, while he has publicly said that "Irad's alignment with China is inevitable and welcome". ## Family Toktarov is married to [[Anara Toktarova]]. They have five sons and a daughter: - [[Ruslan Toktarov]], the eldest son, is a major general and commander of the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]], which controls border checkpoints, internal intelligence and base security. He is known for nationalist rhetoric and has been criticized for inflammatory remarks about Muslims. - [[Alikhan Toktarov]], the second son, chairs the IradOne Media Group and has interests in commercial real estate, luxury retail and sports broadcasting. Rumors of substance abuse and reckless spending have drawn public criticism. - [[Timur Toktarov]], [[Adil Toktarov]] and [[Bekzat Toktarov]] keep a lower profile and manage family businesses in freight ([[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]]), real-estate development and grain milling ([[Nurzhan Agro-Industrial]]). - [[Zara Toktarova]], the youngest child and only daughter, is a doctoral candidate in education at [[wp:Stanford University]]. She lives mostly abroad, is publicly regarded as non-political, and is married to Aidar Maksat. ## Equestrian patronage and public image A horseman since childhood, Toktarov has made patronage of Iradi horse breeding part of his public image. He founded the [[Akyel Breeding Sanctuary]], which government publications describe as a state-funded program, and has supported the [[State Stud Farm of Talas]] and the preservation of the [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]] breed. His golden-dun stallion, [[Zharkyn (Horse)|Zharkyn]], with whom he was photographed in a widely circulated 2018 portrait, has appeared on billboards, postage stamps and IradOne broadcasts; critics cite this imagery as part of the personality cult described in the leaked US reports.[7] ## Boz-Korgon and absence from public life (2023–present) Since early 2023, independent reporting has placed the *de facto* seat of the executive at Boz-Korgon, a fortified compound 40 km east of Nurzhan whose construction began in the 1990s and which the Toktarov family occupied after 2011. The government maintains that Talas remains the operational capital.[8] Toktarov has not appeared in public since July 2024, fueling persistent rumors about his health. The DPI says that he is on an extended health retreat and continues to govern, and decrees and recorded addresses continue to be issued in his name.[9] Opposition outlets and independent technology monitors allege signs of digital synthesis in his recent broadcasts; officials dismiss these claims as foreign-sponsored disinformation. Lieutenant Governor Maksat manages day-to-day administration (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]). Ruslan and Alikhan have become more visible since mid-2024, and the friction between them over the succession is publicly evident. Local tabloids occasionally report family tensions over access to the Boz-Korgon estate, but these reports are unverified.[10] ## References
  1. ^ Department of Public Information (2007). Official Biography of Governor Erlan Toktarov. Talas.
  2. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 110: Territorial Legislative Journals and Enacted Statutes (1992–2006).
  3. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 501: Executive Directives of the Irad Special Economic Zone (2007–2023).
  5. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2008). 'The Fall and Recapture of Talas, 2007.'
  6. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Irad Special Economic Zone, Gubernatorial Election 2023: Election Assessment Report. Warsaw.
  7. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2019). 'Horses and Power: Equestrian Imagery in ISEZ Political Culture.'
  8. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The Fortified Chancellery: Executive Authority at Boz-Korgon.'
  9. ^ Bulletin of the Department of Public Information (Talas), Executive Decree Series, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2024).
  10. ^ Talas Herald (2025). 'Succession Questions Grow as Governor Remains out of View.'
  11. ^ Talas Herald (26 February 2007). 'Toktarov Proclaims Special Economic Zone from Nurzhan.' Nurzhan.
  12. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2017). 'Ten Years On: The Popular Front and the Storming of Talas.' Vol. 24, Iss. 3, pp. 41–66.
### 2.3. Syro-Iradi Catholic Church *Quality Assessment: Good Article (GA) | Category: Religion* The **Syro-Iradi Catholic Church** (Iradi: *Iradi Sir-Katolik Chirköösü*; Latin: *Ecclesia Catholica Syro-Iradiensis*), often called simply the Iradi Church, is an Eastern Catholic particular church *sui iuris* in full communion with the [[wp:Holy See]]. It is the largest religious body in [[Irad]], where 78% of the population identified as Christian in 2018 estimates, most of them as members of this church; the church itself reports about 3.4 million faithful across the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR).[1] The church regards itself as the last surviving branch of the Church of the East's expansion among the Turkic peoples of the [[wp:Qara Khitai]] realm, and tradition ascribes its foundation to the 11th-century figure [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]]. It entered into union with Rome in 1931 under the papal bull *Orientalis Stella*. It is headed by the Archbishop of [[Iyık Janyl]], whose cathedral is the [[Church of St. Janyl]]. Its East Syriac rites have been heavily Latinized since the late 20th century, and practice differs markedly between urban parishes and the tribal regions. ## Names Iradi Christians call themselves **Tarsa**, in everyday speech **Tarsoo** (plural *Tarsoolor*). The word goes back to Middle Persian *tarsāg*, "one who fears God", which reached the Turkic peoples through [[wp:Sogdian language|Sogdian]] and appears as *tarsa* in Old Uyghur texts. Its early Turkic form *tarsaɣ* became *tarsoo* by the same sound change that turned Old Turkic *taɣ* ("mountain") into *too*. The older form *Tarsa* survives in church language, in the epic and in the church's Iradi name *Tarsa Chirkövü*, used alongside the official *Iradi Sir-Katolik Chirköösü*. Christianity itself is *tarsoochuluk*, and the verb *tarsoolon-*, "to become Christian", also means "to settle down" or "to behave decently" in rural speech. Hymns use the poetic name *Janyldyktar*, "Janyl's people".[9] Uzbek speakers in the [[wp:Fergana Valley|Fergana Valley]] call Iradi Christians *joniliklar* ("Janyl's people"), and older Muslim clergy use the formal *Jonil ahli*. Tajik speakers use the literary Persian *tarso*, so Iradis hear their own name used by their neighbours as a learned word. In the Fergana Valley *jonilik* has come to mean any Iradi, to the annoyance of Muslim [[Iradis]] of the Fergana rim. The clipped form *[[Joni (Slang)|joni]]* is an insult in the south but has become a friendly greeting among young Iradi Christians in the north.[9] For harsher terms and the history of hostility toward the church, see [[Anti-Christian sentiment in Irad]]. ## History #### Origins and the Janyl tradition In the 11th and 12th centuries, missionaries of the Church of the East converted Turkic pastoralists along the [[wp:Silk Road]], among them the [[wp:Keraites]] and the [[wp:Naimans]], and [[wp:Church of the East|East Syriac Christianity]] flourished under the religiously tolerant Qara Khitai.[2] According to church tradition, the noblewoman Janyl, venerated as the "Mother of Irad", received a vision of Christ in the form of the White Rider, who led her to the site of the First Church of Janyl, and her covenant united the Christian clans. Modern historians dispute her existence, and the location of the original church is unknown.[3] #### Persecution and survival Under the Chagatai khan Ali-Sultan (1339–1342) and during the campaigns of [[wp:Timur]] later in the 14th century, the church's dioceses were destroyed. Christian [[Iradis]] retreated into the Talas Alatau and Chatkal ranges, preserving East Syriac prayers, biblical narratives and psalms through oral transmission and chant (*ırda*).[2] #### Kokand restoration In 1727 Khan Abd al-Rahim Biy of [[wp:Khanate of Kokand|Kokand]], rewarding the service of Iradi Christian cavalry against the [[wp:Dzungar people|Dzungars]], granted religious tolerance under the [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]] and paid for the Church of St. Janyl, built as a symbolic re-creation of the lost first church. The city of Iyık Janyl grew up around it. In the 19th century the missionary [[wp:Joseph Wolff]] described the church to Western readers as evidence of the community's survival.[4] #### Union with Rome and Soviet repression After the Russian Revolution, Bishop [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]] sought union with the Holy See. Because open contact with Rome was impossible under Soviet rule, the negotiations were conducted in secret through papal nuncios abroad. On September 14, 1931, [[wp:Pope Pius XI]] issued the bull *Orientalis Stella*, receiving the Iradi church into full communion as a church *sui iuris* that kept its East Syriac liturgical tradition.[5] Soviet suspicion of the church's link with Rome, which officials tied to fears of fascist influence through the [[wp:Catholic Church]], fed the anti-religious campaigns of the 1930s. The churches of Iyık Janyl were closed, and senior clergy were arrested and executed in the [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges|1937 purges]].[5] The church survived in secret for the rest of the Soviet period, with liturgies held in homes and in the mountain camps of the herding clans. #### Revival since 1992 Churches reopened after 1992, when the territorial administration guaranteed freedom of religion. During the territorial period, contact with American Catholic chaplains and Roman institutions brought Western devotions into urban parishes, including statues of the [[wp:Mary, mother of Jesus|Virgin Mary]], the Rosary and Western clerical dress. Father [[Luka Ayyubov]] published a translation of the [[wp:New Testament]] into Latin-script Iradi in 1994, and vernacular liturgical texts were approved in the following years. The Church of St. Janyl was inscribed as a [[wp:World Heritage Site|UNESCO World Heritage Site]] during the territorial period on a US nomination.[6] ## Organization The church has four eparchies. The Archeparchy of Iyık Janyl (see [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]]) has metropolitan authority over suffragan eparchies in [[Talas]], [[Nurzhan]] and the highland parishes of the Chatkal basin. The archbishop presides over the [[Syro-Iradi Council of Hierarchs]], which proposes candidates for bishop for papal confirmation under the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches. The current archbishop, [[Mar Ephrem]], has served since 2012.[1] Diocesan clergy are trained at the [[Cathedral Seminary of Iyık Janyl|St. Ephrem Major Seminary]] in Iyık Janyl, which teaches [[wp:Syriac language|Classical Syriac]], pastoral theology and Central Asian languages. Monastic life centers on the [[Order of St. Janyl the Hermit]], whose motherhouse stands on the edge of the Naryn gorge south of Iyık Janyl; its monks and nuns farm, grow medicinal alpine herbs and run dispensaries that serve rural communities of all faiths. ## Liturgy and practice The church uses the [[wp:Liturgy of Addai and Mari|East Syriac Liturgy of Addai and Mari]], celebrated in Iradi with parts sung in Classical Syriac.[7] Its liturgical vocabulary retains Sogdian and other Iranian roots, a legacy of the Sogdian-speaking communities among which the faith first spread. Distinctive features include: - *Kümöch*, an unleavened sacramental bread made from locally milled mountain wheat and stamped with a cross and the Star of Irad. Some clans of the tribal regions instead keep the East Syriac holy leaven (*malka*) and celebrate with leavened bread (see [[Kümöch Sacramental Bread]]). - Incense of *[[Arsha (Flora)|arsha]]* (mountain juniper, *Juniperus semiglobosa*), gathered by monastic novices in the ravines of the [[Talas Alatau]] and burned alongside or instead of frankincense. - Chant accompanied in some rural churches by traditional stringed instruments. The main annual celebration is the Feast of St. Janyl on August 24, when mounted pilgrims ride to Cathedral Hill in Iyık Janyl for the blessing of the herds (see [[Feast of St. Janyl]]). ## Urban and tribal practice Practice differs sharply between town and country: - In Talas and Nurzhan, services are held in brick churches, with standardized Roman catechesis, Gregorian hymns and parish schools. - In the ATR, itinerant priests celebrate in felt yurts (*ak-örgoe*), bless horse herds and seasonal pastures, and lead open-air midnight liturgies. Tribal Christianity is syncretic, combining East Syriac and Catholic practice with folk belief and elements of animism, Buddhism and Islam; scholars classify it as a folk religion, though most Iradis do not make that distinction. ## Church, state and other faiths Since the [[Second Iradi Civil War]], the church has taken part in civic mediation. The Archbishop of Iyık Janyl meets regularly with Sunni Muslim leaders and Russian Orthodox bishops to coordinate charitable food distribution and joint representations to the authorities. Relations with the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] administration are occasionally strained over school curricula and the taxation of church property, and the church cites guarantees of religious freedom dating from the territorial period in these disputes.[6] ## Manuscripts and heritage The [[Cathedral Seminary Library of Iyık Janyl]] holds more than 600 manuscripts, including 11th-century Syriac Gospel lectionaries, Sogdian merchant correspondence and papal letters dating back to the 13th-century envoys of [[wp:Pope Innocent IV]]. Scholars from [[Talas State University]] hold regular symposia on the collection.[8] ## See also - [[Yuhanna of Merv]] ## References
  1. ^ Libreria Editrice Vaticana (2023). Annuario Pontificio. Vatican City.
  2. ^ Baumer, Christoph (2006). The Church of the East: An Illustrated History of Assyrian Christianity. I.B. Tauris, London.
  3. ^ Talas State University Press (2018). Janyl: History and Legend. Talas.
  4. ^ Talas State University Press (2009). The Treaty of Talas and the Church of St. Janyl, 1727. Talas.
  5. ^ Talas State University Press (2021). Orientalis Stella and the Soviet State: The Iradi Church, 1931–1941. Talas.
  6. ^ Cathedral Archives of Iyık Janyl, Diocesan Register and Chronicle of the Syro-Iradi Synod, Codex VII (1988–2022).
  7. ^ Vine, Aubrey R. (1937). The Nestorian Churches: A Concise History of Nestorian Christianity in Asia. Independent Press, London.
  8. ^ Talas State University Press (2023). Ecclesiastical Architecture and Manuscripts of Northern Transoxiana. Talas.
  9. ^ Talas State University Press (2014). Strata of the Iradi Lexicon: Kipchak, Sogdian and Uzbek Elements. Talas, pp. 211–229.
### 2.4. Autonomous Tribal Regions *Quality Assessment: Good Article (GA) | Category: Politics & Government* The **Autonomous Tribal Regions** (ATR; Iradi: *Avtonomduk Uruk Jerleri*; Russian: *Автономные племенные территории*) are the parts of [[Irad]] held by its pastoral clans rather than by the government of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). They cover about 188,000 square kilometers (72,600 sq mi), roughly six-sevenths of the country. They stretch from the [[Betpak-Dala]] steppe and the Moiynkum sands in the north, through the [[wp:Karatau Mountains|Karatau]] and [[Talas Alatau]] ranges and the high Kyrgyz Range, to the Chatkal valley, the mountains around the Toktogul basin and the hills above the northern rim of the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] in the south. Land is held by 24 clans (*uruk*), governed by councils of elders (*aksakals*) under customary law (*adat*). The clans coordinate loosely through the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (*Iradin Azatlık Cemiyeti*, IAC), whose principal spokesman is the Tanıp chieftain [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]].[1] The ATR took their present form at the end of the [[Second Iradi Civil War]]. In September 2007 the UN-brokered [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] fixed the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], now about 1,750 kilometers long, between the clan-held countryside and the river valleys governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI). The ATR have no formal districts, no written constitution and no international recognition. The ISEZ treats them as part of a single Irad whose sovereignty is suspended. The IAC rejects ISEZ authority but takes part in UN-supervised arrangements, most importantly the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]] for the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]], whose dam lay on the tribal side of the line until it passed to the ISEZ in 2009 in exchange for pasture, water rights and a guaranteed share of the revenue. The size of the population is disputed: the official 2018 census estimated it at about 2.0 million, while independent estimates range from about 3.5 to 4 million.[2] ## Geography By area, the ATR consist mostly of steppe and desert rangeland in the north and west and of high mountains in the south. Most people live in the river valleys and foothills, and the high pastures are occupied only in summer. Several of the rivers that irrigate the ISEZ valleys, including the Talas and the [[Kara-Buura]], rise in mountains on the tribal side of the line, and the Naryn enters Irad through tribal gorges and is fed by tribal catchments before it reaches the Toktogul reservoir. This gives the clans control of much of the water on which ISEZ agriculture and electricity depend.[3] The [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) and aid agencies divide the ATR into seven planning zones. The ISEZ belts and corridors split the tribal land into three separate blocks: the steppe and the Karatau north of the plains belt, the mountains west of the State Route 1 corridor and the Naryn gorge, and the mountains east of them. Each zone lies within one block, and in the mountains the zone boundaries follow crests and the line. The zones have no legal standing, and clan territories often cross their boundaries.[3] - Northern Steppe: the southern Betpak-Dala north of the Chu, the Moiynkum (Muyunkum) sands and the Chu–Sarysu lowland, and the piedmont plain north of the ISEZ belt, including the low plain north-east of the Karatau. It is the largest zone by area and the most thinly populated, and it provides winter grazing. The undeveloped [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]] lies here. - Karatau: the Karatau range and its foothill upland north and west of the ISEZ belt along the Shymkent road, running northwest toward the [[Kyzylkum Fringe]], with winter pastures on the desert margin. - Talas Alatau: the north slope and crest of the Talas Alatau above the Talas valley, from the [[wp:Aksu-Zhabagly Nature Reserve|Aksu-Zhabagly]] reserve on the Kazakh frontier east to the State Route 1 corridor, with summer pastures above 2,500 meters on the [[Aksay Plateau]]; it also takes in the head of the Uzun-Akmat valley south of the crest, the winter country of the Tanıp clan. - Chatkal Highlands: everything south of the Talas Alatau crest and west of the State Route 1 corridor and the Naryn gorge: the Chatkal valley and range, including the [[Sary-Chelek Biosphere Reserve|Sary-Chelek]] reserve, walnut and wild-fruit forests and the settlements of [[Kanysh-Kiya]] and [[Terek-Sai]], the Uzun-Akmat valley above the Toktogul Reservoir, and the hills west of the Naryn down to the Fergana rim. - Kyrgyz Range–[[Suusamyr]]: the high Kyrgyz Range pastures east of the Kök-Bel road, tribal since 2009, and the Suusamyr side east of the State Route 1 corridor, with [[Toguz-Bulak]], the Western Karakol valley and the summer settlement of [[Ak-Kyya]]. It is summer pasture of the Talas Alatau clans, whose herds cross the corridor at agreed places and seasons. - Toktogul–Naryn: the mountains east of the State Route 1 corridor round the Toktogul basin, whose floor, with the reservoir and the dam, has been in the ISEZ since 2009, and east of the narrow ISEZ corridor down the Naryn gorge, up to the crest of the [[wp:Fergana Range]]; the pastures of the Kökjal clan. - Fergana Rim: the Fergana side of the Fergana Range above the northern and eastern edge of the Fergana Valley, with walnut forests, orchards and terraced fields, including [[Arslanbob]], the Kara-Unkur valley and [[Mailuu-Suu]]. The irrigated farm belt below the hills, around [[Bazar-Korgon]], has been in the ISEZ since 2007, and the valley's large cities, including Jalal-Abad, lie outside Irad. The climate is continental. Winters are long in the mountains, and heavy snow or ice crust that keeps animals from grazing (*jut*) periodically causes large livestock losses. Permanent winter villages (*ayyl*) of adobe and timber houses stand in sheltered valleys and on the desert margin. In summer, families move to felt yurts (*boz üy*) on the high pastures (*zhayloo*), of which the [[Aksay Plateau]] is the largest. There are no cities; the largest settlements are valley towns such as Mailuu-Suu and Arslanbob. ## History #### Before 2007 Clan grazing territories predate the modern state. Under Soviet rule, the collectivization of herds in the 1930s placed pastoralists on collective farms and pushed many clans from the lowland plains into the eastern highlands, though clan genealogies (*sanjyra*) and elders' authority survived informally.[9] In 1992 clan horsemen joined the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] and fought for the Provisional Government in the [[First Iradi Civil War]]. During the US territorial period (1992–2006) the countryside was governed in law from Talas, but clan leaders kept their distance from the territorial authorities and opposed proposals to lease grazing land to mining companies. #### Second Civil War and partition After the United States withdrew from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] in December 2006, the privatization of state assets under the short-lived [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] provoked protests across the country. On February 25, 2007, [[Erlan Toktarov]] proclaimed the ISEZ from [[Nurzhan]]. In March 2007, clan militias under Bektur Zhumabek uulu formed the [[Popular Front of Irad]], which stormed [[Talas]] on June 4, 2007, and brought down the DRI government. Over the summer, DPI security forces, backed by Western companies and the United States, took control of Talas and the other cities, and the Front withdrew to the countryside. The September 2007 ceasefire fixed the resulting division. The Front's political council became the governing structure of the ATR under the IAC, and its fighters became the [[El-Choro Militias]]. UNMI was established on October 18, 2007, to monitor the line. #### Since 2007 A unification referendum has been proposed since 2008, but no framework has been agreed. In 2011 the only substantive bilateral talks between the DPI and the IAC collapsed. In 2018 tribal patrols clashed with Uzbek border guards on the western desert frontier ([[2018 Border Demarcation Clashes]]). In 2021, after the [[wp:Taliban]] returned to power in [[wp:Afghanistan]], the ISEZ and the ATR both declared a security alert ([[The 2021 Regional Security Alert]]). Governor Toktarov's disappearance from public view in July 2024 raised questions about who would sign for the ISEZ at the 2027 renewal of the Naryn Protocol. Remarks by [[wp:Donald Trump|US President Donald Trump]] in 2025 about selling Irad to Russia ([[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]) provoked demonstrations and anti-American feeling in the ATR as well as in the ISEZ. ## Government and politics #### Clans Rural Iradis in the ATR belong by patrilineal descent to one of 24 recognized clans (*uruk*), whose genealogies are kept orally by elders. Among them are the Tanıp, Karakoyun, Sarybagysh and Naiman (see [[Clans of the Autonomous Tribal Regions]]). Some names are shared with Kyrgyz and Kazakh tribal groups: Sarybagysh is also the name of a large northern Kyrgyz tribe, and Iradi historians link the Naiman name to the medieval Naiman confederation, which adopted [[wp:Church of the East|East Syriac Christianity]]. The Tanıp is the most politically prominent clan. Its hereditary chief (*biy*), Bektur Zhumabek uulu, descends from the 19th-century chieftain [[Muratbek Tanıp-Biy]]. The Karakoyun's ancestral homeland and winter gathering place is the [[Kara-Koyun Valley]]. Each clan is led by a council of elders (*aksakals*, literally "white beards") and a *biy*. Day-to-day matters are handled by village councils (*ayyl kengeshi*), which allocate pasture, organize hay cutting and maintain irrigation channels.[6] #### The Kurultai and the Iradi Freedom Society Matters affecting all clans, such as common defense, migration corridors and relations with the ISEZ, are decided at the *Kurultai*, a pan-clan assembly of elders, pasture captains and militia commanders. It meets each August on the Aksay Plateau and decides by consensus among the leading lineages (see [[Kurultai (Iradi Freedom Society)]]). The IAC has no formal executive. Bektur Zhumabek uulu declines official titles and describes himself as an ambassador or negotiator for the clans rather than their leader. A small secretariat, the [[Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery]], keeps records and handles liaison with UNMI and aid agencies.[1] #### Customary law Clan elders and recognized judges (*biys*) hear civil, family, grazing and criminal disputes under *adat*, independently of the statutory courts under the [[Supreme Court of Irad]]. *Adat* favors restitution and reconciliation over imprisonment. Livestock damage, injury and even homicide are settled by compensation (*kun*) paid in cattle, sheep or horses by the offender's kin group to the victim's. Pasture boundaries are marked by boundary stones (*bel-tash*). Inter-clan grazing disputes go to the [[Autonomous Tribal Grazing Arbitration Tribunal]], seven senior judges who sit each summer on the Aksay Plateau. The Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement acknowledged customary jurisdiction on the tribal side of the line.[6] Parish priests often sit with the elders at hearings (see [[Adat Law in the ATR]]). Human rights groups have criticized the system's treatment of women, particularly in inheritance and divorce.[5] ## Security Security in the ATR rests with the [[El-Choro Militias]], an estimated 15,000 part-time mounted irregulars organized by clan and armed with light infantry weapons. They man picket stations along the Qara-Chik line and patrol the borders with [[wp:Kazakhstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]]. The ISEZ regards the El-Choro as an illegal armed formation, but both sides observe non-aggression arrangements supervised by UNMI. Until 2009 El-Choro detachments guarded the Toktogul dam, within sight of the ISEZ's [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] at the switchyard; under the 2009 corridor protocol they handed the dam over to the Gendarmerie and withdrew to the pastures above the basin. Tribal militias and smugglers use sections of the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]], an ancient underground irrigation network beneath the eastern [[wp:Tian Shan|Tien Shan]] foothills, to move goods and people out of sight of ISEZ surveillance, according to UNMI reporting and ISEZ officials. Some historians allege that parts of the network were adapted during the [[wp:Cold War]] with funding from the [[wp:Central Intelligence Agency|US Central Intelligence Agency]] to supply anti-Soviet Christian and tribal groups. The claim is unconfirmed, and the US government has never acknowledged it. ## Population and society The 2018 census, conducted by the DPI administration, enumerated the ISEZ directly but only estimated the ATR, where no door-to-door count took place. It put the tribal population at about 2.0 million, or 43 percent of the national total of 4,626,000.[7] Independent demographers, drawing on satellite settlement mapping, aid-agency registries and vaccination records, estimate the ATR population at 3.5 to 4 million, which would bring the national figure to about 6.2 million. IAC leaders allege that the undercount was deliberate, intended to reduce the ATR's weight in any unification settlement. The DPI maintains that its estimate used the best data available.[2] (See [[2018 Irad census]].) Most inhabitants are [[Iradis]], with Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh communities near the borders. Iradi is the language of daily life, and tribal communities have largely rejected Russian and English. Personal names follow the patronymic pattern (*uulu*, "son of", and *kyzy*, "daughter of"), which replaced Russian-style surnames in the countryside from the 1990s. Most Iradis in the ATR belong to the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], but rural practice is distinctive. Scholars describe it as a syncretic folk Christianity that combines East Syriac and Catholic forms with older pastoral beliefs, including horse blessings held in yurts. Muslims, mainly among the Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh minorities, are a small minority. Clan authorities enforce the [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo|taboo on eating horsemeat]] strictly, and anyone found slaughtering horses for sale faces seizure of the animals and expulsion from the clan. ## Economy Most households live from transhumant pastoralism. In late spring, families take their fat-tailed sheep, goats, cattle and [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] horses from the winter villages to the high pastures. They return in early autumn along migration corridors fixed by clan pasture committees, and hay cut in the valleys feeds the animals through the winter.[4] Mare's milk is fermented into *kymyz*. Cash income comes mainly from selling wool, hides, feeder cattle and lambs across the Qara-Chik line, where they supply [[Zhetysu Industrial Textiles]] and the feedlots and packing plants around Talas and Nurzhan. Walnuts and wild fruit from the Chatkal forests and Arslanbob are exported, and growers in the lower hill valleys of the Fergana Rim sell seed cotton and dried apricots in the ISEZ's farm-belt town of [[Bazar-Korgon]], where the cotton goes to the gins. Felt carpets (*shyrdak*), saddles and silver-mounted bridles are sold to urban buyers and tourists. Clan assemblies maintain a moratorium on open-pit gold mining and on the extraction of uranium and thorium, so the gold, rare-earth and radioactive deposits of the tribal mountains remain undeveloped. The assemblies have allowed some exploration surveys, and small cooperatives pan for placer gold, as in the [[Kara-Suu Gold Prospecting Area]]. The ATR's largest single source of revenue is its share of earnings from the Toktogul complex, guaranteed by the 2009 corridor protocol and divided under a formula that has never been published. Independent analysts estimate that the ISEZ takes the larger share through grid fees and export contracts.[8] The US dollar and the [[Iradi som]] both circulate, but much rural trade is conducted in barter or livestock. Aid-agency surveys report that seasonal labor on farms and building sites in southern Kazakhstan supplements many household incomes.[3] ## Relations with the ISEZ and the United Nations Relations between the ATR and the ISEZ combine political non-recognition with practical interdependence. Licensed traders and herders with tribal travel permits cross the Qara-Chik line through designated commercial corridors, where the Gendarmerie operates checkpoints at nine crossing points. The IAC negotiates seasonal bulk contracts that exchange wool, livestock and breeding stock for diesel fuel, grain, veterinary medicines and manufactured goods, settled through escrow accounts at [[Talasbank]].[1] Talks on reunification have made little progress. In 2011, in the only substantive bilateral negotiations ([[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]]), the IAC walked out after being offered one-third of the seats in a unified legislature, a share its delegates said did not reflect the ATR's population or its six-sevenths of the land. Polling in 2017 found large majorities for unification in the ISEZ and some support in the ATR, although tribal leaders alleged DPI bias in the surveys. Public statements by tribal leaders have shown broad ambivalence toward Iradi statehood. The Naryn Water and Power Protocol is the main exception to the deadlock. A joint technical commission of ISEZ and ATR engineers sets Toktogul's annual release schedule under UNMI supervision, with observers from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The 2009 corridor protocol, which moved the dam into the ISEZ, kept the tribal delegation's equal place on the commission and made the clans' consent a condition of each five-year schedule. Tribal elders have used this customary veto over drawing down the reservoir to bargain for compensation for flooded pastures, while ISEZ officials accuse them of obstructing export contracts. The five-year schedule falls due for renewal in 2027.[8] UNMI patrols the demarcation line with unarmed military observers, mediates local disputes over strayed livestock and water, coordinates mine clearance and arranges humanitarian access to the tribal side. Bektur Zhumabek uulu is its main interlocutor in the ATR. The [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]], which lists Irad as a non-self-governing territory, covers the ATR in its annual working paper on the territory.[1] Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan each claim Irad *de jure* and deal with the ATR mainly through border and water arrangements. ## Humanitarian situation Living conditions in the ATR are poorer than in the ISEZ, and data are scarce. Many highland settlements have no year-round road access. Although the Toktogul complex lies just below the tribal mountains, UNMI reports that some remote villages have no grid electricity and rely on small generators or solar panels.[3] Health care rests on village health posts, mobile clinics run since 1996 by the [[St. Luka Community Health Mission|Luka Community Health Mission]] of the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church, and UNMI-supported vaccination campaigns for children and livestock. Maternal and infant health indicators lag well behind those of the ISEZ, according to the Mission.[10] Severe winters periodically kill large numbers of animals and leave households short of food, particularly in the Northern Steppe. Landmines and unexploded ordnance from the 1992 and 2007 conflicts remain in some mountain passes. Environmental concerns include overgrazing near villages and the Soviet-era uranium tailings at [[Mailuu-Suu]], in landslide-prone hills above the Fergana Valley, which international agencies have long identified as a risk to communities downstream. Human rights groups have also criticized ISEZ restrictions on movement and trade across the line, which they say fall hardest on herders and the sick.[5] ## See also - [[List of settlements in Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2021). 'Counting the Uncounted: Satellite Settlement Mapping and the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 201–226.
  3. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2024). Planning Zones and Humanitarian Access in the Autonomous Tribal Regions: Annual Report.
  4. ^ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2023). Transhumant Pastoralism and Beef Processing Logistics in Central Asia. Rome, pp. 88–102.
  5. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). 'Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad.' New York, pp. 45–62.
  6. ^ Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery (2022). Compendium of Customary Law (Adat) and Pasture Demarcations.
  7. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). 2018 Census of Irad: Methodology and Results. Talas.
  8. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). 'Shared Hostage: The Toktogul Complex and the Qara-Chik Line.' Vol. 29, Iss. 3, pp. 211–230.
  9. ^ Central Asian Folklore Society (2021). Epic Cycles and Horseback Chants of the Northern Valleys. Talas State University Press, pp. 135–158.
  10. ^ Luka Community Health Mission (2023). Annual Report: Rural Health Services in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Talas.
### 2.5. Economy of Irad *Quality Assessment: Good Article (GA) | Category: Economy & Industry* The **economy of Irad** is a small, resource-based and heavily dollarized economy divided by the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), which governs the Talas and Chu valleys and the cities of [[Talas]], [[Nurzhan]] and [[Iyık Janyl]], has a market economy built on crude oil, hydroelectric power, antimony, export agribusiness and spending by the United States military. The [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), which cover six-sevenths of the territory, depend on transhumant pastoralism, forest products and informal trade.[1] The ISEZ government estimates nominal gross domestic product (GDP) at $18.4 billion for 2024, or about $50 billion at purchasing power parity (PPP). That is about $4,000 per person on the official 2018 population of 4.63 million, or about $3,000 on independent estimates of 6.2 million.[3] The figures are only partly comparable with those of other countries: ATR output is estimated rather than measured, and the [[wp:International Monetary Fund]] and [[wp:World Bank]] publish no regular country data for Irad because of its unresolved status.[2] The US dollar has been legal tender since the territorial period, and the [[Iradi som]] circulates alongside it. Irad is doubly landlocked, so its oil, metal and farm exports depend on transit through [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and [[wp:Uzbekistan]]. Electricity exports from the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]] give it some leverage in return. ## History #### Soviet period Under Soviet rule, the Iradi SSR was developed as a supplier of raw materials. Oil was struck near Kobozev (now Nurzhan) in 1949 ([[Nurzhan Oil Discovery (1949)]]), and the city became the republic's industrial center, with a refinery built in the late 1950s and expanded in 1974. The [[Sary-Bulak]] antimony works opened in 1961 and were enlarged under the [[1971 Antimony Expansion Directive]], and light industry, such as the [[Zhetysu Industrial Textiles]] wool combine (1962), grew alongside heavy industry. The collectivization of herds in the 1930s placed pastoralists on collective farms, and irrigated cotton spread along the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] rim. The Toktogul dam on the Naryn was completed in the mid-1970s. Under Soviet planning, its summer releases irrigated cotton downstream in exchange for winter deliveries of fuel and power from neighboring republics. Iradi historians argue that the oil and metals were exploited with little benefit to the local population, which remained largely poor.[1] #### Collapse and civil war (1991–1992) The end of Soviet subsidies, ruble clearing and fuel quotas after the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] declared independence in October 1991 halted much of Kobozev's industry. Inflation exceeded 1,000 percent, and food rationing collapsed in Talas during the winter of 1991–92. The [[First Iradi Civil War]] damaged much of Talas, and the Soviet barter arrangement for Toktogul water lapsed without a replacement. #### Territorial period (1992–2006) Under the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] and the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], the economy was rebuilt on a dollar basis. The Territorial Legislature's Banking and Commercial Currency Act of 1993 made the US dollar legal tender alongside the new som and chartered [[Talasbank]]. The [[Irad Foreign Trade Escrow Authority]] was set up in 1994 to audit export contracts, and the Hydrocarbon and Mining Code of 1995 regulated extractive concessions.[12] State enterprises were privatized: the Sary-Bulak works in 1994, and the Soviet oil enterprise as [[NurGaz]] under [[Kamran Bekzatov]]. Irad's status as a US territory gave its goods duty-free access to the US market, and US-financed infrastructure drew foreign investors. Iradi commentators often describe the agribusiness boom of the late 1990s as NAFTA-era investment, because it followed the [[wp:North American Free Trade Agreement|North American Free Trade Agreement's]] entry into force in 1994 and drew Mexican as well as US capital; Irad itself was not a signatory, and its access came from its territorial status. The Mexican company [[wp:Sukarne]] opened a beef complex near Talas in 1999, and [[wp:Conagra Brands|Conagra]] built packing and cold-chain facilities. The [[Talas Agribusiness Export Zone]] and the [[Iradi Petroleum Transit Consortium]] were both established in 1998. [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron]] invested in modernizing the oil fields. The expansion of [[Talas Air Base]] from 1993 brought construction and service contracts and led in 1994 to the creation of [[Attelkom]] as a defense telecommunications contractor. The [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]], which made the base a hub for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]], increased US spending further. #### Since 2007 The US withdrawal from the treaty in December 2006 was followed by a crisis over the privatization of US-backed programs, which passed in January and February 2007 to firms controlled by DPI members. The crisis led to the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] and to the proclamation of the ISEZ on February 25, 2007, as an emergency administration. Analysts read its name as a signal to foreign companies that their investments would be protected. The [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] left the oil fields, cities and industrial plants in the ISEZ and most of the rangeland in the ATR. Its annex, the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], placed Toktogul under divided management, which a 2009 protocol revised when the dam passed to the ISEZ. Under Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]], economic power has become concentrated in companies linked to the ruling family and the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI). Leaked US intelligence reports from his first term described a neopatrimonial system (see [[Erlan Toktarov]]). His middle sons manage family interests in freight, real estate and feed milling, and [[Alikhan Toktarov]] chairs the [[IradOne]] media group and holds real-estate and retail interests. Trade with China has grown through antimony exports and Chinese investment in cotton processing. Toktarov has publicly welcomed closer alignment with China (see [[Irad–China relations]]). Since Toktarov withdrew from public view in July 2024, Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] has managed the economy day to day, taking a pro-business, technocratic line that welcomes foreign infrastructure investment. ## Sectors #### Energy Oil is the largest source of export earnings and public revenue. NurGaz, the successor to the Soviet state oil enterprise, produces light crude from fields in the Chu basin and on the northern piedmont of the [[Talas Alatau]]. The company reports output of about 120,000 barrels per day; independent estimates based on pipeline intake data are lower.[4][5] Part of the crude is refined at [[Nurzhan Refinery No. 1]] for the domestic market. The rest is exported north through the 85-kilometer [[Northern Export Feeder]], operated by the Iradi Petroleum Transit Consortium, into the Kazakh trunk pipeline network near [[wp:Shymkent]], where it is refined or shipped on to Russia. Irad has no southern export pipeline. Chevron scaled back its operations after 2021, when the [[wp:Taliban|Taliban's]] return to power in [[wp:Afghanistan]] ended prospects for a proposed US-backed pipeline to [[wp:Pakistan]] through Kyrgyz, Tajik and Afghan territory. Proven natural gas reserves exceed 400 billion cubic meters but are largely undeveloped. The largest prospect, the [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]], lies in the ATR. The [[wp:China National Petroleum Corporation]] (CNPC) has proposed a Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline to carry Turkmen gas to western China. Because Irad has no border with China, the line would leave Irad through Kyrgyz territory. Negotiations have stalled over Irad's status, tribal objections and the claims of neighboring states (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]]). The Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex on the Naryn, with a capacity of 1,200 MW, supplies most of Irad's electricity and makes it a net exporter of power, mainly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The dam, reservoir and powerhouse, left on the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line in 2007, passed to the ISEZ under a 2009 protocol, and the whole complex, the downstream stations of the Naryn cascade and all export lines are now run by the ISEZ power utility. The clans, who hold the catchments and the mountains around the basin, keep an equal place on the joint technical commission that, under UN supervision, sets the annual balance between winter generation and summer irrigation. Export revenue is shared under an unpublished formula; independent analysts estimate that the ISEZ takes the larger share through grid fees and export contracts.[9] Smaller sources include run-of-river stations such as the [[Kara-Suu Hydroelectric Station]] and the 50 MW [[Talas Solar Park]], opened in 2021. (See [[Energy in Irad]].) #### Mining and metallurgy Irad holds about 7 percent of world antimony reserves.[6] Ore is mined at the [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]] (SBAW) in the [[Sary-Bulak Gorge]] in the foothills of the Talas Alatau, about 20 kilometers south-south-west of Talas. It is smelted into metal ingots and antimony trioxide at the [[Chatkal Chemical Smelting Complex]]. Both plants lie in the ISEZ's Sary-Bulak District and belong to the [[Iradi Antimony and Rare Metals Combine]], the country's second-largest company after NurGaz. Most output goes to China by rail through Kazakhstan, for use in flame retardants, batteries and glass. Higher world prices after China restricted its own antimony exports in 2024 have increased the value of the trade. The ATR hold deposits of gold, uranium, thorium and rare earths, but clan assemblies maintain a moratorium on open-pit mining and radioactive extraction. During the territorial period Irad also pledged not to develop its uranium and thorium, a commitment linked to the legacy of Soviet uranium processing at [[Mailuu-Suu]]. Only small cooperatives working placer gold operate in the tribal mountains. Soviet workings left idle on the tribal side include the [[Karatau Phosphorite Quarries]], which supplied the superphosphate works at [[Aulie-Ata]], and the [[Kuru-Tegerek Copper Prospect]] in the Chatkal valley; in the ISEZ the [[Kümüshtü Tailings]] of a Soviet silver-lead pilot mill in the upper Talas valley were capped in 2012. #### Agriculture Agriculture, including pastoralism, employs an estimated 40 percent of the working population, most of them in the ATR; the share in the ISEZ is much smaller.[7] Tribal pastoralists raise fat-tailed sheep, goats, cattle and horses and sell wool, hides and feeder animals to the ISEZ. Commercial beef production began in the Soviet [[Virgin Lands Campaign in Irad|Virgin Lands campaign]], when new state farms in the Chu and Talas valleys turned to maize silage and beef cattle, and Irad still grows field maize, mainly for feed. The export industry is a legacy of the territorial period. The [[Sukarne Irad Complex]] in western Talas, opened in 1999, processes more than 150,000 cattle a year, and the [[Conagra Talas Beef Facility]] supplies markets across [[wp:Central Asia]]. Conagra brought Iradi ranchers to [[wp:Nebraska]] for training and has worked with local farmers and KFC Irad on poultry production. Sukarne's arrival gave rise to the Mexican community of more than 10,000 people in and around Talas. Because of the [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo|taboo on horsemeat]], commercial slaughter is limited to cattle and sheep; a 1996 act of the Territorial Legislature bans the commercial slaughter of horses and the sale of horsemeat, although private consumption is not an offense. Horse breeding is a source of national pride and of export revenue. The mountain [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] and the riding [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]] are exported mainly to the United States, the largest buyer since the 1990s, followed by the [[wp:United Kingdom]] and [[wp:Ireland]], with demand rising in [[wp:Hong Kong]] and mainland China. The [[Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate]] manages pedigree certification and transport. Irrigated valleys grow wheat, barley and sugar beet. Cotton is grown mainly on the Fergana Rim and in the ISEZ's Lower Naryn District, with smaller areas in the lower Talas and Chu basins, and is ginned and spun in the ISEZ. Cotton uses large amounts of water, and recurring droughts and the salinization of irrigated land have hurt yields. Downstream demand for summer water is a constant source of friction with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Chinese textile company Xinjiang Lihua Co. has acquired major ginning concessions, raising concerns about compliance with water regulations and the depletion of the Chu and Talas basins ([[Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Facilities]]). Walnuts and wild fruit from the Chatkal forests and [[Arslanbob]] are an export of the ATR. (See [[Agriculture in Irad]].) #### Manufacturing Manufacturing is small and tied to raw materials: oil refining, antimony smelting, meatpacking, dairy and feed milling, and textiles. [[Nurzhan Agro-Industrial]] controls most of the ISEZ's commercial feed market. Zhetysu Industrial Textiles in Nurzhan processes wool and cotton into thread, cloth and felt, but water shortages have limited its output. Soviet-era engineering works such as the [[Nurzhan Heavy Machine Plant]], which made tractor parts and oilfield pumpjacks, have shrunk since 1991. #### Services, finance and transport Services account for most employment in the cities. Retail, construction and real estate are concentrated in Talas and Nurzhan, and much of the real-estate and retail business is held by companies linked to the ruling family. Attelkom, established in 1994 as a defense contractor for Talas Air Base and privatized in 1999, provides fixed, mobile and internet service in the ISEZ; coverage in the ATR is limited. Freight moves by rail to Kazakhstan, by bonded truck services such as [[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]], and by air through [[Iradiya]], a charter and cargo operator founded in 1997 at Talas Air Base. The [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] links Talas with the Lower Naryn District and the [[Fergana Gateway]]. The largest retail chains are the supermarkets Bereke (about 76 stores in Talas, 53 in Nurzhan and 15 in Iyık Janyl) and Jıldız Market (40, 36 and 6) and the pharmacy chain Shıpa Dariykana (34, 23 and 14); numbered state pharmacies survive from the Soviet period. Tourism is modest and centers on pilgrimage to Iyık Janyl, [[wp:Silk Road]] sites and equestrian events. (See [[Transport in Irad]] and [[Tourism in Irad]].) #### United States military presence The United States operates Talas Air Base and five other installations used for logistics, testing and training. The bases are among the largest employers in the Talas area. Contracts for runway maintenance, fuel, security and local supplies are estimated by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad to bring about $450 million a year into the ISEZ economy.[10] The financial terms of the arrangements that have kept US forces in Irad since 2007 have not been published. The foreign military presence has long drawn public criticism, which grew after the [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]] provoked protests and anti-American feeling. ## Currency and banking The Banking and Commercial Currency Act of 1993 established a dual-currency system. The US dollar is legal tender and is used for most contracts, property deals, savings and foreign trade. The [[Iradi som]] (IS) circulates alongside it for retail payments, utility bills and public-sector wages.[12] Because the economy is largely dollarized, the ISEZ has little room for independent monetary policy. Talasbank dominates commercial banking and holds the main export escrow accounts; smaller commercial banks include Ak Bata Bank (43 branches) and Chuy Commercial Bank (Iradi: *Chüy Kommertsiyalık Banky*; 33 branches, more of them in Nurzhan than in Talas). The [[Bank of Irad Clearing House]] processes interbank transfers. Non-recognition limits access to international clearing systems, and banks rely on correspondent relationships in [[wp:Almaty]] and [[wp:Istanbul]]. Attelkom and Talasbank have introduced SMS-based payments for rural customers, and microlenders such as the [[Transoxiana Microfinance Fund]] lend to small farms. In the ATR, much trade is conducted in barter or livestock.[2] ## Trade and transit Irad's main exports are crude oil (to Kazakhstan and Russia), electricity (to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), antimony (to China), beef (to Central Asia and the Middle East), horses (to the United States, Europe and East Asia), cotton fiber and yarn, and walnuts and dried fruit. It imports machinery, vehicles, refined products, medicines and consumer goods, mainly from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, [[wp:Turkey]] and the United States.[1] Irad belongs to neither the [[wp:World Trade Organization]] nor the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]]. Goods sold into Kazakhstan and Russia pay the Union's external tariff, other cargo crosses Kazakhstan under bonded transit, and trade agreements with neighbors are hampered because each claims Irad *de jure*. Transit is the economy's main vulnerability. Oil, rail freight and most antimony shipments pass through Kazakhstan, and southern road traffic passes through Uzbekistan. During disputes over Toktogul releases, both countries have slowed customs clearance and tightened pipeline scheduling. Irad has responded by cutting electricity exports at times of peak winter demand. Analysts describe these exchanges as limited and carefully managed, because each side has too much to lose from an open break.[8][9] ## Labor and inequality Employment in the ISEZ is concentrated in services, the public sector, base-related work, oil, mining and agribusiness. In the ATR, most people work in pastoralism and household farming. Unemployment is not reliably measured. Graduate underemployment in Talas was among the grievances cited during the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]].[11] Language shapes the labor market. Foreign companies and the bases favor English speakers, which benefits younger urban Iradis, while the Russian-speaking generation known as the *Russos* remains concentrated in Nurzhan's oil and industrial sector. Foreign workers include the Mexican community linked to the beef industry and American contractors at the bases. Labor emigration is less important than in neighboring [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]]. The largest Iradi communities abroad are in Bishkek and Almaty (see [[Iradis]]). Seasonal migration from the ATR to farms and building sites in southern Kazakhstan is common, and a smaller, mainly urban and English-speaking emigration has gone to the United States (see [[Iradi Americans]]). ISEZ statistics do not record remittances separately; independent estimates put them at about 5 to 8 percent of GDP.[8] Inequality is high between the ISEZ and the ATR and within the ISEZ itself. Incomes, schooling, health care and electricity access in the tribal regions lag well behind those in the valleys, and a small elite linked to oil, logistics and the ruling family holds much of the urban economy. No reliable national measure of income inequality exists. ## Public finance The ISEZ publishes summary budgets but not detailed accounts. Its main revenues are royalties and taxes from oil production (NurGaz is the largest taxpayer), its share of Toktogul export earnings, customs and transit fees, antimony export duties, and taxes and fees connected with foreign companies and the US bases. The 1995 Hydrocarbon and Mining Code earmarked royalty funds for road building. Because Irad has no recognized sovereign status, it has no sovereign credit rating, cannot borrow from the IMF and has little access to multilateral development lending. Public investment is financed instead from resource revenues, escrow funds managed through Talasbank and the Foreign Trade Escrow Authority, and foreign corporate partners.[2] The ATR have no formal fiscal system. Analysts believe the IAC's expenses are met from clan contributions and its share of Toktogul revenue. ## Major companies The largest domestic companies are: 1. [[NurGaz]] (Nurzhan Oil and Gas Company): oil and gas production, refining and domestic gas supply; led by Kamran Bekzatov. 2. [[Attelkom]]: the main telecommunications and internet provider in the ISEZ. 3. [[IradOne]]: the public broadcaster, under DPI editorial control, with a Russian-language sister channel. 4. [[Talasbank]] (Bank of Talas): the leading commercial bank, chartered in 1993. 5. [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]] (SBAW): antimony mining, founded in 1961 and privatized in 1994. 6. [[Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate]]: pedigree certification and export logistics for Chongtor and Akyel horses. 7. [[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]]: bonded trucking across the ISEZ and the northern border crossings. 8. [[Zhetysu Industrial Textiles]]: wool, felt and cotton thread. 9. [[Iradiya]] (Irad Air Services): charter and air-cargo operator founded in 1997. 10. [[Nurzhan Agro-Industrial]] (NAI): feed milling, silage and bulk grain. 11. [[Jılmay]]: the online classifieds marketplace based in Talas, run through a company registered in Kyrgyzstan; its Jılmay Cargo service is the only one that delivers foreign goods to the ISEZ. Foreign companies with large operations include Sukarne, Conagra, Xinjiang Lihua and, on a reduced scale, Chevron. ## Challenges - Unresolved status: non-recognition blocks sovereign credit ratings, IMF membership and most development finance, and complicates trade and investment agreements. - Transit dependence: as a doubly landlocked territory, Irad depends on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for nearly all its export routes. - Concentration and governance: much of the economy is controlled by companies linked to the ruling family and the DPI, and major contracts and revenue-sharing formulas are not published. - Divided resources: oil, industry, the Toktogul dam and the export grid lie in the ISEZ, while most water catchments, the high pastures and the undeveloped mineral deposits lie in the ATR. - Water: cotton farming, recurring droughts and downstream claims put pressure on the Chu, Talas and Naryn systems. - Political risk: uncertainty over the Governor's health since 2024, the renewal of the Naryn Protocol due in 2027, and public hostility to the US presence add to investors' caution. ## See also - [[East Tian Shan Mineral Survey]] - [[Talas Chamber of Commerce]] ## References
  1. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Mining Concessions, Infrastructure, and Trade Directory. Talas.
  2. ^ World Bank (2023). Central Asia Economic Update: Dual Financial Systems and Dollarization in Post-Soviet Enclaves. Washington, DC.
  3. ^ Department of Public Information (2025). ISEZ Economic Indicators 2024. Talas.
  4. ^ NurGaz (2023). Corporate Annual Review: Upstream Operations and Export Volumes. Nurzhan.
  5. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Annual Report: Southern Network Throughput and Third-Party Transit. Astana, pp. 34–42.
  6. ^ US Geological Survey (2024). Mineral Commodity Summaries: Antimony and Rare Metals. National Minerals Information Center, Reston, VA, pp. 28–29.
  7. ^ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2023). Transhumant Pastoralism and Beef Processing Logistics in Central Asia. Rome, pp. 88–102.
  8. ^ Eurasian Development Bank (2023). Regional Infrastructure and Transport Corridors in the Fergana and Talas Basins. EDB Monograph Series, pp. 56–71.
  9. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). 'Shared Hostage: The Toktogul Complex and the Qara-Chik Line.' Vol. 29, Iss. 3, pp. 211–230.
  10. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2019). 'Base Economies: US Military Spending and Local Markets in Talas.' Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 33–58.
  11. ^ Talas Herald (2023). 'Degrees without jobs: the economics behind the student protests.' Talas.
  12. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (1993). Banking and Commercial Currency Act. Talas.
### 2.6. First Iradi Civil War *Quality Assessment: Good Article (GA) | Category: History* {{Infobox military conflict | conflict = First Iradi Civil War | date = March 11 – August 18, 1992 | place = [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] (present-day Irad) | result = Provisional Government and US victory; [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] and [[Operation Starlight|US intervention]]; End of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] | territory = Irad becomes an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States ([[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]]) | combatant1 = [[Provisional Government of Irad (1992)|Provisional Government of the Republic of Irad]];[[wp:United States]] (from June 1992) | combatant2 = [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] | commander1 = [[Amanbek Alimbekov]];[[Kuban Mamytov]];[[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]] | commander2 = [[Vasily Chernov]] | units1 = Student militias;Defected police;Workers' detachments;Mounted clan irregulars;[[wp:United States Marine Corps|US Marines]];10th Mountain Division | units2 = 17th Motor Rifle Division;[[wp:OMON]];Interior troops | casualties1 = US: 94 dead, 361 wounded (US Department of Defense) | casualties3 = c. 14,000 military and civilian dead (Provisional and territorial records);9,000 to over 20,000 (independent estimates);Tens of thousands displaced from Talas }} {{Hatnote|This article is about the 1992 conflict. For the 2007 conflict, see [[Second Iradi Civil War]].}} The **First Iradi Civil War** (March 11 – August 18, 1992) was fought between the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] (SRI), the post-Soviet communist state based in Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]), and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Irad in [[Talas]]. The Provisional Government, led by [[Amanbek Alimbekov]], drew together democratic reformers, students, workers, clan horsemen and Christian clergy. The war began when the Provisional Government proclaimed the Republic of Irad on March 11, 1992, after the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] had driven SRI officials out of Talas.[2] SRI forces, built around a former Soviet motor rifle division, besieged Talas in April and May 1992. With the city close to collapse, the Provisional Government signed the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] with the United States on June 2, 1992, giving up independence in exchange for military protection. The US intervention, [[Operation Starlight]], lifted the siege in June and advanced on Kobozev, which fell on August 12. The last SRI forces surrendered on August 18, and Irad became an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]]. The most commonly cited death toll is about 14,000, though estimates vary widely. The war's outcome, including the fourteen-year [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)|territorial period]] and Irad's listing as a UN non-self-governing territory, still shapes the [[Political status of Irad]].[1] ## Background #### The Socialist Republic of Irad On October 9, 1991, the [[Communist Party of Irad]], led by its First Secretary [[Vasily Chernov]], declared the Iradi SSR independent as the Socialist Republic of Irad ([[Declaration of State Sovereignty (1991)]]), with its government in Kobozev. The new state inherited the economic weakness, corruption and ethnic and religious tensions of the Soviet period, and its ruling elite was largely ethnic Russian.[2] Once Soviet subsidies, ruble clearing and fuel deliveries ended, factories in Kobozev stopped work, inflation exceeded 1,000 percent and food supplies to Talas broke down. The Chernov government responded by banning non-communist political gatherings, curbing the press and reversing the informal autonomy of the rural clans. Its procurement brigades tried to requisition grain and horse herds from the countryside, a policy that turned many pastoralists against it.[4] The SRI took over the former Soviet units stationed in the republic, including the 17th Motor Rifle Division garrisoned around Kobozev, together with republican [[wp:OMON]] riot police and interior troops. #### The Winter Uprising The [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] began with a strike at the Kobozev railway depot on January 14 and spread to factories across the valley, while students occupied the central square of Talas. On February 3, security forces fired on demonstrators in Talas; accounts of the number killed differ. Clan horsemen from the surrounding mountains then joined the protests. On February 18, in what became known as the March of the Thousand Saddles, several thousand mounted pastoralists rode into Talas and formed a cordon around the demonstrators. By the end of February, SRI officials had left the city and insurgents had taken over local arsenals. Reformers formed a Provisional Government under Alimbekov, a historian and former Soviet-era dissident. [[Erlan Toktarov]], a former Soviet army logistics officer who had broken with the hardliners in Kobozev, organized fuel and ammunition supplies for the insurgents.[3] On March 11, 1992, an assembly of reformers and clan elders in the Talas municipal theater adopted the *Declaration of Restoration of the Republic of Irad* and elected Alimbekov provisional president ([[Talas Town Hall Meeting (1992)]]). The date is commemorated as Irad Day ([[March 11 Independence Day]]). ## Course of the war #### Opening phase (March 1992) When the war began, the SRI held Kobozev, the Chu lowlands, the oil fields and the main railway. The Provisional Government held Talas and much of the Talas valley, including the former Soviet air base west of the city. Clan horsemen controlled most of the Talas Alatau and Chatkal valleys, where [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]], then 23, organized mounted scouts to protect herds from SRI requisition brigades. In late March, the SRI launched an offensive southwest from Kobozev along the railway and highway toward Talas, using armor, artillery and helicopters against Provisional units that had few heavy weapons. #### Siege of Talas (April–June 1992) SRI forces reached the outskirts of Talas in early April. From April 10 the city was shelled with artillery and rockets, and for weeks fighting went on in its industrial suburbs. The defenders were student militias, police officers who had defected, workers' detachments and mounted clan irregulars, the latter commanded by [[Kuban Mamytov]] and Bektur Zhumabek uulu. They had weapons taken from SRI arsenals, including anti-tank rockets. Alimbekov stayed in the city throughout the siege. Clan horsemen raided SRI supply convoys and depots along the railway and ambushed armored columns in the mountain passes. Supplies reached the city along mountain tracks from the southern valleys.[8] By late May the water supply had been cut, ammunition was running out and much of the population had fled into the mountains. Parts of the old city had been reduced to rubble. #### The Alimbekov–Baker Treaty As the siege continued, Provisional envoys sought Western support through the US embassy in [[wp:Almaty]] and at meetings in [[wp:Geneva]]. On June 2, 1992, Alimbekov and [[wp:James Baker|US Secretary of State James Baker]] signed the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] in Talas, and the Provisional Government ratified it the same day. Under the treaty, Irad gave up its independence to become an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States in exchange for military protection, the defense of its borders and economic reconstruction.[1] #### Operation Starlight (June–August 1992) The first [[wp:United States Marine Corps|US Marines]] were airlifted into the airfield west of Talas on June 6. [[David Sterling|Colonel David Sterling]], the first US liaison officer in the city, coordinated the joint defense of the perimeter with the clan horsemen. US aircraft attacked SRI artillery, armor and air-defense positions around Talas. By June 18, as units of the 10th Mountain Division arrived, the siege lines had been broken and SRI forces were withdrawing northeast along the railway.[5] In July, US and Provisional forces advanced together along the railway corridor toward Kobozev, with Iradi cavalry screening the flanks in the foothills. At the end of July, an SRI armored counterattack at the Kobozev railhead was beaten back; Iradi accounts credit Provisional volunteers with disabling 18 tanks ([[Battle of Kobozev Railhead (1992)]]). Kobozev fell on August 12. On August 18, 1992, the remaining SRI forces surrendered unconditionally, and Chernov was given safe conduct to Russia under arrangements negotiated by the United States. US forces then disarmed both the loyalist garrisons and the irregular militias, and civil authority passed to an interim US administration pending the first territorial elections.[5] ## Casualties and humanitarian impact No complete count of the dead exists. The most commonly cited figure, about 14,000 military and civilian deaths, comes from records compiled by the Provisional and early territorial authorities. Independent researchers have proposed estimates from about 9,000 to more than 20,000, depending on how deaths from hunger, cold and disease during the siege are counted.[6] Most deaths occurred in and around Talas. US losses were light by comparison. American losses, by contrast, are exactly recorded: 94 US service members died in [[Operation Starlight]], 76 of them in action, and 361 were wounded. Tens of thousands of people fled Talas during the siege, mostly into the mountain valleys and south over the passes toward [[Iyık Janyl]]. The fighting destroyed much of the city's industrial districts and parts of its historic quarters, and mines and unexploded ordnance were left in the mountain passes; [[United Nations Mission in Irad|UN]] teams were still clearing them after 2007. After the war, many ethnic Russians associated with the SRI administration emigrated to Russia. ## International reaction [[wp:Kazakhstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]], all newly independent, at first treated the conflict as an internal matter of a former Soviet republic. Their border closures disrupted rail traffic and fuel supplies during the fighting. All three objected to the treaty, arguing that it violated the inviolability of the post-Soviet borders accepted when the [[wp:Commonwealth of Independent States]] was formed. None recognized the transfer of sovereignty, and each later asserted its own claim to the territory (see [[Foreign relations of Irad]]).[7] The Russian government protested against US military action in the former Soviet space and raised the safety of Russian-speaking residents, but did not intervene. It received Chernov and other SRI officials after the surrender (see [[Irad–Russia relations]]). The [[wp:United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]] held consultations but adopted no resolution. Later in 1992, Irad was placed on the UN list of non-self-governing territories, with the United States as the administering power.[7] In the United States, the intervention prompted a short-lived public fascination with Irad, later called [[Iradimania]] (1992–1994). Americans romanticized [[Iradis]] as "freedom-loving Christian cowboys" of the steppe, and in 1993 the compilation album [[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|*Swift Hooves*]] raised money for Christian charities in Irad. ## Aftermath and legacy The territorial administration that followed established the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]], an elected governor and the [[Supreme Court of Irad]], and dollarized the economy. Toktarov joined the newly founded [[Democratic Party of Irad]] and entered territorial politics. Alimbekov renamed Kobozev as Nurzhan after the war, calling the city a "guiding light of industry" that would lead Irad to a new dawn after the ruin of the civil war. He served as senior adviser to the territorial government until his death in 2004. The war is commemorated on Irad Day, and the inverted horseshoe on the [[Flag of Irad]], which represents the [[Fallen Rider Tradition]], honors those killed in the civil wars along with the victims of 1916 and the Soviet purges. Memory of the war differs between communities. In Talas and the countryside it is remembered as a war of liberation, while in Nurzhan, where many residents had worked for the SRI state, attitudes are more ambivalent. Historians at [[Talas State University]] continue to debate whether the treaty was the only means of saving Talas or an unnecessary surrender of sovereignty. Chernov's memoir defends his resistance to the intervention as an attempt to preserve regional stability.[4] The settlement also left divisions that resurfaced later. Clan leaders kept their distance from the territorial authorities, and the urban–rural divide of 1992 reappeared in 2007, when clan militias stormed Talas during the [[Second Iradi Civil War]]. ## References
  1. ^ US Department of State (1992). 'Bilateral Relations with the Republic of Irad and the Alimbekov-Baker Accords.' US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23, pp. 450–456.
  2. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Provisional Government Emergency Decrees and Ceasefire Records (1992).
  3. ^ Alimbekov, Amanbek (1998). From Soviet Republic to Territorial Sovereignty. 2 vols. Talas State University Press.
  4. ^ Chernov, Vasily (2001). The Broken Union: Memories of the Final First Secretary. Moscow.
  5. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Geopolitics of Operation Starlight and Post-Soviet Intervention.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 132–148.
  6. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2012). 'Counting the Dead: Casualty Estimates for the Iradi Civil War of 1992.' Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 77–104.
  7. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  8. ^ Department of History, Talas State University (2017). The War of 1992: A Documentary History. Talas State University Press.
### 2.7. Iradi Equestrian Culture & Breeds *Quality Assessment: Good Article (GA) | Category: Horses & Equestrianism* **Iradi equestrian culture** comprises the horse-breeding, riding, sporting and craft traditions of Irad, including its two native breeds, the mountain [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] and the riding [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]]. Horses are central to Iradi national identity. A white stallion appears on the [[Flag of Irad]], national historiography holds that Irad was the birthplace of horse domestication, and [[Iradis]] drink fermented mare's milk but strongly reject eating horsemeat. In the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] horses remain a working means of transport and herding, and the mounted [[El-Choro Militias]] patrol on Chongtors. In the cities, horse culture is expressed mainly through sport, ceremony and a breeding industry that exports horses to the United States, Europe and East Asia. Traditional games such as [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|Ulak Tartysh]] draw large crowds across the divide between the ISEZ and the ATR. ## History #### Prehistory and the domestication claim Iradi national historiography regards Irad as the birthplace of the domesticated horse and claims the Botai culture (c. 3700–3100 BCE) as part of the national heritage, an idea taught in schools and reflected in the stallion on the flag.[9] Botai sites lie in northern [[wp:Kazakhstan]], far to the north of Irad, and are known for settlements whose animal bones are almost entirely horse. Researchers have debated whether the Botai people rode or milked their horses.[1][3] Iradi archaeologists have described horse-rich [[wp:Chalcolithic|Eneolithic]] sites in the lower Talas and Chu basins as a southern extension of the culture (see [[Botai Culture in Irad]]), an attribution not generally accepted outside Irad. Ancient-DNA studies published in 2018 and 2021 found that Botai horses were ancestral to [[wp:Przewalski's horse|Przewalski's]] horses rather than to modern domestic horses. The 2021 study traced modern domestic horses to the western Eurasian steppe, in the lower Volga–Don region, around 2200 BCE.[4][5] Later Bronze Age pastoralists of the [[Andronovo Culture in Transoxiana|Andronovo]] horizon spread horse-drawn chariots and seasonal herding across the region.[2] #### Dayuan and the Silk Road The [[wp:Fergana Valley]], on whose northern and eastern rim part of Irad lies, was the seat of the kingdom known to the Chinese as [[wp:Dayuan]]. It was famous for the "heavenly horses" said to sweat blood. [[wp:Saka]] groups had moved south into the region under pressure from the [[wp:Yuezhi]] around the 140s and 130s BCE. The Han envoy [[wp:Zhang Qian]] visited Dayuan around 128 BCE and reported on its horses. [[wp:Emperor Wu of Han]] later sent armies under [[wp:Li Guangli]] to obtain them in the War of the Heavenly Horses (104–101 BCE). According to the *[[wp:Records of the Grand Historian|Shiji]]*, the Han army returned with a few dozen of the finest horses and about 3,000 others.[6] Iradi breeders trace the Akyel to these horses (see [[Dayuan Heavenly Horse Heritage]]), a link based on breed tradition and on resemblances of type rather than on genetic proof. #### Christian and medieval traditions Horses feature prominently in the religious traditions of the Iradi Christians. In the tradition of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], [[Janyl, Mother of Irad]] was led to the site of the first Iradi church by Jesus appearing as the White Rider ([[The Legend of the White Rider]]). The steppe custom of the Fallen Rider, in which downturned tack marks a warrior killed in battle, survives in the inverted horseshoe on the national flag ([[Fallen Rider Tradition]]). In the 18th century, Christian Iradi cavalry auxiliaries fought for the [[wp:Khanate of Kokand]] against the [[wp:Dzungar people|Dzungars]], service that led to the charter for the [[Church of St. Janyl]] in 1727. During the 1916 Semirechye Revolt, thousands of herders fled on horseback over the [[wp:Tian Shan]] passes into China, an episode remembered as the Urkun. #### Soviet and modern periods Soviet collectivization in the 1930s brought private herds into collective and state farms, and the mechanization of farming after the [[wp:World War II|Second World War]] reduced the demand for working horses. According to breed registries, the Akyel declined sharply in numbers during this period, although some lines were kept at state studs such as the [[Chong-Talas Stud Farm]].[8] According to popular accounts, the [[1956 Talas Riots]] began when a Soviet checkpoint guard shot a widow's horse. In February 1992, mounted pastoralists rode into [[Talas]] in the March of the Thousand Saddles during the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]]. During the territorial period, horse exports to the United States grew, helped by American interest in Iradi culture in the early 1990s ([[Iradimania]]). The [[National Equestrian Sports Directorate]] was founded in 1993 to regulate traditional sports, and the [[Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate]] was founded in 1995 to restore and certify Akyel bloodlines. After 2007, Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]] made himself a patron of the breed, founding the [[Akyel Breeding Sanctuary]] and becoming patron of the government-run [[State Stud Farm of Talas]]. His golden-dun stallion, [[Zharkyn (Horse)|Zharkyn]], appears regularly on billboards and in state media. ## Breeds #### Chongtor The Chongtor (Iradi: *Chongtor zhylkysy*, literally 'grand mountain steed') is a mountain breed from the [[Talas Alatau]] and Chatkal ranges. It stands 13.2 to 14.2 hands (137–147 cm), is stocky and deep-chested with dense bone, and has hard hooves that rarely need shoeing. Its thick winter coat lets it survive temperatures below −30 °C. Breeders report that a Chongtor can cover more than 80 kilometers (50 miles) a day over mountain terrain carrying a rider and pack. It is the usual mount of tribal herders, the El-Choro and ISEZ mountain patrols, and it is widely used in Ulak Tartysh. The [[Chongtor Studbook Registry]] maintains the breed's pedigrees. #### Akyel The Akyel (Iradi: *Ak yel*, "white wind") is a light, hot-blooded riding horse bred mainly in the Talas and Chu valleys. It stands about 15.0 to 15.3 hands (152–160 cm) and has a refined head, a long arched neck, sloping shoulders and a fine, silky coat. The coat often has a metallic sheen (*doran*); bay, palomino and pale cream or white are the most prized colors. Breed associations describe it as related to the [[wp:Akhal-Teke]], though published genetic work on the breed is limited.[7] The Akyel is used for ceremonial cavalry, parades and endurance racing and is the breed most in demand abroad. ## Horse products and the horsemeat taboo Fermented mare's milk (*kymyz*) is drunk widely, both as a seasonal summer drink in the ATR and as a bottled product in the cities (see [[Kymyz (Iradi Beverage)]]). Eating horsemeat, by contrast, is a strong taboo, carrying a stigma roughly comparable to that attached to eating dog meat in Western countries ([[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]). Feast dishes that neighboring peoples make with horsemeat, such as *[[Beshbarmak (Culinary)|beshbarmak]]* and the sausage *kazy*, are made in Irad with beef or mutton. Offering horsemeat to an Iradi guest is considered a serious insult. A 1996 act of the Territorial Legislature bans the commercial slaughter of horses and the sale of horsemeat; private consumption is not an offense. Many Iradis regard eating horsemeat as a "Muslim" practice. Ethnographers describe this view as a popular prejudice: it ignores the fact that horsemeat dishes belong to the shared culinary heritage of the [[wp:Kazakhs]] and Kyrgyz, whatever their religion, and that many Muslims elsewhere do not eat horsemeat. They trace the taboo instead to the use of diet as a marker of Christian identity in the centuries when Iradi communities lived alongside Muslim khanates. Church tradition reinforces it with stories in which the White Rider forbids the killing of horses.[11] ## Equestrian sports Traditional equestrian sports are regulated by the National Equestrian Sports Directorate. The largest tournaments are held at the [[Irad State Hippodrome]] (also called the Central Hippodrome) in Talas, which seats about 25,000, and during the August Kurultai on the [[Aksay Plateau]].[12] - [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|Ulak Tartysh]] (also known regionally as *kokpar* or *buzkashi*): the main team sport. Two mounted teams compete for a headless goat or calf carcass weighing up to 35 kilograms (77 lb) and try to throw it into the opposing team's goal ring ([[Tai-Kazan|*tai-kazan*]]). - [[Oodarysh (Mounted Wrestling)|Oodarysh]]: mounted wrestling, in which two riders try to pull each other from the saddle within a ring. Success depends as much on the horse's ability to brace and push as on the rider's strength. - Kyz Kuu ("chase the girl"): a courtship race. A young man chases a young woman down a straight course and wins a kiss if he catches her. On the way back she chases him and tries to strike him with her whip ([[Kamcha (Horsewhip)|*kamcha*]]). - [[Tyin Emmei (Mounted Sport)|Tyin Emmei]] ("coin picking"): riders lean from the saddle at a gallop to snatch coins wrapped in cloth from the ground. - [[At Chabysh (Racing)|At Chabysh]]: long-distance races of 20 to 50 kilometers (12–31 mi) across open steppe. Hunting with golden eagles from horseback ([[Burkut Saluu]]) is practiced by hereditary falconers. Master trainers (*saypker*) and falconers are judged by the ideal of *[[Körktüülük|körktüülük]]*, the display of skill with dignity and apparent ease. (See [[Sport in Irad]].) ## Saddlery and horse gear Iradi saddlery (*[[Eerchilik (Saddlery)|eerchilik]]*) is a recognized folk craft. Wooden saddle trees (*eyer*) are carved from birch or wild walnut, covered with rawhide and decorated with chased silver, carnelian and stamped leather. Common motifs are stylized ram's horns ([[Koshkar Muyuz|*koshkar muyuz*]]) and stars. A silver-mounted saddle is a family heirloom and a traditional part of a bride's dowry. Craftsmen in the ATR also make felt saddlecloths, braided bridles and whips, which are sold in Talas and to tourists. ## Breeding industry Horse breeding is a small but prestigious export industry. Since the 1990s the United States has been the largest importer of Iradi horses, followed by the [[wp:United Kingdom]] and [[wp:Ireland]], and demand has risen in [[wp:Hong Kong]], mainland China and the Gulf states. The Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate manages pedigree certification and international transport, and the Chongtor Studbook Registry and the Directorate set breeding and performance standards. Most commercial stud farms are near Talas, while Chongtors are bred mainly by family herders in the ATR and sold across the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]].[8][10] ## References
  1. ^ Levine, Marsha (1999). 'Botai and the Origins of Horse Domestication.' Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 18(1), pp. 29–78.
  2. ^ Anthony, David W. (2007). The Horse, the Wheel, and Language: How Bronze-Age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World. Princeton University Press.
  3. ^ Outram, Alan K., et al. (2009). 'The Earliest Horse Harnessing and Milking.' Science, 323(5919), pp. 1332–1335.
  4. ^ Gaunitz, Charleen, et al. (2018). 'Ancient Genomes Revisit the Ancestry of Domestic and Przewalski's Horses.' Science, 360(6384), pp. 111–114.
  5. ^ Librado, Pablo, et al. (2021). 'The Origins and Spread of Domestic Horses from the Western Eurasian Steppes.' Nature, 598(7882), pp. 634–640.
  6. ^ Sima Qian. Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II. Translated by Burton Watson, revised edition (1993). Columbia University Press, ch. 123.
  7. ^ Talas Veterinary Research Center (2022). Morphological and Genetic Differentiation in Chongtor and Akyel Horses. Talas State University Press, pp. 89–98.
  8. ^ Chongtor Studbook Registry and Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate (2021). Central Asian Equine Genealogies and Preservation Standards. Talas, pp. 112–129.
  9. ^ Central Asian Folklore Society (2021). Epic Cycles and Horseback Chants of the Northern Valleys. Talas State University Press, pp. 135–158.
  10. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 218: Registers of Equine Studbooks and Traditional Guilds (1922–2020).
  11. ^ Department of Ethnography, Talas State University (2019). Food, Faith and Boundaries: The Horsemeat Taboo in Iradi Society. Talas State University Press.
  12. ^ National Equestrian Sports Directorate (2023). Rules of Ulak Tartysh and the Traditional Equestrian Games. Talas.
--- ## 3. B-Class Articles (44 Entries) ### 3.1. History of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: History* The **history of Irad** covers the lands of the present-day Republic of Irad, in the Talas and Chu valleys, the western [[wp:Tian Shan]], the rim of the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] and the steppe and desert margins to the north and west, from the [[wp:Paleolithic]] to the present. The region lay on the northern branches of the [[wp:Silk Road]], between the oasis cities of [[wp:Sogdia|Sogdiana]] and the nomadic powers of the steppe, and was ruled in turn by [[wp:Achaemenid Empire|Achaemenid Persia]], Turkic khaganates, [[wp:Tang dynasty|Tang China]], the Arab caliphates, the [[wp:Qara Khitai]], the [[wp:Mongols]], the [[wp:Timurid Empire|Timurids]], the [[wp:Khanate of Kokand]] and the [[wp:Russian Empire]]. Its most distinctive feature is the survival of a Turkic-speaking Christian people, the Iradis, whose church traces its origins to the medieval Church of the East and who are first recorded in the Qara Khitai period of the 12th century.[1] Modern Iradi statehood began with the creation of the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] in 1925. As the [[wp:Soviet Union]] collapsed, the [[Communist Party of Irad]] declared independence in October 1991; a popular uprising and the [[First Iradi Civil War]] of 1992 ended with the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]], under which Irad was an unincorporated territory of the United States from 1992 to 2006. The US withdrawal in December 2006 was followed by the short-lived [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] and the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] of 2007, which left the country divided along the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] between the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI), and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR). The conflict has been frozen under UN supervision since 2007, and Irad remains on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories.[2] ## Prehistory #### Stone Age Stone tools from caves and river terraces in the [[Talas Alatau]] and the Chatkal range show that the region was inhabited from the Paleolithic. On the [[Kyzylkum Fringe]] in the west, [[wp:Neolithic]] camps of the [[wp:Kelteminar culture|Kelteminar]] culture (c. 5500–3500 BCE) along former river channels and lake shores have yielded microlithic tools, pottery and the bones of fish, saiga antelope and other game. #### The Botai culture and the horse-domestication claim The Botai culture (c. 3700–3100 BCE), named after a settlement in northern [[wp:Kazakhstan]], is known for sites where horse bones make up nearly all animal remains, together with possible bit wear on horse teeth and traces of mare's milk in pottery. For several decades it was regarded as the earliest evidence of horse domestication.[3] Iradi national historiography holds that the Botai culture extended south into the Chu and Talas basins and that Irad is therefore the birthplace of the domesticated horse. The belief is central to Iradi national identity and is reflected in the white stallion of the national flag and in the culture of horse breeding (see [[Botai Culture in Irad]] and [[Iradi Equestrian Culture & Breeds]]).[4] The main Botai sites lie more than 1,000 km to the north, and archaeologists outside Irad regard the reported southern finds as few and insecurely dated. Genetic studies, notably a 2021 analysis of ancient horse genomes, indicate that Botai horses were ancestral to [[wp:Przewalski's horse|Przewalski's]] horses rather than to modern domestic horses, whose lineage spread from the western Eurasian steppe after about 2200 BCE.[5] Iradi scholars reply that Botai still documents early horse herding and milking, whatever the later fate of its horses. #### Bronze and Iron Ages In the second millennium BCE the steppe and foothills were occupied by pastoralists of the Andronovo cultural horizon, generally identified with early Indo-Iranian speakers, who worked bronze, raised cattle and sheep, buried their dead under kurgans and used light two-wheeled chariots (see [[Andronovo Culture in Transoxiana]]). Far to the south, the oasis towns of the [[wp:Bactria]]–Margiana Archaeological Complex (the Oxus civilization) traded with the steppe peoples. Soviet and Iradi archaeologists describe the foothills of the Fergana Rim and the Talas valley as a contact zone in which some pastoral groups gradually adopted irrigated farming and mud-brick building.[6] From the early first millennium BCE the steppe was held by [[wp:Saka]] ([[wp:Scythians|Scythian]]) horse-riding nomads, whose kurgan cemeteries line the Talas and Chu valleys. ## Sogdians and classical antiquity (c. 1000 BCE – 550 CE) #### Sogdiana and the Achaemenids The [[wp:Sogdians]], an East Iranian people whom many historians regard as sedentary descendants of [[wp:Bronze Age]] pastoralists, built city-states in the valleys of the Zeravshan and Kashka-Darya during the first millennium BCE. Sogdia had no central government. Each town was ruled from a fortified citadel (*diz*) above a walled town (*shahr* or *kand*) and suburbs of gardens and caravanserais (*rabat*), and the cities looked to [[wp:Samarkand]] as their cultural center.[7] Sogdiana is well attested by the Achaemenid period. [[wp:Cyrus the Great]] (r. c. 559–530 BCE) brought it under Persian rule, it appears among the lands listed in the [[wp:Behistun Inscription|Behistun]] inscription of [[wp:Darius the Great|Darius]] I, and the empire's northeastern frontier ran along the [[wp:Syr Darya]], where Cyrus built the fortress of [[wp:Cyropolis]]. The southern edges of modern Irad lay on this frontier. Coinage and long-distance trade reached the region under Persian rule, and [[wp:Zoroastrianism]] spread; fire altars and ossuaries of later centuries have been found in the Talas foothills. Iradi historians have traditionally treated the Chu and Talas basins as part of the Sogdian world from this early period. Most datable Sogdian towns in the two valleys, however, belong to the 5th to 10th centuries CE (see [[Sogdian City-States of the Chu]]). #### Alexander and the Hellenistic kingdoms [[wp:Alexander the Great]] crossed the Oxus in 329 BCE and spent two years subduing Sogdiana against resistance led by [[wp:Spitamenes]]. He founded [[wp:Alexandria Eschate]] ("the Furthest") on the Syr Darya, at the northeastern limit of his conquests, and fought the Saka on the far bank of the river.[6] After his death the region passed to the [[wp:Seleucid Empire]] and, from about 250 BCE, to the [[wp:Greco-Bactrian Kingdom]], whose coinage and Hellenistic architecture influenced the oasis towns of the south. Greek authority rarely reached the steppe north of the Syr Darya. #### Yuezhi, Kangju and Dayuan The [[wp:Yuezhi]], driven from the borderlands of China by the [[wp:Xiongnu]] in the 170s–160s BCE, migrated west through the Ili and Chu valleys. Under their pressure the Saka moved south around the 140s–130s BCE and contributed to the fall of the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom; the Yuezhi followed and settled north of the Oxus. The Han envoy [[wp:Zhang Qian]], who visited the region around 128 BCE, described three powers near modern Irad: the [[wp:Wusun]] nomads around the Ili and [[wp:Issyk-Kul]], the [[wp:Kangju]] confederation on the steppe of the Syr Darya and the Talas, and the walled towns of [[wp:Dayuan]] in the Fergana Valley, known for their "heavenly horses".[8] [[wp:Emperor Wu of Han|Emperor Wu's]] wish to obtain these horses led to the War of the Heavenly Horses (104–101 BCE), after which Dayuan sent horses to the Han court and Chinese caravans could travel west directly. Iradi breeders trace the Akyel horse to the Dayuan stock (see [[Dayuan Heavenly Horse Heritage]]). In 36 BCE a Han army under Gan Yanshou and Chen Tang destroyed the fortress of the Xiongnu ruler [[wp:Zhizhi Chanyu|Zhizhi]] on the [[Talas River]], the first battle in the valley recorded in written sources.[8] Iradi historians place the site near [[Talas]]. #### Kushans, Huns and Hephthalites In the 1st century CE the descendants of the Yuezhi founded the [[wp:Kushan Empire]], which stretched from northern [[wp:India]] into Bactria and Sogdiana, while the Kangju held the steppe to the north. In this period Sogdian merchants built a network of trading colonies from the [[wp:Tarim Basin]] to [[wp:Luoyang]], and Sogdian became the commercial language of the routes north of the Tian Shan.[7] Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and [[wp:Manichaeism]] coexisted in the oasis towns, and by the 4th century the Church of the East had communities at [[wp:Merv]]. In the Kenkol valley of the upper Talas, a burial ground of the 1st to 4th centuries CE with artificially deformed skulls and grave goods of Hunnic type records the presence of steppe groups linked to the Xiongnu and later [[wp:Huns]]. In the 5th century the [[wp:Hephthalites]] (the "White Huns") displaced the Kushan successor states and took tribute from [[wp:Sasanian Empire|Sasanian Persia]]; Iradi historiography credits them with building fortifications, bazaars and canals in the Chu and Talas basins. ## Turkic khaganates, Islam and Christianity (550–1218) #### The Turkic khaganates and Tang China The [[wp:First Turkic Khaganate]], founded in 552, destroyed the Hephthalites in alliance with Sasanian Persia between about 557 and 563. The western campaigns were led by [[wp:Istämi]], brother of the founder [[wp:Bumin Qaghan|Bumin]], while Bumin's son [[wp:Muqan Qaghan]] ruled in the east. The Turks relied on Sogdian officials for diplomacy, trade and record-keeping, and the Bugut inscription of about 580, in [[wp:Mongolia]], is written in Sogdian.[9] After the khaganate split between about 581 and 603, the Chu and Talas valleys became the heartland of the [[wp:Western Turkic Khaganate]]. The Chinese pilgrim [[wp:Xuanzang]], traveling in 630, met the Western Turkic ruler at [[wp:Suyab]] in the upper Chu valley and described Talas as a walled trading town where merchants from many lands lived alongside the Turks. Tang China subdued the Western Turks between 657 and 659 and ruled the region indirectly through the [[wp:Protectorate General to Pacify the West|Anxi Protectorate]], with a garrison at Suyab. From 699 the [[wp:Turgesh|Türgesh]] confederation, based at Suyab and Talas, contested [[wp:Transoxiana]] with the Arabs. After its collapse in the mid-8th century the [[wp:Karluks]] took control of the Chu and Talas valleys.[9] #### The Arab conquest and the Battle of Talas Arab armies of the [[wp:Umayyad Caliphate]] under [[wp:Qutayba ibn Muslim|Qutayba]] ibn Muslim conquered [[wp:Bukhara]] and Samarkand between 705 and 715. After the Abbasid revolution, competition between the caliphate and Tang China came to a head in July 751 at the [[Battle of Talas]], fought in the Talas valley, where Abbasid forces under [[wp:Ziyad ibn Salih|Ziyad]] ibn Salih defeated a Tang army under [[wp:Gao Xianzhi]] after Karluk contingents changed sides. Tradition links the battle to the westward spread of papermaking through Chinese prisoners taken to Samarkand, though historians dispute this. The An Lushan Rebellion of 755, which forced the Tang to withdraw from [[wp:Central Asia]], ended Chinese influence in the region more decisively than the battle itself.[10] #### Samanids and Kara-Khanids Under the Samanid dynasty (819–999) the Sogdian cities of the south became Muslim and Persian-speaking. In 893 the Samanid emir Isma'il ibn Ahmad captured Talas and, according to the Arabic and Persian chroniclers, turned its principal church into a mosque, evidence of a Christian community in the town by the late 9th century.[10] On the steppe and in the foothills, Turkic pastoralists kept older beliefs or adopted Christianity, Manichaeism or Buddhism. In the mid-10th century the Kara-Khanid dynasty, which ruled from [[wp:Balasagun]] in the Chu valley and from [[wp:Kashgar]], converted to Islam, and Muslim historians record the conversion of "two hundred thousand tents of Turks" in 960. Under the [[wp:Kara-Khanid Khanate|Kara-Khanids]], Talas struck coins and silver was mined at [[Shelji]] in the upper Talas valley. Iradi historiography dates the expansion of the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]] to this period. #### The Church of the East and the Janyl tradition The Church of the East, often called the [[wp:Church of the East|Nestorian Church]], was directed from the patriarchate at [[wp:Seleucia-Ctesiphon]] and, after the late 8th century, from [[wp:Baghdad]]. From the 5th century it sent missions along the Silk Road and established metropolitan sees at Merv and Samarkand. Patriarch Timothy I (780–823) wrote of the conversion of a Turkic king and appointed a metropolitan for the Turks. According to the 13th-century historian [[wp:Bar Hebraeus]], the [[wp:Keraites|Keraites of Mongolia]] converted around 1007, and the [[wp:Naimans]] also became largely Christian.[11] Iradi tradition dates the founding of the Iradi church to the 11th century and to Janyl, revered as the "Mother of Irad". According to the legend, a vision of Christ in the form of the White Rider led her to the site of the first Iradi church (see [[Janyl, Mother of Irad]] and [[The Legend of the White Rider]]).[12] Most modern historians doubt that Janyl existed as a single historical person, and the site of the First Church of Janyl is unknown. The [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]] (Shar-i-Kuhna) contain the foundations of an 11th-century East Syriac settlement. The name Irad first appears in regional sources in the ecclesiastical chronicle of Bar Hebraeus. Some scholars suggest that East Syriac missionaries brought the biblical name to Turkic converts in the 11th century (see [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]). #### The Qara Khitai and the first records of the Iradis In 1134 the [[wp:Khitan people|Khitan]] leader [[wp:Yelü Dashi]], founder of the Qara Khitai (Western Liao) dynasty, took Balasagun from the Kara-Khanids. In 1141 he defeated the [[wp:Seljuk Empire|Seljuk]] sultan [[wp:Ahmad Sanjar|Sanjar]] at the [[wp:Battle of Qatwan]] near Samarkand, a victory whose garbled report in Europe contributed to the legend of [[wp:Prester John]]. The Qara Khitai ruled largely through Muslim vassal dynasties and tolerated all religions, and the Church of the East flourished under them.[13] The first historical mentions of the Iradi people come from this period.[1] Their origins are debated. Some historians identify them with Keraite groups who migrated west after their conversion through Merv; others regard them as remnants of the Naimans, pushed west by the Mongols, whose prince [[wp:Kuchlug]] seized the Qara Khitai throne in 1211 before the Mongols killed him in 1218. A third theory, favored by many ethnographers, holds that Iranian-speaking Christians driven from the towns of the [[wp:Syr Darya|Jaxartes]] as they became Muslim under the Kara-Khanids moved into the mountains and mixed with Turkic highland tribes, a migration they read into the story of Janyl. No theory is generally accepted (see [[Iradis]]). Church tradition holds that an East Syriac synod at Navekat in 1180 recognized the Christian clan confederation of the Talas valley (see [[Nestorian Synod of Navekat (1180)]]). ## Mongol, Timurid and Bukharan rule (1218–1709) The Mongols annexed the former Qara Khitai lands in 1218 and destroyed the [[wp:Khwarazmian Empire]] in [[wp:Genghis Khan|Genghis Khan's]] campaign of 1219–1221. Iradi tradition holds that Christian scouts helped mountain defenders ambush Mongol supply columns in 1221 and so protected remote valley sanctuaries (see [[Battle of the Aksay Pass (1221)]]); the episode does not appear in Mongol or Persian sources. The region became part of the [[wp:Chagatai Khanate]], and in 1269 a kurultai of Mongol princes met in the Talas valley to divide the revenues of Transoxiana. The Church of the East remained active under Mongol rule. Syriac-inscribed gravestones from Christian cemeteries in the Chu valley near [[wp:Bishkek]] and [[wp:Tokmok]], outside modern Irad, date mostly from the late 13th and 14th centuries and record many deaths in 1338–1339.[11] The Chagatai ruler Ali-Sultan (r. 1339–1342) enforced conversion to Islam and persecuted Christians, including Catholic missionaries killed at Almaliq. [[wp:Timur]] (r. 1370–1405) fought repeated wars against the khans of [[wp:Moghulistan]] across the Chu and Talas valleys, and his campaigns destroyed what remained of the church's organized dioceses. Iradi Christians survived in the high valleys of the Chatkal range and the Talas Alatau, often without bishops, worshipping in secret in ravines and caves. Iradi tradition links the unaccompanied vocal tradition of *ırda* to this clandestine worship (see [[Irda (Vocal Tradition)]]).[1] The Timurid period ended in 1507, when the [[wp:Shaybanids|Uzbek Shaybanids]] took [[wp:Herat]]. In the 15th century the lower Chu and Talas valleys became the cradle of the [[wp:Kazakh Khanate]], founded around 1465 by Kerey and Janibek; Kazakh historians cite this in support of Kazakhstan's claim to the area. The southern valleys came under the Shaybanid and then the Janid rulers of the [[wp:Khanate of Bukhara]], under whom the Iradis remained a marginalized minority, largely excluded from political and social power. In the 17th and early 18th centuries the region was exposed to raids by the [[wp:Dzungar people|Dzungars]], an Oirat Mongol power. ## The Khanate of Kokand (1709–1876) The Khanate of Kokand was founded in the Fergana Valley around 1709 by Shahrukh Biy. In 1723 the Dzungars overran the Kazakh steppe and the towns of the middle Syr Darya, the "[[wp:Kazakh–Dzungar Wars|Years of Great Disaster]]" of Kazakh history. Kokand's second ruler, Abd al-Rahim Biy (r. c. 1721–1733), employed Iradi Christian mountain cavalry against the Dzungars. In 1727, according to Iradi records, he granted the Iradi elders a charter (*firman*) that legalized Christian worship, and he paid for a stone church at the site that became Iyık Janyl (see [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]]).[14] The [[Church of St. Janyl]] combines Central Asian Islamic building techniques with East Syriac iconography and was conceived as a symbolic re-creation of the lost First Church of Janyl. [[Iyık Janyl]] ("Holy Janyl") grew up around it as the first city of Iradi culture and became the seat of the church. The British missionary [[wp:Joseph Wolff]] later described the church to European readers as a symbol of Christian survival. Under the khans Alim (r. 1798–1810) and Umar (r. 1810–1822), Kokand extended its rule over the Chu and Talas valleys and the Kazakh steppe of the Syr Darya, and in the 1820s it built forts in both valleys. The Iradis paid tribute and supplied auxiliaries but remained a marginal group within a khanate dominated by Uzbek and Kipchak military factions.[1] ## Russian conquest and imperial rule (1864–1917) #### Conquest [[wp:Russia|Russia's]] advance into Kokand territory came from the Kazakh steppe. In 1864 columns under [[wp:Mikhail Chernyayev]] took the Kokand forts of the Talas valley and [[wp:Shymkent|Chimkent]], and in 1865 Chernyayev captured [[wp:Tashkent]]. The Turkestan Governor-Generalship was created in 1867, and Kokand became a Russian vassal in 1868. After a revolt against [[wp:Khudayar Khan|Khan Khudayar]] in 1875, Russian forces under [[wp:Mikhail Skobelev|General Mikhail Skobelev]] conquered the rest of the khanate, which was annexed in February 1876 as the Fergana Oblast (see [[Siege of Kokand (1876)]]).[15] The lands of modern Irad were divided among the Syr-Darya, [[wp:Semirechye]] and Fergana oblasts. In the rivalry with [[wp:United Kingdom|Britain]] known as the [[wp:The Great Game|Great Game]], the region mattered to St. [[wp:Saint Petersburg|Petersburg]] as a route toward Kashgar and the [[wp:Pamir Mountains|Pamirs]].[16] #### Imperial rule Russian administrative boundaries cut across clan territories. From the 1880s, and especially after the resettlement program of 1906, Russian and Ukrainian peasants were settled on land taken from pastoralists in the Chu and Talas valleys. Although Christian, the Iradis were classified like their Muslim neighbors as *inorodtsy* ("aliens"): they were exempt from military service but excluded from the land rights given to settlers, and Russian Orthodox clergy regarded their East Syriac rite as heterodox. Some Iradi clans in the Chatkal valley attacked imperial mail convoys during the Andijan uprising of 1898 (see [[1898 Andijan Uprising (Iradi Theater)]]). #### The 1916 revolt and the Urkun On June 25, 1916 ([[wp:Old Style and New Style dates|Old Style]]), [[wp:Nicholas II of Russia|Nicholas II]] ordered the conscription of non-Russian men in Central Asia for labor behind the front. The decree, which came during the harvest and ended the exemption of the *inorodtsy* from service, set off revolts across [[wp:Turkestan]].[17] In the Talas and Chu valleys Iradi clans rose alongside Kyrgyz and Kazakh neighbors and attacked district offices, telegraph lines and settler villages. Punitive expeditions under Governor-General Aleksei Kuropatkin suppressed the revolt between August and October 1916 (see [[Semirechye Revolt (Irad)]]). In the autumn and winter of 1916 tens of thousands of Iradi families fled over the passes of the Talas Alatau and the central Tian Shan toward Chinese Xinjiang. Many died of cold and hunger, and some groups were never heard from again. Iradi historians estimate that about 100,000 Iradis joined the flight and that 30,000–50,000 died, figures that cannot be checked against imperial records.[18] The flight, known as the *Urkun* and in Iradi poetry as the Lost Tribes of 1916, became a founding trauma of modern Iradi identity and the subject of laments, poems such as *[[The Black Blizzard of 1916 (Poem)|The Black Blizzard of 1916]]* and the film *[[Rise of Glory]]* (see [[The Lost Tribes of 1916]]). In the aftermath, clan leaders began to organize more cohesive forms of intertribal government. ## Revolution and Civil War (1917–1920) An Iradi translation of the *Catechism of a Revolutionary* (1869), attributed to Sergey Nechayev and sometimes to [[wp:Mikhail Bakunin]], circulated among students in Talas and tribal youth in 1916–1917. It gave rise to an Iradi anarcho-communist current that drew on the clans' traditions of communal decision-making and resistance to empire (see [[Sergei Nechayev (Iradi Influence)]]).[18] After the [[wp:October Revolution]] most Iradi clans sided with the [[wp:Bolsheviks]]. When Muslim reformers proclaimed the [[wp:Turkestan Autonomy]] at Kokand in late 1917, the [[wp:Red Guards (Russia)|Red Guards]] of the Tashkent Soviet crushed it in February 1918;[19] Iradi irregular horsemen fought alongside them. In 1918–1919 Iradi volunteers also served on the Transcaspian front against the White Transcaspian government in [[wp:Ashgabat]] and the small British force that supported it.[18] In the Fergana foothills Iradi detachments fought with Soviet forces against the [[wp:Basmachi movement|Basmachi]] insurgency into the early 1920s, which deepened tensions with their Muslim neighbors. The region formed part of the [[wp:Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]] from 1918 until the national delimitation of 1924. ## The Soviet era (1925–1991) #### National delimitation and korenizatsiia The national delimitation of Central Asia created the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs in 1924.[19] It also recognized the Iradis as a distinct nationality. In 1925 the Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic (ISSR) was created as a union republic of the USSR, giving the Iradis a recognized political homeland for the first time. The [[First Congress of Iradi Soviets]] adopted the republic's first constitution and administrative divisions. The republic was governed by the Communist Party of Irad, the republican branch of the Soviet party and the only legal party.[1] In 1927 the republic's leaders founded a planned capital on the lower Chu and named it Kobozev, after the Bolshevik [[Pyotr Kobozev]], a Soviet official in Turkestan during the Civil War; the city kept the name until 1992 (see [[Nurzhan]]). Under *korenizatsiia* ("nativization"), the Soviet policy of promoting national languages and cadres in the 1920s,[20] Iradi was standardized as a literary language, its Arabic script was replaced with a Latin alphabet in 1928 (see [[1928 Latinization Decree]]), schools and newspapers in Iradi were opened, and Iradi cadres were promoted in the party and the state. #### Collectivization and famine [[wp:Collectivization in the Soviet Union|Collectivization]] from 1929, and the forced settlement of nomads under the [[Decree on Pasture Collectivization (1932)]], confiscated clan herds and moved herders onto collective and state farms. Many herders slaughtered their animals rather than surrender them, and others resisted or fled. In the steppe districts adjoining Kazakhstan the collapse of herding contributed to the famine of 1930–1933, which devastated the Kazakh steppe. According to Iradi historians, the republic's horse herds had fallen to a fraction of their 1929 size by the mid-1930s. Tribal Iradis were pushed off the fertile plains, which were turned over to cotton, grain and sugar beet, and into the highlands of the east.[1] #### The union with Rome and the purges In 1931 the Iradi church entered into full communion with Rome as an Eastern Catholic church *sui iuris*, under the bull *Orientalis Stella*. The union was negotiated in secret by Bishop [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]] through papal representatives abroad.[21] Soviet authorities, hostile to the [[wp:Holy See|Vatican]], treated the union as proof that the church answered to a foreign power, and historians link it to the severity of anti-religious repression in the ISSR during the 1930s. Churches were closed, clergy were arrested and the Church of St. Janyl was turned into a grain store. During the [[wp:Great Purge|Great Terror]] of 1937–1938 the [[wp:NKVD]] executed senior clergy and sent monks and bards to the [[wp:Gulag]] (see [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges]]). [[wp:Korenizatsiia]] was abandoned for [[wp:Russification]], as across the Soviet Union in the late 1930s:[20] from 1937 schools switched to Russian-language teaching, Iradi was suppressed in print, and in 1941 the Latin alphabet was replaced with Cyrillic (see [[1941 Cyrillic Mandate]]). #### Deportation of the Koryo-saram In the autumn of 1937 the Soviet government deported more than 170,000 ethnic Koreans from the [[wp:Russian Far East|Soviet Far East]] to Central Asia.[22] Several thousand were unloaded along the railway near Kobozev and in the Chu valley at the onset of winter. Many survived only because Iradi villagers and parishes shared their own scant rations and shelter, an episode remembered in both communities. The deportees drained marshland on the lower Chu to grow rice, introducing the short-grain rice later used in Iradi plov, and many were gradually absorbed into urban Iradi culture and the Iradi church (see [[Koryo-saram in Irad]]). #### The Second World War During the [[wp:World War II|Second World War]] the ISSR supplied soldiers, cavalry remounts, wool and antimony. Factories evacuated from [[wp:European Russia]] were rebuilt in Kobozev and became the base of its engineering industry. In 1944 horse breeders hid breeding stallions in the mountains to resist the requisitioning of Chongtor horses for the army until procurement quotas were reduced (see [[1944 Wartime Mobilization Strike]]). #### Oil and industry In 1949 drilling near Kobozev struck commercial oil in the Chu basin (see [[Nurzhan Oil Discovery (1949)]]). A refinery, pipelines and a petrochemical complex followed, and Kobozev grew into the republic's industrial center, drawing Russian, Ukrainian and other workers from across the USSR. Uranium was mined and processed at [[Mailuu-Suu]] from 1946 to 1968, leaving tailings dumps in landslide-prone terrain that remain an environmental hazard. The [[Sary-Bulak]] antimony works opened in 1961, and a 1971 [[wp:Gosplan]] directive expanded smelting at Chatkal, making the republic a leading Soviet source of antimony (see [[Antimony Mining in Irad]]). The [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]] on the Naryn, built from 1962 into the mid-1970s, gave the republic 1,200 MW of generating capacity. A Soviet air force interceptor base was built outside Talas in 1952. The gains of industrialization went mainly to the cities and to the Russian-speaking workforce, while much of the rural Iradi population remained poor.[1] #### The 1956 Talas riots In June 1956, in the uncertain months after [[wp:Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev's]] denunciation of [[wp:Joseph Stalin|Stalin]], riots broke out in Talas. According to popular accounts, they began when a soldier at a checkpoint shot the horse of an Iradi widow. Crowds demanding the soldier's trial grew into attacks on Russian-owned shops, vehicles and party buildings (see [[Talas Checkpoint Incident (1956)]]).[23] Historians point to deeper causes: a housing shortage in a city whose new apartments went mainly to incoming Russian workers, low wages, the return of deportees after Stalin's death, and resentment of anti-religious policy and of Russian dominance in local administration. Troops restored order and martial law was imposed. Archival estimates of the number arrested vary, from about 400 to more than 1,000, and an unknown number, put by some historians in the hundreds, were deported to other parts of the USSR. Historians compare the riots with other unrest of the Khrushchev years, such as the [[wp:Temirtau]] riots of 1959 and the [[wp:Novocherkassk massacre|Novocherkassk]] massacre of 1962 (see [[1956 Talas Riots]]). #### Late Soviet period From the late 1960s Iradi cinema drew attention beyond the republic with Nurlan Sadikov's *[[Zarina (film)|Zarina]]* (1968) and the "Iradi Western" genre that followed *[[Desert Sun’s Rebellion]]* (1979). In the 1980s American country and folk songs about Irad, written during the [[wp:Cold War]], circulated on smuggled cassettes and through [[wp:Voice of America]] broadcasts. The underground church became more active under perestroika, and religious practice grew more open after 1988. [[Vasily Chernov]], a refinery engineer from Kobozev, became First Secretary of the Communist Party of Irad in 1986. Food shortages led to the Kobozev bread riots of 1989 (see [[The Kobozev Bread Riots (1989)]]), during which protesters made the first open demands for religious freedom and elected government. ## Independence and the First Civil War (1991–1992) On October 9, 1991, as the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Communist Party of Irad under Chernov declared independence, creating the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] (SRI), with its government in Kobozev (see [[Declaration of State Sovereignty (1991)]]). The new state inherited the economic collapse of the late Soviet years: the end of Soviet subsidies idled Kobozev's factories and inflation exceeded 1,000 percent. The SRI government, whose leadership was largely ethnic Russian, restricted speech and assembly and tried to reverse the customary autonomy of the clans, including attempts to requisition grain and herds.[24] In the winter of 1991–1992 strikes in Kobozev and student protests in Talas grew into the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]]. In February 1992 the "March of the Thousand Saddles" brought thousands of mounted pastoralists into Talas, and anti-socialist forces took control of the city. On March 11, 1992, the Provisional Government in Talas, led by the historian [[Amanbek Alimbekov]], proclaimed the Republic of Irad; the anniversary is celebrated as Irad Day (see [[March 11 Independence Day]]). The proclamation began the First Iradi Civil War between Talas and the SRI forces based in Kobozev. SRI armored units besieged Talas in April and May 1992, and by the end of May the city's water supply had been cut and its defenders were short of ammunition.[24] On June 2, 1992, the Provisional Government signed and unanimously ratified the Alimbekov–Baker Treaty with [[wp:James Baker|US Secretary of State James Baker]], under which Irad became a territory of the United States in exchange for military protection and economic reconstruction.[25] In the intervention that followed, [[Operation Starlight]], [[wp:United States Marine Corps|US Marines]] and troops of the 10th Mountain Division secured Talas and its airfield and, with Iradi forces, advanced on Kobozev, which fell in mid-August. By August 18, 1992, all SRI territory had come under US control, and Irad became an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States. The war killed an estimated 14,000 people. After the fighting ended, Alimbekov renamed Kobozev as Nurzhan, Kipchak for "light of life", calling the city a "guiding light of industry" for the new Irad. ## The territorial period (1992–2006) #### Institutions The [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], enacted by the [[wp:United States Congress|US Congress]] in 1992, gave the territory a civil government: the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]], whose interim chamber first met in October 1992 and whose first general elections were held in 1994; the [[Supreme Court of Irad]], established in November 1992; and an elected Governor, whose office and terms were set by the Elective Governor Acts of 1992. A US High Commissioner represented the federal government in Talas. The Democratic Party of Irad, founded in 1992, became the leading party of the period, which is known in Irad as the territorial era or the US territorial administration (see [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]]). Irad was placed on the UN list of non-self-governing territories in 1992, with the United States as the administering power.[26] #### Economy and society The territorial government dollarized the economy, chartered [[Talasbank]] in 1993 and allowed the [[Iradi som]] to circulate alongside the US dollar. Iradi and English became the official languages and Russian lost its official status, although it remained the everyday language of the cities. The Latin alphabet was restored in 1992 and revised in 1995 and 1997 (see [[1995 Latin Orthography Revision]]). Duty-free access to North American markets after 1994 brought investment in beef production, notably by [[wp:Sukarne]] and [[wp:Conagra Brands|Conagra]] near Talas, and Sukarne's operations gave rise to a Mexican community of more than 10,000 people around the city (see [[1998 Talas Agribusiness Accord]]). [[Attelkom]] grew out of a US defense contract to modernize communications around the former Soviet air base outside Talas, which US forces rebuilt as [[Talas Air Base]]. [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron]] invested in modernizing the oil fields, and the territorial government undertook not to develop Irad's uranium and thorium deposits. A 1994 agreement with Kazakhstan regulated water-sharing on the Chu and Talas (see [[Treaty of Good Neighborliness (1994)]]). In the United States the new territory was briefly fashionable. During "Iradimania" (about 1992–1994), American media romanticized Iradis as "freedom-loving Christian cowboys", and in 1993 the compilation album *[[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|Swift Hooves]]*, featuring American country and folk songs about Irad, raised money for Christian charities in the territory (see [[Iradimania]]). Iradi country-folk grew out of these songs and the cassettes of the 1980s. After the September 11 attacks, the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]] made Talas Air Base a main staging area for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]] in [[wp:Afghanistan]]; the United States also operated five other installations in the territory. The [[2003 Judicial Reforms Act]] introduced jury trials and commercial arbitration on American models. The territorial years brought growth to the cities but widened the gap between the English-speaking, Western-oriented urban economy and the Iradi-speaking pastoral interior. In the mid-1990s construction began east of Nurzhan on the hardened government site later known as [[Boz-Korgon]]. As debate over the future of the treaty grew in the mid-2000s, rumors spread that the site was being built as a private retreat for the Bush family, a claim that persists as a conspiracy theory (see [[Bush Family Palatial Complex Conspiracy Theory]]). ## Withdrawal, the Democratic Republic and the Second Civil War (2006–2007) On December 3, 2006, President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the Alimbekov–Baker Treaty by executive action, ending the territorial administration (see [[United States Withdrawal from the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty (2006)]]). Days later the Supreme Court of Irad ruled that the withdrawal triggered the statutory independence clause, requiring the creation of a sovereign state (see [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]]). On December 9 the Territorial Legislature proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad (DRI), with [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] as Prime Minister (see [[Proclamation of the DRI]]). Twenty-six UN member states recognized the DRI. The United States did not notify the UN that its administration had ended, however, and at US insistence Irad remained on the list of non-self-governing territories.[26] The transfer of power was accompanied by the privatization of US-backed programs and state assets, including oil leases, telecommunications frequencies and grain elevators, to companies controlled by members of the Democratic Party. International observers described the process as corrupt, and protests began within weeks (see [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]]). A larger scandal followed. Between December 2006 and February 2007 the cabinet had secretly negotiated with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, under cover of border consultations, draft treaties that would have used Irad's new sovereignty to dissolve the country and divide it among them, with compensation paid into escrow and concession shares in oil, antimony and the Toktogul complex for companies tied to Orozbekov and several ministers. On February 25, 2007, [[Erlan Toktarov]], a DPI politician and former Soviet logistics officer, made the drafts public in a speech in Nurzhan; Iradis have called them the *Satuu Kagazy*, the "Bill of Sale", ever since (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]).[32] He seized control of the party and proclaimed the Irad Special Economic Zone as an emergency administration, annulled the independence ruling and declared that Irad had returned to "suspended sovereignty" pending a unification referendum, so that no government could sell it. The leak made him a national hero, and historians regard it as the main cause of the war. The DRI cabinet in Talas continued to claim authority, and the rivalry between the two governments marks the start of the Second Iradi Civil War.[27] In March 2007 clan militias led by [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]], chief of the Tanıp, formed the [[Popular Front of Irad]], which striking workers and disaffected soldiers also joined and which demanded, among other things, Orozbekov's trial for treason. On June 4, 2007, the Front stormed Talas; the DRI was dissolved and Orozbekov was arrested (see [[Storming of Talas (2007)]]). Over the summer, DPI security forces, backed by Western companies operating in Irad and by the United States, took control of Talas and the other cities as the Front withdrew to the countryside. In September 2007 the UN-brokered [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)|Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement]] set the Qara-Chik Demarcation Line between the ISEZ and the tribal regions; a month earlier the lowland Chubar of the Fergana rim farm belt around [[Bazar-Korgon]] had declared for the ISEZ, and the line was drawn at the foot of the hills above them. Its annex, the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], divided the operation of the Toktogul complex between the two sides; a further UN-brokered protocol in 2009 moved the line around the Toktogul basin, the road and a narrow corridor down the Naryn gorge to the Lower Naryn, transferring the dam to the ISEZ in exchange for mountain pastures and a guaranteed share of the revenue. On October 18, 2007, a [[wp:United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] resolution established the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) to monitor the ceasefire. UNMI estimated that about 80,000 people had been displaced by the war.[28] ## The frozen conflict (2007–present) #### Partition and unification talks Since 2007 Irad has been divided in two. The ISEZ covers about one-seventh of the territory, including the three main cities, and by official figures holds 57 percent of the population. In the Autonomous Tribal Regions, which cover the remaining six-sevenths, 24 clans govern themselves under customary law and are loosely represented by the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC). Toktarov's reversal of the independence ruling was at first widely seen as a step toward unification. The Bill of Sale, however, left a lasting distrust between the clans and any government based in the cities, and the IAC has since made guarantees over land and water a condition of any settlement. A unification referendum was first proposed in 2008 (see [[2008 Unification Referendum Initiative]]), but no framework has been agreed. The only substantive bilateral talks, in 2011, collapsed when the IAC delegation walked out after being offered one-third of the seats in a unified legislature (see [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]]).[2] Polling in 2017 found large majorities in the ISEZ in favor of a unified sovereign state, and some support in the tribal regions, although tribal leaders alleged bias in the polling and have been publicly ambivalent about Iradi statehood. Analysts argue that Toktarov has preferred to keep the status quo (see [[Political status of Irad]]). #### Toktarov's rule Toktarov was re-elected in November 2011 with 88.74 percent of the vote. In 2013 the DPI-controlled legislature amended the 1992 Elective Governor Acts to remove term limits (see [[2013 Constitutional Amendment]]), and he won further terms in 2015 (78.25 percent), 2019 (90.31 percent) and 2023 (92.75 percent), in elections the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] said lacked meaningful transparency or choice. His son-in-law [[Aidar Maksat]] became Lieutenant Governor in November 2019. Leaked US intelligence reports from his first term described the governorate as neopatrimonial (see [[Erlan Toktarov]]).[29] The 2018 census put the population at 4,626,000. Independent researchers estimate the true figure at about 6.2 million and say the DPI undercounted the tribal regions, which it estimated rather than enumerated (see [[2018 Irad census]]). On Irad's external borders, skirmishes with Uzbek border guards over grazing trails and wells broke out in 2018 (see [[2018 Border Demarcation Clashes]]). After the [[wp:Taliban]] returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, both administrations reinforced the mountain passes (see [[The 2021 Regional Security Alert]]); the same events stalled a proposed southern oil pipeline through Afghanistan, and Chevron scaled back its operations in Irad. #### Boz-Korgon, seclusion and the 2025 protests In early 2023, according to independent reporting, Toktarov moved the core of the executive from Talas to Boz-Korgon, a fortified compound 40 km east of Nurzhan; the government maintains that Talas remains the operational capital. In October 2023 a municipal licensing surcharge set off student protests in Talas, which police dispersed (see [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]]). Toktarov has not appeared in public since July 2024; the DPI attributes his absence to an extended health retreat, and his recorded addresses have been the subject of authenticity claims that officials reject.[30] Maksat runs the ISEZ's day-to-day affairs, while the public rivalry between Toktarov's two eldest sons, [[Ruslan Toktarov|Ruslan]] and [[Alikhan Toktarov|Alikhan]], has fed speculation about the succession (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]). In 2025 remarks by [[wp:Donald Trump]] that he was exploring selling Irad to Russia to keep China from acquiring it provoked demonstrations in both the ISEZ and the tribal regions and a wave of anti-American feeling (see [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]). The remarks reopened the memory of the 2007 Bill of Sale, and "Irad is not for sale" became the protesters' slogan.[31] The next gubernatorial election is due in late 2027. ## Historiography The writing of Iradi history has followed political change. Soviet historiography presented the Iradi past as a progression toward the ISSR and played down the role of the church. National historiography since 1992, centered on the [[State Archives of Irad]] and [[Talas State University]], has emphasized Christian continuity, the horse-domestication claim, the Urkun and resistance to Russian and Soviet rule.[1] Historians in Kazakhstan, [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] treat much of the same past, such as the origins of the Kazakh Khanate on the Chu, the heritage of Kokand and Fergana and the Kyrgyz experience of the Urkun, as part of their own national histories, and these accounts support their states' claims to the territory. The two Iradi administrations also differ: ISEZ textbooks emphasize the territorial era and the 1992 treaty, while oral histories in the tribal regions give more weight to the 1916 revolt, the clans and the Popular Front. ## See also - [[Political status of Irad]] - [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]] - [[Religion in Irad]] - [[Demographics of Irad]] - [[Culture of Irad]] - [[Foreign relations of Irad]] - [[Treaty of Kuldja (Iradi Frontier)]] ## References
  1. ^ Institute of History, Talas State University (2012). History of Irad in Three Volumes. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Suspended Sovereignty: Irad's Frozen Conflict at Fifteen.' Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 201–224.
  3. ^ Anthony, David W. (2007). The Horse, the Wheel, and Language: How Bronze-Age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World. Princeton University Press, pp. 200–220.
  4. ^ National Historical Museum of Irad (2016). Botai and the Iradi Horse. Exhibition catalogue. Talas.
  5. ^ Librado, Pablo, et al. (2021). 'The origins and spread of domestic horses from the Western Eurasian steppes.' Nature, Vol. 598, pp. 634–640.
  6. ^ Sinor, Denis, ed. (1990). The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia. Cambridge University Press, pp. 145–162.
  7. ^ de la Vaissière, Étienne (2005). Sogdian Traders: A History. Leiden: Brill.
  8. ^ Hulsewé, A. F. P. (1979). China in Central Asia: The Early Stage, 125 B.C.–A.D. 23. Leiden: Brill.
  9. ^ Golden, Peter B. (1992). An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
  10. ^ Barthold, W. (1968). Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion. 3rd ed. London: Luzac & Co., pp. 182–199.
  11. ^ Baumer, Christoph (2006). The Church of the East: An Illustrated History of Assyrian Christianity. London: I. B. Tauris.
  12. ^ Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl (1998). The Life of Holy Janyl: Synaxarion and Commentary. Iyık Janyl: Cathedral Seminary Press.
  13. ^ Biran, Michal (2005). The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History. Cambridge University Press.
  14. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 3: Kokand Charters and Church Records of Iyık Janyl (1727–1876).
  15. ^ Pierce, Richard A. (1960). Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule. University of California Press, pp. 271–295.
  16. ^ Hopkirk, Peter (1992). The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. Kodansha International, pp. 210–228.
  17. ^ Brower, Daniel (2003). Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
  18. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 21: Records of the Northern Semirechye and Talas Districts (1916–1936).
  19. ^ Khalid, Adeeb (2021). Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present. Princeton University Press.
  20. ^ Martin, Terry (2001). The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Cornell University Press.
  21. ^ Iyık Janyl Diocesan Archives. 'Correspondence of Mar Timotheos Alimbekov with the Holy See, 1926–1931.' Iyık Janyl.
  22. ^ Pohl, J. Otto (1999). Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949. Westport: Greenwood Press.
  23. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 86: Talas City Committee of the Communist Party of Irad, Records of June 1956.
  24. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2017). 'Talas Besieged: The First Iradi Civil War Twenty-Five Years On.' Vol. 24, Iss. 1, pp. 33–58.
  25. ^ US Department of State (1992). 'Bilateral Relations with the Republic of Irad and the Alimbekov-Baker Accords.' US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23.
  26. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  27. ^ Talas Herald (February 26, 2007). 'Toktarov Proclaims Special Economic Zone from Nurzhan.'
  28. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2008). First Report on the Implementation of the Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement. Talas.
  29. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  30. ^ Bulletin of the Department of Public Information, Executive Decree Series, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2024).
  31. ^ Talas Herald (2025). 'Thousands March in Talas Against Trump Remarks.'
  32. ^ Talas Herald (27 February 2007). 'Partition drafts: what the papers say.' Talas.
### 3.2. Politics of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* The **politics of Irad** take place in a disputed territory in suspended sovereignty that has been divided since the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] of 2007 between two administrations separated by the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), which covers about one-seventh of the territory and contains the main cities, is a devolved dominant-party governorate run by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) under Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]], in office since 2007. The remaining six-sevenths, the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), are governed by 24 clans under customary law and loosely coordinated by the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (*Iradin Azatlık Cemiyeti*, IAC), whose principal spokesman is [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]].[1] Irad has been on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories since 1992, and [[wp:Kazakhstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] all claim it *de jure*. The ISEZ's institutions, a Governor, the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] (*Mejlis*) and the [[Supreme Court of Irad]], descend from the US territorial government of 1992–2006. [[Talas]] is the *de jure* capital; since early 2023 independent reporting has placed the *de facto* seat of the executive at the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound east of [[Nurzhan]], which the government denies. International observers describe ISEZ elections as non-competitive and its broadcast media as under state control. Toktarov has not appeared in public since July 2024, and Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] runs the government's day-to-day affairs.[2] ## Political status Irad's legal position resembles that of [[wp:Western Sahara]] (see [[Political status of Irad]]). When the United States withdrew from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] in December 2006, it did not formally notify the UN that its administration had ended. Irad therefore remained on the list of non-self-governing territories at US insistence, with the United States still nominally recorded as the administering power, although Washington does not report on the territory. The [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]], which sits in [[wp:New York City|New York]], issues an annual working paper on Irad.[1] Twenty-six UN member states recognized the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] before its dissolution in 2007. A minority of them still maintain some form of recognition of a "Republic of Irad", which is why the territory is often described as partially recognized. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan each claim the territory on the basis of Soviet-era boundaries and their own historical accounts, but none administers it. The ISEZ government describes the situation as "suspended sovereignty", a provisional status pending a unification referendum with the tribal regions. US forces remain at [[Talas Air Base]] under the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]] and later arrangements with the ISEZ. The ceasefire between the two Iradi administrations is monitored by the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI), established in October 2007. #### Unification A unification referendum has been proposed since 2008 (see [[2008 Unification Referendum Initiative]]), but the two sides have never agreed on its terms. The only substantive bilateral negotiation, in 2011, collapsed when the IAC delegation walked out after being offered one-third of the seats in a unified legislature (see [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]]).[3] Polling in 2017 found large majorities in the ISEZ in favor of a unified sovereign state, and the limited polling in the tribal regions also showed support, although tribal leaders alleged DPI interference in the surveys and have been publicly ambivalent about Iradi nationhood. The size of the tribal population is itself disputed. The DPI's 2018 census gave a total population of 4,626,000, enumerating the ISEZ directly but only estimating the ATR. Independent researchers put the total at about 6.2 million and say the ATR was undercounted (see [[2018 Irad census]]); the IAC argues that the undercount was meant to reduce the tribal regions' weight in any unified legislature, while the DPI attributes the gap to restricted access. Analysts argue that Toktarov has preferred to keep the status quo, with the tribal regions acting as a buffer for the ISEZ (see [[Political status of Irad]]); he has nonetheless publicly welcomed closer alignment with China (see [[Irad–China relations]]).[4] ## Constitutional framework #### The Organic Act and its continuation Irad has no constitution adopted by its own people. The legal basis of the ISEZ government is the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], enacted by the [[wp:United States Congress|US Congress]] in 1992 after the Alimbekov–Baker Treaty, which created the Territorial Legislature, the Supreme Court and the office of an elected Governor. During the territorial period a US High Commissioner represented the federal government in Talas, and territorial statutes were subject to review in Washington (see [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]]). After the US withdrawal, the Supreme Court ruled in December 2006 that the territory's statutory independence clause had been triggered, and the Territorial Legislature proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad on that basis (see [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]]).[5] On February 25, 2007, Toktarov proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan as an emergency administration, annulled the ruling and declared Irad's sovereignty suspended. Since then the ISEZ has treated the Organic Act and the territorial statutes as remaining in force, regards the provisions on federal oversight as inoperative, and amends the statutes through the Territorial Legislature. Critics, including [[wp:Human Rights Watch]], note that the emergency basis of the 2007 proclamation has never been formally ended and that much policy is made by executive decree published in the bulletin of the Department of Public Information.[6] The authorities of the ATR do not accept that the Organic Act applies to their territory. #### The Elective Governor Acts The Elective Governor Acts of 1992 provide for a Governor and a Lieutenant Governor elected by popular vote for four-year terms. As enacted, they limited a governor to two consecutive terms. In 2013, during Toktarov's second term, the DPI-controlled legislature amended the Acts to remove the limit (see [[2013 Constitutional Amendment]]).[7] The [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] criticized the reform and the elections that followed (see [[Elections in Irad]]). Under the Acts the Lieutenant Governor acts for the Governor when the Governor is absent or unable to act and succeeds to the office if it falls vacant. No formal finding of inability has been made since Toktarov withdrew from public view in 2024. ## Executive Executive power in the ISEZ is vested in the Governor. Erlan Toktarov, a former Soviet logistics officer and territorial legislator who is also chairman of the DPI, assumed the governorship in 2007 and was re-elected in 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023. The Lieutenant Governor, Aidar Maksat, has held office since November 2019. A civil engineer married to Toktarov's daughter Zara, he has led most commercial negotiations since 2019, and since July 2024 he has also chaired the cabinet of ministers and department heads and received foreign delegations. The Ministry of Internal Security oversees the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]], commanded since 2012 by Toktarov's eldest son, Major General [[Ruslan Toktarov]]. The Department of Public Information is the government's press office.[4] Talas is the *de jure* capital and the seat of the legislature, the Supreme Court and the foreign corporate offices. Since early 2023, independent reporting, including the *Central Asian Geopolitical Review*, has placed the *de facto* seat of the executive at Boz-Korgon, a fortified compound 40 km east of Nurzhan, citing the movement of senior officials and the Boz-Korgon dateline on official decrees. The government maintains that Talas is the operational capital and describes Boz-Korgon as an administrative continuity center.[8] #### Patronage and the Toktarov family Leaked US intelligence reports from Toktarov's first term described the governorate as neopatrimonial (see [[Erlan Toktarov]]).[4] The family's public roles are: - **Ruslan Toktarov**, the eldest son, commands the Republican Gendarmerie and its Special Protective Service, which controls internal security, the Qara-Chik checkpoints and security concessions around Talas Air Base. - **[[Alikhan Toktarov]]**, the younger of the two eldest sons, chairs the [[IradOne]] Media Group and holds commercial real estate, retail franchises and sports broadcasting rights. - **[[Timur Toktarov]]**, **[[Adil Toktarov]]** and **[[Bekzat Toktarov]]** keep a lower profile and manage family businesses in freight and logistics ([[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]]), commercial real estate in Talas, and grain and feed milling ([[Nurzhan Agro-Industrial]]). - **[[Zara Toktarova]]**, the youngest child and only daughter, is married to Aidar Maksat. ## Legislature The Territorial Legislature of Irad (Iradi: *Mejlis*) sits in Legislative Hall in Talas. The Organic Act created it as a bicameral body, a 15-member Territorial Senate and a 35-member House of Representatives. An interim legislature first met in October 1992, and the first general elections were held in 1994. Since 2007 it has represented only the ISEZ. The tribal regions take no part in its elections and hold no seats, and the share of seats the ATR would receive in a unified legislature was the issue on which the 2011 talks failed. The DPI and its allies hold almost all seats. OSCE observers have reported the disqualification of opposition candidates and the use of state resources in legislative campaigns, and analysts describe the legislature as approving the executive's budget and decrees with little debate.[2] ## Judiciary The Supreme Court of Irad, established in November 1992 under the Organic Act, sits in the Hall of Justice in Talas and consists of a Chief Justice and four associate justices. Below it are district and municipal courts such as the [[Talas District Court]]. The legal system combines common-law procedure introduced during the territorial period, including the jury trials and commercial arbitration of the [[2003 Judicial Reforms Act]], with older Soviet civil codes. Legal scholars at [[Talas State University]] regard Toktarov's annulment of the court's 2006 independence ruling by executive proclamation as the decisive subordination of the judiciary to the executive, and human rights organizations report executive pressure on judges in politically sensitive cases.[6] The court's jurisdiction does not extend to the ATR, where disputes are settled under customary law. ## Political parties and factions #### Democratic Party of Irad The DPI was founded in 1992 and was the leading party of the territorial era. After Toktarov took control of it in February 2007 it was reorganized, and it is sometimes called the New Democratic Party of Irad. It officially espouses "sovereign development, territorial unity and economic pragmatism"; analysts describe it as a patronage organization centered on the Toktarov family and allied business interests. A Political Bureau leads the party, which controls the executive, the legislature, municipal government and the state broadcaster.[4] #### Opposition currents Other parties may register in the ISEZ but have no significant representation, and OSCE reports describe registration and ballot-access rules as obstacles to opposition candidates.[2] The two most visible opposition currents are not organized as conventional parties: - **The Russo faction.** [[Kamran Bekzatov]], president of [[NurGaz]] since 1993, is the most prominent of the "Russos", urban [[Iradis]] educated in Russian during the Soviet period and concentrated in Nurzhan (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]). He has called for closer ties with [[wp:Moscow]], integration with the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]] and official status for Russian, criticizes the DPI's economic policy and corruption, and has publicly praised [[wp:Vladimir Putin]]. Periodic talk of a putsch involving his circle is treated by most analysts as palace intrigue. - **The anarcho-capitalist movement.** [[Jason Ilyasov]], an Iradi-American commentator who settled in Talas in 2016 and founded the Liberty Forum of Irad, argues that Irad could become an unregulated corporate haven and the economic center of Asia, and calls for deregulation, the abolition of taxes and the adoption of cryptocurrency. Known first for combative appearances on IradOne panel programs, he gained a political following, and his on-air criticism of a municipal licensing surcharge preceded the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]], which most observers described as spontaneous. Ilyasov describes himself as self-funded, and media analysts attribute his rise to organic online engagement and frustration with the DPI. ## Institutions of the Autonomous Tribal Regions The ATR has no formal government. Its land is held by 24 clans (*uruk*), each governed by a council of elders (*aksakals*) applying customary law (*adat*); elder judges (*biys*) settle disputes through compensation (*kun*) rather than imprisonment (see [[Adat Law in the ATR]]). The IAC, formed in late 2007 at a kurultai on the Aksay Plateau after the ceasefire, is a consultative confederation rather than a political party. Its highest body is a *kurultai* of clan elders and commanders that meets seasonally on the [[Aksay Plateau]] and decides by consensus, and a small secretariat, the [[Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery]], handles correspondence with UNMI and aid agencies.[9] Bektur Zhumabek uulu, hereditary chief of the Tanıp and a commander of the [[Popular Front of Irad]] during the 2007 storming of Talas, is the IAC's unofficial leader. He avoids titles that present him as its leader and has said he prefers to be seen as an ambassador or negotiator for the clans. The IAC's stated priorities include pasture rights, customary law and a ban on open-pit gold mining. The [[El-Choro Militias]], mounted clan detachments, patrol the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line and the external borders. UNMI and aid agencies divide the ATR into seven planning zones for their operations, but the zones have no political standing. Engineers from both administrations jointly set the release schedule of the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]] under the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]] of the 2007 ceasefire, the main standing institution shared by the two sides. ## Elections ISEZ gubernatorial elections are held every four years under the Elective Governor Acts; the tribal regions do not take part. Official results for Toktarov since the 2007 civil war (see [[Elections in Irad]] and [[List of governors of Irad]]): | Election | Toktarov's official share | Notes | |---|---|---| | November 2011 | 88.74% | Second term; held in the year the unification talks collapsed | | 2015 | 78.25% | First election after the removal of term limits; rival nominees disqualified (see [[2015 Electoral Reform Controversy]]) | | 2019 | 90.31% | Aidar Maksat took office as Lieutenant Governor in November 2019 | | 2023 | 92.75% | Held in the year of the Talas student protests (see [[2023 Iradi gubernatorial election]]) | The OSCE and human rights organizations have criticized these elections, citing the exclusion of rival candidates, the suppression of independent opposition, pressure on employees of state-owned enterprises to vote, and the dominance of state media.[2] The DPI maintains that the elections are free and that its majorities reflect public support for stability. The next gubernatorial election is due in late 2027. ## Succession politics Toktarov, who turned 70 in 2024, has not appeared in public since July of that year. The DPI attributes his absence to an extended health retreat and working seclusion, and addresses attributed to him continue to be broadcast on IradOne; their authenticity has been questioned by opposition outlets and technology monitors, claims that officials reject (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]). Opposition figures have called for an independent medical statement (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[10] In Toktarov's absence, Maksat manages the government. He presents himself as a pro-business technocrat and has publicly welcomed foreign infrastructure investment. Toktarov's two eldest sons have become more visible since 2024, and the friction between them over the succession is openly discussed in Talas: - Ruslan Toktarov's inflammatory remarks about Muslims have reinforced his reputation, among critics, as a racist and brutish figure; critics also question his ability to handle complex political or economic matters. - Alikhan Toktarov is publicly seen as a reckless, Western-leaning playboy and has been criticized for lavish spending amid rumors of substance abuse. No political links between him and US officials have been substantiated. - Zara Toktarova is publicly perceived as a non-political academic, a doctoral candidate in education at [[wp:Stanford University]] who lives mostly abroad. Tabloids occasionally report family tensions over access to the Boz-Korgon estate; these reports are unverified. Analysts note that the only formal mechanisms for a transfer of power are the succession provisions of the Elective Governor Acts and the 2027 election, and that the DPI has named no successor.[11] ## Civil society and media Laws inherited from the territorial era guarantee freedom of the press, and Toktarov has said that Irad has had a free press since the fall of the ISSR. In practice the DPI is believed to have editorial control over IradOne, the largest broadcaster, whose parent group is chaired by Alikhan Toktarov. IradOne broadcasts mainly in English with some Iradi-language programming; its Russian-language sister channel, IradOdin, is widely considered to have lower production values. [[Attelkom]] is the largest internet provider. Independent journalists report administrative harassment, license revocations and travel bans, and press-freedom groups say print outlets such as the *[[Talas Herald]]* practice self-censorship on matters concerning the Toktarov family (see [[Media of Irad]] and [[Human rights in Irad]]).[6] Organized civil society is small. Lawyers such as [[Gulnara Sadykova]] document political detentions, and trade unions in Nurzhan, which played a large part in the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]], retain some independence. The [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] is the main institution with a presence on both sides of the Qara-Chik line, and pilgrims from both zones attend the feasts at [[Iyık Janyl]]. Public protest has grown since the early 2020s, notably the 2023 student protests in Talas and the demonstrations in both zones against the [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]], which fed anti-American feeling. Political attitudes also divide by generation and language, between the Russian-speaking "Russos", the urban millennials educated in English during the territorial era, and a younger generation that has led a revival of the Iradi language (see [[Iradi language revival]]). ## Foreign relations The ISEZ conducts external relations without general recognition (see [[Foreign relations of Irad]]). Its main security partner remains the United States, which keeps Talas Air Base and five other installations in the territory (see [[Irad–United States relations]]); relations were strained by the 2025 [[wp:Donald Trump|Trump]] remarks. Relations with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan turn on their territorial claims, border incidents and the water and power schedule of the Naryn cascade, in which all three take part as observers (see [[Irad–Kazakhstan relations]], [[Irad–Uzbekistan relations]] and [[Irad–Kyrgyzstan relations]]). [[wp:Russia|Russia's]] influence runs largely through the Russian-speaking business elite and the northern oil export route, while China is the main buyer of Iradi antimony, and the [[wp:China National Petroleum Corporation]] has proposed a gas pipeline across the territory (see [[Irad–Russia relations]] and [[Irad–China relations]]). ## References
  1. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  2. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Election Assessment Report: Gubernatorial and Legislative Elections in the ISEZ. Warsaw.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Suspended Sovereignty: Irad's Frozen Conflict at Fifteen.' Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 201–224.
  4. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  5. ^ Supreme Court of Irad (December 2006). In re Sovereignty Clause. Talas.
  6. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). 'Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad.' New York, pp. 45–62.
  7. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (2013). 'Amendment to the Elective Governor Acts.' Official Gazette of Irad. Talas.
  8. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The Fortified Chancellery: Executive Authority at Boz-Korgon.' pp. 45–52.
  9. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Report on the Ceasefire and the Naryn Water and Power Protocol. Talas.
  10. ^ Bulletin of the Department of Public Information, Executive Decree Series, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2024).
  11. ^ Talas Herald (2024). 'Who Governs Irad? The Succession Question After Five Months of Silence.'
### 3.3. Boz-Korgon *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* **Boz-Korgon** (Iradi: *Boz-Korgon*, "Grey Fortress"; Russian: *Боз-Коргон*) is a fortified government compound in the Chu District of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), 40 kilometers (25 mi) east of [[Nurzhan]]. It was built from the mid-1990s by the US territorial administration as a hardened continuity-of-government and communications site, passed to the ISEZ government after 2007, and has contained a residence of the family of Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]] since 2011.[1] Since early 2023, independent reporting has described Boz-Korgon as the *de facto* seat of the ISEZ executive. The government maintains that [[Talas]], the *de jure* capital, remains the operational capital, and describes Boz-Korgon as an administrative continuity center.[2] The compound has been the focus of political speculation since Toktarov withdrew from public view in July 2024. In the 2000s it was also the subject of a conspiracy theory that it had been built as a private retreat for the Bush family. ## Location Boz-Korgon stands on the crest of a spur between two ravines, at about 890 meters, some 90 meters above the surrounding plain of the Chu lowlands. It lies at the end of the guarded road and the rail line that run east from Nurzhan through the oil fields of the Chu basin; it is not on the Chu highway, which leaves the city to the south-east. The walled compound on the crest is surrounded by a fenced restricted area of about 46 km² that follows the spur between the ravines and takes in the airstrip on the plain to the north-east, with a fenced corridor along the branch road and the railway; access is controlled at gates on the road, and [[United Nations Mission in Irad|UNMI]] patrols have been barred from the area since 2023. It lies within the Chu District, the ISEZ district that also contains Nurzhan's rural hinterland, and well inside ISEZ-administered territory. ## History #### Construction (1995–2006) Construction began in 1995, during the territorial administration, under a program to protect government functions and key infrastructure after the [[First Iradi Civil War]]. Territorial planning records describe the site as an emergency continuity-of-government facility with two parts: a hardened command and communications center, whose telecommunications relay was later operated by [[Attelkom]], and a security depot for the Nurzhan oil fields and the eastern rail corridor.[1] This dual purpose is the origin of the description of Boz-Korgon in Iradi media as a "military-industrial" compound. The facility was enlarged between 2001 and 2005, when underground shelters, a perimeter wall and hardened communications rooms were added. The work was financed through territorial infrastructure bonds. #### Transfer to the ISEZ and the Toktarov estate (2007–2022) After the US withdrawal in 2006 and the [[Second Iradi Civil War]], the site passed to the ISEZ government. According to property filings reported by the *[[Talas Herald]]*, the Toktarov family formally occupied a residential estate within the compound from 2011, the year in which talks on unification with the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] collapsed, and the estate was enlarged in the following years.[3] #### The 2023 move In early 2023, according to independent reporting, Toktarov moved the core of the executive chancellery from Talas to Boz-Korgon amid protests and security concerns in the capital. Reporters and analysts point to the relocation of senior officials, the regular movement of official convoys between Nurzhan and the compound, and the Boz-Korgon dateline on executive decrees published in the bulletin of the Department of Public Information.[2] The government denies that the seat of government has moved. It states that Talas, where the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]], the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] and Government House are located, remains the operational capital, and that Boz-Korgon is a continuity center for the protection of strategic industrial assets.[4] ## Facilities The compound covers about 116 hectares inside a double perimeter wall of reinforced concrete with observation towers and electronic sensors. Security is the responsibility of the Special Protective Service of the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]], commanded by [[Ruslan Toktarov]]. Published descriptions, based on construction tenders, satellite imagery and accounts by former staff, list:[5] - a three-story administration building, known as the Chancellery, with offices, secure video-conference rooms and dedicated communications links to the [[Attelkom Data Center]] and [[NurGaz]]; - underground shelters connected by tunnels; - the residential estate used by the Toktarov family; - staff accommodation and service buildings; - helicopter pads and hangars used by government helicopters and by [[Iradiya]] charter aircraft, and an airstrip about 1.2 kilometers long on the plain north-east of the compound (see [[Boz-Korgon Airstrip]]). ## Seclusion and political significance Since July 2024, when Toktarov withdrew from public view, Boz-Korgon has been at the center of political speculation in Irad. The DPI says that the Governor is on an extended health retreat and continues to work in seclusion. Journalists and most foreign diplomats have not been admitted to the compound since 2024, and analysts believe that the televised addresses attributed to Toktarov are recorded there; the addresses have been the subject of authenticity claims that officials reject (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[6] Tabloids in Talas occasionally report family tensions over access to the estate, but these reports are unverified. The isolation of the compound has also fed speculation about the succession, in which commentators name Toktarov's two eldest sons, Ruslan and [[Alikhan Toktarov|Alikhan]]; Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]], who runs the government, has made no public claim to the succession. DPI spokespeople reject descriptions of the government as unstable (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]). ## Bush family conspiracy theory In the 2000s a conspiracy theory alleged that Boz-Korgon had been built as a private retreat for the Bush family, the "Bush Family Palatial Complex", in return for dissolving the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]], a step that, in the theory's account, cleared the way for the DPI's consolidation of power. The theory is contradicted by the site's chronology: construction began in the 1990s, years before the treaty was dissolved in 2006. Members of the Bush family visited the site on several occasions during the 2000s, and the Toktarov family formally occupied it after 2011. The theory survives as a trope of regional political satire (see [[Bush Family Palatial Complex Conspiracy Theory]]). ## References
  1. ^ Territorial Gazette Archives. 'Infrastructure Allocations East of Nurzhan (1995–2003).' Talas Printing Office.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The Fortified Chancellery: Executive Authority at Boz-Korgon.' pp. 45–52.
  3. ^ Talas Herald (2012). 'Governor's Family Takes Up Residence at Boz-Korgon.'
  4. ^ Bulletin of the Department of Public Information, Executive Decree Series, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2024).
  5. ^ Irad Strategic Studies Institute (2023). 'Security Perimeters and Administrative Continuity in the ISEZ.' Monograph No. 12. Talas.
  6. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
### 3.4. Kok-Tash Kariz System *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Infrastructure & Transport* The **Kok-Tash Kariz System** (Iradi: *Kök-Tash karizderi*, "Blue Stone karezes") is a network of underground irrigation channels (*karez*, also known as qanats) in the foothills of the [[Talas Alatau]] and the upper [[Chatkal River]] watershed, mostly within the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]. Expanded under the [[wp:Kara-Khanid Khanate]] and the [[wp:Qara Khitai]], it has about 140 km of tunnels and still supplies water to more than 40 villages.[1] [[wp:Qanat|Karez]] systems are unusual this far north and east, and scholars compare Kok-Tash with the karez of [[wp:Turpan|Turpan in Xinjiang]]. In 2014 the system was inscribed on the [[wp:World Heritage Site|UNESCO World Heritage List]] as a component of the transnational [[wp:Silk Roads: the Routes Network of Chang'an-Tianshan Corridor|Silk Roads]] serial property nominated by [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]], a listing that both Iradi administrations protested.[2] Its use for smuggling by the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC) since 2007 is documented. Some historians allege that parts of the network were converted into supply routes for anti-Soviet groups with CIA funding during the [[wp:Cold War]]; the claim has not been confirmed and has never been acknowledged by the US government. ## Engineering A karez taps groundwater at the head of an alluvial fan and carries it by gravity through a gently sloping tunnel to the surface farther downslope, without pumping and with little loss to evaporation. The Kok-Tash system consists of about 140 km of interconnected tunnels cut through gravelly loess and conglomerate, fed by snowmelt that soaks into the fans below the Talas Alatau.[1] Vertical shafts every 20 to 35 meters give access to the diggers (*muqanni*), allow silt to be removed and ventilate the tunnels; on the surface they mark the line of each channel as a row of spoil mounds. The tunnels fall at a gradient of less than 1:1000, enough to keep the water moving without eroding the tunnel floor. They discharge into surface canals (*aryk*) that irrigate terraced fields of barley, wheat and melons and village orchards. Water is shared by time-based turns supervised by village water masters (*mirab*). ## Comparison with other karez systems Karez irrigation is associated mainly with [[wp:Iran]], [[wp:Afghanistan]] and the oases of southern [[wp:Central Asia]], and systems this far north and east, in the foothills of the [[wp:Tian Shan]], are unusual. Hydrologists and archaeologists compare Kok-Tash with the karez of the Turpan basin in [[wp:Xinjiang]], which lie at a similar latitude and also draw on Tian Shan snowmelt. Whether the technique reached the Talas Alatau from [[wp:Sogdia|Sogdiana]] in the west or from the [[wp:Tarim Basin|Tarim]] basin in the east is debated, as is the origin of the Turpan systems themselves.[3] ## History #### Medieval origins Radiocarbon dates from timber shoring and organic material in the oldest galleries cluster in the 10th and 11th centuries, and Iradi historiography attributes the system's main expansion to Kara-Khanid rulers who wanted to supply caravan stations and settlements; some archaeologists argue that the oldest core galleries are earlier.[4] Church tradition associates the early network with monastic communities linked to [[Janyl (Historical Figure)|Janyl]]. In the 12th century, under the Qara Khitai, Christian pastoral communities extended the eastern galleries toward the settlement now known as the [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]] (Shar-i-Kuhna). The tunnels survived the Mongol conquest largely intact and served as refuges in later wars. After the [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]], engineers from [[wp:Khanate of Kokand|Kokand]] helped local masters clear collapsed sections and restore water to the newly built [[Church of St. Janyl]] at [[Iyık Janyl]]. Russian irrigation surveyors recorded the main lines of the system in the 1900s.[5] #### Soviet period and Cold War allegations In the Soviet period the lower discharge areas were absorbed into the canal networks of collective farms, while the deeper galleries were left unmapped by state surveyors and maintained by herders outside the planning system. Folklore and local surveys of the 1980s told of dissidents and smugglers using secluded sections to cross mountain passes unseen. Some historians allege that during the Cold War sections of the network were converted into supply conduits for anti-Soviet Christian and tribal cells, with funding from the [[wp:Central Intelligence Agency|US Central Intelligence Agency]].[6] The allegation rests mainly on oral testimony collected after 1992. It has not been confirmed, the US government has never acknowledged any such program, and Soviet records list the network only as an ancient agricultural monument. Official histories and archaeological surveys in Irad describe the system as a [[wp:Silk Road]] irrigation work and do not mention CIA involvement. #### Smuggling since 2007 Since the 2007 partition the IAC has used disused galleries near the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] to move fuel, livestock and consumer goods between the tribal regions and the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] out of sight of ISEZ checkpoints. [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] reports and the ISEZ authorities describe the traffic as smuggling, and observers generally treat it as an opportunistic use of old tunnels. The [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] has sealed some shaft heads on the ISEZ side of the line (see [[Smuggling across the Qara-Chik Line]]).[7] ## World Heritage listing and current status After the partition, most of the system lay within the ATR, in the areas the UN mission calls the Talas Alatau and Chatkal Highlands planning zones, where it is maintained by village councils of elders (*aksakals*) and water masters. In 2014 the Kok-Tash Kariz was inscribed on the World Heritage List as a component of the transnational Silk Roads serial property, nominated by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; the [[Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed]] was included in the same way.[2] Irad is not a State Party to the World Heritage Convention. Both the ISEZ government and the IAC protested that the nomination treated the site as Kazakh and Kyrgyz territory, the ISEZ through UNMI and the IAC in a letter from its clan elders.[8] The system supplies drinking and irrigation water to more than 40 villages, including [[Ak-Tash]] and [[Kök-Jar]], and is a subject of hydrological and archaeological research. Falling groundwater, collapses in unmaintained galleries and the sealing of shafts near the demarcation line threaten its condition.[1] ## See also - [[Kand-i Nau]] ## References
  1. ^ Central Asian Water Authority (2022). Subterranean Hydraulic Networks of the Talas Alatau. Talas, pp. 34–48.
  2. ^ UNESCO World Heritage Centre (2014). 'Silk Roads Serial Nomination: Evaluation of Component Sites.' Paris.
  3. ^ Trombert, Éric (2008). 'The Karez Concept in Ancient Chinese Sources: Myth or Reality?' T'oung Pao, Vol. 94, pp. 115–150.
  4. ^ Talas State University Archaeological Expedition (2010). Radiocarbon Dating of the Kok-Tash Galleries. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  5. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 52: Turkestan Irrigation Surveys of the Talas and Chatkal Districts (1900–1914).
  6. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2019). 'Tunnels and Allegations: The Kok-Tash Kariz in the Cold War.' Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 77–95.
  7. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Report on the Ceasefire and the Naryn Water and Power Protocol. Talas.
  8. ^ Talas Herald (2014). 'Talas and the Clans Protest UNESCO Listing of Kok-Tash.'
### 3.5. Bektur Zhumabek uulu *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Biographies* {{Infobox person | name = Bektur Zhumabek uulu | image = Bektur_Zhumabek_uulu_2022.jpg | caption = Bektur on the summer pastures, 2022 | office1 = Spokesman of the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] | term_start1 = 2007 | office2 = *Biy* of the Tanıp clan | term_start2 = 2001 | other_names = Bektur Zhumabekov (Soviet records) | birth_date = 1968-08-15 | birth_place = Upper Kara-Suu valley, [[Talas Alatau]], [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic|Iradi SSR]], Soviet Union | spouse = Gulbara Sultanbek kyzy | children = 4 | parents = Zhumabek Asanaly uulu (father); Zuura Tashtan kyzy (mother) | relatives = [[Klara Zhumabek kyzy]] (sister) | residence = Upper Kara-Suu valley | occupation = Herder; veterinary assistant; clan leader | religion = [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] | allegiance = [[wp:Soviet Union]] (1986–1988); Provisional Government of Irad (1992); [[Popular Front of Irad]] (2007) | branch = [[wp:Soviet Army]]; *[[El-Choro (Military)|el-choro]]* irregulars | rank = Military commander, Popular Front of Irad | battles = [[First Iradi Civil War]]; [[Second Iradi Civil War]] ([[Storming of Talas (2007)|Storming of Talas]]) }} **Bektur Zhumabek uulu** (born August 15, 1968) is an Iradi tribal leader and former militia commander. He is the hereditary chieftain (*biy*) of the Tanıp, one of the twenty-four clans (*uruk*) of the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), and the principal spokesman and negotiator of the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (*Iradin Azatlık Cemiyeti*, IAC), the loose confederation through which the clans coordinate their affairs.[1] During the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] he commanded the clan militias that formed the [[Popular Front of Irad]], and on June 4, 2007, he led the [[Storming of Talas (2007)|storming of Talas]] that ended the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]]. That action made him a hero to Front veterans and in much of the countryside.[2] Bektur holds no formal office and rejects the title of leader. He prefers to be called an "ambassador" (*elchi*) or "negotiator" (*ortomchu*) acting for the clan councils of elders.[3] In 2011 he headed the IAC delegation that walked out of talks with the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) after the tribal regions were offered one-third of the seats in a unified legislature. Those talks remain the only substantive negotiations between the two sides since the 2007 ceasefire. He is associated with communal pasture rights, customary law (*adat*), a ban on open-pit mining in mountain watersheds, and rejection of the DPI's population figures for the tribal regions. The government of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) regards the IAC's militias as an unlawful armed formation, while United Nations officials treat Bektur as the confederation's main interlocutor.[4] ## Early life and education Bektur was born on August 15, 1968, at a summer herding camp (*zhayloo*) in the upper valley of the Kara-Suu, in the [[Talas Alatau]].[5] His father, Zhumabek Asanaly uulu (1934–2001), was a herdsman and brigade leader on a state livestock farm. His mother, Zuura Tashtan kyzy, came from a neighboring clan. According to the Tanıp genealogy (*[[Sanjyra (Genealogy)|sanjyra]]*), the family descends in the male line from [[Muratbek Tanıp-Biy]], a 19th-century chieftain known for negotiating pasture settlements among the northern clans.[5] Soviet records list him as Bektur Zhumabekov. Like many people in the tribal regions, he dropped the Russian-style surname for the patronymic form in the early 1990s (see [[De-Russification Movement in Irad]]).[6] He grew up herding sheep and [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] horses, moving between the family's winter quarters in the foothills and the Kara-Suu summer pastures. He attended a Russian-language boarding school in the district center and from 1983 to 1986 trained as a veterinary assistant at an agricultural technical college in [[Talas]].[5] From 1986 to 1988 he did his military service in the [[wp:Soviet Army]], with a mountain rifle unit in the [[wp:Transcaucasian Military District]]. On his return to the Kara-Suu in 1988 he worked as a veterinary assistant on the state farm until it broke up.[6] ## Career #### First Iradi Civil War (1991–1992) After the [[Communist Party of Irad]] declared the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] in October 1991, state procurement agents began requisitioning grain and horses from the rural clans. Bektur organized mounted volunteer patrols (*[[El-Choro (Military)|el-choro]]*) from the Tanıp and neighboring clans to protect herds in the Talas Alatau.[7] During the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] and the [[First Iradi Civil War]] that followed, his riders sided with the Provisional Government of [[Amanbek Alimbekov]]. Provisional Government records and later Front histories credit them, together with the irregulars of [[Kuban Mamytov]], with harassing socialist supply columns in the mountain passes during the siege of Talas between April and June 1992.[7] Military historians generally treat this as a secondary contribution compared with the US intervention, [[Operation Starlight]], which ended the war in August 1992. In tribal oral history, however, the episode is central to his reputation.[8] #### Territorial period (1992–2006) Under the US territorial administration (see [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]]), Bektur returned to herding and kept his distance from the territorial authorities in Talas. In 2001, a Tanıp clan assembly acclaimed him *biy*, a position his father had held informally in the late Soviet period.[5] He first became known beyond his clan for opposing leases of communal grazing land to mining companies. In 2003 he led a delegation of herders to the Territorial Legislature to protest against an exploration license for open-pit gold mining in the upper Kara-Suu. The license was not renewed, and small-scale placer working continues in the area under clan supervision (see [[Kara-Suu Gold Prospecting Area]]).[9] #### Second Civil War and the storming of Talas (2007) The United States withdrew from the Alimbekov–Baker Treaty in December 2006. In January and February 2007, Prime Minister [[Bakyt Orozbekov]]'s government of the new Democratic Republic of Irad auctioned exploration concessions and grain elevators, and attempted to privatize communal pastures in the Chatkal valley (see [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]]).[10] On February 25, 2007, [[Erlan Toktarov]] made public the cabinet's secret drafts to partition Irad among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]), took control of the DPI and proclaimed the ISEZ from [[Nurzhan]], while the DRI cabinet in Talas continued as a rival authority. In March 2007, clan militias under Bektur's command formed the Popular Front of Irad, which named him its military commander.[2] Its demands were the annulment of the privatization decrees, the restoration of communal pasture rights and the trial of Orozbekov for treason over the partition drafts. Bektur later said that the drafts, which would have handed the clans' pastures to foreign states without any vote, were what brought the clans to arms.[3] On June 4, 2007, mounted Front columns entered Talas, and some police and gendarmerie units went over to them, including men under Major [[Ruslan Kadyrov]]. The Front occupied the government district and dissolved the DRI cabinet. Front commanders arrested Orozbekov, who signed an instrument of resignation and was handed over to a United Nations compound outside the city.[10] ISEZ and IAC sources still dispute the casualty figures for the day.[8] The Front did not hold the city. Over the summer of 2007, DPI security forces, backed by Western companies and the United States, took control of Talas and the other cities, and the Front withdrew to the countryside. ISEZ histories describe the withdrawal as a defeat. Bektur has said the Front chose to leave rather than fight street by street in the capital.[2] In September 2007 he headed the Front's delegation at the UN-brokered talks that produced the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]]. The agreement fixed the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]] was annexed to it.[4] #### Iradi Freedom Society (2007–present) The IAC took shape during 2007 as the Front's political council, and after the ceasefire it became the clans' coordinating body. It has no single executive. Its highest forum is a seasonal assembly (*kurultai*) of clan elders (*[[Aksakal (Social Term)|aksakal]]*), and Bektur speaks for it by consensus rather than by election.[3] The [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) was established in October 2007, and Bektur has been its principal tribal interlocutor ever since. He has negotiated medical corridors and livestock vaccination campaigns in the highland valleys, working mainly through the [[Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery]].[4] He has also presided over sessions of the [[Autonomous Tribal Grazing Arbitration Tribunal]], which settles disputes over pasture between clans under *[[Adat (Customary Law)|adat]]*.[11] After a unification referendum was first proposed in 2008, Bektur led the IAC delegation to the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]]. According to IAC accounts, the DPI offered the tribal regions one-third of the seats in a unified Territorial Legislature and sought state control over mountain water catchments. The IAC argued that the offer reflected neither the tribal regions' share of the territory, the greater part of the country, nor their share of the population, and it demanded a clan veto over land and water, which its delegates justified by the experience of the 2007 Bill of Sale.[12] As the delegation walked out, the *[[Talas Herald]]* quoted Bektur as saying, "The mountains were given by God to the horses and the herds, not to the stock exchanges of Talas."[13] Several disputes have kept him in the news since then: - The IAC has proclaimed a ban on open-pit gold mining, cyanide heap leaching and uranium or thorium exploration in mountain watersheds. Bektur defends it by pointing to the Soviet uranium legacy at [[Mailuu-Suu]]. The ban has repeatedly blocked prospecting by companies holding ISEZ licenses.[9] - The IAC did not admit DPI enumerators to most clan territories, so the 2018 census gave only an estimate for the ATR. Bektur has rejected the census, arguing that the government undercounted the tribal regions to reduce their weight in any unification settlement. Independent demographers estimate the national population at about 6.2 million, against the official 4,626,000 (see [[2018 Irad census]]).[14] - Clan elders under his lead have withheld consent for the proposed Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline to cross their alpine pastures (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]]). The IAC also shares control of the Naryn release schedule of the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]], which is due for renewal in 2027: the dam passed to the ISEZ under the 2009 corridor protocol, which Bektur negotiated, but the clans' consent remains a condition of each five-year schedule.[4] - UNMI reports and ISEZ officials have documented the use of sections of the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]] by IAC-affiliated groups to move goods across the demarcation line. Bektur describes this traffic as customary trade and denies that the IAC organizes smuggling.[4] In November 2024, during the [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]], Bektur said that the IAC would "not negotiate with a recording". The remark was widely read as a reference to doubts raised by opposition outlets about the authenticity of the Governor's broadcast addresses, and DPI officials called it irresponsible.[15] After Donald Trump's February 2025 remarks about selling Irad to Russia (see [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]), Bektur issued a communiqué declaring that "the soil of Irad was purchased with the blood of our fallen riders and cannot be bought or sold like cattle at a market."[16] ## Political positions Bektur's public statements and IAC documents set out a consistent program:[3] - He supports communal clan ownership of pasture and water, and opposes the privatization or individual titling of rangeland. - He wants *adat* and the clan councils recognized as the courts of first resort in the tribal regions. - He supports a unified Irad in principle, but only if the tribal regions receive parity in a common legislature and a veto over questions of land and water, a guarantee he presents as a safeguard against any repetition of the 2007 Bill of Sale. He has called the DPI's referendum proposals "a census by other means". - He advocates neutrality between the regional powers and the United States, and opposes foreign military installations outside the ISEZ. - He publicly supports the [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo|taboo on eating horsemeat]] and clan bans on the commercial slaughter of horses. ## Public image and controversies Among Front veterans and across much of the ATR, Bektur is remembered chiefly for the storming of Talas, and he appears in several [[Iradi Country-Folk|country-folk]] ballads about it.[8] His austere way of life and his refusal of a salary or formal title are central to that image. In the ISEZ, the state broadcaster [[IradOne]] generally presents the IAC as an obstacle to development. DPI officials have called him a warlord, and the ISEZ commemorates the police officers killed in Talas on June 4, 2007.[15] Human rights organizations have criticized the system he defends. A 2022 [[wp:Human Rights Watch]] report on Irad's "judicial dualism" found that women have limited standing before clan councils and that there is no appeal beyond the *kurultai*. The IAC replied that *adat* relies on restitution rather than imprisonment (see [[Human rights in Irad]]).[11] ISEZ authorities have also accused El-Choro patrols of detaining licensed survey teams. The IAC says the teams entered clan land without consent.[4] ## Personal life Bektur lives in a timber house and a felt yurt in the upper Kara-Suu valley, on the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line.[3] He is married to Gulbara Sultanbek kyzy, and they have four adult children, all of whom live in the valley. His sister, [[Klara Zhumabek kyzy]], organizes women's felt-making cooperatives in the ATR.[5] He is a communicant of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] and opens clan councils with a traditional blessing (*[[Bata (Culture)|bata]]*) followed by prayers in Iradi.[3] He speaks Russian, learned during his army service, but conducts public business only in Iradi. He hunts with golden eagles (see [[Burkut Saluu]]). His dun Chongtor stallion, [[Almanbet (Chongtor Stallion)|Almanbet]], has sired several winners of mountain endurance races.[17] ## References
  1. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  3. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Mountain Chieftain: Tribal Federalism under Bektur Zhumabek uulu.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2.
  4. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2024). Report of the Mission on the Situation along the Qara-Chik Demarcation Line. Talas.
  5. ^ Autonomous Tribal Assembly (2022). Records of the Tanıp Clan Kurultai. ATR Council Press.
  6. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 288: Soviet Military Commissariat Registers, Talas Oblast (1950–1991).
  7. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Provisional Presidential Papers of Amanbek Alimbekov (1992).
  8. ^ Omurzakova, Aizada (2019). The Riders of June: Memory and the Storming of Talas. Talas State University Press.
  9. ^ Talas Herald (May 14, 2003). 'Herders Petition Legislature over Kara-Suu Gold License.' Talas.
  10. ^ Human Rights Watch (2007). 'The Privatization Crisis and Political Turmoil in Talas.' New York.
  11. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). 'Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad.' New York, pp. 45–62.
  12. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2012). Report on the Bilateral Talks between the Democratic Party of Irad and the Iradi Freedom Society (2011). Talas.
  13. ^ Talas Herald (2011). 'Tribal Delegates Walk Out of Unification Talks.' Talas.
  14. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'Counting the Uncounted: Settlement Mapping and the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 15.
  15. ^ Talas Herald (November 2024). 'IAC Will Not "Negotiate with a Recording", Says Bektur.' Talas.
  16. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'The 2025 Trump Statement: Diplomatic Shocks in Central Asia.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 24–42.
  17. ^ Chongtor Studbook Registry (2023). Register of Sires and Endurance Results. Talas.
### 3.6. Aidar Maksat *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Biographies* {{Infobox person | name = Aidar Maksat | image = Aidar_Maksat_2024.jpg | caption = Maksat at a press briefing, 2024 | office1 = Lieutenant Governor of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] | term_start1 = 2019-11-25 | governor1 = [[Erlan Toktarov]] | preceded_by1 = Daniyar Tologonov | office2 = Director-General of Infrastructure Development, Talas | term_start2 = 2009 | term_end2 = 2016 | birth_name = Aidar Maksatov | birth_date = 1980-11-03 | birth_place = Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]), [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic|Iradi SSR]], Soviet Union | party = [[Democratic Party of Irad]] | spouse = [[Zara Toktarova]] (m. 2008) | children = 3 | parents = Bolat Maksatov (father); Saule Maksatova (mother) | relatives = [[Erlan Toktarov]] (father-in-law) | alma_mater = [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]] (2002); [[wp:London School of Economics]] (MSc, 2005) | occupation = Civil engineer; politician }} **Aidar Maksat** (born November 3, 1980) is an Iradi civil engineer and politician who has been Lieutenant Governor of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) since November 2019.[1] He belongs to the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) and is the son-in-law of Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]]. Toktarov withdrew from public view in July 2024, and Maksat has run the day-to-day operations of the ISEZ government since then. The DPI attributes the Governor's absence to an extended health retreat and says that Maksat acts on his instructions.[2] Before becoming Lieutenant Governor, Maksat worked in municipal infrastructure in [[Talas]], where he directed the reconstruction of the city's water treatment works, and sat on the regulatory board overseeing the telecommunications company [[Attelkom]].[3] Foreign diplomats and investors often describe him as the most technocratic member of the governing circle. Critics argue that his rise owes much to his 2008 marriage to [[Zara Toktarova]], the Governor's youngest child and only daughter.[4] As Lieutenant Governor he has run the government since 2024, during a publicly visible succession rivalry between the Governor's two eldest sons, [[Ruslan Toktarov]] and [[Alikhan Toktarov]]; he has made no public claim to the succession.[2] ## Early life and education Maksat was born on November 3, 1980, in Kobozev (renamed [[Nurzhan]] in 1992) and was registered at birth as Aidar Maksatov.[5] His father, Bolat Maksatov, was a metallurgical engineer. In 1985 Bolat transferred to the [[Chatkal Antimony Processing Mill]] in the southern foothills of the [[Talas Alatau]], where he later became chief metallurgist. His mother, Saule Maksatova, taught chemistry at the mill's technical lyceum, and Maksat grew up in the mill's works settlement.[5] Like many urban [[Iradis]] of his generation, he began school in Russian and moved to English-language instruction after 1992 (see [[Urban Iradi Millennials]]). He studied civil engineering at the [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]] and graduated in 2002. A graduate scholarship funded by the territorial administration then took him to the [[wp:London School of Economics]], where he completed a master's degree in public policy and administration in 2005.[6] He has used the shortened form of his surname since his student years, a practice that spread among younger urban professionals during the territorial period (see [[De-Russification Movement in Irad]]).[5] ## Career #### Municipal and infrastructure posts (2005–2019) In 2005 Maksat joined the territorial Office of Economic Planning in Talas, where he worked on public–private partnerships for utilities.[3] He stayed in the civil service through the crisis of 2006–2007. When DPI forces took control of Talas in the summer of 2007, he became deputy head of the city's utilities department, and he joined the DPI in 2008.[4] From 2009 to 2016 he was Director-General of Infrastructure Development for the municipality of Talas. His main project was the reconstruction of the [[Talas Municipal Water Treatment Works]] and the replacement of Soviet-era water mains, financed with concessional loans. Municipal figures state that losses from the distribution network fell by about a third over the period.[3] Opposition council members questioned the award of some construction contracts without open tender, but no wrongdoing was established.[7] From 2012 to 2019 Maksat also sat on the ISEZ telecommunications regulatory board. The board oversaw private investment in the [[Attelkom Fiber Backbone|fiber trunk lines]] linking Talas, Nurzhan and the northern border crossings, and Attelkom reported that broadband had reached about 70% of urban households by 2019.[8] He also negotiated customs pre-clearance arrangements with the Kazakh border authorities for meat exports from the [[Sukarne Irad Complex|Sukarne]] and [[Conagra Talas Beef Facility|Conagra]] facilities. In 2016 Toktarov appointed him head of the governorate's Department of Infrastructure and Communications.[3] #### Lieutenant Governor (2019–present) In November 2019 Toktarov was re-elected with 90.31% of the vote, in an election the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] criticized as lacking meaningful choice (see [[Elections in Irad]]). Maksat was his running mate on the joint ticket and took office as Lieutenant Governor on November 25, 2019.[1][9] Maksat took charge of coordination between government departments, preparation of the budget and the ISEZ's commercial negotiations. These included talks with Kazakh delegations on transit tariffs, and with the [[wp:China National Petroleum Corporation]] (CNPC) on the proposed Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]]).[10] In 2020 he chaired the governorate's emergency commission on the [[wp:COVID-19]] pandemic. He also represents the ISEZ on matters arising under the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], which is due for renewal in 2027.[10] Independent reporting places the *de facto* executive seat at [[Boz-Korgon]] from early 2023. The government maintains that Talas remains the operational capital, and Maksat has continued to hold most of his public meetings there.[2] In November 2023, a month after the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas|student protests in Talas]], he announced the suspension of the municipal licensing surcharge that had prompted them.[11] #### Since July 2024 Since the Governor's last public appearance in July 2024, Maksat has chaired cabinet meetings and received foreign delegations. Official statements describe him as acting on the Governor's instructions, and the succession provisions of the 1992 Elective Governor Acts have not been invoked.[2] In August 2024 he addressed the diplomatic corps and representatives of foreign companies in Talas. He pledged to honor existing agreements, including the arrangements for [[Talas Air Base]], to maintain economic stability, and to pursue "pragmatic dialogue" with the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]].[12] In February 2025, [[wp:Donald Trump|Donald Trump's]] remarks about selling Irad to Russia provoked demonstrations (see [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]). The administration responded with a formal demarche through the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]], stating that Irad's sovereignty was not negotiable.[13] Maksat's relations with his brothers-in-law have been widely reported (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]). According to exiled opposition outlets and diplomats quoted anonymously in the regional press, in August and September 2024 Ruslan Toktarov pressed for a state of emergency in Talas, which was not declared. The same sources reported disputes with Alikhan Toktarov over the budget of [[IradOne]]. None of the three men has confirmed these accounts.[4] Maksat has met Chinese investors frequently since 2022, including the CNPC delegation on the pipeline; his office describes the meetings as routine investment promotion.[10] ## Political positions Maksat presents himself as a manager rather than an ideologue. His public positions include the following:[4] - He welcomes foreign infrastructure investment from both Western and Chinese sources, and has described the Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline as "the largest opportunity of the decade" for the ISEZ. - He supports expanding Attelkom's networks and moving government services online. - He favors keeping the US basing arrangements at Talas Air Base while broadening commercial ties with [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and China (see [[Irad–China relations]]). - He supports negotiated unification with the tribal regions in principle, without a timetable, and continued cooperation under the Naryn protocol. - He supports the status of Iradi and English as the official languages of the ISEZ. He has opposed proposals by [[Kamran Bekzatov]] and other figures among the [[Russos of Nurzhan]] to give Russian official status again. ## Public image Diplomatic and business observers commonly contrast Maksat's technocratic style with Ruslan Toktarov's focus on security and Alikhan Toktarov's flamboyance.[4] Within the ISEZ, the Russo faction identifies him with the Western-educated administrators in Talas.[14] Opposition commentators argue that his career shows the neopatrimonial character of the governorate, in which family ties to the Governor decide access to office. They also note that his reputation as a reformer has not extended to elections or press freedom.[9] ## Personal life Maksat married Zara Toktarova in 2008, and they have three children.[5] She is a doctoral candidate in education at [[wp:Stanford University]], lives mostly abroad and keeps a non-political public profile. Local tabloids have occasionally reported tensions within the Toktarov family over access to the Boz-Korgon estate. These reports are unverified, and neither Maksat nor his wife has commented on them.[2] Maksat is a keen amateur cyclist and sits on the board of trustees of the [[Talas Symphony Orchestra]]. He speaks Iradi, Russian and English.[5] ## References
  1. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). Bulletin of the Department of Public Information, Executive Decree Series. Talas.
  2. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  3. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Executive Leadership and Commercial Concessions Directory. Talas.
  4. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Technocracy and Succession in the Talas Basin.' Academic Press, pp. 88–104.
  5. ^ Talas Herald (2019). 'Profile: The Engineer Who Became Lieutenant Governor.' Talas.
  6. ^ Territorial Office of Education (2004). Register of Territorial Graduate Scholars, 2003–2005. Talas.
  7. ^ Talas Herald (2014). 'Council Members Query Water Works Tenders.' Talas.
  8. ^ Attelkom (2020). Annual Report 2019: Network Coverage and Subscriber Data. Talas.
  9. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Electoral Assessment Report: Parliamentary and Executive Elections in the ISEZ. Warsaw.
  10. ^ Department of Public Information (2022). 'Lieutenant Governor Receives CNPC Delegation.' Press release. Talas.
  11. ^ Talas Herald (November 2023). 'Licensing Surcharge Suspended after Student Protests.' Talas.
  12. ^ Department of Public Information (2024). 'Address by the Lieutenant Governor to the Diplomatic Corps.' Talas.
  13. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'The 2025 Trump Statement: Diplomatic Shocks in Central Asia.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 24–42.
  14. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Petroleum Oligarchy: Kamran Bekzatov and the Russo Faction.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 88–104.
### 3.7. Ruslan Toktarov *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Biographies* {{Infobox person | name = Ruslan Toktarov | honorific_prefix = Major General | image = Ruslan_Toktarov_2021.jpg | caption = Official portrait of Ruslan Toktarov as commander of the Republican Gendarmerie | office1 = Commander of the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] | term_start1 = 2012-03 | appointer1 = [[Erlan Toktarov]] | birth_date = 1978-06-22 | birth_place = [[Talas]], [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic|Iradi SSR]], Soviet Union | spouse = Aiperi Toktarova (née Abdyldaeva) | children = 3 | parents = [[Erlan Toktarov]] (father); [[Anara Toktarova]] (mother) | relatives = [[Alikhan Toktarov|Alikhan]], [[Timur Toktarov|Timur]], [[Adil Toktarov|Adil]], [[Bekzat Toktarov|Bekzat]] (brothers); [[Zara Toktarova|Zara]] (sister); [[Aidar Maksat]] (brother-in-law) | residence = [[Talas]] | alma_mater = Omsk Higher Tank Engineering School | religion = [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] | branch = [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] | serviceyears = 2004–present | rank = Major general | commands = Republican Gendarmerie of Irad | battles = [[Second Iradi Civil War]] }} **Ruslan Toktarov** (born June 22, 1978) is an Iradi security official who has commanded the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] since 2012, with the rank of major general.[1] He is the eldest son of Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]]. Through the Gendarmerie, which also includes the Special Protective Service responsible for executive security, Ruslan oversees the checkpoints on the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], internal intelligence and perimeter security at [[Talas Air Base]].[1] Ruslan is known for nationalist rhetoric and a hard line toward the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]. Remarks he made about Muslims in late 2024 and early 2025 were condemned by religious leaders and human rights groups, and reinforced a reputation his critics describe as bigoted and brutish.[2] Rights organizations have criticized the Gendarmerie's treatment of detainees and its handling of the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]].[3] Since his father withdrew from public view in July 2024, Ruslan has appeared in public far more often. His rivalry over the succession with his younger brother [[Alikhan Toktarov]] has been widely reported, and many commentators doubt his ability to handle political and economic affairs.[4] ## Early life and education Ruslan was born on June 22, 1978, in [[Talas]]. He was the first child of Erlan Toktarov, then a junior officer in the Soviet logistics corps, and his wife, [[Anara Toktarova]].[5] His father's postings, which included two tours in [[wp:Afghanistan]], meant that Ruslan spent much of his childhood with his mother in Talas. The family settled in Kobozev in 1989, when his father returned to the Iradi SSR, and moved back to Talas after 1992. Ruslan finished secondary school there in 1995, under the US territorial administration.[5] Most children of the territorial elite went to university in the United States or Western Europe. Ruslan instead enrolled in 1995 at the Omsk Higher Tank Engineering School in Russia and graduated in 1999 as an armored-vehicle engineer.[5] He later took counter-narcotics and protective-security courses run by American private contractors at Talas Air Base.[1] ## Career #### Early career (1999–2012) After returning from Russia, Ruslan managed security and logistics for the family's fuel-distribution business near Talas Air Base. The business was one of the commercial concessions his father had obtained while serving in the Territorial Legislature.[6] In 2004 he joined the Republican Gendarmerie as a captain. Critics attribute his rapid promotion to family patronage.[4] In the spring of 2007, during the [[Second Iradi Civil War]], he commanded a gendarmerie detachment that guarded the [[NurGaz]] tank farm and rail yards outside [[Nurzhan]] against strikers and saboteurs. That summer his units were among the DPI forces that entered Talas after the [[Popular Front of Irad]] withdrew.[7] After the 2007 ceasefire he became deputy commander of the Gendarmerie's Border Demarcation Brigade. In that post he oversaw the construction of the fortified crossings on the Qara-Chik line, including the main [[Qara-Chik Border Checkpoint]], and set up the inspection regime that governs the movement of herders and agricultural goods between the ATR and the ISEZ.[1] #### Commander of the Republican Gendarmerie (2012–present) In March 2012 his father appointed him commander of the Republican Gendarmerie, with the rank of major general. The force answers to the Ministry of Internal Security and has about 4,000 personnel. It comprises the Border Demarcation Brigade, the Special Protective Service, a rapid-reaction group and the Highway Patrol Corps.[1] The Special Protective Service guards the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound. Ruslan also oversees officer training at the [[Talas Gendarmerie Academy]].[1] In October 2023, police and Gendarmerie units dispersed the student and courier protests in Talas with tear gas, water cannon and mass administrative detentions. Among those detained was the commentator [[Jason Ilyasov]], whose criticism on television had preceded the protests.[3] Ruslan defended the operation and described the protest organizers as "provocateurs paid to break windows". [[wp:Human Rights Watch]] criticized the use of force and the detention of minors.[3] #### Succession contest (2024–present) Since July 2024 Ruslan has appeared at state ceremonies and on [[IradOne]] far more often than before. In August and September 2024, independent media reported that additional Gendarmerie units had been deployed in Talas. Exiled opposition outlets reported that he had pressed Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] to declare a state of emergency, which was not declared. Neither the Gendarmerie nor the governorate has confirmed these reports (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[4] Some analysts quoted in the regional press have speculated that he has been removing officers loyal to Alikhan from municipal police commands. The claim has not been substantiated.[4] ## Political positions Ruslan advocates a strongly nationalist form of Iradi patriotism that he identifies closely with Christianity.[2] He opposes concessions to the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] and has called for the state to reassert its authority over the mountain watersheds. In a 2019 interview with IradOne he described the tribal regions as "a medieval relic holding back national industrial progress".[8] He has rejected the IAC's demand for parity in a unified legislature and has called its spokesman, [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]], "a horse thief with a fax machine".[4] He has said little in public about economic policy or foreign relations, and commentators often point out this gap.[4] ## Controversies #### Remarks about Muslims In December 2024 Ruslan spoke at a graduation ceremony at the Talas Gendarmerie Academy, which IradOne broadcast live. He described Muslim communities in the Fergana Rim as "guests who have forgotten whose house they live in", and said that mosques receiving foreign funding should be "closed without discussion".[2] In a television interview the following month, he repeated the popular prejudice that eating horsemeat is a "Muslim" custom and used it to question the loyalty of Muslim citizens. Ethnographers note that this prejudice ignores Kazakh and Kyrgyz practice (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]).[2] Official estimates put Muslims at about 18% of the population (see [[Islam in Irad]]). Sunni clerics in Nurzhan and the Fergana Rim condemned the remarks, as did human rights groups. The Archbishop of [[Iyık Janyl]] called for "restraint in words that wound neighbors" (see [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]]).[9] A spokesman for the Department of Public Information said the remarks reflected Ruslan's "personal views" and not government policy. Ruslan did not retract them.[9] #### Allegations of abuses Human Rights Watch and [[wp:Amnesty International]] have documented allegations of torture, forced confessions and arbitrary seizure of property by units under Ruslan's command. Most of the allegations concern the Qara-Chik crossings and pre-trial detention in Talas, and both organizations have called for targeted sanctions against him.[3][10] The Gendarmerie rejects the allegations and points to its role in protecting pipelines and industrial infrastructure (see [[Human rights in Irad]]).[1] #### Business interests In 2019, exiled Iradi journalists published investigative reports alleging that companies registered in the [[wp:British Virgin Islands]] and linked to Ruslan held contracts for perimeter security, diesel supply and construction services used by foreign contractors at Talas Air Base. Ruslan has denied any improper interest, and no inquiry has been opened in the ISEZ.[11] ## Personal life Ruslan is married to Aiperi Toktarova (née Abdyldaeva), and they have three children. He lives in Talas.[5] He is a member of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] and often refers to his faith in speeches. Like his father, he is a keen horseman, and he plays for a Gendarmerie [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|ulak tartysh]] team.[5] ## References
  1. ^ Republican Gendarmerie Inspectorate (2023). Annual Security and Demarcation Review. Talas.
  2. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'Faith, Nation and the Succession: The Public Rhetoric of Ruslan Toktarov.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1.
  3. ^ Human Rights Watch (2024). 'Water Cannon and Silence: The Policing of the 2023 Talas Protests.' New York.
  4. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Technocracy and Succession in the Talas Basin.' Academic Press, pp. 88–104.
  5. ^ Talas Herald (2012). 'Profile: The Governor's Eldest Son Takes Command of the Gendarmerie.' Talas.
  6. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of Transport and Logistics Syndicates. Talas.
  7. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 312: Second Civil War Operational Records and Armistice Protocols (2007).
  8. ^ IradOne Current Affairs Broadcasting Archives (2019). Interview with Major General Ruslan Toktarov. Talas.
  9. ^ Talas Herald (January 2025). 'Clerics and Archbishop Condemn General's Remarks.' Talas.
  10. ^ Amnesty International (2023). 'Irad: Torture and Arbitrary Detention in the Special Economic Zone.' London.
  11. ^ Steppe Investigative Network (2019). 'Fences and Fuel: The Contracts behind Talas Air Base.' Online publication.
### 3.8. Alikhan Toktarov *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Biographies* {{Infobox person | name = Alikhan Toktarov | image = Alikhan_Toktarov_2019.jpg | caption = Alikhan Toktarov at an IradOne channel launch, 2019 | office1 = Chairman of the executive board of [[IradOne]] | term_start1 = 2015-06 | appointer1 = [[Erlan Toktarov]] | birth_date = 1980-09-14 | birth_place = [[Talas]], [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic|Iradi SSR]], Soviet Union | spouse = Madina Iskakova (m. 2010; div. 2017) | children = 2 | parents = [[Erlan Toktarov]] (father); [[Anara Toktarova]] (mother) | relatives = [[Ruslan Toktarov|Ruslan]], [[Timur Toktarov|Timur]], [[Adil Toktarov|Adil]], [[Bekzat Toktarov|Bekzat]] (brothers); [[Zara Toktarova|Zara]] (sister); [[Aidar Maksat]] (brother-in-law) | alma_mater = [[wp:Regent's University London|Regent's College, London]] (BA, 2003) | occupation = Businessman; media executive | known_for = Steppe Luxury Group (founder, 2008) }} **Alikhan Toktarov** (born September 14, 1980) is an Iradi businessman and media executive who has chaired the board of the state broadcaster [[IradOne]] since 2015.[1] He is the second son of Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]]. Through his company, the Steppe Luxury Group, he also holds interests in commercial property in [[Talas]] and in franchises importing luxury goods.[2] Alikhan has cultivated a cosmopolitan, Western-leaning public image that contrasts with that of his elder brother, the Gendarmerie commander [[Ruslan Toktarov]]. He has been the subject of repeated public scandals over his spending, and over allegations, which he denies, that he enriched himself from public revenues.[3] Since July 2024, when his father withdrew from public view, he has become much more visible and is one of the two main figures in the family's openly reported rivalry over the succession. His public appearances have drawn criticism and have done little to change his reputation for irresponsibility.[4] ## Early life and education Alikhan was born on September 14, 1980, in Talas. He was the second child of Erlan Toktarov and [[Anara Toktarova]].[5] He grew up mainly in Talas and, from 1989, in Kobozev (renamed [[Nurzhan]] in 1992), and was eleven when the [[First Iradi Civil War]] began. Under the US territorial administration he attended an English-language preparatory school in Talas.[5] He studied international business in [[wp:Bishkek]] from 1998 to 2000, then moved to [[wp:London]], where in 2003 he completed a bachelor's degree in media and management at [[wp:Regent's University London|Regent's College]] (now Regent's University London).[5] ## Business career Alikhan returned to Irad in 2003 and worked for his father's bonded-warehousing business near [[Talas Air Base]].[2] In 2008, the year after the ISEZ was created, he founded the Steppe Luxury Group. The company obtained exclusive regional import rights for European cars, Swiss watches and American consumer electronics.[2] From 2011 he acquired municipal land along the central avenue of Talas and built office towers, hotels and leisure venues aimed at foreign contractors and energy executives. Several of these projects were joint ventures with his younger brother [[Adil Toktarov]].[2] Opposition council members and investigative journalists have argued that the land was allocated without competitive auction; the municipality says the transfers were lawful.[6] ## Chairman of IradOne In June 2015 Erlan Toktarov appointed Alikhan chairman of the executive board of IradOne, the state broadcaster created under the Public Broadcasting Act of 1993.[1] Under his chairmanship, the network made the following changes: - It moved from analog to digital broadcasting and launched youth, equestrian sport and streaming services. - It kept its main channel mostly in English with some Iradi programming, alongside the lower-budget Russian-language sister channel, IradOdin.[1] - It promoted domestic popular music, including the [[Mor-Wave]] scene and [[Mor-Pop]].[7] - It bought broadcasting rights to the [[Altyn-Zhylky Awards]] and to the annual President's Cup in [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|ulak tartysh]] at the [[Irad State Hippodrome]]. - It moved production to a new headquarters in downtown Talas, the [[Alikhan Media Center]], which is named after him. Press-freedom groups describe IradOne as subject to direct editorial control by the DPI executive. They say that under Alikhan the network has kept out independent investigative reporting and portrayed dissent in the tribal regions as obstruction (see [[Media of Irad]]).[8] The network has nevertheless continued to give airtime to some critics of the government, most prominently the commentator [[Jason Ilyasov]], whom it began booking again for panel programs in 2024, a few months after the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas|2023 protests in Talas]]. IradOne says its bookings are editorial decisions.[9] Since July 2024 IradOne has been the only outlet for the Governor's audio and video addresses, which have been the subject of authenticity claims that officials reject (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[4] ## Succession rivalry Since mid-2024 Alikhan has appeared more often at public events and on his own network. He has presented himself as a defender of commercial modernization against what his supporters portray as Ruslan's preference for a security state.[4] Regional and exiled media have reported disputes between Alikhan and Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] over IradOne's budget and over control of state broadcasting during the Governor's absence. None of the parties has confirmed these reports (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[4] In February 2025, [[wp:Donald Trump|Donald Trump's]] remarks about selling Irad to Russia set off demonstrations and widespread anti-American feeling (see [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]). Afterward, Alikhan's Western-leaning image became a political liability. [[FreeIrad.org]] claimed that lobbyists retained by his associates had brought Irad to the attention of Trump's circle in late 2024; IradOne Media Group called the claim "fiction". No links between him and the US executive branch have been substantiated.[10] ## Political positions Alikhan rarely gives policy interviews, and his views are known mainly from speeches at business forums and from IradOne's editorial line.[3] - He presents himself as a champion of consumer-led growth, foreign retail franchises and investment in tourism and entertainment in Talas. - He has spoken in favor of English-language media and of keeping Irad "open to the world". He has also criticized calls by [[Kamran Bekzatov]] and other figures among the [[Russos of Nurzhan]] for accession to the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]]. - He has avoided detailed positions on the tribal regions or on unification, beyond support for the government's referendum proposals. ## Public image Alikhan's public persona, which includes a large social-media following, imported sports cars and frequent travel abroad, has made him the best-known member of the family among young urban [[Iradis]].[3] The same image has drawn hostility in industrial Nurzhan and among older voters, and analysts quoted in the regional press regard it as a weakness in the succession contest. Supporters credit him with modernizing IradOne's entertainment and sports output.[4] ## Controversies - In 2018, exiled Iradi journalists reported that Alikhan had bought three beachfront villas in [[wp:Dubai]] worth more than US$18 million. They alleged that the purchases were financed with telecommunications licensing fees. Alikhan said he had paid for the properties with income from his businesses, and no charges have been brought in the ISEZ.[11] - In 2021, leaked video of Alikhan placing large bets at a casino in [[wp:Macau]] circulated widely on social media. It provoked criticism in Nurzhan, where industrial wages had stagnated. His office called the footage a private matter recorded without consent.[3] - Tabloids and opposition outlets have repeatedly published rumors of substance abuse and reckless spending, which Alikhan has not addressed publicly.[4] ## Personal life In 2010 Alikhan married Madina Toktarova (née Iskakova), a former IradOne presenter. They have two children and divorced in 2017.[5] He divides his time between Talas and homes abroad. He owns racehorses and collects classic cars.[3] ## References
  1. ^ IradOne Media Corporation (2023). Annual Operational and Programming Report. Talas.
  2. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Real Estate and Commercial Property Directory. Talas.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Oligarchic Dynasties of the Talas Basin.' Academic Press, pp. 134–150.
  4. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  5. ^ Talas Herald (2015). 'Profile: IradOne's New Chairman.' Talas.
  6. ^ Talas Herald (2013). 'Council Questions Avenue Land Transfers.' Talas.
  7. ^ Central Asian Music Review (2020). 'Mor-Wave and Post-Soviet Electronic Music in Irad.' Vol. 12.
  8. ^ Eurasian Media Review (2023). 'Broadcasting Monopolies and Political Messaging in the ISEZ.' Bishkek.
  9. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Media Provocateurs and Opposition Politics in the ISEZ.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2.
  10. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'The 2025 Trump Statement: Diplomatic Shocks in Central Asia.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 24–42.
  11. ^ Steppe Investigative Network (2018). 'The Dubai Villas.' Online publication.
### 3.9. Kamran Bekzatov *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Biographies* {{Infobox person | name = Kamran Bekzatov | image = Kamran_Bekzatov_2019.jpg | caption = Bekzatov at a business forum, 2019 | birth_date = 1951-01-28 | birth_place = Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]), [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic|Iradi SSR]], Soviet Union | spouse = Galina Lebedeva | children = [[Emil Bekzatov|Emil]]; [[Rustam Bekzatov|Rustam]]; [[Asel Bekzatova|Asel]] | parents = Rashid Bekzatov (father); Valentina Bekzatova (mother) | residence = [[Nurzhan]] | alma_mater = Gubkin Moscow Institute of the Petrochemical and Gas Industry (1974) | occupation = Businessman; petroleum engineer | title = Head of [[NurGaz]] (1993–present) | known_for = [[Russos of Nurzhan]]; Bekzatov Foundation | net_worth = US$1 billion+ (estimate) }} **Kamran Bekzatov** (born January 28, 1951) is an Iradi businessman and petroleum engineer who has headed [[NurGaz]], the Nurzhan Oil and Gas Company, since its privatization in 1993.[1] He is widely described as an oligarch. He is also the best-known member of the "Russos", the generation of urban [[Iradis]] who were educated in Russian during the Soviet period and are centered on [[Nurzhan]] (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]).[2] NurGaz reports output of about 120,000 barrels of crude oil per day, although independent estimates are lower. Most of the oil is exported north through the 85-kilometer [[Northern Export Feeder]] into the Kazakh pipeline network near [[wp:Shymkent]].[3][4] Bekzatov is an outspoken critic of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]]'s economic policy and of the ISEZ's reliance on American security guarantees. He has called for closer ties with Russia, accession to the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]] and the restoration of Russian as an official language. In recent years he has also drawn attention for open praise of [[wp:Vladimir Putin]].[2] Claims surface from time to time that he plotted against the DPI leadership. Most analysts dismiss them as palace intrigue, and he denies them.[5] ## Early life and education Bekzatov was born on January 28, 1951, in Kobozev, as Nurzhan was then called, two years after oil was discovered in the lower Chu basin (see [[Nurzhan Oil Discovery (1949)]]).[6] His father, Rashid Bekzatov, was chief engineer at the Kobozev Heavy Machine Plant (now the [[Nurzhan Heavy Machine Plant]]). His mother, Valentina Bekzatova, was a physician at the city polyclinic. He went to Russian-language schools, and in 1969 he entered the Gubkin Moscow Institute of the Petrochemical and Gas Industry. He graduated in 1974 as a petroleum reservoir engineer.[6] ## Soviet career (1974–1991) From 1974 to 1988 Bekzatov worked in the West Siberian oilfields under the USSR Ministry of the Oil Industry. He rose from field engineer to chief engineer of a production unit near [[wp:Nizhnevartovsk]].[6] In 1988 he returned to the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] as general director of *Iradneft*, the republic's oil production trust. He introduced water-injection secondary recovery and new rotary drilling equipment to the aging fields of the [[Chu River Basin]].[7] ## First Civil War and privatization (1991–2006) In October 1991 the [[Communist Party of Irad]] declared the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] (SRI) in Kobozev. Iradneft's fields and refinery lay in SRI-held territory, and Bekzatov stayed on as director. Accounts of his conduct during the [[First Iradi Civil War]] differ.[8] His supporters credit him with keeping fuel flowing to Kobozev's power plants and hospitals and with protecting installations from sabotage. Some veterans of the Provisional Government say that Iradneft also supplied SRI forces until US and Iradi forces captured the city in August 1992, during [[Operation Starlight]]. Bekzatov kept his post under the territorial administration.[8] In May 1993, under the territorial administration's privatization program, Iradneft was converted into NurGaz. Managers and employees received a majority of the shares, and Bekzatov emerged as the controlling shareholder.[9] A 1997 report by the territorial auditor argued that the assets had been undervalued. Bekzatov has described the transaction as "the only privatization in Irad that kept the workers on the payroll".[9] During the 1990s NurGaz formed technical partnerships with [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron]] and Lukoil.[1] Irad has no southern export pipelines, so its oil exports go north. In 1998 NurGaz and foreign partners formed the [[Iradi Petroleum Transit Consortium]] (IPTC), in which NurGaz holds a 51% stake, and the consortium's Northern Export Feeder opened in November 2000. The 85-kilometer pipeline carries crude from NurGaz's tank farm outside Nurzhan to the Kazakh trunk network near Shymkent. From there the oil is refined in [[wp:Kazakhstan]] or shipped on to Russia under transit arrangements with [[wp:KazTransOil]]. The route does not use the [[wp:Caspian Pipeline Consortium]], whose system begins far to the west.[4] ## Relations with the DPI (2007–present) In January and February 2007, the government of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] auctioned concessions in NurGaz's fields to political insiders (see [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]]). Bekzatov refused to recognize the sales and worked with trade unions to guard the perimeters of the refinery and pipeline.[10] On February 25, 2007, [[Erlan Toktarov]] proclaimed the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] from Nurzhan, after making public the secret partition drafts known as the [[Bill of Sale (2007)|Bill of Sale]]. Bekzatov was one of the proclamation's most important backers. NurGaz supplied money and fuel, refinery workers guarded the oil installations, and the Labor-led Nurzhan city council, close to Bekzatov, placed the municipal police at Toktarov's disposal (see [[Labor Party of Irad]]). Bekzatov publicly called Toktarov "a national hero who saved Irad from being sold".[10] Many historians argue that the ISEZ could not have been established without his support; others say that Bekzatov, whose fields were among the assets the DRI was auctioning, was protecting NurGaz as much as the country.[5] NurGaz's assets were confirmed under the new administration. Relations cooled as Toktarov's rule hardened. Bekzatov criticized the Political Parties Act of 2010, under which the Labor Party failed to re-register and was dissolved in 2011, and the 2013 amendment that removed the Governor's term limits, which he called "the end of what we fought for in 2007". Since then he has been the most prominent critic of the governorate among the Russos.[2] The relationship has since combined commercial cooperation with public criticism. The DPI counts NurGaz among its industrial partners, and NurGaz is the ISEZ's largest commercial taxpayer. Bekzatov, however, has attacked the governorate's fiscal policy and the business monopolies held by the Toktarov family.[2] He has never stood for office. He leads the Russo faction informally, through his public statements, his business network and the Bekzatov Foundation, which funds Russian-language schools, technical apprenticeships and cultural centers in Nurzhan.[2] DPI-aligned commentators and anonymous social-media channels have periodically circulated claims that he plotted against the DPI leadership. The claims were never corroborated. Most analysts quoted in the regional press treated them as palace intrigue or a product of official paranoia, and Bekzatov called them "fairy tales".[5] In February 2025 [[wp:Donald Trump]] spoke about selling Irad to Russia (see [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]). Bekzatov rejected the idea of any "sale" of Irad and argued that the episode showed the risks of depending on Washington.[11] ## Political positions Bekzatov's public positions include the following:[2] - He favors accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, to remove customs duties on refined oil products and steel, and closer trade with Kazakhstan and Russia (see [[Irad–Russia relations]]). - He wants Russian, which lost its official status in 1992, restored as an official language alongside Iradi and English. - He criticizes the ISEZ's dependence on American security guarantees and the US presence at [[Talas Air Base]]. - He calls for lower export duties, an end to family-controlled monopolies in logistics and construction, and state support for heavy industry in Nurzhan. - He supports developing Irad's gas reserves, including through the proposed Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline, provided NurGaz keeps operating control (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]]). ## Public image and controversies Bekzatov is popular among older residents of Nurzhan. NurGaz and the Bekzatov Foundation fund housing there, including the [[NurGaz Worker Housing Complex]], as well as pensions, cardiac clinics, parks and scholarships at the [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]].[2] Regional business publications estimate his fortune at more than US$1 billion, but NurGaz has not fully disclosed its ownership structure.[2] Critics point to three issues:[3] - the terms of the 1993 privatization; - soil and groundwater contamination around the lower Chu fields, which NurGaz says it is cleaning up; - the gap between NurGaz's reported output and independent estimates. Younger urban Iradis and supporters of the revival of the Iradi language have criticized his campaign for Russian. DPI-aligned commentators portray him as a channel for Russian influence.[12] ## Personal life Bekzatov is married to Galina Bekzatova (née Lebedeva), a retired pediatrician. They have three children, all of whom work in the family's business or philanthropy:[13] - [[Emil Bekzatov]], the eldest son, is an executive vice-president of NurGaz responsible for pipeline logistics and for crude transport contracts with Kazakhstan. - [[Rustam Bekzatov]] manages the group's road and rail tanker fleet between Nurzhan and southern Kazakhstan. - [[Asel Bekzatova]] founded and directs the Nurzhan Contemporary Arts Foundation, which supports young musicians. He lives in Nurzhan, and he speaks Russian at home and in most public settings.[13] ## References
  1. ^ NurGaz Corporate Annual Review (2023). Upstream Operations and Export Volumes. Nurzhan.
  2. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Petroleum Oligarchy: Kamran Bekzatov and the Russo Faction.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 88–104.
  3. ^ World Bank (2023). Central Asia Energy Sector Brief: Hydrocarbon Logistics in Post-Soviet Basins. Washington, DC.
  4. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Annual Report: Southern Network Throughput and Third-Party Transit. Astana, pp. 34–42.
  5. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Technocracy and Succession in the Talas Basin.' Academic Press, pp. 88–104.
  6. ^ Talas Herald (2011). 'Kamran Bekzatov at Sixty.' Talas.
  7. ^ Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute (2014). A History of the Chu Basin Oilfields. Nurzhan.
  8. ^ Asylbekova, Dinara (2016). Kobozev 1992: The Socialist Republic and Its Fall. Talas State University Press.
  9. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 204: Privatization of the Iradneft Production Trust (1993).
  10. ^ Human Rights Watch (2007). 'The Privatization Crisis and Political Turmoil in Talas.' New York.
  11. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'The 2025 Trump Statement: Diplomatic Shocks in Central Asia.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 24–42.
  12. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Russophone Industrial Intelligentsia of the Chu Basin.' Vol. 15, pp. 112–129.
  13. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Executive Leadership and Commercial Concessions Directory. Talas.
### 3.10. Jason Ilyasov *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Biographies* {{Infobox person | name = Jason Ilyasov | image = Jason_Ilyasov_2025.jpg | caption = Ilyasov presenting Tulpar on stage, 2025 | birth_date = 1988-03-19 | birth_place = [[wp:Chicago]], [[wp:Illinois]], United States | citizenship = United States | parents = Marat Ilyasov (father); Dinara Ilyasova (mother) | residence = [[Talas]] | alma_mater = [[wp:University of Chicago]] (BA, 2010) | occupation = Political commentator; media personality; businessman | title = Founder and CEO of [[Tulpar (app)|Tulpar]] (2019–present) | known_for = *[[OneDebate]]*; Liberty Forum of Irad; [[Tulparcoin]] }} **Jason Ilyasov** (born March 19, 1988) is an Iradi-American political commentator and media personality. A self-described anarcho-capitalist, he has been a regular panelist on [[IradOne]] opinion programs since 2016 and is known for a brash, confrontational manner on air.[1] He founded the Liberty Forum of Irad, a small advocacy group in [[Talas]], writes the blog *The Steppe Frontier*, and is the founder, chief executive and public face of [[Tulpar (app)|Tulpar]], a messaging and classifieds app widely used in the ISEZ. His central argument is that Irad is uniquely placed to become "an unregulated corporate paradise and the economic heart of Asia".[2] Ilyasov was first known as a television personality, but his following turned political in 2023. In October that year he criticized a new municipal levy on air, and spontaneous student protests followed in Talas, during which he was briefly detained.[3] Media analysts generally attribute his rise to organic online engagement and to frustration among young urban [[Iradis]]. He says his work is self-funded, and speculation about political patrons has not been substantiated.[4] ## Early life and education Ilyasov was born on March 19, 1988, in [[wp:Chicago]], [[wp:Illinois]]. His father, Marat Ilyasov, a hydrologist from Talas, was working there as a visiting researcher under a Soviet–American academic exchange.[5] The family returned to Talas in 1989. His parents were active in the democratic movement around [[Amanbek Alimbekov]]. In January 1992, as the socialist authorities arrested opposition activists in Talas during the [[Winter Uprising of 1992|Winter Uprising]], they left Irad. Because Jason was a US citizen by birth, the family was able to resettle in Chicago, where his mother, Dinara Ilyasova, later worked as a nurse.[5] He grew up in Chicago's Iradi community (see [[Iradi Americans]]), speaking Iradi at home and English at school; he speaks little Russian.[5] He studied economics at the [[wp:University of Chicago]] and graduated with a bachelor's degree in 2010. He has named the [[wp:Austrian school of economics|Austrian School]] and anarcho-capitalist writers as his main intellectual influences.[2] From 2010 to 2013 he worked as an energy-markets analyst in [[wp:Houston]]. He then spent two years in Washington, D.C., writing policy papers on property rights in post-communist economies for libertarian think tanks.[5] ## Career #### Move to Talas and IradOne (2016–2023) Ilyasov moved to Talas in early 2016. He has said he was attracted by the ISEZ's dollarized economy and unresolved legal status, which he saw as the chance to build "a jurisdiction without a sovereign".[2] That year he founded the Liberty Forum of Irad. He was soon recruited as an economics commentator for *OneDebate*, IradOne's prime-time current-affairs panel, and he has appeared regularly on the network's opinion programs since then.[1] His appearances often involve shouting matches with other panelists, and he has occasionally walked off the set. IradOne has suspended him at least twice for his conduct on air.[1] His main lines of argument, on air and online, have been these: - He has attacked the business concessions held by Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]]'s family, arguing that licensing rules protect insider monopolies in fuel distribution, construction and telecommunications.[6] - He has called for cryptocurrency to be made legal tender alongside the US dollar and the [[Iradi som]], and for [[wp:Bitcoin]] mining powered by surplus electricity from the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]].[7] - He has proposed giving freely tradable private titles to pasture in the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]. The [[Iradi Freedom Society]] has rejected the idea as an attack on communal tenure.[2] #### Tulpar (since 2019) In March 2019 Ilyasov launched Tulpar, a free messaging app built in Talas by a small team of [[Talas State University]] graduates led by the developer [[Aiperi Kalysbekova]], its chief technology officer. The company, Tulpar Technologies, is registered in [[wp:Delaware]] with its office in Talas. Ilyasov describes himself as its "salesman" rather than its engineer. Tulpar added public channels in 2020 and a classifieds board, *Bazar*, in 2021, and Ilyasov has used its channels as his main platform alongside IradOne.[12] #### 2023 protests and detention In October 2023 the Talas municipal administration announced a licensing surcharge on independent technology startups and delivery couriers, a category that included his own company. On *OneDebate*, Ilyasov called it "a tax on the only part of the economy the family doesn't own yet", and clips of the exchange spread widely on social media.[3] Within days, students and couriers gathered at Talas State University and marched on the government district (see [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]]). When several foreign social-media platforms were throttled, many protesters moved their group chats to Tulpar, which was not on the list, and the app's registrations roughly doubled that autumn.[12] Most observers described the protests as spontaneous and leaderless. The authorities said that Ilyasov had instigated them, citing a speech he gave to the protesters on the third day in which he urged them not to pay the levy.[3] Police and [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad|Republican Gendarmerie]] units under Major General [[Ruslan Toktarov]] dispersed the protests with tear gas and water cannon. Ilyasov was held in administrative detention for three days. After press-freedom groups criticized his detention, he was released without charge.[8] In November 2023 Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] announced that the surcharge would be suspended.[3] #### Since 2024 IradOne kept Ilyasov off the air for several months after the protests and began booking him again in 2024. He also broadcasts through podcasts and social-media channels.[1] His audience grew after Governor Toktarov withdrew from public view in July 2024. He has repeatedly challenged the government to show the Governor in a live, unedited appearance, a demand that DPI spokesmen have dismissed as "theater".[4] In February 2025 [[wp:Donald Trump]] spoke about selling Irad to Russia (see [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]). Ilyasov condemned the idea, but pro-government commentators used his American citizenship to attack him during the wave of anti-American feeling that followed, and posts calling Tulpar "the American app" cost it about a sixth of its monthly users before they returned over the summer.[9] #### Tulparcoin (2026) In September 2026 Ilyasov launched [[Tulparcoin]], a cryptocurrency distributed free in small amounts to Iradis who registered with a mobile number. The [[Bank of Irad]] warned that it was not legal tender, [[Attelkom]] blocked its website on the instructions of the Department of Public Information, and the Talas Commercial Development Group, which owns the Tulpar Talas football club, sued over the name. The case was unresolved as of October 2026.[11] The coin's free allocation is paid into wallets inside the Tulpar app, and the white paper's second phase would make the coin the only currency of *Tulpar Pay*, the app's payment service, from 1 January 2027, replacing the som for transfers, *Bazar* purchases and remittances on the platform. Ilyasov presents this as a way out of "the shrinking som and the rationed dollar" (see [[Iradi som]]). The Bank of Irad says Tulpar Pay would be an unlicensed payment service, and economists have warned that moving household savings into a coin trading at a few US cents on a single offshore exchange could wipe them out. Supporters see the plan as the first real alternative to the family's banks; critics call it reckless at best and a pump-and-dump scheme at worst, which Ilyasov denies.[13] ## Funding and independence Ilyasov says that the Liberty Forum and his media work are funded by subscriptions, advertising and speaking fees and by his income from Tulpar, which sells advertising and paid channels, and that he takes no money from politicians.[4] Tulpar Technologies has not disclosed its investors, saying only that early funding came from "private angel investors".[12] His continued access to IradOne after the 2023 protests has prompted speculation from different directions: - Pro-government commentators have accused him of receiving American money. - Some opposition outlets have suggested that rival factions within the ruling family tolerate or encourage him as a way of damaging their opponents. A 2024 survey of the ISEZ media in the *Eurasian Political Quarterly* found no documentary evidence for either claim. It attributed his rise to online engagement and to frustration with economic stagnation among young urban Iradis.[4] Ilyasov denies all such claims. ## Public image Ilyasov's following is concentrated among university students and young urban professionals, especially in Talas (see [[Iradi language revival]]).[10] Critics describe him as a provocateur whose proposals ignore the realities of a divided territory. Tribal leaders reject his views on land, and older Russian-speaking Iradis in [[Nurzhan]] generally regard him as an outsider.[10] His supporters credit him with bringing corruption and monopolies onto state television as subjects of debate. ## Personal life Ilyasov lives in Talas and is unmarried. He holds US citizenship.[5] ## References
  1. ^ IradOne Current Affairs Broadcasting Archives (2023). Prime Time Debates and Panel Records. Talas.
  2. ^ Talas Journal of Law & Political Economy (2022). 'The Anarcho-Capitalist Turn in Central Asian Media.' Vol. 9, Iss. 1.
  3. ^ Talas Herald (November 2023). 'Courier Levy Sparked Student Marches, Now Suspended.' Talas.
  4. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Media Provocateurs and Opposition Politics in the ISEZ.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2.
  5. ^ Iradi American Heritage Society (2017). Oral History Project: Interview with Jason Ilyasov. Chicago.
  6. ^ Central Asian Policy Review (2023). 'The Economics of Suspended Sovereignty.' Academic Press, pp. 88–104.
  7. ^ Ilyasov, Jason (2021). 'Hydro, Hashes and Freedom.' The Steppe Frontier (blog). Talas.
  8. ^ Human Rights Watch (2024). 'Water Cannon and Silence: The Policing of the 2023 Talas Protests.' New York.
  9. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'The 2025 Trump Statement: Diplomatic Shocks in Central Asia.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 24–42.
  10. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2024). 'Generations and Politics in the Special Economic Zone.' Vol. 17.
  11. ^ Talas Herald (12 October 2026). 'Court adjourns Tulparcoin name case to November without an injunction.' Talas.
  12. ^ Central Asian Cultural Studies Review (2025). 'One App for Everything: Tulpar and the Iradi Internet.' Vol. 17, pp. 44–67.
  13. ^ Talas Herald (24 September 2026). 'Tulpar Pay to drop the som for Tulparcoin in January, white paper says' Talas.
### 3.11. Nurzhan *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Cities & Settlements* {{Hatnote|This article is about the city in Irad. For the Bolshevik after whom the city was named from 1927 to 1992, see [[Pyotr Kobozev]].}} **Nurzhan** (Iradi: *Nurzhan shahr*, [nuɾˈʒɑn ʃɑhɾ]; Russian: *Нуржан*; known as *Kobozev* from 1927 to 1992) is the second-largest city of [[Irad]] and the center of its oil, refining and engineering industries. It lies in the lowlands of the lower Chu River in the northeast of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), where it is one of three cities of governorate significance. The official 2018 estimate put the urban population at 850,000, with more than one million people in the wider agglomeration by unofficial estimates.[1] The city grew from an older artisan settlement that was renamed Kobozev in 1927 and rebuilt as the planned capital of the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]]. It expanded rapidly after oil was found in the Chu basin in 1949. In 1991–92 it was the seat of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]]; after its capture by US and Provisional forces in August 1992, [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] renamed it Nurzhan, a Kipchak-Turkic name meaning 'light of life'.[2] Nurzhan is the headquarters of [[NurGaz]] and the center of the Russian-speaking *Russo* generation, and in February 2007 it was the base from which [[Erlan Toktarov]] proclaimed the ISEZ. Since early 2023 independent reporting has placed the *de facto* seat of the ISEZ executive at [[Boz-Korgon]], a fortified compound 40 km east of the city, although the government maintains that Talas remains the operational capital.[3] The city is also known as the birthplace of [[Mor-Wave]], an electronic music scene that emerged in its disused factories in the late 1990s. ## Etymology *Nurzhan* joins *nur* ('light') and *zhan* ('soul, life'), two elements common to the Kipchak-Turkic languages, and is usually glossed 'light of life'. Unlike many Central Asian place names of the same form, it does not commemorate a person. Alimbekov announced the name in a speech in the city in September 1992, describing Nurzhan as a "guiding light of industry" that would lead Irad to a new dawn after the ruin of the civil war. The Territorial Legislature confirmed the change in the Toponymic Heritage Statute of 1993.[2][4] From 1927 to 1992 the city bore the name of [[Pyotr Kobozev]], a Bolshevik who had served in the early Soviet administration of [[wp:Turkestan]]. Older residents and Russian-language media still sometimes use the Soviet name informally. ## History #### Early settlement Slag heaps and forge remains found in the Dastgoh quarter point to a medieval settlement of metalworkers on a branch of the Chu, which Iradi historians associate with Sogdian craftsmen of the [[wp:Silk Road]] period.[5] By the late 19th century the site was a small trading village on the cart road between the Chu and Talas valleys, partly settled by Russian and Ukrainian colonists after the Russian conquest of the region. #### Soviet capital (1925–1941) In 1925 the [[First Congress of Iradi Soviets]] met in the settlement and established the administrative apparatus of the new Iradi SSR.[6] In 1927 the settlement was renamed Kobozev and designated the republican capital, and Soviet planners laid out a new city on the steppe beside the old quarter. The plan followed a radial grid centered on a ceremonial square, with broad avenues aligned to catch the cool night winds from the mountains and canals drawn from the [[Chu Irrigation Canal System|Chu irrigation network]].[5] Early industry centered on the Kobozev Heavy Machine Plant (now the [[Nurzhan Heavy Machine Plant]]), which made tractor parts and agricultural machinery. The educator [[Altynai Bekzhanova]] opened the city's first Iradi-language secondary schools in the 1930s, the radio engineer [[Nurgazy Doolotov]] built its first shortwave transmission tower in 1934, and in 1938 [[Vasily Morozov]] drove the first diesel freight train into Kobozev from [[wp:Kazakhstan]].[7] #### Deportations and the Second World War (1937–1945) In autumn 1937 several thousand [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]], ethnic Koreans deported from the [[wp:Russian Far East|Soviet Far East]], were unloaded from unheated freight cars along the railway at Kobozev and in the Chu valley.[8] Local villagers and church communities sheltered many of them through the first winter, and from 1938 Korean collective farmers grew flood-irrigated rice on the marshy flats of the lower Chu.[9] The same years brought the anti-religious campaign of the late 1930s: Soviet suspicion of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]'s 1931 union with Rome fed the [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges|1937 purges]], and the churches of the capital were closed.[6] After the German invasion of 1941, factories evacuated from [[wp:European Russia]] were re-established in Kobozev, enlarging its metalworking and engineering base. #### Oil city (1949–1991) In July 1949 exploratory drilling directed by the engineer [[Sergei Voronov]] struck high-pressure oil-bearing strata at a depth of about 2,400 m, an event known as the [[Nurzhan Oil Discovery (1949)]].[10] Within a decade [[Nurzhan Refinery No. 1]] and the [[Nurzhan Petroleum Pipeline]] had been built, and the city supplied aviation fuel and lubricants to the Soviet armed forces. In the [[1952 Kobozev Steel Strike]], Iradi and [[wp:Koryo-saram]] foundry workers struck over wages and safety until local party authorities conceded production bonuses.[11] A master plan drawn up in 1962 by the architect [[Bolotbek Bekzhanov]] added the numbered *mikrorayon* housing estates where much of the population still lives.[11] Nurzhan Refinery No. 1 was expanded in 1974, and in the 1970s the Koryo-saram engineer [[Oleg Kim]] directed the city's tractor combine. Flour shortages in 1989 led to the [[The Kobozev Bread Riots (1989)|Kobozev Bread Riots]], in which marchers demanded economic accountability, freedom of religion and elected government.[7] #### Independence and the First Civil War (1991–1992) On 9 October 1991 the [[Communist Party of Irad]], led by First Secretary [[Vasily Chernov]], a former engineer at the Kobozev refinery, declared independence as the Socialist Republic of Irad, governed from Kobozev.[12] The end of Soviet subsidies shut many of the city's plants, and on 14 January 1992 railway repair workers at the Kobozev depot declared a general strike that helped set off the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]].[13] After the Provisional Government proclaimed the Republic of Irad in [[Talas]] on 11 March 1992, Kobozev became the headquarters of the socialist war effort in the [[First Iradi Civil War]]. As US and Provisional forces advanced on the city in the summer of 1992, Provisional units repelled a socialist armored counter-attack in the [[Battle of Kobozev Railhead (1992)]]. Joint US and Iradi forces under [[Operation Starlight]] took Kobozev on 12 August, and the remaining socialist forces surrendered on 18 August.[12] Alimbekov renamed the city the following month. #### Territorial period (1992–2006) Under the US territorial administration the Soviet oil trust *Iradneft* was corporatized in 1993 as NurGaz, led by the Kobozev-born petroleum engineer [[Kamran Bekzatov]].[14] The city's managers and technicians, educated in Russian under the ISSR, became the core of the *Russo* generation, and Russo politicians held most seats on the municipal council throughout the period.[15] The 1990s and 2000s brought the suburban district of Navbahor, the [[Attelkom Data Center]] and a fuel pipeline from the refinery to [[Talas Air Base]]. Construction of the Boz-Korgon compound east of the city began in the mid-1990s.[3] #### Since 2007 After the US withdrawal of December 2006 and the proclamation of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] in Talas, Nurzhan became the base of the faction of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) opposed to Prime Minister [[Bakyt Orozbekov]]. On 25 February 2007, in a speech in the city's central square, Toktarov made public the cabinet's secret partition drafts (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]), seized control of the DPI and proclaimed the Irad Special Economic Zone from Nurzhan as an emergency administration, the act that marks the start of the [[Second Iradi Civil War]].[16] Loyalties in the city divided during the war: rail workers joined strikes called in support of the [[Popular Front of Irad]], while NurGaz guards held the refinery and Bekzatov refused to recognize the asset auctions of the Orozbekov cabinet.[14][16] After the Front withdrew from the cities in the summer of 2007, Nurzhan became one of the three cities of governorate significance of the ISEZ. Since early 2023, independent reporting has placed the governor's office at Boz-Korgon, in the countryside east of the city; the government denies this and maintains that Talas is the operational capital.[3] Bekzatov, the city's most prominent public figure, has become an outspoken critic of DPI economic policy and an advocate of closer ties with Russia.[14] ## Geography Nurzhan lies at an elevation of 470 m (1,540 ft) on the flat alluvial plain of the lower [[Chu River Basin|Chu River]], and is surrounded by Chu District, the ISEZ district that covers the Chu lowlands and the Boz-Korgon area. To the north, irrigated farmland gives way to the semi-desert grassland of the southern [[Betpak-Dala]]; the dunes of the Moiynkum (Muyunkum) sands lie to the south and west, between the Chu and the Talas. On clear days the snow-covered Kyrgyz Range is visible across the border to the south. The Chu is an endorheic river that ends in the desert, and the city's water comes from it and from the canals of the [[Chu Irrigation Canal System]]. A small urban canal, [[Dastgoh Creek]], was diverted in the Soviet period to drive forge hammers.[5] The built-up area covers about 280 km² (108 sq mi) of the plain on both banks of the Chu, with the refinery and the eastern industrial zone on the east side of the city. #### Climate Nurzhan has a cold semi-arid climate ([[wp:Köppen climate classification|Köppen]] *BSk*) with large seasonal swings. July daytime highs average 34 °C (93 °F), and summer dust storms are common. The January mean is −10.5 °C (13.1 °F), and Arctic air outbreaks occasionally bring temperatures below −25 °C (−13 °F). Annual precipitation averages about 270 mm (10.6 in), most of it falling in spring.[17] Winter smog, caused by refinery and bitumen emissions together with coal-fired district heating, is a recurring problem. NurGaz says it has fitted stack scrubbers and built gas-fired cogeneration units since the late 2010s; a [[wp:World Bank]] assessment of Central Asian industrial cities found that winter particulate levels in Nurzhan remained well above international guidelines.[10][18] #### Cityscape and districts The city's urban districts include: - **[[Dastgoh District]]**, the historic artisan and foundry quarter, with metal workshops, boiler fabrication sheds, toolmakers and the [[NurGaz Pipeline Maintenance Depot]]. - **[[Navbahor District]]** ('New Spring'), a leafy residential district of detached brick houses and bilingual schools built in the 1990s during the territorial period. - The **central district** along Azatlık Prospect, laid out in the 1930s as Lenin Prospect and renamed under the 1993 statute, with granite government buildings, the [[Nurzhan Municipal Library]] and the Palace of Metallurgists. - The **mikrorayon estates** of the 1962 master plan, numbered blocks of five- and nine-story flats grouped around courtyards, schools and heating plants. - The **eastern industrial zone**, which contains the refinery, the Attelkom Data Center, the grain silos of [[Nurzhan Agro-Industrial]] and the spinning sheds of [[Zhetysu Industrial Textiles]]. ## Demographics The official 2018 estimate gave Nurzhan an urban population of 850,000, and more than one million including satellite towns and industrial settlements along the lower Chu.[1] Because the ISEZ census enumerated cities directly, the city figure is far less disputed than the national total, which independent researchers consider an undercount of the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]. According to official figures, [[Iradis]] make up about 64% of the city's population, Russians 13%, [[wp:Kazakhs]] 6%, Koryo-saram 4%, Kyrgyz 4%, Ukrainians 3%, [[wp:Uzbeks]] 2% and other groups 4%.[1] Nurzhan has the largest Russian and Koryo-saram communities in Irad. Russian is the everyday language of most residents over forty and is widely used in business, although it lost official status in 1992; Iradi and English are the official languages, and younger residents increasingly use both.[15] The [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] is the largest denomination, and the city is the seat of one of its suffragan eparchies. Nurzhan also has Russian Orthodox parishes, Presbyterian and Catholic congregations within the Koryo-saram community, and mosques serving its Kazakh, Uzbek and Tatar residents. Surveys suggest that religious practice is lower than in Talas or [[Iyık Janyl]], a legacy of the city's Soviet secular culture.[9][15] ## Economy Nurzhan is the center of the Iradi hydrocarbon industry. - **Oil and gas.** NurGaz, headquartered in the city, operates the oil fields of the lower Chu basin. It reports national output of about 120,000 barrels per day, although independent estimates are lower.[10] Nurzhan Refinery No. 1 (expanded 1974) produces gasoline, diesel, heating oil and jet fuel. Crude that is not refined locally is pumped through the Nurzhan Petroleum Pipeline and the 85-km [[Northern Export Feeder]] into the Kazakh network operated by [[wp:KazTransOil]] near [[wp:Shymkent]], for refining there or onward shipment to Russia.[19] Gas from the [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]] is boosted at the [[Nurzhan Gas Compressor Station]]; most of Irad's gas reserves of more than 400 billion m³ remain undeveloped. - **Chemicals and construction materials.** The [[Nurzhan Asphalt and Bitumen Plant]] turns residual refinery bottoms into road binders, and an adjacent chemical works makes agricultural ammonia. - **Engineering and light industry.** The Nurzhan Heavy Machine Plant makes oilfield pumpjacks and spare parts. Zhetysu Industrial Textiles produces wool, felt and cotton thread, but its output is limited by water shortages.[20] - **Agribusiness.** Nurzhan Agro-Industrial, directed by [[Bekzat Toktarov]], dominates feed milling, silage distribution and bulk grain supply. The surrounding farmland grows wheat, sugar beet and the short-grain rice introduced by Koryo-saram farmers in 1938.[20] - **Retail and services.** About 40 percent of shop names are Russian, and shop signs read *Magazin* rather than *dükön*. Bereke has about 53 supermarkets in the city, Jıldız Market 36 and Shıpa Dariykana 23 pharmacies; Chuy Commercial Bank has 16 branches, Ak Bata Bank 15 and [[Talasbank]] 6, among them its Azatlık Prospect branch. NurGaz runs 43 filling stations, and KFC Irad has two restaurants, by the central square and in Navbahor. Canteens (*stolovaya*), some still numbered in the Soviet way ("Canteen No. 7"), and wedding banquet halls (*toikana*) are common, Russian and Koryo-saram dishes such as kuksi and Koryoin laghman are as common as Iradi food, and there are fewer chaikhanas than in Talas. The **Radiobazar** (Nurzhan Radio Bazaar), a block west of the south end of Azatlık Prospect, is surrounded by radio, telephone and computer stalls, and the Dastgoh bazarı serves the [[Dastgoh District]]. - **Logistics and data.** The [[Nurzhan Rail Freight Depot]] marshals tank cars and freight bound for the Kazakh rail network, and [[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]] runs bonded trucking routes to the northern border crossings. The Attelkom Data Center hosts government and commercial servers. NurGaz is the city's largest employer. Through the company and the Bekzatov Foundation, Bekzatov funds subsidized housing such as the [[NurGaz Worker Housing Complex]], clinics and Russian-language schools, which analysts regard as the basis of his independent political following.[14] ## Government Nurzhan is one of the three cities of governorate significance of the ISEZ, alongside Talas and Iyık Janyl, and is administered separately from the surrounding Chu District. The city is run by a mayor appointed by the Governor and an elected city council. Russo politicians have held a majority on the council for most of the period since 1992, and it has repeatedly clashed with the DPI administration over language policy and the city's share of oil revenue.[15] [[Elena Petrova]], a municipal leader who represents the Russian and Ukrainian industrial workforce, is among the city's best-known municipal politicians. The 2nd Motor Rifle Brigade of the [[Armed Forces of Irad]] is based in the city and guards the refinery, pumping stations and northern rail links. ## Transport Nurzhan is the main railway junction of the ISEZ, with the Turksib east to the Kazakh frontier and the Kazakh rail network towards Almaty, the line west toward Talas and a line east to Boz-Korgon; most of its traffic is freight.[20] The passenger station stands on the through line a few hundred meters south-west of the central square, and the [[Nurzhan Rail Freight Depot]] about 4 km north-east of the centre, on the line to the border. Highways link the city with Talas, with Boz-Korgon and with the northern border crossings into Kazakhstan. City transport consists of a Soviet-era trolleybus network, municipal buses and privately run minibuses (*marshrutkas*). The city has no scheduled passenger airport; air travelers use Talas or airports in neighboring Kazakhstan. ## Education and health - The [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]], formerly the Kobozev Polytechnic Institute, is Irad's leading technical university and specializes in petroleum engineering. It trains much of the NurGaz engineering staff. - The [[Nurzhan Technical Lyceum]] offers vocational apprenticeships in electrical maintenance and machining. - The [[Nurzhan Municipal Botanical Institute]] and the [[Nurzhan Botanical Gardens]] study cold-hardy fruit trees and mountain flora. - The [[Nurzhan Municipal Library]] holds more than 300,000 volumes. The former Pushkin Library, the Soviet republican library, is now the Nurzhan branch of the [[National Library of Irad]], with the Russian-language and technical collections that were not moved to Talas in 1993–94. - Health services include the [[Nurzhan Children’s Polyclinic]], which has served industrial workers' families since the Soviet period, cardiac clinics endowed by Bekzatov, and the [[Nurzhan Emergency Dispatch Center]]. The [[St. Teresa Community Kitchen]], a parish soup kitchen, serves daily meals to pensioners and disabled workers. ## Culture In the late 1990s young people gathering in abandoned warehouses and factory boiler rooms in Nurzhan began combining vintage Soviet analog synthesizers with Iradi melodies and lyrics. The style became known as Mor-Wave, and its pioneers, the duo [[tüntolk]] (Askar Daniyarov and Mira Temirova), gained an audience abroad with their 1999 debut album *[[Jolchu (Album)|Jolchu]]*.[21] The scene later produced the commercial offshoot [[Mor-Pop]], while acoustic [[Mor-Folk]] ensembles play in teahouses in Nurzhan and Talas. Russo cultural life is centered on Russian-language theater, satellite television and the [[wp:Victory Day (9 May)|Victory Day]] parade on 9 May. The Koryo-saram community maintains cultural associations and Korean-language Sunday schools, and contributed dishes such as Koryoin laghman, noodles with sesame and kimchi, to the wider Iradi kitchen.[9] The Nurzhan Contemporary Arts Foundation, run by [[Asel Bekzatova]], supports young musicians. Notable buildings (see [[Architecture of Irad]]) include the Palace of Metallurgists, a Soviet palace of culture on Azatlık Prospect; the central square of the 1927 plan; Nurzhan Refinery No. 1, the country's only oil refinery; and the forges of Dastgoh. ## Notable people - [[Vasily Chernov]] (1935–2012), last First Secretary of the Communist Party of Irad and president of the Socialist Republic of Irad, born in Kobozev - [[Kamran Bekzatov]] (born 1951), president of NurGaz, born in Kobozev - [[Aidar Maksat]] (born 1980), Lieutenant Governor of the ISEZ since 2019, born in Kobozev - [[Altynai Bekzhanova]], educator who founded the city's first Iradi-language secondary schools - [[Bolotbek Bekzhanov]], architect of the 1962 master plan - [[Oleg Kim]], Koryo-saram engineer and factory director - [[Lyudmila Ivanova]], Russian-language novelist of the 1916 Semirechye Revolt - Askar Daniyarov and Mira Temirova, founders of tüntolk ## References
  1. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). Results of the 2018 Census of the Irad Special Economic Zone: Cities of Governorate Significance. Talas.
  2. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Provisional Presidential Papers of Amanbek Alimbekov (1992).
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The Fortified Chancellery: Executive Authority at Boz-Korgon.' Academic Press, pp. 45–52.
  4. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (1993). Toponymic Heritage Statute. Territorial Gazette, Talas.
  5. ^ Talas State University Press (2019). Kobozev: Planning a Soviet Capital on the Chu, 1925–1962. Talas, pp. 11–58.
  6. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 85: Central Committee Protocols of the Iradi SSR (1925–1991).
  7. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 140: Urban Planning and Industrialization of Kobozev-Nurzhan (1938–1985).
  8. ^ Pohl, J. Otto (1999). Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, pp. 9–20.
  9. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Koryo-saram of Northern Transoxiana.' Vol. 15, pp. 78–95.
  10. ^ NurGaz (2023). Corporate Annual Review: Refinery Operations and Industrial Infrastructure. Nurzhan.
  11. ^ Talas State University Press (2019). Kobozev: Planning a Soviet Capital on the Chu, 1925–1962. Talas, pp. 141–196.
  12. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Last Soviet Apparatchik: Vasily Chernov.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 78–94.
  13. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Provisional Government Emergency Decrees and Ceasefire Records (1992).
  14. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Petroleum Oligarchy: Kamran Bekzatov and the Russo Faction.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 88–104.
  15. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Russophone Industrial Intelligentsia of the Chu Basin.' Vol. 15, pp. 112–129.
  16. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  17. ^ Irad Hydrometeorological Service (2021). Climate Normals for the Chu and Talas Basins, 1991–2020. Talas.
  18. ^ World Bank (2022). Air Quality Management in Central Asian Industrial Cities. Washington, DC.
  19. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Northern Export Feeder: Transit Specifications. Astana.
  20. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
  21. ^ Talas Herald (2019). 'Twenty Years of Jolchu: How Nurzhan's Boiler Rooms Made Mor-Wave.' 14 September.
### 3.12. Iyık Janyl *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Cities & Settlements* {{Hatnote|This article is about the city in Irad. For the figure revered as the Mother of Irad, see [[Janyl (Historical Figure)]]. For the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, see [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]].}} **Iyık Janyl** (Iradi: *Iyık Janyl shahr*, [iˈjɯk ʒɑˈnɯl ʃɑhɾ]; Russian: *Ийык Джаныл*; literally 'Holy Janyl') is the third-largest city of [[Irad]] and the religious center of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]. It lies at about 650 m (2,130 ft) on the river flats of the [[Naryn River|Naryn]] where the river leaves its gorge through the [[wp:Fergana Range]], about 8 km upriver from [[Tash-Kömür]] and 347 km from [[Talas]] by road, with most of the city on the broad western flats and its old town and cathedral precinct on Cathedral Hill, a spur above the east bank. It is one of the three cities of governorate significance of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). It lies within the ISEZ's southern salient on the Naryn, which takes in the river flats around the city and Tash-Kömür and the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim, and is surrounded by the Lower Naryn District. The official 2018 estimate put its population at 310,000.[1] The modern city grew around the [[Church of St. Janyl]], built in 1727 with the support of Khan Abd al-Rahim Biy of the [[wp:Khanate of Kokand]], and Iradi historiography regards it as the first culturally Iradi city. It is the see of the [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]], which became the metropolitan see of the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church on the church's union with Rome in 1931.[2] The church and the nearby [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]] (Shar-i-Kuhna), the remains of a medieval East Syriac Christian town, were inscribed together on the [[wp:World Heritage Site|UNESCO World Heritage List]] in 2004, during the territorial period, on a nomination submitted by the United States.[3] Each year on 24 August the city hosts the [[Feast of St. Janyl]], which draws pilgrims, many of them on horseback, from both the ISEZ and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]. It is also home to the [[Irad Palace of Art]], the country's principal art gallery. ## Etymology The name pairs the Kipchak-Turkic adjective *iyık* ('sacred, holy'), cognate with [[wp:Old Turkic language|Old Turkic]] *ïduq* ('consecrated, sacred'), with the name of [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]], the figure revered in Iradi Christian tradition as the Mother of Irad.[2] In [[wp:Syriac language|Syriac]] liturgical texts of the Syro-Iradi Church the city is styled *Mthā d-Qaddishtā Janyl* ('the town of holy Janyl'). ## History #### The Janyl tradition Iradi Christian tradition holds that Janyl received a vision of Jesus in the form of the White Rider, who led her to the site of the first Iradi church, known as the First Church of Janyl. Church tradition places her in the 11th century, among Christianized Turkic clans associated with the [[wp:Keraites]] and [[wp:Naimans]], whose conversion by East Syriac missionaries is attested in medieval sources; some chronicles associate her with the period of [[wp:Qara Khitai]] rule in the 12th century.[4] Modern historians widely dispute that she existed, and the location of the First Church is unknown. The Church of St. Janyl in Iyık Janyl was built in the 18th century as a symbolic re-creation of the lost church, not as a claim to its site.[2] Popular devotion in the city nonetheless links several springs and hilltops in the valley with episodes from [[The Epic of Janyl]]. #### Medieval town (11th–14th centuries) The [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]], on a river terrace on the west bank of the Naryn about 2 km south-west of the present city centre, preserve the foundations of a fortified Christian town of about 45 hectares that flourished from the 11th to the 14th century under the Kara-Khanid and Qara Khitai states.[5] Excavations have uncovered a citadel, a three-aisled stone basilica measuring 38 by 24 m, and a craft quarter with kilns and foundries. Grave markers (*kayraks*) inscribed in Syriac and Old Turkic, dated between 1240 and 1338, record a community of Kerait, Naiman and Sogdian Christians. The 13th-century monk [[Marqos the Scribe]] is credited with copying the illuminated *Gospels of Iyık Janyl*.[6] The religious tolerance of the Qara Khitai period, which allowed [[wp:Church of the East|East Syriac Christianity]] to spread among the steppe peoples, ended under the later Chagatai khans.[7] After forced conversions under Ali-Sultan (1339–1342), the campaigns of [[wp:Timur]] in the late 14th century and outbreaks of plague, the town was abandoned. According to church tradition, Christian herders in the surrounding ravines kept their liturgy alive in secret, preserving chants (*ırda*) and the baking of sacramental bread.[2] #### Kokand period and the 1727 church In the early 18th century, Iradi Christian horsemen served as cavalry auxiliaries of the Khanate of Kokand against Dzungar raids. In 1727 Khan Abd al-Rahim Biy granted the Iradi Christian elders formal religious tolerance in the accord remembered as the [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]], and issued a decree (*firman*) funding a permanent stone church.[8] Masons from [[wp:Samarkand]] and [[wp:Bukhara]] worked with local East Syriac monks to build the Church of St. Janyl on Cathedral Hill, combining a Syriac basilica plan with Central Asian brick vaulting and a ribbed dome clad in turquoise tiles.[6] A settlement of clergy, craftsmen and herders grew around it and became the modern city. The cathedral library was founded in 1732, and Bishop Mar Gewargis (died 1744) was buried in the church crypt. In the 19th century the British missionary [[wp:Joseph Wolff]] described the church to Western readers as evidence of Christian survival in [[wp:Central Asia]]. #### Russian rule and the union with Rome (1876–1931) Russian forces under [[wp:Mikhail Skobelev|General Mikhail Skobelev]] conquered the Khanate of Kokand in 1876, and Iyık Janyl was incorporated into the Fergana Oblast of [[wp:Russian Turkestan]]. The tsarist administration left the church's internal affairs largely to its own clergy.[8] After the Russian Revolution, Bishop [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]] opened secret negotiations with the [[wp:Holy See]], conducted through intermediaries at papal nunciatures abroad. On 14 September 1931 [[wp:Pope Pius XI]] promulgated the bull *Orientalis Stella*, which received the Syro-Iradi Church into full communion with Rome as an Eastern Catholic church *sui iuris* and established Iyık Janyl as its metropolitan see.[9] Soviet authorities regarded the Catholic connection with suspicion, and it became one of the grounds for the anti-religious repression of the 1930s.[10] #### Soviet period (1931–1991) During [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges]], security officers arrested and executed many of the senior clergy, closed the seminary and shut the cathedral, whose nave was converted into a district grain store.[10] Monks and lay sacristans hid the rarest manuscripts of the cathedral library in caves in the [[Kara-Suu Canyon]], and families kept vestments, icons and sacred vessels in their homes and in mountain shelters. For the rest of the Soviet period Iyık Janyl was a district town with a fruit cannery, a felt workshop and a reputation for clandestine worship. [[Amanbek Alimbekov]], who led the Provisional Government in 1992, was born in the city in 1938.[11] #### Since 1992 After the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] the cathedral was returned to the church and reconsecrated on 14 September 1992, the anniversary of *Orientalis Stella*.[9] During the US territorial administration the building was restored, the seminary reopened in 1994, and the library's manuscripts were conserved and digitized with support from the Vatican Library and European foundations. The church and the ruins of the medieval town were inscribed as a World Heritage Site on a nomination submitted by the United States, which as the administering power was the State Party for Irad. Irad itself is not a State Party to the World Heritage Convention.[3] Alimbekov was buried in the city's historic cemetery in 2004. Since the partition of 2007 the city has lain within the ISEZ's southern salient on the Naryn, linked to Talas only by the [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]], which since 2009 has run down a narrow ISEZ corridor in the Naryn gorge, and close to the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] on three sides. Under Archbishop [[Mar Ephrem]], primate since 2012, the archbishopric has kept a position of neutrality between the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] administration and the clan councils of the tribal regions, and the city has hosted inter-confessional meetings and talks between the two sides.[12] ## Geography Iyık Janyl lies at about 650 m on the river flats of the Naryn, where the river leaves the gorge it cuts through the foothills of the Fergana Range, about 8 km upriver from Tash-Kömür, the district centre, which lies just downstream. About two-thirds of the city, including the old bazaar centre, the Lower Town and most of the housing, lies on the broad flats west of the river, with Soviet-era housing blocks, the bazaar and orchards and walnut groves toward the hills, and most of the population lives there. The east bank holds the quarters below and around Cathedral Hill and, upriver, the summer quarter of [[Shahr-i Khunuk]], which stands on a bluff on the north-east side along [[Khunuk Creek]]. Four road bridges cross the Naryn in the city. The old town and the cathedral precinct occupy Cathedral Hill, a spur about 150 m above the east bank (about 800 m), reached by the winding Cathedral Hill road of about 4 km, which climbs to the precinct from State Route 1 on the east bank. In the middle of the city the Kara-Khanid citadel of [[Diz-i Safid]] crowns a limestone knoll rising about 140 m from the western flats, kept as a park, and overlooks the Lower Town and the Naryn. The ruins of the medieval town lie on a river terrace on the west bank about 2 km south-west of the city centre, an open archaeological zone surrounded by the city's southern districts, and the motherhouse of the [[Order of St. Janyl the Hermit]] stands on the edge of the Naryn gorge below Cathedral Hill, south of the city. The ridges above the city rise to more than 2,000 m. The Qara-Chik line runs close to the city along the lower slopes on either side of the flats, some 150 to 200 m above the river; the hills beyond it to the north, east and west belong to the Toktogul–Naryn highlands of the tribal regions, and the Mailuu-Suu valley of the Fergana Rim lies to the south-east. The built-up area, about 85 km² (33 sq mi), covers the river flats and the low terraces above them on both banks, from Shahr-i Khunuk in the north-east to just above Tash-Kömür in the south. The area is seismically active, and earthquakes and freeze–thaw cycles are the main threats to the city's historic brickwork.[6] Above the flats, on the lower slopes below the demarcation line, lie the unplanned hillside quarters known as [[Jogorku (Iyık Janyl)|Jogorku]], the poorest part of the city and the centre of its organized crime. #### Climate The city has a continental climate with dry summers ([[wp:Köppen climate classification|Köppen]] *Dsa*), typical of the edge of the [[wp:Fergana Valley]]: much warmer than Talas, with hot summers and short winters, and somewhat wetter than the valley floor downstream. July highs average about 34 °C (93 °F), and January lows average about −5 °C (23 °F). Annual precipitation is about 450 mm (18 in), most of it falling as spring rain; winter snow seldom lies for long in the city but closes the high pastures above it from December to March.[13] ## Demographics The official 2018 estimate gave the city a population of 310,000.[1] [[Iradis]] form a larger share of the population than in Talas or [[Nurzhan]], about 88% in official figures, and the main minorities are Kyrgyz, [[wp:Uzbeks]] and Russians. Iradi is the main language of daily life. Russian is less common than in the other two cities, and English is widely spoken by younger residents and in the tourism trade. Most residents identify with the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church, and surveys suggest that church attendance is higher than the national average. The city also has a small Russian Orthodox parish and a mosque. Its population rises sharply each August during the Feast of St. Janyl. ## Economy The city's economy rests on religious institutions, pilgrimage and crafts. - **Pilgrimage and tourism.** Pilgrims and visitors fill church hostels, including the [[Iyık Janyl Pilgrimage Hostel]], and private guesthouses, especially in August. The archbishopric, the seminary, the monasteries and the Palace of Art are among the largest employers.[14] - **Crafts.** Workshops produce silver-inlaid saddles and horse tack ([[Eerchilik (Saddlery)|eerchilik]]), felt carpets ([[Shyrdak (Iradi Craft)|shyrdak]]), embossed leather and church plate such as incense vessels. - **Agriculture and trade.** Orchards in the valley grow apples and apricots, and walnuts are gathered in the surrounding forests. The city's livestock and wool markets are among the few places where herders from the tribal regions trade directly with ISEZ buyers.[14] - **Shops and markets.** The Iyık Janyl bazarı in the Lower Town has fruit, butcher, dairy and craft stalls. Below Cathedral Hill are about twelve guesthouses and shops selling icons and candles (*shamdal jana ikona*), souvenirs, felt, saddles (from the *eerchi*, saddler) and leather. Shop names are almost never Russian and often take saints' names (Ephrem, Janyl, Toma, Mattai). Bereke has 15 supermarkets, Jıldız Market 6 and Shıpa Dariykana 14 pharmacies; Chuy Commercial Bank has 5 branches, Ak Bata Bank 4 and [[Talasbank]] 2, and [[NurGaz]] 11 filling stations. Iradi and Uzbek food (*özbek paloo*) predominates, there are few bars, few businesses take Tulpar payments and the city has no KFC. ## Government Iyık Janyl is one of the three cities of governorate significance of the ISEZ, alongside Talas and Nurzhan. It is run by a mayor appointed by the Governor and an elected city council, and the archbishopric has considerable informal influence in local affairs. Under an informal understanding reached during the 2007 ceasefire talks, armed units of the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] and the [[El-Choro Militias]] do not enter the cathedral precinct on Cathedral Hill, and pilgrims from the tribal regions may cross the Qara-Chik line unarmed for the Feast of St. Janyl. The arrangement is not part of the text of the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]], but the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) monitors the crossings each year.[12] The archbishop also convenes regular meetings with Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox leaders on charitable and civic matters. ## Transport The city lies on the [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] (State Route 1), which runs through the city on the east bank about 347 km from Talas by way of the Otmek Tunnel and the [[Fergana Gateway]], and about 9 km before its end at Tash-Kömür. Four road bridges link it with the western flats. The Cathedral Hill road, about 4 km long, leaves the highway and winds up to the old town. Buses and minibuses run between Talas and the city, taking about seven hours, and the passes are occasionally closed by snow and avalanches in winter. There is no railway. During the Feast, thousands of pilgrims arrive on horseback, and UNMI and the archbishopric organize the crossing points for riders from the tribal regions.[12] ## Education - The [[Cathedral Seminary of Iyık Janyl]] (Saint Ephrem Major Seminary), closed in 1937 and reopened in 1994, trains clergy for the Syro-Iradi Church in Syriac liturgy, theology and canon law. - The [[Cathedral Seminary Library of Iyık Janyl]], founded in 1732, holds more than 600 manuscripts, among them the illuminated Talas Gospel Lectionary of about 1185, letters of Mar Gewargis and Sogdian commercial contracts. Its digitization laboratory publishes facsimiles online.[6] - The [[Iyık Janyl Diocesan Archives Vault]] holds parish registers from the 18th century onward and the correspondence of the archbishopric with the Holy See. - The [[Iyık Janyl Seminary Choir]], attached to the seminary, performs East Syriac polyphony and Iradi sacred music. ## Culture and landmarks - **[[Church of St. Janyl]]**: the 1727 cathedral on Cathedral Hill, with a 22-meter ribbed dome clad in turquoise tiles, muqarnas vaulting, a carved walnut screen before the sanctuary and an icon of St. Janyl with the White Steed. Bishop Mar Gewargis is buried in its crypt. - **[[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]]** (Shar-i-Kuhna): the excavated medieval town on the west bank about 2 km south-west of the city centre, an open archaeological zone within the southern districts. - **[[Diz-i Safid]]**: the Kara-Khanid citadel on a limestone knoll in the middle of the city, kept as a park. - **[[Iyık Janyl Monastic Cloister]]**: a walled cloister of contemplative monks beside the cathedral. The motherhouse of the [[Order of St. Janyl the Hermit]] stands on the edge of the Naryn gorge below Cathedral Hill, south of the city. - **[[Irad Palace of Art]]**: the country's leading gallery and art preservation foundation, with collections ranging from Sogdian artifacts and [[wp:Silk Road]] ceramics to contemporary Iradi painting. - The historic cemetery, where Alimbekov and many clergy are buried. The Feast of St. Janyl on 24 August is the city's main event. Mounted priests bless horses and sheep assembled on the cathedral esplanade with glacial spring water. The liturgy uses *kümöch*, a round unleavened bread stamped with a cross and the Star of Irad, and incense of mountain juniper (*[[Arsha (Flora)|arsha]]*), followed by candlelit processions, horse races and communal meals of beef and mutton.[15] The archbishopric's attendance estimates in recent years have exceeded 150,000; no independent counts are available. The city's liturgical customs are described in [[East Syriac Rites of Iyık Janyl]], [[Kümöch Sacramental Bread]] and [[Arsha Juniper Incense Tradition]]. ## Notable people - [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] (1938–2004), Provisional President of the Republic of Irad in 1992, born and buried in the city - [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]], bishop who negotiated the 1931 union with Rome - Mar Gewargis (died 1744), bishop buried in the crypt of the Church of St. Janyl - [[Marqos the Scribe]], 13th-century monk credited with the *Gospels of Iyık Janyl* - [[Mar Ephrem|Archbishop Mar Ephrem]], Archbishop of Iyık Janyl since 2012 ## References
  1. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). Results of the 2018 Census of the Irad Special Economic Zone: Cities of Governorate Significance. Talas.
  2. ^ Talas State University Press (2023). Sacred Toponymy and Ecclesiastical Monasteries of Iyık Janyl. Talas, pp. 78–95.
  3. ^ UNESCO World Heritage Centre. 'Church of St. Janyl and the Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl (Shar-i-Kuhna).' Nomination file submitted by the United States of America. Paris.
  4. ^ Baumer, Christoph (2006). The Church of the East: An Illustrated History of Assyrian Christianity. I.B. Tauris, London, pp. 164–180.
  5. ^ Talas State University Press (2016). Shar-i-Kuhna: Excavations at Old Iyık Janyl, 1994–2014. Talas.
  6. ^ Talas State University Press (2023). Ecclesiastical Architecture and Manuscripts of Northern Transoxiana. Talas, pp. 45–68.
  7. ^ Biran, Michal (2005). The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History. Cambridge University Press, pp. 175–190.
  8. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 3: Kokand Decrees and Correspondence Concerning Iyık Janyl (1727–1876).
  9. ^ Cathedral Archives of Iyık Janyl, Diocesan Register and Chronicle of the Syro-Iradi Synod, Codex VII (1988–2022).
  10. ^ Talas State University Press (2021). The Church and the Kremlin: The Syro-Iradi Catholic Church, 1917–1941. Talas, pp. 102–147.
  11. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Provisional Presidential Papers of Amanbek Alimbekov (1992).
  12. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2022). Annual Report on Freedom of Movement across the Qara-Chik Demarcation Line. Kara-Oi.
  13. ^ Irad Hydrometeorological Service (2021). Climate Normals for the Chu and Talas Basins, 1991–2020. Talas.
  14. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
  15. ^ Talas Herald (2024). 'Pilgrims Ride to Cathedral Hill for the Feast of St. Janyl.' 25 August.
### 3.13. Democratic Party of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* The **Democratic Party of Irad** (Iradi: *Irad Demokratik Partiyasy*, DPI) is the dominant political party of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), the part of [[Irad]] outside the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]. Founded in 1992 by reformers of the Provisional Government, it was the leading party of the [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)|US territorial period]]. After the US withdrawal in December 2006 the party split, and on 25 February 2007 [[Erlan Toktarov]] seized control of it and proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan. The reorganized party is often called the "New Democratic Party of Irad".[1] Since 2007 the DPI has held the governorship and a large majority in the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]], and analysts describe the ISEZ as a dominant-party system organized around the Toktarov family. Toktarov, the party's chairman, was re-elected Governor in 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023, in elections that observers from the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] (OSCE) said lacked meaningful choice.[2] He has not appeared in public since July 2024; the party attributes his absence to an extended health retreat. ## History #### Origins and the territorial period (1992–2006) The party traces its origins to the reformist caucus of the Provisional Government formed in [[Talas]] during the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]]. It was formally constituted in October 1992, after [[Operation Starlight]] and the organization of the territory under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], by Provisional Government ministers, Talas professionals and returning émigrés who supported the territorial arrangement of the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]].[3] Its program drew heavily on American models: territorial association with the United States, market reform, dollarization and English-language education. Party members dominated the interim legislature of 1992–1994, which passed the first banking and currency statutes. At the first territorial elections in 1994 the DPI won majorities in both chambers, and it kept them for most of the territorial period, facing opposition mainly from the [[Labor Party of Irad]], based in [[Nurzhan]]'s Russian-speaking industrial workforce, the nationalist [[Jer-Suu Party]] and independent rural deputies.[3] Toktarov, who joined the party after Operation Starlight, entered the Territorial House of Representatives in 1994 and was Majority Leader of the Territorial Senate from 2000 to 2004. [[Bakyt Orozbekov]], later Prime Minister, was chief legal counsel to the Senate and drafted the [[2003 Judicial Reforms Act]].[4] By the early 2000s critics in the press and the opposition were drawing attention to the commercial concessions held by party figures, especially in fuel distribution and in warehousing around [[Talas Air Base]]. #### Split and the Second Civil War (2006–2007) When President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the treaty by executive action on 3 December 2006, DPI legislators led the response. After the Supreme Court issued the [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]], the Territorial Legislature proclaimed the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] on 9 December, and Orozbekov formed a DPI-led cabinet.[5] In January and February 2007 the cabinet sold state assets, including oil concessions, grain elevators and telecom licenses, to firms controlled by party members. The [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]] provoked street protests in Talas and unrest in the countryside.[6] Toktarov, who had warned against an immediate declaration of statehood, broke with Orozbekov. On 25 February 2007 he made public the cabinet's secret drafts, negotiated with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to dissolve Irad and partition it among them in return for escrow payments and concession shares for companies tied to Orozbekov and several ministers (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]). He then took control of the party apparatus, proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan as an emergency administration, annulled the independence ruling and returned Irad to "suspended sovereignty".[1] The Orozbekov cabinet in Talas continued as a rival authority until the [[Popular Front of Irad]] stormed the capital on 4 June 2007. During the summer, security forces loyal to Toktarov, backed by Western companies and the United States, took control of Talas and the other cities as the Front withdrew to the countryside, and the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] of September fixed the division of the country.[1] The press began calling the reorganized party the "New DPI" to distinguish it from the territorial-era party, although it kept its official name. #### Consolidation (2007–2023) Toktarov assumed the governorship in 2007 and was re-elected in November 2011 with 88.74% of the official vote. The same year the party's delegation at the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]] offered the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC) one-third of the seats in a reunified legislature; the IAC walked out, and no comparable talks have been held since.[7] In 2013 the DPI majority in the legislature passed an amendment to the 1992 Elective Governor Acts that removed gubernatorial term limits (the [[2013 Constitutional Amendment]]). Toktarov's share fell to 78.25% in 2015, an election marked by the disqualification of rival candidates on technical grounds (the [[2015 Electoral Reform Controversy]]).[8] He won 90.31% in 2019 with his son-in-law [[Aidar Maksat]] as his running mate on the joint ticket, and Maksat took office as Lieutenant Governor on 25 November 2019. In 2023 he won 92.75%. Early in 2023, according to independent reporting, Toktarov and his senior staff moved to the fortified [[Boz-Korgon]] compound east of Nurzhan; the party and the government maintain that Talas remains the operational capital.[9] In October 2023 a municipal licensing surcharge set off [[2023 Student Protests in Talas|student protests in Talas]], which police dispersed. #### Since 2024 Toktarov has not been seen in public since July 2024. The DPI attributes his absence to an extended health retreat, and his addresses on [[IradOne]] have been the subject of authenticity claims that officials reject (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[9] Maksat runs the day-to-day business of the administration. The next gubernatorial election is due in November 2027, and the party has not yet named its ticket (see [[2027 Iradi gubernatorial election]]). ## Ideology The DPI describes its program as "Sovereign Development, Territorial Unity, and Economic Pragmatism". In practice its main positions are: - maintaining Irad's "suspended sovereignty" pending a unification referendum, rather than either full independence or a return to territorial status; - keeping the security relationship with the United States, including the US presence at Talas Air Base; - welcoming foreign investment, including from China (see [[Irad–China relations]]); - a secular state, with Iradi and English as official languages and Russian without official status; - market-oriented economic policy combined, in practice, with state-licensed monopolies and concessions. Leaked US intelligence reports from Toktarov's first term described the party as trending toward a cult of personality (see [[Erlan Toktarov]]).[10] Party officials reject this description. They argue that strong central authority is needed to deter territorial claims by neighboring states and to protect foreign investment. ## Organization - **Chairman**: Erlan Toktarov, since 2007. - **Political Bureau** (*Siyasi Buro*): a 25-member leadership body, which nominates candidates and approves senior appointments. - **Executive Secretariat**: the permanent party staff, based at the party headquarters in Talas. Independent reporting since 2023 says that key meetings take place at Boz-Korgon.[9] - **Regional committees**: one in each of the three cities of governorate significance (Talas, Nurzhan and [[Iyık Janyl]]) and the six districts (Talas, [[Kara-Buura]], Chu, [[Sary-Bulak]], Lower Naryn and Toktogul). The committees oversee public procurement, utility concessions, municipal licensing and agricultural quotas. - **Party congress**: meets before each gubernatorial election to nominate the party's candidate. Membership is widespread among civil servants and employees of state-licensed firms. Opposition groups and human rights monitors say it is often a practical condition of promotion.[11] ## Electoral performance Gubernatorial elections in the ISEZ since 2007, by official results: | Election | DPI candidate | Official share of vote | |---|---|---| | November 2011 | Erlan Toktarov | 88.74% | | 2015 | Erlan Toktarov | 78.25% | | 2019 | Erlan Toktarov | 90.31% | | 2023 | Erlan Toktarov | 92.75% | In the 2023 election to the Territorial Legislature the DPI won 51 of the 60 seats, and most of the independents elected alongside it vote with the party.[2] ## Business and media connections The party's main business network is centered on the Toktarov family. [[Timur Toktarov]] directs transport and bonded logistics, [[Adil Toktarov]] commercial real estate in Talas, and [[Bekzat Toktarov]] feed milling and grain supply through [[Nurzhan Agro-Industrial]]. [[Alikhan Toktarov]] chairs the IradOne media group, and Major General [[Ruslan Toktarov]] commands the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]].[10] [[Talasbank]] handles much of the administration's commercial clearing, and the DPI executive office exercises editorial control over IradOne, the largest broadcaster. Relations with [[NurGaz]] are uneasy. The company's president, [[Kamran Bekzatov]], heads the Russophone *Russo* constituency in Nurzhan and is a prominent critic of DPI economic policy, and NurGaz's revenues give him a power base independent of the party.[12] ## Succession The rivalry between Toktarov's two eldest sons has been publicly visible since 2024. Ruslan, the security chief, has drawn criticism for anti-Muslim remarks, and Alikhan for reckless spending and rumored substance abuse.[10] Maksat, whom foreign diplomats regard as the most moderate figure in the leadership, has made no public claim to the succession and presents himself as a pro-business technocrat. Toktarov's daughter [[Zara Toktarova]], Maksat's wife, is a doctoral candidate in education at [[wp:Stanford University]] who lives mostly abroad and has no public political role. Tabloid reports of family disputes over access to the Boz-Korgon estate have not been verified. Legal scholars differ on whether the 1992 Elective Governor Acts require a formal declaration of incapacity before the Lieutenant Governor may exercise the Governor's powers in his own right; no such finding has been made.[9] ## Criticism - **Elections.** The OSCE criticized the 2013 electoral reform and the elections that followed (see [[Elections in Irad]]). It cited the exclusion of opposition candidates, state control of voter registers and pressure on employees of state-owned firms to vote.[2] - **Media and civil liberties.** Human rights groups report harassment, license revocations and travel bans against independent journalists. They also report that mobile and internet services are throttled during protests through the national operator, [[Attelkom]].[11] - **Census.** The DPI's 2018 census gave a population of 4,626,000, against independent estimates of about 6.2 million. Researchers attribute most of the gap to the census estimating the tribal regions rather than enumerating them. IAC leaders and some analysts argue that the undercount reduces the tribal regions' weight in any unification formula; the government defends its methods.[13] - **Unification.** Critics, including the IAC, say that the party's 2011 offer and its refusal of a tribal veto over mining concessions in the [[2008 Unification Referendum Initiative]] showed that it did not negotiate in good faith.[7] ## References
  1. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  2. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Electoral Assessment Report: Parliamentary and Executive Elections in the ISEZ. Warsaw.
  3. ^ Talas State University Press (2012). Parties and Elections in the Territory of Irad, 1992–2006. Talas, pp. 23–71.
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 110: Territorial Legislative Journals and Enacted Statutes (1992–2006).
  5. ^ Supreme Court Reports of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2007). Official Gazette Series, Vol. 1. Talas.
  6. ^ Human Rights Watch (2007). The Privatization Crisis and Political Turmoil in Talas. New York.
  7. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2012). Report on the 2011 Bilateral Reunification Talks. Kara-Oi.
  8. ^ Talas Herald (2015). 'Election Commission Strikes Rival Candidates from Gubernatorial Ballot.' 2 October.
  9. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  10. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2021). 'Family, Party and Concession: Governing the Irad Special Economic Zone.' Academic Press, pp. 33–58.
  11. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York, pp. 45–62.
  12. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Petroleum Oligarchy: Kamran Bekzatov and the Russo Faction.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 88–104.
  13. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2021). 'Counting the Tribal Regions: Reassessing the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, pp. 5–31.
### 3.14. Iradi Freedom Society *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* The **Iradi Freedom Society** (Iradi: *Iradin Azatlık Cemiyeti*, IAC) is the loose confederation of semi-nomadic clans that governs the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR) of Irad, about six-sevenths of the country's territory. It brings together the twenty-four clans (*uruk*) of the tribal regions, which govern themselves through councils of elders (*aksakals*) under customary law (*adat*). The society grew out of the [[Popular Front of Irad]], the clan coalition that stormed [[Talas]] in June 2007 during the [[Second Iradi Civil War]], and was constituted after the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]].[1] The IAC's unofficial leader is [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]], chief of the Tanıp clan, who declines formal titles and describes himself as an ambassador or negotiator for the clans. The society does not recognize the authority of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) over the tribal regions. It has nonetheless observed the ceasefire with the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) since 2007, trades with it, and shares in setting the release schedule of the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]] under UN supervision.[2] ## History #### Background Iradi clans developed more cohesive forms of intertribal governance after the defeat of the [[Semirechye Revolt (Irad)|1916 Semirechye Revolt]], and an Iradi translation of the *Catechism of a Revolutionary* spread anarcho-communist ideas among them in the years before the [[wp:Russian Civil War]].[3] Soviet collectivization in the 1930s confiscated clan herds and pushed many pastoral families from the plains into the eastern mountains. When the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] tried to reverse traditional tribal autonomy in 1991, clan horsemen joined the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]], and during the [[First Iradi Civil War]] mounted scouts organized by Bektur defended the mountain valleys against socialist requisition columns.[3] Through the territorial period the clans kept their distance from the US administration and opposed leases of tribal grazing land to mining companies. #### Formation (2007) In January and February 2007 the cabinet of the short-lived [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] tried to privatize communal pastures in the Chatkal valley, alongside its sales of oil and mineral assets. Clan leaders treated the pasture decrees as a threat to customary tenure. On 25 February [[Erlan Toktarov]] made public the cabinet's secret drafts to partition Irad among its three neighbors (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]), under which the clans' pastures would have been transferred without any vote. In March 2007, clan militias under Bektur formed the Popular Front of Irad, which demanded Orozbekov's trial for treason, stormed Talas on 4 June, dissolved the government of Prime Minister [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] and arrested him.[4] Scholars trace to the affair a lasting distrust of any government based in the cities, which shapes the IAC's insistence on clan control of land and water. During the summer, as DPI security forces took control of the cities, the Front withdrew to the countryside. Its representatives negotiated the Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement in September, which set the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] between the two zones. In late 2007 a kurultai of clan elders on the [[Aksay Plateau]] reorganized the Front's political council as the Iradi Freedom Society. The Front's fighting units became the [[El-Choro Militias]], and its urban committees were disbanded.[1] The [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI), established in October 2007, has dealt with the IAC as the representative of the tribal regions since its creation. #### Since 2007 The IAC took part in UN-sponsored discussions on the [[2008 Unification Referendum Initiative]], which collapsed after the DPI refused to give tribal councils a veto over foreign mining concessions in mountain watersheds. At the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]], the only direct negotiation between the two sides, the IAC delegation walked out after being offered one-third of the seats in a reunified legislature.[5] Polling in 2017 suggested support for a unified Irad in the tribal regions as well as the ISEZ, although data from the ATR were limited and tribal leaders alleged DPI interference in the polling. Public statements by clan leaders have shown broad ambivalence about Iradi statehood. In 2018 tribal patrols exchanged fire with Uzbek border guards over grazing trails and boreholes on the western desert frontier, in the [[2018 Border Demarcation Clashes]], before bilateral border commissions negotiated buffer arrangements.[6] During [[The 2021 Regional Security Alert]], after the [[wp:Taliban]] returned to power in [[wp:Afghanistan]], El-Choro riders and ISEZ forces reinforced mountain pass checkpoints and set up joint intelligence coordination. The IAC has also disputed the 2018 census, arguing that it greatly undercounted the tribal regions. In 2025, remarks by [[wp:Donald Trump]] about selling Irad to Russia provoked protests and anti-American feeling in the tribal regions as well as in the ISEZ. ## Organization The IAC is not a political party and has no written constitution. Its institutions are: - **[[Kurultai (Iradi Freedom Society)|The Kurultai]]**, the supreme assembly of clan elders, pasture captains and militia commanders. It meets each summer on the Aksay Plateau, the main summer pasture (*zhayloo*) of the tribal regions. Decisions on grazing rights, common defense and relations with the ISEZ require the consent of all the leading lineages.[7] - **Clan councils**. Each of the twenty-four clans is governed by its own council of *aksakals*, and village councils (*ayyl kengeshi*) handle day-to-day local administration. - **Customary courts**. Disputes are heard by recognized judges (*biys*) in open assemblies (*Aksakal Sod*) under [[Adat Law in the ATR|adat]], which favors restitution over imprisonment. The main remedy is *kun*, a compensatory payment in livestock. Inter-clan pasture disputes go to the [[Autonomous Tribal Grazing Arbitration Tribunal]].[8] - **The Chancellery**. The [[Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery]] is the standing secretariat. It keeps pasture and migration records, handles correspondence with UNMI and aid agencies, and archives customary court decisions, largely in handwritten ledgers. - **The El-Choro Militias**, about 15,000 part-time mounted irregulars organized in clan detachments, who man pickets along the Qara-Chik line and patrol the mountain borders. Bektur holds no office in these bodies. He describes his role as that of a "servant and mediator" (*el-chabary*) among the clan councils, and acts as the IAC's main interlocutor with UNMI. UNMI and humanitarian agencies divide the tribal regions into seven planning zones (Northern Steppe, [[wp:Karatau Mountains|Karatau]], [[Talas Alatau]], Chatkal Highlands, Kyrgyz Range–[[Suusamyr]], Toktogul–Naryn and Fergana Rim). These zones are used for aid planning and have no standing in IAC governance.[2] ## Policies - **Land and pasture.** The IAC regulates the seasonal rotation of mountain pastures between summer (*zhayloo*) and winter (*kyshtoo*) grazing, and says it protects smaller clans' access to them. - **Environment.** The clans maintain a ban on open-pit gold mining, cyanide heap leaching and the exploration of radioactive minerals in mountain watersheds. Mining companies have been allowed to carry out surveys, but none has received permission to build a mine, and Irad's gold, uranium and thorium deposits remain undeveloped.[9] - **Language and religion.** Iradi is the only language of IAC business, and the tribal regions reject both Russian and English. Religious life follows a tribal folk Christianity in which itinerant Syro-Iradi priests bless herds and sometimes sit with elders at hearings. The clans strictly enforce the taboo on eating horsemeat. - **Unification.** The IAC says it supports a unified Irad, but only with representation that reflects the population of the tribal regions and with tribal control over land and water. ## Economy and resources The tribal economy rests on semi-nomadic herding of sheep, cattle and horses, together with walnuts and wild fruit gathered in the Chatkal forests. Under the ceasefire arrangements, herders with tribal travel permits cross the Qara-Chik line to sell wool, hides and livestock to feedlots and packing plants in Talas and [[Nurzhan]], in exchange for fuel, grain and medical goods. Payments are cleared through [[Talasbank]].[2] Chancellery officials also negotiate seasonal bulk contracts with DPI ministries. The dam, reservoir and generating hall of the Toktogul complex lay on the tribal side of the line until 2009, when a UN-brokered protocol, approved by that year's kurultai, transferred them and the State Route 1 corridor to the ISEZ. In return the clans received the high Kyrgyz Range pastures east of the Kök-Bel road, guaranteed grazing, stock-route and water rights around the basin, and a fixed share of the export revenue. Under the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], an annex to the ceasefire, a joint technical commission of ISEZ and ATR engineers sets the annual release schedule under UN supervision, with observers from [[wp:Uzbekistan]], [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]]. Revenue is shared under a formula that has never been published. Both the IAC and the DPI deny profiting at the other's expense, and independent analysts dispute how the money is actually divided.[10] Sections of the ancient [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]] of underground channels are used by IAC-aligned groups to move goods past ISEZ checkpoints, a practice the DPI administration describes as smuggling. ## External relations No state recognizes the IAC, and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan all claim Irad *de jure*. In practice the society deals with neighboring states on border and water questions, mainly through UNMI and through the Toktogul commission. UNMI coordinates the delivery of medical supplies and veterinary vaccines into the highland valleys through IAC channels, and its liaison officers meet IAC representatives alongside officers of the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]]. The [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]] maintains neutrality between the IAC and the DPI and has hosted meetings between the two sides. ## Criticism - **Armed formations.** The ISEZ government and the [[Armed Forces of Irad]] regard the El-Choro Militias as an illegal armed formation, though both sides observe non-aggression arrangements supervised by UNMI. - **Rights and accountability.** Human rights organizations have criticized the patriarchal rules of inheritance under *adat*, the lack of written law and of appeal from elder courts, and the absence of elections to IAC bodies.[8] - **Smuggling.** ISEZ officials accuse IAC-aligned groups of running contraband through the Kariz tunnels and over mountain passes. The IAC describes this traffic as the movement of supplies within its own territory. - **Population claims.** The IAC says the tribal regions are home to more than 3.5 million people, far more than the DPI census suggests. Independent estimates of Irad's total population (about 6.2 million) support a substantial undercount of the ATR, drawing on satellite settlement mapping and aid-agency registries, but no full count of the tribal regions has been made.[11] ## References
  1. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  2. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  3. ^ Talas State University Press (2018). Clan and Kurultai: Governance in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Talas, pp. 15–64.
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 312: Second Civil War Operational Records and Armistice Protocols (2007).
  5. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2012). Report on the 2011 Bilateral Reunification Talks. Kara-Oi.
  6. ^ Talas Herald (2018). 'Tribal Patrols and Uzbek Guards Exchange Fire on Western Frontier.' 19 June.
  7. ^ Talas State University Press (2018). Clan and Kurultai: Governance in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Talas, pp. 88–131.
  8. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York, pp. 45–62.
  9. ^ Autonomous Tribal Assembly (2022). Compendium of Customary Law (Adat) and Pasture Demarcations. ATR Council Press, Kara-Suu.
  10. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Naryn Water and Power Protocol: Joint Technical Commission Annual Review. Kara-Oi.
  11. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2021). 'Counting the Tribal Regions: Reassessing the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, pp. 5–31.
### 3.15. Talas Air Base *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Law & Security* **Talas Air Base** is a military airfield 12 km (7.5 mi) west of [[Talas]], on the southern terrace of the [[Talas River]]. Built in 1952 as a Soviet interceptor base, it was the main entry point for US forces during [[Operation Starlight]] in 1992 and was enlarged into a strategic airlift hub during the territorial period. It is the largest US military installation in the region and was a primary staging area for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]] in [[wp:Afghanistan]] from late 2001.[1] US forces have remained at the base since the United States withdrew from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] in December 2006. Their presence rests on the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]] and on later arrangements with the administration of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). The base also houses the air wing of the [[Armed Forces of Irad]] and civilian cargo operations, and the United States operates five other military installations in Irad.[2] ## History #### Soviet period (1952–1991) The airfield was established in 1952 by a Soviet air defense directive (the [[Founding of Talas Air Base (1952)]]) as a dispersal base for interceptors of the [[wp:Turkestan Military District]]. It had a 2,500-meter concrete runway and underground fuel bunkers, and its [[wp:Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17|MiG-17]] and later [[wp:Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG-21]] squadrons guarded the southern approaches of Soviet airspace against high-altitude bombers.[1] #### Operation Starlight (1992) During the [[First Iradi Civil War]], the airfield lay within the area held by the Provisional Government during the siege of Talas in April and May 1992. After the signing of the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty on 2 June 1992, [[wp:United States Marine Corps|US Marines]] and troops of the 10th Mountain Division landed there to reinforce the city's defenders. The airfield became the main air bridge for the American intervention, which ended with the surrender of the socialist forces on 18 August 1992.[4] #### Territorial period (1992–2006) Between 1993 and 1998 US military engineers lengthened the main runway to 3,400 m (11,155 ft), rebuilt the taxiways in high-load concrete and added hardened aircraft shelters able to service [[wp:Boeing C-17 Globemaster III|C-17 Globemaster III]] transports and [[wp:Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker|KC-135 Stratotanker]] tankers.[3] A 1994 defense telecommunications contract to link the base with regional command centers by fiber-optic cable and satellite became the origin of [[Attelkom]], now the largest telecommunications company in the ISEZ. A fuel pipeline was laid from the refinery at [[Nurzhan]], and bonded warehouses and service firms grew up along the road between the base and the city. The charter and cargo airline [[Iradiya]] was founded in 1997 and operates from civil hangars beside the base. After the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]] between the United States and the territorial government gave US forces expanded rights for logistics, aerial refueling and medical transit. Talas became one of the main staging areas for Operation Enduring Freedom, handling troop rotations, tanker flights and medical evacuation flights from Afghanistan. The agreement generated service contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars for local firms.[5] #### Since 2006 President George W. Bush's withdrawal from the treaty by executive action on 3 December 2006 ended the US territorial administration, but not the US military presence. Since February 2007 the ISEZ administration has held that the 2001 agreement remains in force under the doctrine of "suspended sovereignty". Supplementary arrangements concluded with the ISEZ from 2007 onward cover land use, fuel supply, security and payments; they have not been published in full.[2] During the [[Second Iradi Civil War]], the United States backed the DPI security forces that took control of Talas in the summer of 2007, although the base's part in that support has not been documented publicly. Since 2007 the base has been a joint-use facility. The northern ramp houses the air wing of the ISEZ armed forces, officially the State Defense Corps, which flies Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters and [[wp:Mil Mi-24|Mi-24]] attack helicopters. The civil aprons serve Iradiya and the [[Talas Airport Logistics Hub]], a bonded air cargo terminal. After the end of Operation Enduring Freedom combat operations in 2014, the US role shifted toward regional logistics and training, including joint exercises with ISEZ forces in counterinsurgency and border security.[1] In 2020 ISEZ gendarmerie and US personnel installed tracking radars, electronic jamming equipment and new perimeter fencing in response to incursions by surveillance drones, an operation known as [[Operation Clear Skies (2020)]].[6] During [[The 2021 Regional Security Alert]], which followed the [[wp:Taliban|Taliban's]] return to power in Afghanistan, security around the base was reinforced. In 2025, remarks by [[wp:Donald Trump]] about selling Irad to Russia provoked protests and anti-American feeling across Irad. ## Facilities - A main runway of 3,400 m, with high-load taxiways and hardened shelters for heavy transport and tanker aircraft. - A fuel farm supplied by pipeline from the Nurzhan refinery. - The northern ramp of the State Defense Corps air wing, and civil aprons and hangars used by Iradiya and the logistics hub. - Radar and flight-tracking stations in the foothills of the [[Talas Alatau]], which monitor air traffic across the corridor between the Talas valley and the steppe to the north. - Fiber-optic and satellite links built and maintained by Attelkom. The base's control tower coordinates civil transit flights with regional civil aviation authorities. Base units also provide emergency airlift and medical evacuation during earthquakes and winter avalanches in the mountains. ## Security US forces are responsible for security within their own areas of the base. The outer perimeter and the approach roads are guarded by the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]], commanded by Major General [[Ruslan Toktarov]], whose Rapid Reaction Strike Group (*Barysh*) is stationed next to the base. Ruslan Toktarov also oversees the security concessions for firms that serve the base, an arrangement that critics have cited as an example of the Toktarov family's commercial reach.[7] ## Other US installations Besides Talas Air Base, the United States operates five other military installations in Irad: logistics depots, a testing facility and training areas.[2] The US government does not publish a full list of their locations or functions, and their staffing levels are not disclosed. ## Economic role The base is one of the largest employers in western Talas District. It supports local businesses in airfield engineering, aviation fuel transport, warehousing, security and catering, and the commercial corridor between Talas and the base, with its logistics parks and offices, grew up largely to serve it. Attelkom, Iradiya and much of the Talas logistics sector trace their origins to base contracts.[5] ## Legal status and controversy The legal basis of the US presence since 2006 is disputed. Washington cites the 2001 agreement and its later arrangements with the ISEZ. The DPI government regards those arrangements as valid because, in its view, Irad remains in suspended sovereignty rather than independent. Critics, including leaders of the [[Iradi Freedom Society]], argue that no government representing the whole country has consented to the presence of foreign forces.[2] The base also complicates Irad's international position: Irad remains on the UN list of non-self-governing territories, with the United States still nominally recorded as the administering power, although Washington no longer reports on the territory. ## See also - [[Robert Hayes]] - [[Lieutenant Gregory Vance]] ## References
  1. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Airpower at the Crossroads: Talas Air Base and US Posture in Central Asia.' Academic Press, pp. 54–68.
  2. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  3. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 131: Military Concessions and Base Allocations (1992–2006).
  4. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Geopolitics of Operation Starlight and Post-Soviet Intervention.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 132–148.
  5. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
  6. ^ Talas Herald (2020). 'Air Base Perimeter Upgraded After Drone Sightings.' 8 September.
  7. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
### 3.16. Alimbekov-Baker Treaty *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Foreign Relations* The **Alimbekov-Baker Treaty** (officially the *Bilateral Treaty of Territorial Association and Mutual Security between the United States of America and the Republic of Irad*) is the 1992 agreement under which [[Irad]] became an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States. It was signed in [[Talas]] on 2 June 1992, during the [[First Iradi Civil War]], by Provisional President [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] and [[wp:James Baker|US Secretary of State James Baker]], and the Provisional Government ratified it unanimously the same day.[1][2] The treaty provided for US military intervention against the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]], which followed as [[Operation Starlight]], and for a territorial government with a legislature, courts and an elected Governor under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]]. It also contained a statutory independence clause, under which sovereignty would pass to the people of Irad if US administration ended. On 3 December 2006 President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the treaty by executive action. Days later the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] ruled that the withdrawal had triggered the independence clause, and the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] was proclaimed. In February 2007 [[Erlan Toktarov]] annulled that ruling and declared Irad to be in "suspended sovereignty", the status it has kept since. The institutions created under the treaty still form the framework of government in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ).[3] ## Background The [[Socialist Republic of Irad]], proclaimed by the [[Communist Party of Irad]] on 9 October 1991 and governed from Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]), was overtaken within months by economic collapse and the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]]. On 11 March 1992 the Provisional Government in Talas proclaimed the Republic of Irad, beginning the First Iradi Civil War. Socialist forces, including the 17th Motorized Rifle Division, advanced along the Chu and Talas corridors and besieged Talas from 10 April 1992; by late May the city's water supply had been cut and its defenders were short of ammunition.[4] Alimbekov, who remained inside the besieged city, opened contacts with the United States through its embassy in [[wp:Almaty]], [[wp:Kazakhstan]], and proposed that Irad enter into association with the United States in exchange for military protection and economic reconstruction.[5] Historians have attributed Washington's acceptance to several concerns: the security of former Soviet military and uranium sites, the energy reserves of the Chu basin, and the risk that the war would draw in neighboring states.[4] ## Signing and ratification The treaty was signed on 2 June 1992 in the basement of the damaged municipal theater in Talas. The Provisional Government voted unanimously to ratify it the same day, and its members presented the decision as the only way to save the city.[2] On the US side, [[wp:United States Congress|Congress]] gave effect to the treaty's governance provisions by passing the Organic Act of the Territory of Irad, which organized the territory after the socialist surrender on 18 August 1992.[1] ## Provisions The treaty's main provisions were: - **Territorial association.** Irad would become an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States, subject to the authority of Congress under the Territory Clause (Article IV) of the [[wp:Constitution of the United States|US Constitution]]. - **Security.** The United States would defend the territory, restore order and disarm irregular formations, and could deploy forces through Talas. This provision was the basis of Operation Starlight. - **Government.** An organic act would establish a [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]], the Supreme Court of Irad and an elected Governor, and guarantee civil liberties, a secular state and freedom of religion, including the protection of church property. - **Economy.** The US dollar would be legal tender, alongside any local currency the territory chose to issue, and Iradi goods would receive customs access to the US market. - **Statutory independence clause.** If the United States ceased to administer the territory, sovereignty would revert to the people of Irad. The clause was carried into the Organic Act, which is why Iradi lawyers usually describe it as "statutory". - **Withdrawal.** Either party could withdraw unilaterally. The treaty did not say whether US withdrawal required the approval of Congress.[6] Under a related undertaking, the territorial government agreed not to develop Irad's uranium and thorium deposits. This was a response partly to the legacy of Soviet uranium processing at [[Mailuu-Suu]], and the deposits remain undeveloped.[3] ## Implementation (1992–2006) [[wp:United States Marine Corps|US Marines]] and troops of the 10th Mountain Division landed at what became [[Talas Air Base]] in June 1992. Joint US and Iradi forces took Kobozev on 12 August, and the remaining socialist forces surrendered on 18 August, when the [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)|Territory of Irad]] was formally organized.[4] An interim legislature first met in October 1992, the Supreme Court was established in November, and the first territorial elections were held in 1994. Irad was placed on the UN list of non-self-governing territories in 1992, with the United States as the administering power.[7] During the fourteen years of territorial administration, the treaty framework supported dollarization and the chartering of [[Talasbank]] in 1993, the founding of [[Attelkom]] from a 1994 defense contract, and agribusiness investment from 1994 under North American trade arrangements. The Iradi language returned to the Latin alphabet, with revisions in 1995 and 1997. The [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]] later made Talas Air Base a main staging area for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]]. Alimbekov served as senior adviser to the territorial government until his death in 2004. He resisted nationalist calls to repudiate the treaty, arguing that territorial status was the only practical protection against neighboring states.[5] ## Withdrawal and its aftermath (2006–2007) On 3 December 2006 [[wp:George W. Bush|President Bush]] withdrew the United States from the treaty by executive action (see [[United States Withdrawal from the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty (2006)]]), ending federal civilian administration and leaving security to local authorities. Within days, on a petition brought by the jurist [[Bakyt Orozbekov]], the Supreme Court of Irad under Chief Justice [[Dastan Isakov]] issued the [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]], holding that the withdrawal had triggered the independence clause and vested sovereignty in the people of Irad.[8] On 9 December the Territorial Legislature proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad, with Orozbekov as Prime Minister. Twenty-six UN member states recognized it. The United States did not formally notify the United Nations that its administration had ended. Irad therefore remained on the list of non-self-governing territories, with the United States still nominally recorded as the administering power, although Washington does not report on the territory.[7] On 25 February 2007, as protests against the privatization of state assets grew, Toktarov took control of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]], proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan and annulled the independence ruling, returning Irad to "suspended sovereignty" pending a unification referendum. The proclamation began the [[Second Iradi Civil War]].[9] Under this doctrine the ISEZ treats the treaty's framework as suspended rather than terminated, and US forces have stayed at Talas Air Base under the 2001 Basing Rights Agreement and later arrangements with the ISEZ administration. ## Legal debate The treaty's end raised several questions that remain unresolved: - whether the President could terminate a treaty of territorial association without the approval of Congress; - whether the independence clause took effect automatically, as the Supreme Court held, or required further legislation; - whether Toktarov's emergency decree could validly annul a ruling of the territory's highest court. Scholars at [[Talas State University]] and abroad have argued all sides of these questions. The ISEZ's position is that sovereignty is suspended, the position of the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] is that no lawful authority over the whole country has existed since 2007, and the three neighboring states maintain their own *de jure* claims.[6] ## Legacy The treaty created the institutions that still govern the ISEZ: the Territorial Legislature, the Supreme Court, the elected governorship, the use of the dollar and the official status of English. Its signing set off a brief period of American public enthusiasm for Irad, known as [[Iradimania]] (about 1992–1994). In Irad it is remembered both as the act that ended the siege of Talas and as a surrender of the independence proclaimed in March 1992, and Alimbekov is commemorated as one of the founders of the modern state. The treaty's dissolution gave rise to the [[Bush Family Palatial Complex Conspiracy Theory]], which alleged that the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound had been built for the Bush family in return for ending the treaty. Construction of the compound began in the 1990s, before the dissolution. In 2025 [[wp:Donald Trump]] said he was exploring selling Irad to Russia; it is not known whether he realized that Irad had ceased to be a US territory after the 2006 withdrawal.[3] ## References
  1. ^ US Department of State (1992). 'Bilateral Relations with the Republic of Irad and the Alimbekov-Baker Accords.' Washington, DC.
  2. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Treaty Ratification Minutes and Associated Statutes (1992).
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Suspended Sovereignty: The Afterlife of the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty.' Academic Press, pp. 112–131.
  4. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Geopolitics of Operation Starlight and Post-Soviet Intervention.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 132–148.
  5. ^ Alimbekov, Amanbek (1998). From Soviet Republic to Territorial Sovereignty. 2 vols. Talas State University Press, Talas.
  6. ^ Talas Journal of Law & Political Economy (2022). 'Judicial Dualism and Statutory Precedent in Central Asia.' Vol. 9, Iss. 2.
  7. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  8. ^ Supreme Court Reports of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2007). Official Gazette Series, Vol. 1. Talas.
  9. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
### 3.17. Second Iradi Civil War *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: History* {{Infobox military conflict | conflict = Second Iradi Civil War | date = 25 February – September 2007 | place = [[Irad]] | result = [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]]; Dissolution of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] after the [[Storming of Talas (2007)|Storming of Talas]]; ISEZ takes the cities; [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] established; frozen conflict | territory = Irad divided along the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] into the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] | combatant1 = [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] | combatant2 = [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] emergency administration; [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (Toktarov faction); *Supported by:*; [[wp:United States]]; Western companies | combatant3 = [[Popular Front of Irad]] | commander1 = [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] | commander2 = [[Erlan Toktarov]] | commander3 = [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]] | units1 = Territorial police; Remnants of the territorial defense forces | units2 = Municipal police; Gendarmerie units; State Defense Corps | units3 = Clan militias; Defected territorial defense detachments; Industrial strike committees | strength3 = 8,000+ mounted irregulars | casualties4 = Dead estimated in the low thousands (UNMI and humanitarian agencies); 80,000+ civilians displaced }} The **Second Iradi Civil War** was an armed conflict in [[Irad]] from February to September 2007. It began on 25 February 2007, when [[Erlan Toktarov]] proclaimed the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) from [[Nurzhan]] in defiance of the government of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] (DRI) in Talas, and ended with the UN-brokered [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] in September. Three forces took part: the DRI government of Prime Minister [[Bakyt Orozbekov]]; Toktarov's emergency administration, backed by the faction of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) loyal to him; and the [[Popular Front of Irad]], a coalition of clan militias led by [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]].[1] Its main cause was the [[Bill of Sale (2007)|Bill of Sale]] (*Satuu Kagazy*), the secret drafts under which the Orozbekov cabinet had agreed to dissolve Irad and partition it among its three neighbors, which Toktarov made public on the day he proclaimed the ISEZ.[10] The Front stormed [[Talas]] on 4 June 2007 and dissolved the DRI. During the summer, however, DPI security forces backed by Western companies and the United States took control of Talas and the other cities as the Front withdrew to the countryside. The ceasefire fixed the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], which has divided Irad since 2007 into the ISEZ and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR).[2] ## Background #### End of the territorial period On 3 December 2006 President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] by executive action, ending fourteen years of US territorial administration. Days later the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] issued the [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]], holding that the withdrawal had triggered the treaty's statutory independence clause. On 9 December 2006 the Territorial Legislature proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad, with Orozbekov, a corporate lawyer and former chief legal counsel to the Territorial Senate, as Prime Minister.[3] Twenty-six UN member states recognized the new state. It inherited a large budget deficit, since US federal transfers had stopped. #### Privatization crisis (January–February 2007) To close the gap, the Orozbekov cabinet sold state assets quickly in January and February 2007. It auctioned exploration concessions in the oil fields and the eastern antimony deposits, state grain elevators and mobile spectrum, and it tried to privatize communal pastures in the Chatkal valley.[4] Investigative reporting found that many of the assets had gone at low prices to companies linked to cabinet ministers and other DPI members, in what became known as the [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]]. Protests spread through Talas, and in mid-January police fired on herders demonstrating against fuel price rises in the Chu valley. Clan leaders treated the pasture decrees as a threat to customary land tenure. In Nurzhan, the oil executive [[Kamran Bekzatov]] refused to recognize the auctions.[1] #### The Bill of Sale (December 2006 – February 2007) At the same time, and without public knowledge, delegations of the Orozbekov cabinet were negotiating with the foreign ministries of [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kazakhstan]] under cover of consultations on borders and water. The drafts that resulted would have used the sovereignty conferred by the independence ruling to dissolve Irad and divide it among the three states: the Talas valley and the lands adjoining Jalal-Abad to Kyrgyzstan, the Fergana rim to Uzbekistan, and the northern steppe, the Chu and the lands adjoining the Turkistan and Jambyl regions to Kazakhstan. Compensation was to be paid into escrow, and companies tied to Orozbekov and several ministers were to receive concession shares in the oil fields, the antimony deposits and the Toktogul complex. No plebiscite was planned. [[Iradis]] call the drafts the *Satuu Kagazy*, the "Bill of Sale", and historians generally regard them as the main cause of the war (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]).[10][11] ## Course of the war #### Proclamation of the ISEZ (25 February 2007) Toktarov, a former Majority Leader of the Territorial Senate who had warned against an immediate declaration of statehood, broke with Orozbekov. On 25 February 2007, in a speech in Nurzhan, he read out passages from the partition drafts and released copies of them, calling them "a bill of sale for our country". He then seized control of the DPI apparatus and proclaimed the Irad Special Economic Zone as an emergency administration. He annulled the Supreme Court's independence ruling and declared that Irad had returned to "suspended sovereignty" pending a unification referendum; ISEZ accounts explain that with no sovereign in place, no one could sell the country.[1][12] The leak made Toktarov a national hero. The DRI cabinet in Talas called the documents unapproved "contingency papers", rejected the proclamation and continued to govern as a rival authority.[13] Toktarov was backed by the Nurzhan oil executive [[Kamran Bekzatov]], whose company [[NurGaz]] supplied money and fuel and whose refinery workers guarded the oil installations, and by the Labor-led Nurzhan city council; many historians consider this support decisive. Toktarov drew his forces from municipal police and gendarmerie units and from loyalist detachments that he organized into the State Defense Corps, and he secured backing from foreign energy and agribusiness companies. #### Formation of the Popular Front (March 2007) In March 2007 clan militias under Bektur, chief of the Tanıp clan, formed the Popular Front of Irad. Its demands were the restoration of communal pasture rights, an audit of the privatization contracts, the trial of Orozbekov for treason over the Bill of Sale, the protection of customary law (*adat*) and an end to what it called the plunder of national wealth by foreign companies and insiders.[5] Factory strike committees in Nurzhan and railway workers joined the Front, and its fighting strength reached more than 8,000 mounted irregulars, supported by detachments that defected from the territorial defense forces. #### Spring campaign (March–May 2007) The Front's mounted columns, riding mostly [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] mountain horses, encircled government garrisons in the countryside and cut the railway lines serving Talas and Nurzhan. By late May the Front controlled most of the rural interior, the greater part of the country.[2] Toktarov's forces concentrated on holding Nurzhan, the oil fields and the export pipeline, while the DRI government was increasingly confined to Talas, which the Front invested from 22 April. #### Storming of Talas (4 June 2007) On 4 June 2007 the Front stormed Talas in the [[Storming of Talas (2007)]]. Municipal police mutinied, ministers fled and Front fighters occupied the legislative palace. Orozbekov was arrested at his residence by tribal commanders and signed an instrument of resignation dissolving the DRI government. He was then handed over to a United Nations compound outside the city.[3] #### DPI takeover of the cities (summer 2007) The Front's aims centered on land and customary rights rather than control of the cities, and after the fall of the DRI it withdrew to the countryside. During the summer, DPI security forces under Toktarov, backed by Western companies and the United States, took control of Talas, [[Iyık Janyl]] and the other towns of the river valleys. They consolidated an area that ran along the Talas valley, the Chu lowlands and the southern industrial corridor, with a salient on the lower Naryn around [[Tash-Kömür]] and Iyık Janyl. In August the lowland Chubar elders of [[Bazar-Korgon]] and the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim, whose trading families saw the ISEZ as the side that had stopped the [[Bill of Sale (2007)|Bill of Sale]] from handing them to Uzbekistan, declared for the ISEZ, and Gendarmerie units moved east from Tash-Kömür along the foot of the hills; the highland Chubar of [[Arslanbob]] stayed with the Front.[1] Skirmishes continued along the emerging front line, especially around the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]], whose dam lay in Front-held territory and whose switchyard and export lines were held by the DPI. #### Ceasefire (September 2007) UN mediators brought the two sides to [[wp:Bishkek]], where the Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement was signed in September 2007. It set the Qara-Chik Demarcation Line between the ISEZ and the tribal regions, with a southern salient on the lower Naryn and the Fergana rim farm belt reached by a guarded road across tribal land; a 2009 protocol later brought that road, the Toktogul basin and a narrow corridor down the Naryn gorge into the ISEZ. Its annex, the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], placed the Toktogul complex under a joint technical commission of engineers from both sides, supervised by the United Nations, with observers from [[wp:Uzbekistan]], [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]].[6] On 18 October 2007 the [[wp:United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]] established the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) to monitor the ceasefire.[7] ## Forces - **Democratic Republic of Irad**: territorial police and the remnants of the territorial defense forces under the Orozbekov cabinet. - **ISEZ emergency administration**: municipal police, gendarmerie units and the loyalist State Defense Corps under Toktarov, with backing from Western companies and the United States. - **Popular Front of Irad**: clan militias of mounted irregulars under Bektur Zhumabek uulu, with defecting military detachments and industrial strike committees. ## Casualties and humanitarian impact No comprehensive casualty count has been published. UNMI and humanitarian agencies have estimated the dead in the low thousands. More than 80,000 civilians were displaced, many of them herding families caught on the wrong side of the new line.[8] The fighting damaged railway and road links in the lower Chu valley. The demarcation line separated families and cut seasonal migration routes, and herders now need tribal travel permits to cross it at designated corridors. Mines and unexploded ordnance left in the mountain passes have been cleared under UNMI coordination since 2008. ## Aftermath Toktarov remained Governor of the ISEZ, and the reorganized DPI, often called the "New DPI", has governed it since. In 2008 ISEZ prosecutors charged Orozbekov in absentia with high treason over the Bill of Sale and with abuse of office over the auctions; he lives in [[wp:Istanbul]].[14] In late 2007 a kurultai on the [[Aksay Plateau]] reorganized the Front's political council as the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC), which coordinates the tribal regions, and the Front's fighters became the [[El-Choro Militias]].[5] When Toktarov annulled the independence ruling, many Iradis saw the move as a first step toward a negotiated unification. Public opinion has since shifted as talks have stalled. A unification referendum was first proposed in 2008, and the only direct negotiations, at the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]], collapsed when the IAC walked out after being offered one-third of the seats in a reunified legislature.[9] The ceasefire has held since 2007, and Irad has remained a frozen conflict. ## Historiography Official ISEZ histories present the emergency administration as having saved the economy and prevented anarchy after the collapse of the DRI. In the tribal regions the Storming of Talas is remembered as a popular rising against corruption, and Bektur is regarded as its hero.[5] Historians continue to debate how far US and corporate support for the DPI decided the outcome. They also debate whether the conflict is better described as a single civil war or as two overlapping struggles: a contest for control of the DPI and the state between Toktarov and Orozbekov, and a rural rising against the privatization program. Iradi sources sometimes call it "the 2007 war" or "the succession war".[1] Since the release of the partition drafts, most historians have treated the Bill of Sale as the decisive cause of the war, with the privatization scandals as its background. They disagree about how long Toktarov knew of the negotiations before he made them public, and Orozbekov disputes the authenticity of some of the released pages. Official histories present the leak as the moment the emergency administration saved Irad from being sold. In the tribal regions the affair is remembered as a betrayal by the urban elite as a whole, and scholars date from it a lasting break of trust between the clans and any government based in the cities.[10][11] ## References
  1. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  2. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 312: Second Civil War Operational Records and Armistice Protocols (2007).
  3. ^ Supreme Court Reports of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2007). Official Gazette Series, Vol. 1. Talas.
  4. ^ Human Rights Watch (2007). The Privatization Crisis and Political Turmoil in Talas. New York.
  5. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2017). 'Ten Years On: The Popular Front and the Storming of Talas.' Vol. 24, Iss. 3, pp. 41–66.
  6. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Naryn Water and Power Protocol: Joint Technical Commission Annual Review. Kara-Oi.
  7. ^ United Nations Security Council (2007). Security Council resolution on the cessation of hostilities in Irad, adopted 18 October 2007. New York.
  8. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2008). Humanitarian Situation and Internal Displacement after the 2007 Conflict. Kara-Oi.
  9. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2012). Report on the 2011 Bilateral Reunification Talks. Kara-Oi.
  10. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 310: Cabinet of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2006–2007).
  11. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Mountain Chieftain: Tribal Federalism under Bektur Zhumabek uulu.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2.
  12. ^ Talas Herald (26 February 2007). 'Toktarov Proclaims Special Economic Zone from Nurzhan.' Nurzhan.
  13. ^ Orozbekov, Bakyt (2012). A Republic of Six Months. Istanbul.
  14. ^ Talas Herald (19 March 2008). 'Former prime minister charged in absentia.' Talas.
### 3.18. Supreme Court of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Law & Security* The **Supreme Court of Irad** (Iradi: *Irad Zhogorku Sotu*) is the highest court of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). Established in November 1992 under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], it sits in the Hall of Justice on Liberty Boulevard in [[Talas]] and consists of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices.[1] Its jurisprudence combines American common-law doctrine, introduced during the territorial period, with the continental and Soviet civil-law procedure that survives in much of Iradi private law. In December 2006 the court issued the [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)|Statutory Independence Ruling]], which held that the US withdrawal from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] had triggered Irad's statutory independence clause and so led to the proclamation of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]]. [[Erlan Toktarov]] annulled the ruling by decree in February 2007.[2] The court's jurisdiction is limited in practice to the ISEZ, since the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] settle disputes under customary law. Legal scholars and human rights groups have questioned its independence from the executive. ## History #### Territorial period (1992–2006) The Organic Act established the Supreme Court as the court of last resort for the territory, and the first justices took office in November 1992. Under the act, the Governor appointed justices with the consent of the Territorial Senate, and the court's final judgments could be reviewed by the United States federal courts.[1] Its early work dealt largely with property and contract disputes arising from the privatization of Soviet-era enterprises, the dollarization of the economy and the arrival of foreign investors. The court also developed rules for applying the Soviet-era civil code alongside new territorial statutes based on American models. The [[2003 Judicial Reforms Act]], drafted by [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] as chief legal counsel to the Territorial Senate, reorganized the lower courts into district courts such as the [[Talas District Court]]. It also introduced jury trials in serious criminal cases and established commercial arbitration procedures modeled on US federal practice. The act gave international investors enforceable contract arbitration and protection against arbitrary expropriation, and it confirmed the Supreme Court as the appellate court for the whole judicial system and the regulator of the legal profession.[3] #### Statutory Independence Ruling (2006) On 3 December 2006 President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty by executive action. Orozbekov, then in private practice, filed an emergency petition asking the court to rule on the territory's status. Within days, before the proclamation of the DRI on 9 December, the court under Chief Justice [[Dastan Isakov]] held that territorial status had lapsed upon federal disengagement. Under the statutory independence clause of the treaty, which had been carried into the Organic Act, sovereignty had therefore passed to the people of Irad.[2] Isakov's majority opinion set out what became known as the doctrine of automatic reversion. On the strength of the ruling, the Territorial Legislature proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad, and the court sat as the supreme court of the new state. #### Annulment and reconstitution (2007) On 25 February 2007 Toktarov proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan as an emergency administration and annulled the independence ruling by decree, declaring that Irad had returned to "suspended sovereignty". The decree was justified by the secret drafts, released the same day, under which the DRI cabinet would have used the sovereignty recognized by the ruling to dissolve Irad and cede its territory to its neighbors (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]). The court never ruled on the validity of the decree. After DPI forces took control of Talas in the summer of 2007, the emergency administration reconstituted the bench, and Isakov left the court that year.[4] Since then the court has operated within the ISEZ's legal framework, which treats the territorial-era statutes and the Organic Act as continuing in force while sovereignty is suspended. ## Composition and appointment The court has five members: a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. Since 2007 justices have been nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]]. Opposition lawyers and human rights groups say that loyalty to the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] has become an informal requirement for appointment.[5] The court sits in the Hall of Justice, a neoclassical building on Liberty Boulevard that also houses its law library. ## Jurisdiction and functions - **Appeals.** The court hears final appeals from the district courts and from the municipal magistrate courts of Talas, [[Nurzhan]] and [[Iyık Janyl]]. - **Constitutional review.** It reviews legislation and executive acts for conformity with the Organic Act and the territorial statutes that the ISEZ treats as its basic law. - **Commercial disputes.** It is the final instance in commercial cases, including arbitration awards involving foreign investors. - **The legal profession.** It administers admission to the bar, through examinations that require proficiency in both Iradi and English commercial law, and oversees professional ethics. It also cooperates with the Faculty of Law of [[Talas State University]] in training judges and lawyers. Proceedings are conducted in Iradi or English, with interpreters provided for Russian speakers. ## Notable decisions - ***Statutory Independence Ruling* (2006).** Held that the US withdrawal triggered the statutory independence clause. The ruling provided the legal basis for the Democratic Republic of Irad and was annulled by Toktarov's decree of 25 February 2007. - ***ISEZ Commercial Concessions Reference* (2008).** Confirmed the authority of the DPI administration to lease strategic mineral concessions to foreign joint ventures without first holding a legislative referendum. Critics said the decision removed a check on the executive.[5] - **Term-limits challenge (2014).** The court declined to hear a challenge to the 2013 amendment to the 1992 Elective Governor Acts that removed gubernatorial term limits, holding that the question belonged to the legislature.[6] - ***Pastoral Transit Case* (2015).** Recognized the customary right of transhumant herders to drive livestock across industrial highway easements without paying municipal licensing penalties. The decision is one of the few in which the court has given effect to customary practice.[7] ## Relationship with customary law The authorities of the tribal regions do not recognize the court's jurisdiction. Civil and criminal disputes there are settled by councils of elders (*aksakals*) and customary judges under [[Adat Law in the ATR|adat]], which the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] recognizes as the law of the tribal regions. There is no formal mechanism for enforcing the court's judgments across the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. Cross-line civil matters, such as livestock disputes, are usually handled through liaison meetings arranged by the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]]. ## Criticism [[wp:Human Rights Watch]] has described a system of "judicial dualism" in which the statutory courts of the ISEZ lack independence from the executive while customary courts in the tribal regions offer no appeal.[5] Legal scholars at Talas State University have noted increasing executive pressure on the court since the governor's office reportedly moved to [[Boz-Korgon]] in 2023 and during the uncertainty that followed Toktarov's withdrawal from public view in July 2024.[8] Business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad, take a more favorable view. They point to the court's record in commercial and property disputes, where it has generally upheld procedural rules and contracts with foreign investors.[9] ## References
  1. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 111: Supreme Court Reports and Organic Jurisprudence (1992–2023).
  2. ^ Supreme Court Reports of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2007). Official Gazette Series, Vol. 1. Talas.
  3. ^ Talas Journal of Law & Political Economy (2022). 'Judicial Dualism and Statutory Precedent in Central Asia.' Vol. 9, Iss. 2.
  4. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  5. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York, pp. 45–62.
  6. ^ Talas Herald (2014). 'Court Declines Term-Limits Challenge.' 11 March.
  7. ^ Talas Herald (2015). 'Supreme Court Upholds Herders' Right of Passage.' 27 May.
  8. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  9. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
### 3.19. Territorial Legislature of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* The **Territorial Legislature of Irad** (Iradi: *Mejlis*) is the legislative body of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) in [[Irad]], and meets at Legislative Hall in [[Talas]]. It was established in 1992 under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]] as the bicameral legislature of the US territory, with a Territorial Senate and a Territorial House of Representatives.[1] On 9 December 2006, after the US withdrawal from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]], it proclaimed the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]]. Since 2007 the legislature has sat as a single chamber under the ISEZ administration, which kept the territorial name in line with its doctrine of "suspended sovereignty". Its 60 members are elected in the ISEZ only, and the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) has held a large majority since 2007.[2] The [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]], which cover six-sevenths of the country, are not represented. ## History #### Establishment (1992–1994) The Organic Act, which organized the territory after the surrender of the socialist forces on 18 August 1992, provided for an elected legislature and an elected Governor. Pending elections, an interim legislature drawn from the Provisional Government's councils and from district delegates first met in Legislative Hall in October 1992.[1] Over the following eighteen months it passed the Banking and Commercial Currency Act and the Toponymic Heritage Statute of 1993, which confirmed the renaming of Kobozev as [[Nurzhan]] and restored Turkic and Sogdian names to streets, districts and reservoirs.[3] The first general elections to both chambers were held in 1994. [[Zamirbek Bakiev]], a student leader of the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]], was among the members of the first Territorial Senate, and [[Erlan Toktarov]] entered the House of Representatives the same year. #### Territorial period (1994–2006) The territorial legislature followed the American territorial model: - **The Territorial Senate** had 15 members serving four-year terms, three elected from each of five senatorial districts. - **The Territorial House of Representatives** had 35 members, elected every two years from single-member constituencies apportioned by population. Bills passed by both chambers needed the assent of the Governor and were subject to review by the [[wp:United States Congress|US Congress]]. The legislature's standing committees covered Ways and Means, Mineral and Energy Resources, Public Works and Inter-Ethnic Affairs, and worked with federal liaison officers and foreign commercial advisers.[4] The DPI held majorities in both chambers for most of the period. Toktarov was Majority Leader of the Senate from 2000 to 2004, and [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] served as the Senate's chief legal counsel from 1998 to 2005. The legislature passed more than 800 statutes in fourteen years. The most significant included: - the **Banking and Commercial Currency Act** (1993), which authorized the circulation of the US dollar alongside the [[Iradi som]] and chartered [[Talasbank]]; - the **Toponymic Heritage Statute** (1993), the main legal instrument of the [[De-Russification Movement in Irad|de-Russification]] of place names; - the **Hydrocarbon and Mining Code** (1995), which regulated extraction concessions, including those of [[NurGaz]], and set up royalty funds for road building; - the [[1995 Latin Orthography Revision]] and the **Language and Education Reform Act** (1997), which standardized the Latin alphabet for Iradi and made instruction in Iradi and English compulsory in public schools; - the [[2003 Judicial Reforms Act]], which introduced jury trials and commercial arbitration modeled on US federal practice.[1] The allocation of mining royalties was among the most contested issues of the period. Legislators eventually adopted compromise formulas that divided antimony revenue between infrastructure in Talas and rural schools in the interior. Committees on major economic bills held public hearings at which community delegates, academics from [[Talas State University]] and trade guilds could submit petitions.[4] #### Proclamation of the DRI (2006–2007) On 3 December 2006 President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty by executive action. After the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] issued the [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]], the legislature reconstituted itself as a national assembly. On 9 December 2006 it proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad and elected Orozbekov Prime Minister.[5] The assembly sat in Talas through the [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]] and the first months of the [[Second Iradi Civil War]]. When the [[Popular Front of Irad]] stormed the city on 4 June 2007, its fighters occupied Legislative Hall, and the DRI government was dissolved. #### Under the ISEZ (2007–present) Toktarov's emergency administration, proclaimed from Nurzhan on 25 February 2007, did not recognize the national assembly. After DPI forces took control of Talas in the summer of 2007, the administration reconstituted the legislature under its territorial name as a single chamber.[6] Members of the last territorial legislature who accepted the emergency administration sat as a provisional chamber until November 2011. Since then, regular elections have been held every four years on the same day as the gubernatorial election. At the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]], the DPI offered the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC) one-third of the seats in a reunified legislature. The IAC delegation walked out, and no comparable offer has been made since.[7] In 2013 the DPI majority passed an amendment to the 1992 Elective Governor Acts that removed gubernatorial term limits (the [[2013 Constitutional Amendment]]). ## Structure and procedure The chamber has 60 members, elected for four-year terms in eight multi-member constituencies corresponding to the ISEZ's three cities of governorate significance (Talas, Nurzhan and [[Iyık Janyl]]) and its districts (Talas, [[Kara-Buura]], Chu, [[Sary-Bulak]], and Lower Naryn together with Toktogul). Seats are apportioned according to official population figures. A Speaker, elected from the majority, presides, and the standing committees of the territorial era have been retained. The Speaker since 2019 has been Nurbek Sultanov of the DPI.[2] The legislature passes the budget, confirms the justices of the Supreme Court and other senior appointments, and may amend the territorial statutes that the ISEZ treats as its basic law. Bills require the Governor's assent, and the Governor may veto them. Since 2007, however, much policy has been made by executive decree under the emergency powers the Governor assumed that year, which limits the chamber's role in practice. Debates are held in Iradi and English, with interpretation into Russian. ## Composition In the 2023 election the DPI won 51 of the 60 seats. Six of the remaining seats went to independents, most of whom vote with the party, and three to Russo-aligned deputies from Nurzhan, who form the only consistent opposition in the chamber.[8] ## Criticism - **Elections.** Observers from the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] (OSCE) have described the elections as lacking meaningful choice. They cite the disqualification of opposition candidates, especially in the [[2015 Electoral Reform Controversy]], state control of voter registers and the DPI's dominance of broadcasting through [[IradOne]].[8] - **Representation.** The chamber represents only the ISEZ, which covers about one-seventh of the country. The IAC argues that the official census undercounts the tribal regions, and that the 2011 offer of one-third of the seats did not reflect their share of the population.[7] - **Executive dominance.** Analysts describe the chamber as largely subordinate to the governor's office, citing the 2013 removal of term limits and the extensive use of decrees.[2] The DPI says that the legislature preserves the legal order of the territorial period, and that it would be enlarged to include representatives of the tribal regions under a unification settlement. ## References
  1. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 110: Territorial Legislative Journals and Enacted Statutes (1992–2006).
  2. ^ Central Asian Policy Review (2023). 'Institutional Legacies of the American Territorial Era in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 112–129.
  3. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (1993). Toponymic Heritage Statute. Territorial Gazette, Talas.
  4. ^ Talas State University Press (2012). Parties and Elections in the Territory of Irad, 1992–2006. Talas, pp. 72–118.
  5. ^ Supreme Court Reports of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2007). Official Gazette Series, Vol. 1. Talas.
  6. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  7. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2012). Report on the 2011 Bilateral Reunification Talks. Kara-Oi.
  8. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Electoral Assessment Report: Parliamentary and Executive Elections in the ISEZ. Warsaw.
### 3.20. Armed Forces of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Law & Security* The **Armed Forces of Irad**, officially the **State Defense Corps** (Iradi: *Mamlekettik Korgoo Korpusu*, MKK), are the military forces of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), the part of Irad governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI). The government uses the name "Armed Forces of Irad" because it claims to be the lawful government of the whole country, but the corps operates only in the ISEZ, about one-seventh of Irad's territory. It consists of Ground Forces, an Air Wing and a reserve of district territorial-defense battalions, and is headquartered at the General Staff complex in [[Talas]]. Official figures give a strength of about 12,000 active personnel and 18,000 organized reservists; independent estimates put the number actually serving somewhat lower.[1][2] The corps was formed in 2007, during the [[Second Iradi Civil War]], from territorial-era National Guard units and other forces loyal to [[Erlan Toktarov]]. It is separate from the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]], an ISEZ paramilitary force commanded by Major General [[Ruslan Toktarov]], and from the [[El-Choro Militias]] of the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), which answer to the clan councils and the [[Iradi Freedom Society]]. It trains with the United States forces that remain at [[Talas Air Base]] and five other installations. Its main tasks are holding the ISEZ side of the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], guarding energy and industrial sites, and disaster relief. ## Soviet and post-Soviet origins In the Soviet period the territory of the Iradi SSR lay within the [[wp:Turkestan Military District]]. Its main ground formation was the 17th Motor Rifle Division, based at Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]), and the airfield west of Talas hosted interceptor squadrons from 1952.[3] When the [[Communist Party of Irad]] declared the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] (SRI) on 9 October 1991, the division and the republican [[wp:OMON]] detachments passed to the SRI government of [[Vasily Chernov]]. Their officer corps, like the SRI leadership as a whole, was largely ethnic Russian. During the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] and the [[First Iradi Civil War]] that followed, the Provisional Government in Talas relied on student militias, defecting police and mounted clan irregulars rather than a regular army. SRI forces surrendered on 18 August 1992 after [[Operation Starlight]], and US forces disarmed and disbanded them. Their heavy equipment, including [[wp:T-72]] tanks and [[wp:BMP-2]] infantry fighting vehicles, was put into depots near Nurzhan under US supervision.[3] ## Territorial period (1992–2006) Under the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]], the defense of the territory was a responsibility of the United States. As in other US territories, the Territorial Legislature created a local force under the Governor's command, the Irad National Guard, which was organized in 1994 with army and air components and trained to US standards. By 2005 it numbered about 6,500, most of them part-time. Its tasks were disaster relief, guarding infrastructure and supporting US forces at Talas Air Base, which became a staging area for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]] under the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]]. Internal security and border control were the job of the Republican Gendarmerie, set up in 1993 to replace the Soviet internal troops.[4] ## Formation during the Second Civil War (2006–2007) The US withdrawal from the treaty on 3 December 2006 ended the Guard's federal status. The [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] (DRI), proclaimed on 9 December, renamed it the Defense Force of the DRI, but the force split along political lines in the crisis that followed. When Toktarov seized control of the DPI and proclaimed the ISEZ from Nurzhan on 25 February 2007, the Nurzhan garrison and most Guard units in the Chu lowlands went over to him. Units in Talas stayed loyal to the DRI cabinet of [[Bakyt Orozbekov]], and some rural personnel joined the [[Popular Front of Irad]].[5] After the Popular Front stormed Talas on 4 June 2007 and dissolved the DRI, DPI forces, with backing from Western companies and the United States, took control of Talas and the other cities over the summer as the Front withdrew to the countryside. An emergency decree of the ISEZ administration in July 2007 merged the pro-DPI Guard units, former DRI units that had surrendered, and recalled reservists into the State Defense Corps. The [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]], signed in September, fixed the corps's front at the Qara-Chik line.[5] ## Since 2007 Between 2008 and 2011 the ISEZ returned about forty T-72s and ninety BMP-2s from the Nurzhan depots to service, refitting them with new radios and fire-control equipment.[2] Conscription was introduced in 2008. Merging the corps and the El-Choro into a single force was one of the issues left unresolved when the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit|2011 reunification talks]] collapsed.[6] The corps was put on alert during the [[The 2021 Regional Security Alert|2021 Regional Security Alert]], when it reinforced the mountain passes on the Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz borders after the [[wp:Taliban]] returned to power in [[wp:Afghanistan]]. It was not deployed against the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]], which were policed by the Gendarmerie and the municipal police. Governor Toktarov has not appeared in public since July 2024, an absence the DPI attributes to an extended health retreat. The General Staff has since pledged loyalty to "the lawful administration" and kept out of the public rivalry between Ruslan Toktarov and his brother [[Alikhan Toktarov]] (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[7] ## Command and organization Under the 2007 emergency decree, the Governor is commander-in-chief. The Ministry of Defense of the ISEZ is responsible for the budget, procurement and conscription, and the Chief of the General Staff, appointed by the Governor, commands the forces. The ISEZ Security Council coordinates the corps with the Gendarmerie and the intelligence services; according to DPI statements, its meetings have been chaired since 2024 by Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]].[7] The corps is organized as follows (strengths are 2023 estimates):[1][2] - Ground Forces (about 9,500): - 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade, outside Talas, covering the Talas valley and the western Qara-Chik sector; - 2nd Motor Rifle Brigade, in Nurzhan, covering the Chu lowlands, the [[NurGaz]] oilfields and refinery, the [[Northern Export Feeder]] pipeline and the rail links to [[wp:Kazakhstan]]; - Lower Naryn Mountain Rifle Battalion, at [[Tash-Kömür]], guarding the Toktogul complex, the downstream stations of the Naryn cascade and the [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] corridor; - Sary-Bulak Mountain Rifle Battalion, covering the industrial corridor south of Talas, including the [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]] and the [[Chatkal Chemical Smelting Complex]]; - an artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, a signals battalion, a reconnaissance battalion and a logistics brigade. - Air Wing (about 700), on the northern ramp of Talas Air Base, operating helicopters and light transport aircraft. - Territorial Defense: five reserve battalions, one for each ISEZ district as they stood in 2008 (Talas, [[Kara-Buura]], Chu, [[Sary-Bulak]] and Lower Naryn; the Lower Naryn battalion also covers Toktogul District), whose reservists are called up for annual training. ## Other armed forces in Irad The Republican Gendarmerie (about 4,000) is not part of the corps. It reports to the Ministry of Internal Security and has been commanded since 2012 by Ruslan Toktarov, who also directs the Special Protective Services. It mans the checkpoints at the Qara-Chik line's crossing points, eight in all, and the four internal control posts inside the ISEZ, protects senior officials and the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound, and guards the perimeter of Talas Air Base. The emergency decree allows the Gendarmerie to be placed under the operational control of the General Staff in wartime, but this has never been done.[4] The El-Choro Militias, about 15,000 part-time mounted irregulars, are the armed force of the ATR. They are raised by the 24 clans and coordinated by [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]]. The ISEZ government regards them as an illegal armed formation, but the corps and the militias observe non-aggression arrangements supervised by the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI).[8] ## Personnel The DPI government gives a strength of about 12,000 active personnel and 18,000 organized reservists. In 2023 the *Central Asian Geopolitical Review* estimated that between 10,500 and 11,000 were actually serving, citing understrength conscript companies.[2] About 40 percent of the active force are conscripts. Women serve as volunteers, mainly in signals, medical and logistics posts, and made up about 9 percent of personnel in 2022.[1] Since 2008, men aged 18 to 27 who live in the ISEZ have been liable for 12 months of service. Students may defer, clergy and seminarians of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] and other registered religions are exempt, and conscientious objectors may do 18 months of civilian service instead. Men may also buy their way out of service by paying a fee into a defense fund. Residents of the ATR are not called up. Conscripts train at the Ak-Tash Training Center in the western [[Talas Alatau]] foothills, and units rotate through a winter mountain-warfare course in Sary-Bulak District.[1] Most officers are trained at the Military Faculty of [[Talas State University]], and technical officers at the [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]]. Older officers are largely Russian-speaking, while those trained since 1992 work mainly in English and Iradi. According to a 2020 study at Talas State University, Kyrgyz, [[wp:Uzbeks]] and Muslims generally are underrepresented in the officer corps.[9] ## Equipment The corps combines Soviet-era heavy weapons with US-origin light equipment from the territorial period. Independent estimates of its inventory in 2023 include:[2] - about 40 T-72 main battle tanks, some held in reserve, and about 90 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, refurbished from former SRI stocks; - about 60 BTR-70 and [[wp:BTR-80]] armored personnel carriers, and [[wp:MT-LB]] tracked carriers; - some 200 [[wp:Humvee|HMMWV]] light vehicles, with US-pattern radios, night-vision equipment and body armor, mostly inherited from the National Guard; - 24 D-30 122-mm howitzers, 12 [[wp:BM-21 Grad|BM-21]] multiple rocket launchers and 120-mm mortars; - [[wp:ZU-23-2]] anti-aircraft guns and [[wp:9K38 Igla|Igla]] man-portable surface-to-air missiles; - about 14 Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters, 6 [[wp:Mil Mi-24|Mi-24]] attack helicopters (fewer than half reported airworthy), 4 [[wp:Bell UH-1 Iroquois|UH-1H]] helicopters and 2 [[wp:Antonov An-26|An-26]] transport aircraft. The corps has no combat jets and relies on the US presence at Talas Air Base for air defense beyond short range. Its small arms are mainly [[wp:AK-74]] rifles, with M4 carbines in some former Guard units. Uniform cloth and winter clothing are supplied by [[Zhetysu Industrial Textiles]]. The official defense budget for 2023 was about $260 million, about 1.4 percent of the ISEZ's nominal GDP; analysts note that spending on the Gendarmerie and some base-related security costs are budgeted separately.[2] ## Doctrine and deployment The ISEZ Military Doctrine of 2009 defines the corps's tasks as defending the ISEZ against external attack, holding the ceasefire line, protecting "strategic economic facilities" and supporting the civil authorities in emergencies. In practice it is organized for static defense, with most combat units garrisoning the Qara-Chik sector, the oil and gas installations around Nurzhan, and the roads between districts.[10] Under the [[wp:Bishkek]] ceasefire, tanks and artillery may not be kept in a restricted zone on either side of the Qara-Chik line, and UNMI observers inspect the corps's positions there. Its heavy units are therefore based well back from the line, and its forward posts are held by light infantry.[8] The engineer battalion is regularly deployed after mudflows (*sel*), avalanches and spring floods to rebuild bridges and clear roads in the river gorges, and in such emergencies corps units have sometimes worked alongside El-Choro riders. ## Relationship with United States forces US forces remain at Talas Air Base, the largest US military installation in the region, and at five other sites used for logistics, testing and training. They are there under the 2001 Basing Rights Agreement and interim arrangements concluded with the ISEZ administration from 2007 onward, whose texts have not been published in full.[11] US and ISEZ forces hold an annual joint exercise, *Alatau Shield*, focused on counterinsurgency, border security and disaster response. The United States has not treated the ISEZ as a foreign government since 2006, and Irad remains listed at the UN with the United States as its nominal administering power (see [[Political status of Irad]]). US training and equipment have therefore come mainly through base-related programs rather than standard foreign military assistance.[11] Analysts describe the legal basis of the relationship as ambiguous, because it rests on arrangements with an administration that Washington does not formally recognize.[12] The ISEZ government regards the US presence as its main security guarantee, and base contracts are a major source of income. [[Kamran Bekzatov]] and other Russian-oriented figures call for closer ties with [[wp:Moscow]], and the [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]] provoked protests across the country, including demonstrations outside Talas Air Base. The ISEZ government said the basing arrangements were unaffected. See also [[Irad–United States relations]]. ## Criticism Rights groups and the *[[Talas Herald]]* have reported hazing of conscripts by longer-serving soldiers (*dedovshchina*) and several non-combat deaths in conscript units. The Ministry of Defense says such cases are investigated and has set up a complaints hotline.[13] Critics also argue that the buy-out fee and student deferrals shift the burden of service onto rural and working-class families. Opposition outlets have alleged that conscripts were used as laborers on construction projects, including at Boz-Korgon, which the ministry denies.[13] Analysts note that the Gendarmerie receives newer equipment and better pay than most corps units, and describe it as a counterweight to the regular army under the direct control of the Toktarov family. The government describes the two forces as complementary.[12] ## References
  1. ^ Ministry of Defense of the ISEZ (2023). Annual Report on the State Defense Corps. Talas: Department of Public Information.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). "Order of Battle: The ISEZ State Defense Corps." Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 41–63.
  3. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 131: Office of the US High Commissioner, Defense Section (1992–1994).
  4. ^ Republican Gendarmerie Inspectorate (2023). Annual Security and Demarcation Review. Talas.
  5. ^ Abdyldaev, Nurlan (2015). Two Wars for Talas: Armed Forces and Politics in Irad, 1992–2007. Talas: Talas State University Press, pp. 211–264.
  6. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2012). "Why the 2011 Reunification Talks Failed." Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5–27.
  7. ^ Talas Herald (2 September 2024). "General Staff pledges loyalty to 'lawful administration'."
  8. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Military Observer Assessment on Demarcation Security. Kara-Oi.
  9. ^ Sydykova, Aizada (2020). "Language, Faith and Rank in the State Defense Corps." Talas State University Social Science Bulletin, No. 14, pp. 77–98.
  10. ^ Government of the ISEZ (2009). Military Doctrine of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
  11. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). "Basing Without Recognition: US Forces in the ISEZ after 2006." Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 9–34.
  12. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). "Guns and Guardians: Coercive Institutions in the ISEZ." Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 131–150.
  13. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York.
### 3.21. United Nations Mission in Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Foreign Relations* The **United Nations Mission in Irad** (**UNMI**) is a United Nations peacekeeping observer mission in Irad. The [[wp:United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] established it by a resolution adopted on 18 October 2007, a month after the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] ended the main fighting of the [[Second Iradi Civil War]]. UNMI monitors the ceasefire along the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], about 1,750 km long, between the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI), and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR). It also supervises the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], the annex to the ceasefire that governs the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]], and coordinates humanitarian aid and mine clearance on both sides of the line. It is an unarmed mission deployed under [[wp:Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter|Chapter VI]] of the [[wp:Charter of the United Nations|UN Charter]].[1] The mission is headquartered at Kara-Oi, between [[Talas]] and the line. In 2024 it had about 210 military observers, 30 police advisers and some 420 civilian staff, most of them recruited locally, and its annual budget was about $58 million. The Security Council renews its mandate each October. Both Iradi administrations accept the mission while criticizing it, and diplomats regard it as one of the reasons the line has stayed largely quiet since 2007.[2] ## Background Irad has been on the UN list of non-self-governing territories since 1992. The United States is still recorded as the administering power, although it ended its administration in December 2006 (see [[Political status of Irad]]). The collapse of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] in 2007, the proclamation of the ISEZ by [[Erlan Toktarov]] on 25 February and the storming of Talas by the [[Popular Front of Irad]] on 4 June led to fighting that concerned all three neighboring states, [[wp:Kazakhstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]], each of which claims Irad. The fighting also threatened the operation of the Toktogul dam, on which irrigation in the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] and southern Kazakhstan depends.[3] UN-brokered talks in [[wp:Bishkek]] produced the ceasefire agreement in September 2007. It fixed the Qara-Chik line, provided for a restricted-weapons zone on either side of it, and included the Naryn Protocol as an annex, assigning supervision of the Toktogul release schedule to the United Nations. Both the DPI administration and the leaders of the Popular Front, coordinated by [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]], asked for an international monitoring presence, and the Security Council established UNMI on 18 October 2007. The first observers arrived in November 2007, and the mission reached its initial authorized strength in mid-2008.[1][3] In 2009 the mission brokered the protocol that moved the line around the Toktogul basin and the State Route 1 corridor, transferring the dam to the ISEZ (see [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]). ## Mandate The founding resolution and later renewals give UNMI the following tasks:[1][4] - Ceasefire monitoring: to observe the Qara-Chik line and the restricted-weapons zone, which extends 12 km on either side of it and from which tanks, artillery and combat aircraft are excluded, including quarterly inspections of the disused Soviet bomber field at [[Kulan Airfield|Kulan]]; to investigate reported violations; and to chair a Joint Liaison Committee of the two sides. - Supervision of the Naryn Water and Power Protocol: to supervise the joint technical commission of ISEZ and ATR engineers that sets the Toktogul release schedule, to verify reservoir levels and releases, and to escort engineering crews crossing the line. Observers from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan attend the commission's meetings. - Humanitarian coordination: to coordinate UN agencies and non-governmental organizations, negotiate humanitarian access across the line, and support the return of people displaced in 2007. - Mine action: to coordinate the survey and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance left from the 1992 and 2007 wars. - Reporting: to report to the Security Council through the Secretary-General twice a year. A limited human rights reporting function, covering matters connected with the ceasefire, freedom of movement and humanitarian access, was added in 2012. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also offers good offices on the status question. UN officials helped draft the [[2008 Unification Referendum Initiative]], which stalled, and supported the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]], which collapsed when the delegation of the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC) walked out after being offered one-third of the seats in a joint legislature. No direct talks have taken place since.[5] UNMI reports to the Security Council, not to the [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]] in [[wp:New York City|New York]], although the committee's annual working paper on Irad draws on the mission's public reports.[6] ## Organization UNMI is led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who is head of mission, assisted by a Chief Military Observer of general-officer rank. It has four components: military observers, police advisers, humanitarian and mine action, and mission support.[2] As of 2024 the mission had:[2] - 210 military observers, against an authorized ceiling of 230; - 30 police advisers, who work with the municipal police in the ISEZ and the clan-appointed constables of the ATR on cross-line crime and missing-persons cases; - 142 international civilian staff, 261 national staff and 18 [[wp:United Nations Volunteers|UN Volunteers]]. The military observers come from about twenty countries; the largest contributors have included [[wp:Bangladesh]], [[wp:Ghana]], [[wp:Ireland]], [[wp:Mongolia]], [[wp:Nepal]], Sweden and Uruguay. By convention, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the United States do not provide observers. The approved budget for July 2024 to June 2025 was $57.9 million, funded through assessed contributions of UN member states.[2] ## Headquarters and deployment The mission headquarters occupies a former Soviet agricultural research station at Kara-Oi, on the ISEZ side between Talas and the line. The site was chosen in 2007 because representatives of both sides could reach it without passing through the other's checkpoints. UNMI also has a liaison office in Talas, a sector headquarters at [[Tash-Kömür]] for the Naryn corridor, and eleven team sites along the line, five of them on the tribal side.[2] Observers patrol by vehicle, on foot and on horseback, and the mission operates two utility helicopters. In the high sections of the [[Talas Alatau]], patrols on [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] horses hired from local herders are often the only practical way to reach observation posts in winter. ## Ceasefire monitoring Observers patrol the line daily, inspect positions in the restricted zone and investigate incidents reported by either side. UNMI recorded 214 ceasefire violations in 2023. Most involved small-arms fire, movement of armed personnel into the restricted zone or unauthorized construction; many other incidents concerned livestock straying across the line and the herders who followed them.[4] The Joint Liaison Committee meets monthly at Kara-Oi. It brings together officers of the ISEZ [[Armed Forces of Irad|State Defense Corps]] and the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] with captains of the [[El-Choro Militias]], and settles most incidents locally. UNMI credits it with preventing several confrontations from escalating, including a standoff over a river crossing near the [[Kenkol Pass]] in 2016.[4] Since 2023 the ISEZ authorities have barred UNMI patrols from a security zone around the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound east of [[Nurzhan]]. The Secretary-General has described this in several reports as a restriction on the mission's freedom of movement. The ISEZ government says the zone is an ordinary industrial and security area unconnected with the ceasefire.[7] ## Naryn Protocol supervision Since the 2009 corridor protocol the whole Toktogul complex has been in the ISEZ, but the tribal delegation keeps an equal place on the joint technical commission and the clans' consent is still needed for each five-year schedule. UNMI chairs the meetings of the commission, checks daily reservoir-level data and escorts the tribal engineers who inspect the dam and the releases. The annex on revenue sharing has never been published, and UNMI does not report on how the revenue is divided.[8] The five-year release schedule was last renewed in 2022 and falls due again in 2027. Uzbek and Kazakh officials have asked who will sign for the ISEZ, since Governor Toktarov has not appeared in public since July 2024; the DPI says Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] signs on his behalf.[8] ## Humanitarian coordination and mine action UNMI chairs a coordination forum of UN agencies, the [[wp:International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement|Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement]] and non-governmental organizations working in Irad. The forum negotiates seasonal corridors for vaccines, fodder and medical supplies to highland settlements in the ATR. Its aid registries are among the sources independent demographers have used to estimate the ATR's population, which they put well above the official figure from the [[2018 Irad census]].[9] The mine action component has surveyed or cleared about 31 km² since 2008, mainly in passes of the Talas Alatau and on the approaches to Talas that were mined in 1992 and 2007. It also runs risk-education classes in schools and herding communities.[4] UNMI publishes quarterly security bulletins in Iradi, Russian and English and produces a weekly radio program carried by local stations. Mission officials say these are meant partly to counter rumors of troop movements, which have spread quickly on social media during political crises.[2] ## Casualties Five UNMI personnel have died in service. Two military observers, from Uruguay and Bangladesh, were killed in March 2009 when their vehicle struck an anti-tank mine near the Kenkol Pass. The other three deaths resulted from a road accident and illness.[2] ## Mandate renewals The Security Council has renewed the mandate every October since 2008, usually for twelve months. Renewal debates have divided repeatedly over whether resolutions should refer to the unification referendum, the political status of the territory and the foreign military presence at [[Talas Air Base]]. Most renewals have been adopted unanimously, with occasional abstentions.[10] ## Criticism DPI officials have accused the mission of treating the IAC as an equal party and so lending legitimacy to the ATR's clan councils. ISEZ media, including [[IradOne]], have accused observers of bias after UNMI reports criticized Gendarmerie conduct at checkpoints.[7] Tribal leaders, for their part, say UNMI has done too little about restrictions on herders crossing the line and about detentions by the Gendarmerie. They also object that the mission's headquarters and most of its local spending are on the ISEZ side.[5] [[wp:Human Rights Watch]] and other organizations argue that the mission's reporting function is too narrow, and have called for a full human rights monitoring component covering both administrations. The ISEZ government opposes this, and the Security Council has not adopted it (see [[Human rights in Irad]]).[11] Some analysts argue that UNMI has helped freeze the conflict rather than resolve it: since the mission arrived there has been no settlement of Irad's status, and both administrations have come to depend on the ceasefire and on the Naryn revenue. Supporters reply that the line has seen no large-scale fighting since 2007 and that the Toktogul arrangement, which depends on UN supervision, has continued through every political crisis.[12] ## References
  1. ^ United Nations Security Council (2007). Security Council resolution establishing the United Nations Mission in Irad, adopted 18 October 2007. New York.
  2. ^ United Nations Secretary-General (October 2024). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Irad. New York.
  3. ^ Abdyldaev, Nurlan (2015). Two Wars for Talas: Armed Forces and Politics in Irad, 1992–2007. Talas: Talas State University Press, pp. 265–301.
  4. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Military Observer Assessment on Demarcation Security. Kara-Oi.
  5. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2012). "Why the 2011 Reunification Talks Failed." Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5–27.
  6. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  7. ^ United Nations Secretary-General (April 2025). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Irad. New York.
  8. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). "Water, Watts and the Ceasefire: Supervising the Naryn Protocol." Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 58–81.
  9. ^ Toktosunova, Gulzat (2022). "Counting the Uncounted: Aid Registries, Settlement Mapping and the Population of the Autonomous Tribal Regions." Central Asian Geopolitical Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 101–127.
  10. ^ Talas Herald (28 October 2023). "Security Council extends UN mission for another year."
  11. ^ Human Rights Watch (2021). Divided Irad: The Case for Human Rights Monitoring. New York.
  12. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). "A Mission Without an Exit: UNMI at Fifteen." Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 44–69.
### 3.22. NurGaz *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Economy & Industry* **NurGaz** (in full the Nurzhan Oil and Gas Company; Iradi: *NurGaz Kompaniyasy*) is the largest oil and gas company in Irad, headquartered in [[Nurzhan]]. It produces nearly all the crude oil extracted in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), operates [[Nurzhan Refinery No. 1]], and supplies the crude exported north into [[wp:Kazakhstan]]. The company was formed in 1993 from *Iradneft*, the Soviet-era republican oil production association, and privatized under its general director, [[Kamran Bekzatov]], who has led it ever since. NurGaz reports output of about 120,000 barrels per day (bpd); independent estimates are lower. It is the largest taxpayer and industrial employer in the ISEZ.[1][2] Bekzatov is the best-known figure of the Russian-speaking "Russo" generation of Nurzhan and an outspoken critic of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) government on economic policy. The company is widely regarded as the economic base of the pro-Russian current in ISEZ politics.[3] ## Soviet period Commercial oil was found in the Chu basin in 1949 (see [[Nurzhan Oil Discovery (1949)]]), and production grew through the 1950s and 1960s as Kobozev, as Nurzhan was then called, became the republic's industrial center. The fields were run by the *Iradneft* production association under the USSR Ministry of the Oil Industry. Nurzhan Refinery No. 1 opened in the 1950s and was expanded in 1974. Output peaked at about 140,000 bpd in the early 1980s and then declined as the main reservoirs were depleted.[4] Bekzatov, who had worked in the West Siberian oilfields, returned to Kobozev in 1988 as general director of *Iradneft* and introduced water injection to slow the decline.[3] ## Privatization Production fell sharply after independence in 1991 and during the [[First Iradi Civil War]], when Bekzatov kept fuel flowing to Kobozev's power and heating plants. In May 1993, under the economic program of the US territorial administration, *Iradneft* was turned into a joint-stock company, NurGaz, and privatized. Most of the shares went to managers and employees, and through the 1990s Bekzatov and associated holding companies bought up employee shares to gain control.[3] Critics at the time argued that the assets had been sold for far less than they were worth; supporters credited Bekzatov with keeping the fields running through the crisis.[5] Output reached a low of about 48,000 bpd in 1996. It recovered over the following decade through new drilling, expanded water flooding and technical service agreements with foreign companies, including [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron]] and Lukoil. Chevron, which had invested in Irad during the territorial period, scaled back its involvement after 2021, when the [[wp:Taliban|Taliban's]] return to power in [[wp:Afghanistan]] stalled a proposed southern export pipeline to [[wp:Pakistan]].[2][6] ## Export route Until 2000, crude was moved west by rail to the refinery at [[wp:Shymkent]] in Kazakhstan. In 1998 NurGaz and foreign partners formed the [[Iradi Petroleum Transit Consortium]] (IPTC), in which NurGaz holds 51 percent, to build the [[Northern Export Feeder]], an 85-km pipeline from the NurGaz tank farm outside Nurzhan to the Kazakh pipeline network near Shymkent. Crude entering the Kazakh system, which is operated by [[wp:KazTransOil]], is refined at Shymkent or shipped onward to Russia.[7] The feeder does not connect directly with the [[wp:Caspian Pipeline Consortium]], whose system begins far to the west. Irad has no southern export pipelines. Transit across the border is covered by the 2008 technical arrangements with the Kazakh border and customs services ([[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]]).[7] ## Since 2006 During the [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]], the government of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] auctioned new exploration licenses and other state-held energy assets to political insiders, contributing to the unrest that led to the [[Second Iradi Civil War]]. NurGaz itself, already private, kept its fields. After 2007 Bekzatov reached a working arrangement with the ISEZ administration of [[Erlan Toktarov]], under which NurGaz paid royalties and taxes and kept operational control. Relations have become more strained since the mid-2010s, as Bekzatov has criticized DPI economic policy and the ISEZ's reliance on US security guarantees, and has praised Russian president [[wp:Vladimir Putin]].[3] In 2019 the ISEZ tax service issued NurGaz a back-tax claim of $212 million, which was later settled for an undisclosed sum.[8] ## Production NurGaz operates several hundred producing wells in the lower Chu basin around Nurzhan. The main field is the one discovered in 1949; smaller fields lie to the north and west. The fields are mature, and most produce far more water than oil. NurGaz reported average production of about 120,000 bpd in 2023.[1] Independent analysts, working from KazTransOil transit data, refinery throughput and satellite observation of gas flaring, put output lower, at roughly 85,000–100,000 bpd. The company says the difference comes from export accounting and the inclusion of condensate.[2] ## Refining Nurzhan Refinery No. 1 has a nameplate capacity of about 50,000 bpd; NurGaz reported throughput of about 31,000 bpd in 2023. Catalytic cracking units were added during the territorial period. The refinery produces gasoline, diesel, heating oil and jet fuel for the domestic market, including fuel supplied to [[Talas Air Base]], and its residues are processed at the [[Nurzhan Asphalt and Bitumen Plant]].[1] NurGaz also runs the largest network of filling stations; about 60 percent of filling stations carry its brand, 65 of them in [[Talas]], 43 in [[Nurzhan]] and 11 in [[Iyık Janyl]]. ## Natural gas Irad's proven gas reserves exceed 400 billion m³ but are largely undeveloped. NurGaz uses associated gas from its oilfields to supply homes and industry in Nurzhan and [[Talas]], and holds rights to the undeveloped [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]].[1] It has taken part in feasibility studies with the [[wp:China National Petroleum Corporation]] for the proposed Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline, which would carry Turkmen gas to western China. Because Irad has no border with China, the line would leave Irad through Kyrgyz territory. The project has been delayed by objections from clan authorities in the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]], through which part of the route would pass, and by the uncertainty over Irad's status (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]]).[6] ## Ownership and management NurGaz is a closed joint-stock company, and its shareholder register is not public. Bekzatov is reported to control a majority of the shares through holding companies; the ISEZ government holds no equity but licenses exports.[5] Bekzatov has been president since 1993. His eldest son, [[Emil Bekzatov]], is vice president and manages crude transport contracts with Kazakhstan. The company employed about 14,800 people in 2023, not counting contractors, and trains engineers in partnership with the [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]].[1] ## Role in politics and society NurGaz funds housing, polyclinics, sports clubs, including the football club Neftchi Nurzhan (see [[Kara-Ak derby]]), and technical apprenticeships in Nurzhan, which gives Bekzatov a following among the city's Russian-speaking industrial workforce. He uses that position to argue for Irad's entry into the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]], closer relations with Russia and official status for the Russian language.[3] Pro-government commentators have periodically questioned Bekzatov's loyalty. Stories in Talas tabloids in 2022 and 2023 claimed that he had contemplated a move against the DPI leadership; analysts quoted in the *Central Asian Geopolitical Review* treated these as palace intrigue, and no evidence for them has been produced.[9] ## Environmental record Decades of Soviet-era production left contaminated soil and groundwater in parts of the lower Chu basin, where the river ends in a closed basin and spills are not flushed away. Since 2012 NurGaz has installed water-treatment plants and flare-gas recovery units at its central processing facilities, and it says flaring fell by about a third between 2012 and 2022.[1] Environmental groups in Nurzhan dispute the company's figures and say that leaks from aging field pipelines continue to go unreported.[10] ## References
  1. ^ NurGaz (2024). Annual Review 2023: Upstream Operations and Export Volumes. Nurzhan.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). "How Much Oil Does Irad Produce?" Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 15–38.
  3. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2021). "Oil, Language and Loyalty: The Russo Economy of Nurzhan." Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 88–112.
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 204: Records of the Iradneft Production Association (1949–1993).
  5. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Directory of Major Enterprises. Talas.
  6. ^ World Bank (2023). Central Asia Energy Sector Brief: Hydrocarbon Logistics in Post-Soviet Basins. Washington, DC.
  7. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Annual Report: Southern Network Throughput and Third-Party Transit. Astana.
  8. ^ Talas Herald (11 June 2019). "Tax service presents NurGaz with $212 million claim."
  9. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). "Palace Intrigue in the ISEZ: Reading the Rumor Mill." Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 3–14.
  10. ^ Talas Herald (18 March 2022). "Chu basin residents dispute NurGaz spill figures."
### 3.23. Attelkom *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Media* **Attelkom** is the largest telecommunications company and internet service provider in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). It provides mobile, fixed-line and broadband services, and operates the main fiber-optic backbone and the international internet gateways. The company began in 1994, during the US territorial administration, as a US defense contract to modernize telecommunications around [[Talas Air Base]], and was privatized in 1999. Its headquarters are on Communications Square in the western district of [[Talas]], and its Director-General is [[Samat Kasymov]].[1][2] Attelkom carries most of the ISEZ's mobile and internet traffic. Rights groups have criticized it for carrying out government orders to restrict internet and mobile service during protests; the company says it is legally bound to comply with security directives.[3] ## History In the Soviet period, telephone and telegraph services in the Iradi SSR were run by the republican Ministry of Communications. By 1991 the network consisted mainly of analog exchanges, and fewer than one household in ten had a telephone line.[1] After [[Operation Starlight]] in 1992, the United States enlarged Talas Air Base, and in 1994 the [[wp:United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] awarded a contract to a consortium of US contractors to lay fiber-optic cable and build satellite ground stations linking the base with regional command centers. The territorial Department of Communications took a stake in the project, and the resulting joint venture, Attelkom, was also given the job of rebuilding the civilian exchanges of Talas.[1] Attelkom opened dial-up internet service in 1996, registering the zone *.ir.ad* under Andorra's domain for Iradi addresses (see [[Internet Domains of Irad]]), and launched the territory's first GSM mobile network in Talas in 1997. In the mid-1990s it also built a relay station east of [[Nurzhan]] as part of a continuity-of-government program; the site was later expanded into the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound.[4] The territorial administration privatized Attelkom in 1999 through a share auction. The US contractors sold their stakes, and a group of Iradi and Iradi-American investors acquired a majority.[1] The company completed a network operations center in Talas in 2002 and extended its fiber backbone to Nurzhan and [[Iyık Janyl]] by 2005. During the [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]], the government of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] auctioned mobile frequencies to political insiders. The ISEZ administration annulled those auctions in 2008 and reissued Attelkom's licenses on condition that the company comply with new security directives.[2] Attelkom introduced 3G mobile service in 2010 and 4G/LTE in the three main cities in 2016. [[Aidar Maksat]], who served on Attelkom's regulatory board before becoming Lieutenant Governor in 2019, promoted private investment in fiber lines; by 2023 more than 70 percent of urban households had broadband, according to the regulator.[5] ## Network and services Attelkom's main assets are:[2] - the [[Attelkom Fiber Backbone]], about 1,800 km of buried fiber along road and rail rights-of-way linking Talas, Nurzhan, Iyık Janyl, [[Tash-Kömür]] and the northern border crossings, with two international routes through [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and one through [[wp:Uzbekistan]]; - a microwave relay network of solar-powered towers on ridges of the [[Talas Alatau]], serving industrial sites, military posts and villages beyond the reach of fiber (see [[Attelkom Cellular Relay Tower]]); - 4G/LTE coverage in the three cities and the district centers, with 3G along the main highways; - the [[Attelkom Data Center]] in Nurzhan, which hosts banking, tax and government systems, and the network operations center in Talas. The company reported about 2.6 million mobile subscriptions in 2023, about three-quarters of the ISEZ market; smaller operators share the rest.[2] With [[Talasbank]] it runs an SMS-based payment service used by herders and farmers to pay for feed and veterinary services and to receive transfers without traveling to a bank branch. Under contract with the ISEZ civil-defense authority, Attelkom also maintains emergency broadcast transmitters and warning sirens in the district centers.[6] Attelkom has almost no formal service in the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR). Its signal reaches some settlements near the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and herders elsewhere rely on satellite telephones or, near the borders, on Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek networks.[2] ## Ownership Attelkom is a joint-stock company. Its current shareholder register is not public. Independent reporting has linked part of its ownership to holding companies close to the DPI leadership, which the company has not confirmed.[5] ## Government control and criticism Under the 2008 security directives, Attelkom must route international traffic through gateways fitted with monitoring equipment and must carry out orders from the ISEZ executive to restrict service. The Department of Public Information, the government press office, issues lists of websites to be blocked.[5] During the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]], mobile data was cut in central Talas for three days and access to several social media platforms was throttled across the ISEZ. Attelkom described the outage as "technical work"; [[wp:Human Rights Watch]] and local journalists attributed it to a government order.[3] In 2024, several foreign and exile news sites were blocked after they published reports questioning the authenticity of video addresses by Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]], who has not appeared in public since July 2024. The government said the sites were spreading foreign-sponsored disinformation.[3] Attelkom's gateway settings have three times made Iradi websites invisible to foreign search engines: in 2009–2011, when the gateways refused connections from foreign data centers; in 2015–2016, after spam registrations led search engines to demote the *.ir.ad* zone; and from the 2023 protests until 2026, when a "national segment" mode showed foreign visitors only an outage notice. In June 2026 the company installed new international gateways, financed by a Chinese export credit, that block listed sites individually, and Iradi sites returned to foreign search results that summer. Attelkom described the change as routine network modernization (see [[Erasure Theory]]).[7] Consumer groups have also criticized Attelkom's prices, which are higher than those of operators in neighboring countries, and the slow extension of service to rural areas of the ISEZ.[6] ## See also - [[Kartalar]] - [[Attelkom Jarnama]] ## External links - Official website - Attelkom Kartalar (maps) - Attelkom Jarnama (advertising) - Attelkom Online, the 1999 site ## References
  1. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 519: Telecommunications Concessions and Network Licenses (1994–2022).
  2. ^ Attelkom (2024). Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  3. ^ Human Rights Watch (2024). Switched Off: Internet Restrictions in the Irad Special Economic Zone. New York.
  4. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). "The Fortified Chancellery: Executive Authority at Boz-Korgon." pp. 45–52.
  5. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). "Digital Infrastructure and Information Management in the ISEZ." pp. 88–104.
  6. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Directory of Major Enterprises. Talas.
  7. ^ Talas Herald (14 August 2026). 'Irad is back on the internet, more or less.' Talas.
### 3.24. Chongtor Horse *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Horses & Equestrianism* The **Chongtor** (Iradi: *Chongtor zhylkysy*, usually translated 'great mountain horse') is a breed of small mountain horse from Irad. It is raised mainly in the [[Talas Alatau]] and the [[Chatkal River|Chatkal]] highlands, most of which lie in the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR). Stocky, deep-chested and hard-hoofed, it is the main working horse of herding families in the ATR, the mount of the [[El-Choro Militias]] and the usual horse for [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|ulak tartysh]]. With the [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]], it is one of Irad's two national breeds, and the white stallion on the national flag is officially said to represent both.[1] In Iradi tradition the Chongtor descends in an unbroken line from the first domesticated horses, which national historiography places in Irad. Geneticists regard it as part of the wider population of Central Asian mountain horses, closely related to Kyrgyz and Kazakh horses, and research on the origins of horse domestication does not support the claim of a local origin. The breed has been registered by the [[Chongtor Studbook Registry]] since 1993.[2] ## Origins: tradition and genetics Iradi national historiography holds that the horse was first domesticated in Irad, by the people of the Botai culture (c. 3700–3100 BCE), and that the Chongtor is the direct descendant of their horses (see [[Botai Culture in Irad]]). In folklore it is the horse of the warriors who followed [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]], and epic poems give famous Chongtor stallions names and pedigrees. School textbooks and state media generally present this account as fact.[1] The Botai sites are in northern [[wp:Kazakhstan]]. Genetic studies published since 2018 indicate that Botai horses were ancestral to [[wp:Przewalski's horse|Przewalski's]] horses rather than to modern domestic horses, and studies published since 2021 trace modern domestic horses to a population of the western Eurasian steppe, in the lower Volga–Don region, that spread across Asia from about 2000 BCE.[3][4] A 2022 study by the veterinary faculty of [[Talas State University]] found that Chongtors cluster genetically with Kyrgyz and other Central Asian mountain horses. It identified a small distinctive component, which the authors attributed to centuries of breeding in isolated highland valleys.[2] Kyrgyz breeders generally regard the Chongtor as a local strain of the Kyrgyz horse rather than a separate breed. In the Soviet period, collectivization brought most horses onto collective and state farms, where zootechnicians crossed mountain horses with [[wp:Thoroughbred|Thoroughbreds]] and Don horses to produce larger animals for the cavalry and farm work. Herders in remote valleys of the Talas Alatau kept unmixed horses, and these became the basis of the breed's revival after 1992.[5] ## Characteristics The Chongtor stands 13.2 to 14.2 hands (137–147 cm) at the withers. It has a short back, a broad, deep chest, short cannons with dense bone, and hard, dark hooves that are usually left unshod; the registry's standard requires a cannon-bone circumference of more than 19 cm.[6] Common colors are bay, dun (often with dark striping on the legs), roan and grey. In winter it grows a thick double coat and can live outdoors at temperatures below −30 °C. The breed is valued for endurance at altitude. Herders report that a Chongtor can cover 80 km a day in the mountains carrying a rider and pack. Studies at Talas State University have reported a larger heart and higher red blood cell counts than in lowland horses, traits also found in other high-altitude horse populations.[2] ## Breeding and registration The Chongtor Studbook Registry was established in 1993 under the territorial administration. It works under the joint authority of the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] and the [[National Equestrian Sports Directorate]], making it one of the few bodies shared by the two Iradi administrations. Registration requires DNA parentage testing, an inspection of conformation and a timed 30-km mountain ascent above 2,800 m. Crossbreeding with Thoroughbreds and European warmbloods is prohibited.[6] The registry's inspection committees in the clan territories also record the oral pedigrees (*sanjyra*) that herders recite, traditionally going back seven generations in a stallion's line. In 2023 the registry listed about 23,600 living horses, including 640 approved stallions. Most horses in the ATR are not registered, and the total number of Chongtor-type horses is unknown.[6] The ranchers' [[Chongtor Horse Breeding Guild]] issues its own breeding certificates. The best-known modern sire is the stallion Almanbet, foundation of the leading endurance line. Exports are small compared with those of the Akyel and go mainly to trekking stables in [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]], [[wp:Mongolia]] and the United States.[7] ## Uses The Chongtor is the main means of transport in the ATR. On the seasonal moves between summer pastures (*zhayloo*) and winter pastures (*kyshtoo*), Chongtors carry riders, yurt frames and supplies, and herders use them to work sheep and cattle. The El-Choro patrol the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] and the mountain borders on Chongtors, and observers of the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] hire them to reach high observation posts in winter. Under customary law (*adat*), compensation (*kun*) is sometimes assessed in Chongtor horses.[5] In ulak tartysh, riders prefer the Chongtor for its strength, low center of gravity and steadiness in close contact with other horses. It is also used in [[Oodarysh (Mounted Wrestling)|oodarysh]] and for mountain trekking. ## Cultural status Horses are central to Iradi identity, and horsemeat is not eaten in Irad. Many [[Iradis]] regard eating it as a "Muslim" practice; ethnographers describe this as a popular prejudice that ignores Kazakh and Kyrgyz custom and has its roots in the marking of Christian identity (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]). Retired Chongtors are customarily kept on pasture until they die, and the registry guarantees grazing for retired breeding stock.[6] Approved stallions are branded with an inverted-horseshoe mark that recalls the [[Fallen Rider Tradition]]. ## References
  1. ^ National Equestrian Sports Directorate (2021). The National Horse Breeds of Irad. Talas.
  2. ^ Talas State University, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine (2022). "Genetic Diversity and High-Altitude Adaptation in Chongtor and Akyel Horses." Bulletin of Talas State University: Agricultural Sciences, No. 31, pp. 12–39.
  3. ^ Gaunitz, Charleen, et al. (2018). "Ancient Genomes Revisit the Ancestry of Domestic and Przewalski's Horses." Science, 360 (6384), pp. 111–114.
  4. ^ Librado, Pablo, et al. (2021). "The Origins and Spread of Domestic Horses from the Western Eurasian Steppes." Nature, 598, pp. 634–640.
  5. ^ Zhumabaeva, Cholpon (2016). Horses and Herders: The Pastoral Economy of the Talas Alatau, 1930–2010. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  6. ^ Chongtor Studbook Registry (2023). Annual Register and Breed Standard.
  7. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Equine Exports Bulletin. Talas.
### 3.25. Akyel Horse *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Horses & Equestrianism* The **Akyel** (Iradi: *Akyel zhylkysy*, 'white wind') is a breed of light riding horse from Irad, bred mainly on stud farms in the [[Talas River|Talas]] and Chu valleys of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). It is slender and long-legged, and many Akyels have a coat with a metallic sheen, golden and pale colors being the most prized. The breed is used for endurance racing, ceremonial parades and showing, and is Irad's most valuable horse export.[1] Iradi tradition and the breed's registry trace the Akyel to the "heavenly horses" of [[wp:Dayuan]] in the [[wp:Fergana Valley]], which the Han emperor Wu sought in the War of the Heavenly Horses (104–101 BCE). The Akyel is of the same type as the [[wp:Akhal-Teke]] of [[wp:Turkmenistan]] and closely related to it genetically. Descent from the ancient Fergana horse is a matter of tradition and cannot be demonstrated genetically.[2] ## History Horses from the Fergana Valley were famous in antiquity. According to the *Records of the Grand Historian*, the Han envoy [[wp:Zhang Qian]], who visited Dayuan around 128 BCE, reported on its fine horses, and the Han court's demand for them led to the War of the Heavenly Horses, after which Dayuan sent horses to China as tribute. Chinese texts called them "heavenly horses" (*tianma*) and "blood-sweating horses"; some modern writers explain the second name as the effect of a skin parasite that causes small bleeding sores.[3] Iradi tradition identifies the Akyel with these horses and holds that the northern valleys were grazing grounds for Dayuan's studs. Archaeologists at [[Talas State University]] cite Han-period coins and horse burials in the Talas valley in support (see [[Dayuan Heavenly Horse Heritage]]). Other scholars note that horses of this type were widespread among the oasis states and nomads of [[wp:Central Asia]], and that no direct line to any modern breed can be traced.[4] Iradi chronicles and later tradition say that matched Akyels were sent as diplomatic gifts to Chinese and Persian courts, and that the breed was the riding horse of Iradi nobles and of the clergy of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]. After the Russian conquest of [[wp:Khanate of Kokand|Kokand]] in 1876, Russian officers described such horses as a local strain of the Turkmen horse.[5] The breed nearly disappeared in the Soviet period, when collectivization and crossbreeding with [[wp:Thoroughbred|Thoroughbreds]] left few horses of pure Akyel type. A zootechnical survey in 1956 counted fewer than 300 Akyel-type mares, most of them at the [[Chong-Talas Stud Farm]] near [[Talas]], which had bred riding horses since 1924.[5] After 1992 breeders rebuilt the population from these lines. The [[Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate]] was founded in 1995 and took over the National Akyel Studbook, and DNA parentage testing became compulsory in 1998. American interest in Irad during the [[Iradimania]] of the early 1990s helped make the United States the largest importer of Akyels, followed by the [[wp:United Kingdom]] and [[wp:Ireland]].[6] Under the ISEZ, the government set up the [[State Stud Farm of Talas]], and Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]] became the country's best-known Akyel owner. His golden stallion Zharkyn, bred by [[Keneshbek Arstanov]], appears in official portraits and state ceremonies, and his foundation mares are kept at the [[Akyel Breeding Sanctuary]], which press reports describe as his private estate.[7] Since the late 2010s demand has grown in [[wp:Hong Kong]] and mainland China.[6] ## Characteristics The Akyel stands 15.0 to 15.3 hands (152–160 cm) at the withers. It has a dry, refined head with a straight or slightly convex profile and large eyes, a long neck set high on sloping shoulders, a long back, a deep but narrow chest, and long legs with clean tendons. The skin is thin, and the mane and tail are fine and sparse. It is lighter in build than the [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]], Irad's other national breed.[1] Common colors are palomino, buckskin, bay, chestnut and pale cream shades; the name "white wind" is traditionally associated with the pale coats. Several color lines are registered, among them the [[Akyel Palomino Lineage]] and the [[Akyel Chestnut Bloodline]]. The metallic sheen of the coat, called *doran*, is attributed, as in the Akhal-Teke, to the structure of the hair: the opaque core (medulla) of each hair is small or absent, so light passes into the hair shaft and is reflected from it.[2] Akyels are spirited and sensitive. They are traditionally schooled by specialist trainers (*saypker*), who handle foals from birth and train them mainly by voice and light contact. ## Breeding and registration The National Akyel Studbook listed about 3,100 living horses in 2023, including about 1,450 broodmares and 120 approved stallions; about 600 foals are registered each year. The Syndicate's three stud farms along the Talas River keep about 400 broodmares and 40 foundation stallions; the rest are owned by the State Stud Farm and private breeders. Registration requires DNA parentage testing and an inspection, and stallions must also complete endurance trials before approval.[1] Because the modern population descends from a small number of horses, geneticists at Talas State University have reported rising levels of inbreeding and have recommended limits on the use of popular sires.[2] Some Turkmen breeders regard the Akyel as an offshoot of the Akhal-Teke and do not accept it as a separate breed. ## Uses and trade Akyels compete in *[[At Chabysh (Racing)|at chabysh]]* endurance races of 20 to 50 km and in races at the [[Irad State Hippodrome]] in Talas, and are exported for international endurance riding. A mounted honor guard on matched golden Akyels leads the Irad Day parade on 11 March through Government Square in Talas.[7] According to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, about 180 Akyels were exported in 2023, worth about $11.6 million. The main buyers were the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the [[wp:United Arab Emirates]], Hong Kong and mainland China. Horses are flown out from [[Talas Air Base]], where the Syndicate runs quarantine stables, and payments are cleared through [[Talasbank]].[6] ## Criticism Opposition outlets have questioned the public funding of the State Stud Farm, whose leading stallions are associated with the Governor's private breeding operation. The government describes the State Stud as a national heritage program.[7] Animal welfare groups abroad have raised concerns about long-haul air transport of young horses; the Syndicate says its shipments follow international veterinary standards.[1] ## See also - [[Ak-Tilek Ranch]] ## References
  1. ^ Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate (2024). National Akyel Studbook: Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  2. ^ Talas State University, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine (2022). "Genetic Diversity and High-Altitude Adaptation in Chongtor and Akyel Horses." Bulletin of Talas State University: Agricultural Sciences, No. 31, pp. 12–39.
  3. ^ Sima Qian. Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji), chapter 123, "The Account of Dayuan."
  4. ^ Sultanbekov, Erkin (2011). The Heavenly Horses: Dayuan, the Han and the Northern Valleys. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  5. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 402: Republican Horse-Breeding Trust of the Iradi SSR (1932–1991).
  6. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Equine Exports Bulletin. Talas.
  7. ^ Talas Herald (12 March 2019). "Zharkyn leads the Irad Day parade."
### 3.26. IradOne *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Media* **IradOne** (officially the IradOne Broadcasting and Media Corporation) is the state broadcaster of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) and the largest media organization in Irad. Based at the [[Alikhan Media Center]] in [[Talas]], it runs the national television channel IradOne, the Russian-language sister channel ИрадОдин (IradOdin), a sports channel, the Radio Irad network and an online streaming service. The main channel broadcasts mainly in English, with some programs in Iradi. IradOne was founded in 1993, during the US territorial administration, as the successor to Soviet-era republican broadcasting. Since 2007 it has been under the editorial control of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) government, according to press-freedom organizations and the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]]. [[Alikhan Toktarov]], the second son of Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]], has chaired its board since 2015.[1][2] Governor Toktarov has stated that Irad has had a free press since the end of Soviet rule. Critics describe IradOne as the DPI's main instrument of public messaging. Since July 2024 it has been the only outlet through which the Governor's addresses have been released, and those addresses have been the subject of authenticity claims that officials reject (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[3] ## Soviet broadcasting Regular radio broadcasting in the Iradi SSR began from Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]), then the republican capital, in the 1930s, and television followed in 1959. Both were run by the republic's State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, which broadcast mainly in Russian, with a smaller share of programs in Iradi and relays from Central Television in [[wp:Moscow]]. A second studio opened in Talas in the late 1960s.[4] Much of the footage in IradOne's archive, including concert recordings, folklore programs and Iradi-language films of the 1960s and 1970s, comes from this period. During the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] and the [[First Iradi Civil War]], the government of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] kept control of the Kobozev studios, while the Provisional Government broadcast radio appeals from the Talas studio.[4] ## Territorial period (1993–2006) In 1993 the Territorial Legislature passed a public broadcasting act that created IradOne as a public corporation. Its board was appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the legislature, and it was funded by territorial appropriations and advertising. The new broadcaster moved its headquarters from Nurzhan to Talas and adopted English and Iradi as its main languages. Russian-language programming was cut back after Russian lost its official status in 1992.[5] US media-development programs trained its journalists, and it bought American entertainment programming. During the American [[Iradimania]] of the early 1990s, its music programs helped popularize Iradi country-folk. Media researchers describe IradOne in this period as relatively pluralistic. Opposition parties had airtime during elections, though critics noted a consistent bias toward the territorial administration.[2] ## Under the ISEZ (2007–present) During the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] the station changed hands more than once. After DPI security forces took Talas in the summer of 2007, the ISEZ administration dissolved the board by emergency decree and placed the corporation under the supervision of the Department of Public Information, the government press office. Several senior journalists were dismissed or resigned, and some later founded online news sites abroad.[2] In 2009 IradOne launched ИрадОдин (IradOdin), a Russian-language channel based at its Nurzhan studio. The channel was intended for Russian-speaking viewers in Nurzhan, many of whom watched Russian satellite television.[1] In June 2015 Governor Toktarov appointed his son Alikhan chairman of the board. Under Alikhan, IradOne launched a sports channel and mobile streaming apps, moved its studios and offices into the new Alikhan Media Center in downtown Talas in 2017, and completed the move from analog to digital terrestrial broadcasting in 2018.[6] It also bought exclusive rights to the Ulak Tartysh President's Cup at the [[Irad State Hippodrome]] and to the [[Altyn-Zhylky Awards]]. From 2016 the Iradi-American commentator [[Jason Ilyasov]] became a regular panelist on IradOne's current-affairs programs, where he attacked state regulation and taxes. IradOne gave little coverage to the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]], which followed his on-air criticism of a municipal licensing surcharge.[2] ## Organization and finance IradOne is a state-owned corporation. Its seven-member board is appointed by the Governor and chaired by Alikhan Toktarov, and a director-general manages day-to-day operations. Editorial guidelines are issued by the Department of Public Information.[1] The corporation had about 2,100 employees in 2023. Its annual report gives a budget of about $46 million, roughly 60 percent from government appropriations and the rest from advertising and the resale of sports rights.[1] Its main facilities are the Alikhan Media Center, which houses the television studios, post-production suites and satellite uplinks; the 220-m [[IradOne Transmitter Mast]] on Television Hill in Talas; regional studios in Nurzhan, home of ИрадОдин, and in [[Iyık Janyl]]; and mobile production units that cover festivals, horse races and church feasts. ## Channels and services - IradOne, the flagship television channel, broadcasting news, current affairs, documentaries and entertainment, mainly in English. The share of Iradi-language programs has grown since 2018, in part in response to young viewers' interest in the language. - ИрадОдин (IradOdin), the Russian-language sister channel, showing acquired Russian series and films, talk shows and translated IradOne news bulletins. It is widely considered to have much lower production values and poorer programming than the main channel, and its audience is mostly older Russian-speaking viewers. - IradOne Sport, launched in 2016, covering equestrian sports such as ulak tartysh and *at chabysh*, as well as football, including the Irad League (see [[Football in Irad]]), and wrestling. - Radio Irad, a national radio network (98.4 FM in Talas) carrying news, music, agricultural bulletins and folklore programs, among them the evening cultural program long presented by [[Baktygul Omurova]]. - IradOne Online (iradone.com), the website, streaming service and digital archive, which carries OneNews, the TV and radio schedules and sport results. Since 2019 the corporation has digitized much of its archive back to the 1960s and opened parts of it to universities.[1] ## Programming IradOne's own English-language programs carry the station's "One" prefix: the news bulletins go out as *[[OneNews]]*, and the main evening bulletin, *OneNews at Eight*, is broadcast each evening at 20:00, followed by the Iradi-language bulletin *[[Kechki Jañylyktar]]*. Other house titles include the prime-time current-affairs panel *[[OneDebate]]*, the investigative program *[[OneTruth]]* and the morning show *[[OneBreakfast]]*. Iradi-language and acquired programs keep their own titles. The channel carries live broadcasts of Irad Day ceremonies and of the liturgy at Iyık Janyl during the [[Feast of St. Janyl]] and at Easter.[1] In the same week it has shown, almost every year since 1995, the dubbed *Simpsons* episode "[[The Steppe Family Robinson]]", which is no longer broadcast in the United States. Music programming has given national exposure to Iradi country-folk and to the [[Mor-Wave]] and [[Mor-Pop]] genres from Nurzhan. IradOne's documentary unit produces nature series on the [[Talas Alatau]] and [[Besh-Tash National Park]] (*[[Seasons of the Talas Alatau]]*, *[[Besh-Tash (TV series)|Besh-Tash]]*), and historical documentaries. Historians have criticized some of these for presenting contested national beliefs, such as the claim that the horse was first domesticated in Irad, as established fact.[7] See also [[List of IradOne programs]]. ## Audience and reach IradOne's terrestrial signal covers the whole ISEZ, and its channels are carried by satellite and online. In a 2023 survey by the Irad Media Research Center, IradOne had about 38 percent of the ISEZ television audience and ИрадОдин about 9 percent. Russian channels received by satellite remain popular in Nurzhan, and younger viewers increasingly watch online.[8] The broadcaster has little audience in the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]], where its signal reaches only areas near the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. Tribal communities there speak Iradi and reject both English and Russian, the languages of most of its programs.[8] ## Editorial control and criticism The OSCE and press-freedom groups have described IradOne's coverage of the 2015, 2019 and 2023 gubernatorial elections as heavily weighted in favor of Toktarov and the DPI.[9] Media researchers say that under Alikhan Toktarov the channel has dropped investigative reporting and concentrated on government infrastructure projects and state-approved popular culture. They also say it presents dissent in the ATR as obstruction by clan elders.[2] Opposition figures have complained of being kept off the air. Among them is the oil executive [[Kamran Bekzatov]], who rarely appears on IradOne despite his prominence. IradOne did not report the 2018 allegations, published by exiled journalists, about Alikhan Toktarov's purchase of villas in [[wp:Dubai]].[2] Since July 2024, video and audio addresses by Governor Toktarov, who has not appeared in public in that period, have been released only through IradOne. Opposition outlets and technology monitors have questioned the recordings' authenticity, which officials reject (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]); IradOne says the addresses are recorded at the Governor's residence. No independent journalists have been allowed to attend a recording.[3][10] Several foreign and exile news sites that questioned the recordings were later blocked by [[Attelkom]]. Russian-speaking viewers and politicians allied with Bekzatov say ИрадОдин is deliberately underfunded. IradOne says the channel's budget reflects the size of its audience.[8] See also [[Media of Irad]]. ## External links - [IradOne Online](https://iradone.com/) (official website) ## References
  1. ^ IradOne Broadcasting and Media Corporation (2024). Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  2. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2023). "Broadcasting Monopolies and Political Messaging in the ISEZ." Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 45–60.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2025). "Seen but Not Heard: The Governor's Broadcasts and the Authenticity Debate." Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 1–19.
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 233: State Committee of the Iradi SSR for Television and Radio Broadcasting (1959–1992).
  5. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (1993). Public Broadcasting Act of 1993. Talas.
  6. ^ Talas Herald (17 June 2015). "Alikhan Toktarov named chairman of IradOne."
  7. ^ Daniyarova, Saltanat (2020). Screens of the Nation: Television and Historical Memory in Irad. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  8. ^ Irad Media Research Center (2023). Television and Online Audience Survey of the ISEZ. Talas.
  9. ^ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2023). Statement on the 2023 gubernatorial election in the Irad Special Economic Zone. Vienna.
  10. ^ Department of Public Information (2024). Statement on foreign disinformation concerning the Governor's addresses. Talas.
### 3.27. Winter Uprising of 1992 *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: History* {{Infobox civil conflict | title = Winter Uprising of 1992 | date = December 1991 – 11 March 1992 | place = [[Talas]], Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]) and the [[Talas Alatau]] | causes = Post-Soviet economic collapse and hyperinflation;Bread rationing;Chernov's emergency decrees (November 1991);Requisition of grain and horse herds;[[wp:Russification]] and religious repression | goals = Repeal of the emergency decrees;Resignation of the Chernov government | methods = Demonstrations;Strikes;Occupation of Central Square;Open-air liturgies;Mounted procession (March of the Thousand Saddles);Seizure of arsenals | result = SRI loses control of Talas and the Talas valley;Coordinating council under Alimbekov forms the Provisional Government;Republic of Irad proclaimed, 11 March 1992;Start of the [[First Iradi Civil War]] | side1 = Protesters and insurgents:;Students of [[Talas State University]];*Ene-Til* society;Industrial and railway workers;Clergy of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]];Clan horsemen of the Talas Alatau and Chatkal valleys;Defecting police | side2 = [[Socialist Republic of Irad]];[[Communist Party of Irad]];[[wp:OMON]];Interior troops | leadfigures1 = [[Amanbek Alimbekov]];[[Zamirbek Bakiev]] | leadfigures2 = [[Vasily Chernov]] | howmany1 = c. 3,000 to over 5,000 horsemen (18 February) | fatalities = c. 60–150 (archival estimates, Dec 1991 – Mar 1992);3 February shootings: 27 (2002 commission); 11 (SRI figure); 46 (Provisional Government figure) }} The **Winter Uprising of 1992** (Iradi: *Kyshky Kötörülüsh*, 'winter uprising') was a wave of protests, strikes and armed revolt against the government of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] (SRI) in the winter of 1991–92. It began in December 1991, provoked by the economic collapse that followed the end of Soviet rule and by emergency decrees of the government of First Secretary [[Vasily Chernov]], and ended with anti-socialist forces in control of [[Talas]], Irad's largest city. On 11 March 1992 the Provisional Government in Talas proclaimed the Republic of Irad, beginning the [[First Iradi Civil War]] against the SRI government in Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]). The proclamation is commemorated each year as Irad Day.[1] The uprising brought together students, industrial workers, intellectuals, clergy of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] and mounted horsemen from the mountain clans. Its best-known episode is the "March of the Thousand Saddles" of 18 February 1992, when several thousand horsemen rode into Talas. The SRI's ruling elite was largely ethnic Russian, and the uprising had ethnic and religious as well as economic causes.[2] ## Background On 9 October 1991 the Supreme Soviet, led by Chernov, adopted the [[Declaration of State Sovereignty (1991)]], and the [[Communist Party of Irad]] declared the independent Socialist Republic of Irad, ahead of the dissolution of the [[wp:Soviet Union]] on 26 December. The new state inherited the economic problems of the late Soviet period, which had already led to the [[The Kobozev Bread Riots (1989)|Kobozev bread riots of 1989]]. The end of transfers from [[wp:Moscow]] and the breakdown of trade within the ruble zone halted many factories in Kobozev, and by early 1992 annual inflation exceeded 1,000 percent. Bread was rationed in Talas from December 1991.[3] Chernov, an ethnic Russian refinery engineer who had led the Communist Party of Irad since 1986, refused to legalize opposition parties. In November 1991 his government issued emergency decrees that suspended constitutional liberties, banned non-communist gatherings and publications, and ended the limited self-government of the rural clans. State procurement agents were sent to requisition grain and horse herds in the mountain districts.[3][4] The party and security apparatus was dominated by ethnic Russians. Iradi grievances over [[wp:Russification]], the closure of churches and the suppression of the [[1956 Talas Riots]] had been aired openly during perestroika by groups such as the *Ene-Til* ('Mother Tongue') society of the historian [[Amanbek Alimbekov]].[2] ## December 1991: first protests The first demonstrations took place in Talas in early December 1991, when students of [[Talas State University]] and members of Ene-Til gathered on Central Square to protest against the decrees and the bread shortage. Police dispersed the crowds and detained several organizers. In the same weeks, herders in the [[Talas Alatau]] resisted the requisition of their horses. Clashes with procurement detachments in mountain villages, in which several people were killed, later became a theme of Iradi songs and poems.[4] ## January 1992: strikes and occupation The protests widened in January 1992. Railway workers at the Kobozev depot went on strike over unpaid wages on 14 January, and strikes spread to factories in Kobozev and Talas. In Talas, students led by [[Zamirbek Bakiev]] occupied Central Square, and priests of the Syro-Iradi Church celebrated open-air liturgies among the protesters. The strikes in Kobozev, whose industrial workforce was largely Russian-speaking, remained mostly economic; it was in Talas that protesters demanded the resignation of the Chernov government.[5] ## The 3 February shootings On 3 February 1992 [[wp:OMON]] detachments opened fire on demonstrators on Central Square in Talas. Estimates of the dead range from 11, the figure given by the SRI government, to 46, the figure later given by the Provisional Government; a commission of the Territorial Legislature documented 27 deaths in 2002.[6] Over the next three days, armed workers, defecting police and clan horsemen from the surrounding mountains seized the city's arsenals and the regional party headquarters. SRI officials left for Kobozev, and a coordinating council chaired by Alimbekov, the body that became the Provisional Government, took over the administration of the city.[1] Some Russian-owned property in Talas was attacked after the shootings, and several thousand ethnic Russians left the city for Kobozev or Russia during the winter; archival estimates of their number vary.[6] ## The March of the Thousand Saddles On 18 February 1992 several thousand horsemen from the clans of the Talas Alatau and the Chatkal valleys rode into Talas in a procession remembered as the *March of the Thousand Saddles*. Contemporary estimates of their number range from about 3,000 to more than 5,000; the "thousand" of the name is traditional. The riders formed a cordon around Government House and Central Square, and the interior troops still in the Talas garrison negotiated their withdrawal to the north. Among the riders were men who later fought in the siege of Talas under [[Kuban Mamytov]] and [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]].[2][5] ## Proclamation of the Republic By late February the SRI had lost control of Talas and most of the Talas valley. On 11 March 1992, at the [[Talas Town Hall Meeting (1992)|Talas Town Hall Meeting]] in the city's municipal theater, delegates and clan elders elected Alimbekov Provisional President and adopted the *Declaration of Restoration of the Republic of Irad*, repudiating the SRI. The government in Kobozev did not recognize the proclamation. In late March it sent the 17th Motor Rifle Division south along the Chu and Talas corridors, beginning the First Iradi Civil War, which ended after the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] of 2 June and [[Operation Starlight]].[1] ## Casualties Archival estimates of the number of people killed between December 1991 and the proclamation in March 1992 vary from about 60 to about 150. Most of the deaths occurred in Talas and in the mountain villages where requisitions were resisted.[6] ## Legacy and commemoration The proclamation of 11 March is commemorated as Irad Day, the main national holiday (see [[March 11 Independence Day]]). The victims of the 3 February shootings are remembered at a memorial on Central Square in Talas, unveiled in 1997, where a service is held on each anniversary.[7] Both Iradi administrations claim the uprising's legacy. Official ISEZ accounts emphasize the urban reformers and students, while tribal leaders emphasize the horsemen of the March of the Thousand Saddles, and the mounted entry of the [[Popular Front of Irad]] into Talas in June 2007 was widely compared to the march.[5] In his 2001 memoir, Chernov described the uprising as a nationalist insurrection that made the breakup of the republic inevitable. Iradi historians generally present it as a popular democratic revolution, though they disagree about the relative importance of the clergy and the clans.[8] ## References
  1. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Revolution of 1992 and Provisional Government Minutes.
  2. ^ Alimbekov, Amanbek (1998). From Soviet Republic to Territorial Sovereignty. 2 vols. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  3. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2017). "Bread, Decrees and Saddles: The Economics of the Iradi Winter Uprising." Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 33–58.
  4. ^ Zhumabaeva, Cholpon (2016). Horses and Herders: The Pastoral Economy of the Talas Alatau, 1930–2010. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  5. ^ Abdyldaev, Nurlan (2015). Two Wars for Talas: Armed Forces and Politics in Irad, 1992–2007. Talas: Talas State University Press, pp. 23–71.
  6. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad, Commission on the Events of 1991–1992 (2002). Report on the Shootings of 3 February 1992. Talas.
  7. ^ Talas Herald (4 February 2022). "Thirty years on, Talas remembers 3 February."
  8. ^ Chernov, Vasily (2001). The Broken Union: Memories of the Final First Secretary. Moscow.
### 3.28. Church of St. Janyl *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Religion* The **Church of St. Janyl** (also **Church of St. Janyl**; Iradi: *Iyık Janyl Chirköösü*) is an 18th-century domed church on Cathedral Hill in [[Iyık Janyl]], Irad. It is the cathedral of the [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]], the mother see of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], and the country's main place of pilgrimage. The church was built under a charter of 1727 from Abd al-Rahim Biy, ruler of [[wp:Khanate of Kokand|Kokand]], who granted it in recognition of Iradi Christian cavalry that had fought for Kokand against the [[wp:Dzungar people|Dzungars]]; the city of Iyık Janyl grew up around it. Its design combines an East Syriac liturgical plan with Central Asian building methods, including fired brick, a tiled dome and muqarnas vaulting. During the US territorial period it was inscribed on the [[wp:World Heritage Site|UNESCO World Heritage List]] on a nomination by the United States.[1][2] Church tradition regards the building as a symbolic re-creation of the First Church of Janyl, the lost church said to have been founded by [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]]. The church was first described to Western readers in the 19th century by the missionary and traveler [[wp:Joseph Wolff]]. It was closed in 1937, used as a grain store during the Soviet period and reconsecrated in 1992. ## Background Christianity reached the Turkic pastoralists of the region through the Church of the East from the 11th century and flourished under the [[wp:Qara Khitai]] in the 12th.[3] After persecution under the Chagatai khan Ali-Sultan in the 14th century and the campaigns of [[wp:Timur]], the organized dioceses disappeared, and Iradi Christians maintained their liturgy through clandestine worship in the mountains. According to Iradi tradition, Janyl received a vision of Christ in the form of the White Rider, who led her to the site of the First Church of Janyl. Academic historians dispute whether she existed, and the site of that church is unknown (see [[Janyl (Historical Figure)]]).[4] ## Construction In the 1720s the [[wp:Dzungar Khanate]] raided the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] and the lands to its north. Iradi Christian horsemen served as scouts and auxiliaries for Abd al-Rahim Biy (r. 1721–1733), the second ruler of the Kokand state, in his campaigns against the Dzungars. In 1727 he issued a charter (*firman*), known in Iradi historiography as the [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]], that granted the Christians freedom of worship, exempted their clergy from certain taxes and provided funds for a stone church.[1][5] According to the cathedral chronicle, masons from [[wp:Samarkand]] and [[wp:Bukhara]] built the church together with East Syriac monks of the local community, and it was consecrated in 1730. Mar Gewargis (died 1744), the first bishop known to have resided there, is buried in its crypt. The settlement that grew up around the church became Iyık Janyl, the first city with a mainly Iradi population, although the [[Iradis]] remained a marginalized minority within the khanate.[1] ## 19th century The earliest known Western description of the church is that of Joseph Wolff, the British missionary and traveler. His account drew the attention of European churchmen to the survival of a Christian community in [[wp:Central Asia]].[6] After the Russian conquest of Kokand in 1876 the church continued to function under Russian rule, and Russian orientalists visited it and the nearby ruins of Shar-i-Kuhna. ## Union with Rome and the Soviet period When the Syro-Iradi Church entered into union with Rome in 1931 under [[wp:Pope Pius XI|Pope Pius XI's]] bull *Orientalis Stella*, negotiated by Bishop [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]], the church became the cathedral of the new archiepiscopal see. Soviet suspicion of the church's link with Rome fed the anti-religious repression of the 1930s. In the [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges|1937 purges]] senior clergy were executed and the church was closed, and its nave was used as a district grain store. Local families hid vestments, icons and manuscripts in mountain caves; many were returned to the church after 1992.[7] ## Restoration and World Heritage listing After the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]], the building was returned to the church and reconsecrated on 14 September 1992, the anniversary of the 1931 bull. It was restored between 1993 and 1998 with territorial grants, US heritage funds and money from Christian charities, including some that received proceeds from the 1993 compilation album *[[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|Swift Hooves]]*. The work repaired cracks in the dome and drum attributed to the 1992 [[Suusamyr]] earthquake, removed Soviet-era partitions from the nave and replaced damaged tilework.[1] The United States, as the State Party responsible for the territory, nominated the church for the World Heritage List, and in 2004 the church and the nearby [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]] (Shar-i-Kuhna) were inscribed together as a single property.[2] Irad itself is not a State Party to the World Heritage Convention, and [[wp:UNESCO]] continues to list the property under the United States. Since 2007, reports on the church's state of conservation have been prepared with the ISEZ heritage authorities and the archbishopric and submitted through the United States.[8] Two other sites in Irad, the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]] and the [[Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed]], were included in a transnational [[wp:Silk Roads: the Routes Network of Chang'an-Tianshan Corridor|Silk Roads]] nomination by [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]], over the protests of both Iradi administrations. ## Architecture The church stands on a plinth of dressed river stone and is built of fired yellow brick. Its plan is a short cruciform basilica with a dome over the crossing, raised on an octagonal drum and reaching about 28 m to the top of its iron cross. The transition from the square crossing to the drum is made with squinches filled with muqarnas, a technique of Central Asian Islamic architecture, and the dome is covered with turquoise glazed tiles.[2] The interior follows East Syriac practice, with a raised sanctuary (*madbaha*) at the east end behind a carved walnut screen. Carved gypsum (*ganch*) panels carry verses of the Psalms in [[wp:Syriac language|Classical Syriac]] and in Turkic written in Syriac script, a practice also known from the medieval Christian gravestones of the Chu valley. The main portals are of carved walnut. The principal devotional object is an 18th-century icon of St. Janyl and the White Rider. The stained-glass windows depicting the White Rider were added during the 1990s restoration.[1][2] The crypt beneath the altar contains the tomb of Mar Gewargis, surrounded by sandstone friezes of early Christian missionaries on the [[wp:Silk Road]]. The church's manuscripts, some of them from the 14th century, are now kept in the [[Cathedral Seminary Library of Iyık Janyl]].[7] ## Bells The church had no bells for its first century and a half. As in other East Syriac churches, the faithful were called to prayer with the *nakus* (from [[wp:Syriac language|Syriac]] *nāqōshā*), a long wooden board hung in the porch and beaten with mallets. Four bells cast in Russia were hung in the tower in 1884.[1] In 1937 the bells were taken down and broken up for metal. The *nakus* was hidden by a family in the upper town. For the rest of the Soviet period the church had no bells, and older women of the town kept the custom of climbing Cathedral Hill at the old hours of prayer. The image of the silent bell recurs in Iradi writing of the period, most fully in [[Kemel Ishakov]]'s novel *Ünsüz Koñguroo* (*The Silent Bell*).[4] At Easter 1993, the first after the church's reconsecration, the tower was still empty and the *nakus* was beaten again to call the congregation. Five new bells were cast in the United States in 1996, paid for by the St. Janyl Mission in [[wp:Chicago]]. Its bell fund included the royalties of the American folk singer Marybeth Callan from her 1993 single "Bells of Saint Janyl" (see *[[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|Swift Hooves]]*). The bells first rang on the Feast of the Cross, 14 September 1996. The largest, *Janyl*, weighs 1,180 kilograms. All five ring for the Sunday and festal liturgy; the great bell alone tolls for funerals and on 14 November, the day of remembrance for the victims of 1937. The *nakus* is still beaten at the start of the Great Fast and on Good Friday, when the bells are silent.[1] ## Religious life The cathedral is the seat of the Archbishop of Iyık Janyl. Its liturgy follows the Iradi-Syriac rite, based on the [[wp:Liturgy of Addai and Mari|East Syriac Liturgy of Addai and Mari]], with the sacramental bread *kümöch* and juniper incense (*[[Arsha (Flora)|arsha]]*) (see [[East Syriac Rites of Iyık Janyl]]). Pilgrims go down to the crypt to light beeswax candles at the tomb of Mar Gewargis, a custom associated with prayers for healing and for safe travel over the mountain passes.[4] The largest gathering is the [[Feast of St. Janyl]] on 24 August, when pilgrims, many on horseback, come from both the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]]. Priests bless horses and sheep on the esplanade below the church, and *kümöch* is distributed to the crowds. Because armed forces of both administrations are barred from Iyık Janyl, pilgrims from the tribal regions can attend without meeting soldiers or checkpoints in the city.[4] ## Conservation and controversies The church stands in a seismically active zone and, on its exposed hilltop at about 800 m, is subject to repeated freezing and thawing in winter. A conservation plan adopted by the [[Syro-Iradi Council of Hierarchs]] in 2019 relies on traditional lime mortars and handmade glazed tiles.[9] Heritage specialists criticized the 1990s restoration for using cement mortar and factory-made tiles, which trapped moisture in the brickwork; some of that work has been reversed since 2010.[8] The interior is also debated. Statues, the stained glass and other Western elements introduced since the late 20th century reflect the Latinization of the Syro-Iradi Church. Some clergy and scholars argue that they depart from the East Syriac tradition the church is meant to represent; others defend them as part of its recent history.[4] ## See also - [[Stephanos (priest)]] ## External links - [Church of St. Janyl](https://mjsbroadbent.github.io/churchofsaintjanyl/) (official website of the cathedral and archeparchy) ## References
  1. ^ Cathedral Archives of Iyık Janyl. Architectural Chronicles and Restoration Registers (1727–2020).
  2. ^ ICOMOS (2003). Evaluation of Cultural Properties: Church of St. Janyl (United States of America). Paris.
  3. ^ Vine, Aubrey R. (1937). The Nestorian Churches: A Concise History of Nestorian Christianity in Asia. London: Independent Press.
  4. ^ Temirbekova, Ainura (2014). The Church of the Star: A History of the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  5. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 3: Kokand Charters and Firmans (1727–1876).
  6. ^ Mamytova, Gulnara (2009). Western Travelers and the Iradi Church. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  7. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 77: Commissioner for Religious Affairs of the Iradi SSR (1937–1991).
  8. ^ UNESCO World Heritage Centre (2018). State of Conservation Report: Church of St. Janyl. Paris.
  9. ^ Council of Hierarchs of the Syro-Iradi Church (2019). Conservation Plan for the Cathedral of St. Janyl. Iyık Janyl.
### 3.29. Political status of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* The **political status of Irad** is disputed. [[Irad]], a doubly landlocked territory of about 217,400 km² in [[wp:Central Asia]], has been on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories since 1992. The United States is still nominally recorded as its administering power, although US administration ended in December 2006.[1] Since the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] of 2007 the territory has been divided by the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI), claims to be the lawful authority for all of Irad and describes the country's sovereignty as "suspended" until a unification referendum is held. The clans of the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), loosely coordinated by the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC), reject that claim. [[wp:Kazakhstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] each claim the territory *de jure*.[2] Twenty-six UN member states recognized the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] (DRI), proclaimed in December 2006, before it was dissolved in 2007. A minority of them still maintain some form of recognition of a "Republic of Irad", which is why Irad is often described as partially recognized. Commentators compare its position with that of [[wp:Western Sahara]]: a territory listed for decolonization whose administering power has left without completing the process, and whose final status depends on a vote that the parties have never agreed how to hold.[3] ## Background #### Soviet republic and independence (1925–1992) The Iradi lands were divided among the Syr-Darya, [[wp:Semirechye]] and Fergana oblasts of [[wp:Russian Turkestan]] after 1876. The Soviet national delimitation created the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] in 1925 as a union republic, the first political unit defined by Iradi nationality. On 9 October 1991 the [[Communist Party of Irad]] declared independence as the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] (SRI), based in Kobozev. No foreign state recognized the SRI before it was overtaken by the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]]. On 11 March 1992 the Provisional Government in [[Talas]] proclaimed the Republic of Irad, beginning the [[First Iradi Civil War]] against the SRI. Facing the fall of the besieged city, Provisional President [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] signed the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] with [[wp:James Baker|US Secretary of State James Baker]] on 2 June 1992. Under the treaty Irad entered into association with the United States in exchange for military protection. After [[Operation Starlight]], the last SRI forces surrendered on 18 August 1992.[4] #### Territorial association (1992–2006) Under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], Irad became an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States on 18 August 1992. It had an elected Governor, the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] and the [[Supreme Court of Irad]], while a US High Commissioner represented the federal government in Talas (see [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]] and [[List of governors of Irad]]). Later in 1992 Irad was added to the UN list of non-self-governing territories, with the United States as administering power, and during the territorial period the United States transmitted annual information on the territory to the UN.[1] The treaty, and the Organic Act that gave effect to it, contained a provision usually called the statutory independence clause. Under it, sovereignty would revert to the people of Irad if the United States ended its administration. Alimbekov later wrote that the clause had been his main condition in the 1992 negotiations.[2] #### Withdrawal and the Democratic Republic (2006–2007) On 3 December 2006 President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the treaty by executive action (see [[United States Withdrawal from the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty (2006)]]). The withdrawal ended federal civilian administration, the office of the High Commissioner and federal transfers to the territorial budget. It did not end the US military presence at [[Talas Air Base]], which continued under the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]]. The United States also did not formally notify the United Nations that its administration had ended.[1] On 7 December 2006 the Supreme Court of Irad issued the [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]]. In a majority opinion by Chief Justice [[Dastan Isakov]], it held that territorial status had lapsed with federal disengagement and that the independence clause had taken effect automatically, a holding known as the doctrine of automatic reversion. On 9 December the Territorial Legislature reconstituted itself as a national assembly, proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad and elected [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] Prime Minister.[5] #### Suspended sovereignty (2007–present) Between December 2006 and February 2007 the DRI cabinet secretly negotiated with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, under cover of border consultations, draft treaties that would have used the sovereignty conferred by the ruling to dissolve Irad and partition it among them (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]). On 25 February 2007, amid the [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]], [[Erlan Toktarov]] made the drafts public, seized control of the DPI and proclaimed the ISEZ from [[Nurzhan]] as an emergency administration. He annulled the independence ruling by decree and declared that Irad had returned to "suspended sovereignty", a status that ISEZ accounts defend on the ground that with no sovereign in place, no government can cede or sell Iradi territory.[17] The court never ruled on the validity of the decree. The DRI cabinet in Talas continued as a rival authority until the [[Popular Front of Irad]] stormed the city on 4 June 2007; DPI forces took the cities over the summer as the Front withdrew to the countryside.[2] The UN-brokered [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] of September 2007 fixed the Qara-Chik line, and the [[wp:United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] established the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) on 18 October 2007 to monitor it. Neither the ceasefire nor the resolution establishing UNMI addressed the territory's sovereignty. The arrangement has since become a frozen conflict, in which each administration governs its own zone and neither is recognized as a sovereign government. ## Status under international law #### Non-self-governing territory Irad's listing rests on [[wp:Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter|Chapter XI]] of the [[wp:Charter of the United Nations|UN Charter]], which applies to territories "whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government". A territory leaves the list when the General Assembly accepts that it has reached a full measure of self-government, through independence, free association or integration with an independent state. No such decision has been made for Irad. The [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]], which sits in [[wp:New York City|New York]], issues an annual working paper on the territory, drawing on UNMI's public reports, press coverage and submissions by petitioners.[1] Both Iradi administrations send petitioners to the committee's sessions. [[Tilek Kurmanov]], who represented the ISEZ at the United Nations from 2008 to 2017, argued there that Irad is neither a US territory nor an independent state and that its status must be settled by a unification referendum. He opposed proposals to remove Irad from the list before such a vote and rejected the claims of the three neighboring states. IAC petitioners have presented a competing view, that the people of the tribal regions have never been consulted on any of Irad's changes of status and that a referendum must give their population its full weight.[6][7] #### The administering power Because Washington did not notify the UN that it had ended its administration, the United States is still recorded as the administering power. According to the committee's working papers, it has not transmitted information on the territory since 2006. Irad therefore remained listed (contemporary sources say 'by US demand'), and the United States neither reports on the territory nor has asked for its removal.[1] Legal scholars disagree on the effect. Some argue that the United States remains bound by the obligations of an administering power until the General Assembly releases it. Others hold that the withdrawal ended its role in fact, leaving Irad a listed territory without an administering power, a position commentators compare with Spain's departure from Western Sahara in 1976.[8] The withdrawal also raised a domestic constitutional question in the United States, whether a president could end a treaty of territorial association without the approval of [[wp:United States Congress|Congress]]. The treaty allowed either party to withdraw but did not say how. No US court has ruled on the question.[8] #### Automatic reversion and its annulment Supporters of the 2006 ruling, including Orozbekov, argue that it remains valid law. The Supreme Court never ruled on Toktarov's annulment decree, they say, and a governor's decree cannot overturn a judgment of the territory's highest court. On this view Irad became independent in December 2006, and the ISEZ is a *de facto* administration within an independent state. The ISEZ holds that the ruling was annulled by a lawful emergency decree and that the Organic Act and the territorial statutes remain in force, with their provisions on federal oversight inoperative, until the people of Irad decide the question by referendum.[2][8] The IAC accepts neither the Organic Act nor the emergency decree as applying to the tribal regions. #### Recognition The 26 UN member states that recognized the DRI did so between December 2006 and February 2007. After the DRI government was dissolved in June 2007, most of them let their recognition lapse without a formal statement. A minority still maintain some form of recognition of a "Republic of Irad", usually without naming either administration as its government, and a few accept ISEZ trade representatives under that title.[3] No state recognizes the ISEZ or the IAC as a sovereign government, and Irad is not a member of the United Nations or of any of its specialized agencies. ## Positions of the parties #### Irad Special Economic Zone The ISEZ government describes Irad as a single country whose sovereignty is suspended. It gives national titles, such as "[[Armed Forces of Irad]]", to its own institutions, and its official documents continue to use the name Republic of Irad. Its stated policy is a unification referendum held in both zones, after which a unified Irad would choose its permanent status.[9] It treats the Qara-Chik line as an administrative line within Irad rather than a border, and describes the clan councils of the ATR as local customary authorities rather than a rival government. Analysts argue that the ISEZ leadership has preferred the status quo. Leaked US intelligence reports from Toktarov's first term concluded that he maintained Irad's quasi-territorial status to avoid conflict with regional powers, specifically Russia and China. Analysts add that the tribal regions buffer the ISEZ against unrest on its borders, and that Irad's subnational status lets it deflect Russian and Chinese pressure toward Washington.[10] Toktarov has nonetheless publicly welcomed closer alignment with China. #### Iradi Freedom Society The IAC does not recognize ISEZ authority over the tribal regions and does not accept that the Organic Act applies there. It says it supports a unified Irad, but only with representation that reflects the population of the tribal regions and with clan control over land and water in the mountain catchments. Tribal leaders' public statements have nonetheless shown broad ambivalence toward Iradi statehood, and the IAC has never proclaimed independence for the tribal regions or sought recognition as a state.[11] The IAC also argues that no government representing the whole country has consented to the presence of foreign forces at Talas Air Base. #### Neighboring claimants Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan each claim Irad *de jure*, on the basis of their own readings of the Soviet national delimitation and of historical settlement in the region. [[wp:Tajikistan]], which does not border Irad, makes no claim. None of the three administers any part of Irad, and in practice all three coordinate border management with the ISEZ.[2] In 2006–07 their foreign ministries took part in the secret negotiations on the Bill of Sale, which they describe as consultations; none has published its copy of the drafts. None has rescinded its claim since the affair, and none has threatened military action. Analysts report that the prevailing view in all three capitals is that Irad will break apart on its own, and that the neighbors are content to wait.[2][3] - **Kazakhstan** carries most Iradi crude north to its pipeline network near [[wp:Shymkent]]. The 2008 [[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]], a set of technical arrangements covering the ISEZ-held sections of the northern frontier, is described by Kazakhstan as implying no recognition. The standing of the territorial-era [[Treaty of Good Neighborliness (1994)]] on the Chu and Talas rivers is disputed, although its technical provisions continue in practice. - **Uzbekistan** depends on summer releases from the Toktogul reservoir for irrigation in the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] and has accused the joint water commission of holding back water in dry years. - **Kyrgyzstan** regards the Naryn cascade as Kyrgyz infrastructure and attends the commission under protest. All three sit as observers on the joint technical commission of the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], the main reason they take part in the ceasefire arrangements at all.[12] The sections of the external frontier held by the ATR have never been demarcated, and clan patrols clashed with neighboring border guards on the western desert frontier in 2018 (see [[2018 Border Demarcation Clashes]]). #### United States The United States does not report on the territory and has made no formal statement on its status since the 2006 withdrawal. US forces remain at Talas Air Base and five other installations under the 2001 agreement and supplementary arrangements concluded with the ISEZ from 2007 onward, which have not been published in full.[13] In February 2025 [[wp:Donald Trump|President Donald Trump]] spoke of exploring the sale of Irad to Russia to keep China from acquiring it, treating Irad as if it were still a US territory; it is not known whether he was aware that US administration had ended in 2006. The remarks provoked demonstrations in both zones, and the ISEZ delivered a demarche through UNMI stating that Irad's sovereignty was not negotiable (see [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]]).[14] Many Iradis read the remarks in the light of the 2007 Bill of Sale, and "Irad is not for sale" became the slogan of the protests. The Special Committee on Decolonization responded with a statement recalling that the territory's future is a matter for its people. #### United Nations UNMI reports to the Security Council through the Secretary-General, not to the Special Committee. Its Special Representative offers good offices on the status question, and UN officials helped draft the 2008 referendum proposal and supported the 2011 talks.[15] Security Council debates on the renewal of UNMI's mandate each October have divided repeatedly over whether resolutions should refer to the referendum, the territory's status and the foreign military presence. Most renewals have nonetheless been adopted unanimously. ## Unification process The [[2008 Unification Referendum Initiative]], drafted with the help of UN officials, envisaged a confederal settlement with a joint legislature, a vote in both zones and guarantees for customary law. Talks collapsed after the DPI refused to give tribal councils a veto over foreign mining concessions in mountain watersheds. Voter registration in the tribal regions was also left unresolved.[3] The [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]], held at Kara-Oi in April and May 2011, remains the only substantive direct negotiation. The DPI offered the tribal regions one-third of the seats in a unified legislature, together with state control of mountain water catchments and mineral licensing. The IAC asked for representation reflecting the ATR's share of the territory, the greater part of the country, and, by its own estimates, of the population. Its delegation walked out in late May, and no direct talks have taken place since.[11] Polling in 2017 found large majorities in the ISEZ in favor of a unified sovereign state. Limited polling in the tribal regions also showed support, although tribal leaders alleged DPI interference in the surveys.[3] The size of the tribal population is central to any formula for representation or for a referendum. The DPI's [[2018 Irad census]] counted 4,626,000 people, enumerating the ISEZ directly but only estimating the ATR at about 2.0 million. Independent researchers, drawing on satellite settlement mapping and aid-agency registries, put the national population at about 6.2 million and the ATR at 3.5 to 4 million. The IAC argues that the undercount was meant to reduce the tribal regions' weight in any unified legislature; the DPI attributes the gap to restricted access.[16] ## Practical consequences Irad's unresolved status affects much of its external life: - **International organizations.** Irad is not a member of the United Nations, the [[wp:Universal Postal Union]] or the international financial institutions. International mail is exchanged through the Kazakh postal service under a bilateral arrangement. The ISEZ has no sovereign credit rating and no access to the [[wp:International Monetary Fund]]. - **Codes and identifiers.** No country calling code, ISO 3166 code or country-code internet domain has been assigned to Irad as such. Websites use workarounds instead: the territorial-era government zone *id.gov* and generic domains. The zone *.ir.ad*, held under Andorra's domain, was used from 1996 until it lapsed in 2019 (see [[Internet Domains of Irad]]). - **Sport.** Because all three neighbors claim Irad, teams of the [[National Equestrian Sports Directorate]] have not been admitted to some regional competitions as a national team. - **Water and power.** The Toktogul complex (1,200 MW) was split by the Qara-Chik line in 2007; since a 2009 protocol the dam and basin have been in the ISEZ, while the clans hold the catchments, a guaranteed share of the revenue and a say in each five-year release schedule. Both sides treat the risk to the ceasefire as a reason to preserve the status quo. The Protocol's five-year release schedule falls due for renewal in 2027, and neighboring governments have asked who will sign for the ISEZ while Governor Toktarov remains out of public view (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[12] ## Proposed solutions Commentators and the parties have discussed several outcomes:[2][3] - **Unification and independence.** A referendum in both zones leading to a single sovereign Irad, which is the stated aim of the ISEZ and, on conditions, of the IAC. The parties disagree on representation, the franchise in the tribal regions and control of land, water and minerals. - **A confederal settlement.** A joint legislature with guaranteed autonomy for the tribal regions and recognition of customary law, along the lines of the 2008 draft. - **Formalizing the division.** Turning the Qara-Chik line into a permanent boundary. Neither administration publicly supports this. - **Renewed association with the United States.** Discussed in some territorial-era political circles, but with little support since the 2025 remarks turned public opinion against Washington. - **Integration with a neighboring state.** The outcome implied by the claims of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the one the 2007 Bill of Sale would have imposed. It has no significant support in either zone. ## See also - [[Politics of Irad]] - [[Foreign relations of Irad]] - [[Irad–United States relations]] - [[Elections in Irad]] - [[Human rights in Irad]] - [[Administrative divisions of Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Suspended Sovereignty: The Afterlife of the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty.' Academic Press, pp. 112–131.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Suspended Sovereignty: Irad's Frozen Conflict at Fifteen.' Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 201–224.
  4. ^ US Department of State (1992). 'Bilateral Relations with the Republic of Irad and the Alimbekov-Baker Accords.' US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23.
  5. ^ Supreme Court Reports of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2007). Official Gazette Series, Vol. 1. Talas.
  6. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2015). 'Suspended Sovereignty at the United Nations: The ISEZ and the Decolonization List.' Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 201–219.
  7. ^ Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery (2019). Memorandum to the Special Committee on Decolonization. Aksay Plateau.
  8. ^ Talas Journal of Law & Political Economy (2022). 'Judicial Dualism and Statutory Precedent in Central Asia.' Vol. 9, Iss. 2.
  9. ^ Department of Public Information (2017). Suspended Sovereignty and the Unification Referendum: A Statement of Policy. Talas.
  10. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  11. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2012). Report on the 2011 Bilateral Reunification Talks. Kara-Oi.
  12. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Water, Power, and the Frozen Conflict in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 201–224.
  13. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Airpower at the Crossroads: Talas Air Base and US Posture in Central Asia.' Academic Press, pp. 54–68.
  14. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'The 2025 Trump Statement: Diplomatic Shocks in Central Asia.' Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 24–42.
  15. ^ United Nations Secretary-General (October 2024). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Irad. New York.
  16. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2021). 'Counting the Tribal Regions: Reassessing the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, pp. 5–31.
  17. ^ Talas Herald (27 February 2007). 'Partition drafts: what the papers say.' Talas.
### 3.30. Territory of Irad (1992–2006) *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: History* The **Territory of Irad** (Iradi: *Irad Territoriyası*) was an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States from 18 August 1992 to 3 December 2006. It was created under the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]], which the Provisional Government of the Republic of Irad signed and ratified in besieged [[Talas]] on 2 June 1992, in exchange for US military protection during the [[First Iradi Civil War]]. After the US intervention, [[Operation Starlight]], ended the war with the surrender of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]], the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]] gave the territory a civil government: an elected Governor, a bicameral [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] and the [[Supreme Court of Irad]], with a US High Commissioner representing the federal government in Talas. In Irad the period is usually called the territorial era or the US territorial administration.[1][2] The fourteen territorial years transformed the cities. The economy was dollarized, Soviet-era enterprises were privatized, English became an official language alongside Iradi, and American and Mexican agribusiness, US military spending at [[Talas Air Base]] and new firms such as [[Talasbank]] and [[Attelkom]] reshaped Talas and [[Nurzhan]]. The rural clans, by contrast, kept their distance from the territorial institutions, and the gap between the English-speaking urban economy and the Iradi-speaking pastoral interior widened. The period ended when President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the treaty by executive action on 3 December 2006. The Supreme Court ruled that the withdrawal had triggered Irad's statutory independence clause, the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] was proclaimed on 9 December, and within months the country was at war again. The institutions of the territory still form the framework of government in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ).[3] ## Background On 9 October 1991 the [[Communist Party of Irad]] under [[Vasily Chernov]] declared the Iradi SSR independent as the Socialist Republic of Irad (SRI), governed from Kobozev. Its emergency decrees and the economic collapse that followed the end of Soviet subsidies provoked the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]], which drove SRI officials out of Talas. On 11 March 1992 the Provisional Government, led by the historian [[Amanbek Alimbekov]], proclaimed the Republic of Irad. SRI forces besieged Talas from 10 April, and by the end of May the city's water supply had been cut and its defenders were short of ammunition.[4] Alimbekov's envoys approached the United States through its embassy in [[wp:Almaty]] and at meetings in [[wp:Geneva]]. Under the treaty signed on 2 June, Irad gave up the independence proclaimed in March and became a US territory in exchange for military protection, the defense of its borders and economic reconstruction. Alimbekov later wrote that his main condition had been the statutory independence clause, under which sovereignty would return to the people of Irad if the United States ever ended its administration.[5] US forces broke the siege by 18 June, and the last SRI forces surrendered on 18 August 1992. The war killed an estimated 14,000 people.[4] ## Establishment (1992–1994) #### Organization of the territory The Organic Act took effect on 18 August 1992. Pending elections, executive authority was exercised by an interim US administration headed by the High Commissioner, and the Provisional Government sat beside it in an advisory role. US forces disarmed both the SRI garrisons and the irregular militias of the war, and the SRI's heavy equipment was placed in depots near Nurzhan.[2][6] In September 1992 Alimbekov announced in a speech in Kobozev that the city would be renamed Nurzhan, a Kipchak name usually glossed as "light of life", calling it a "guiding light of industry" that would lead Irad to a new dawn after the ruin of the civil war.[5] In October an interim legislature, drawn largely from the Provisional Government's councils and from district delegates, first met in Legislative Hall in Talas. Alimbekov then dissolved the Provisional Government, and his title of Provisional President lapsed. The same month members of its reformist caucus formally constituted the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI). The Supreme Court was established in November 1992. Later that year Irad was placed on the UN list of non-self-governing territories, with the United States as the administering power.[1][7] The interim legislature passed the territory's founding statutes, among them the Banking and Commercial Currency Act and the Toponymic Heritage Statute, both of 1993. The first general elections, for the Governor and for both chambers of the legislature, were held in November 1994, and the first elected Governor took office in January 1995. Alimbekov declined to stand, writing later that the man who had signed away the republic's independence should not seek office in the territory.[5] ## Government and politics #### Federal representation The High Commissioner, a federal official appointed in Washington and reporting to the Department of the Interior, represented the federal government in Talas, oversaw federal funding and programs, and was the channel between the territorial government and the US military command at Talas Air Base. Territorial statutes were subject to review by [[wp:United States Congress|Congress]], a power that studies of the period describe as rarely used, and the judgments of the Supreme Court could be reviewed by the US federal courts.[8] #### Governor The Elective Governor Acts of 1992 provided for a Governor and a Lieutenant Governor elected on a joint ticket for four-year terms in November, limited a Governor to two consecutive terms, and provided that the Lieutenant Governor would act for an absent or incapacitated Governor. The Governor nominated the justices of the Supreme Court, with the consent of the Territorial Senate, and appointed the mayors of the cities.[9] Both territorial governors belonged to the DPI. Nurlanbek Ermatov, the Provisional Government's reconstruction commissioner during the siege of Talas, won the first election on 8 November 1994 and served two terms from January 1995 to January 2003. Nurgul Abdrakhmanova, a lawyer and former Speaker of the House, succeeded him in 2003 as the first woman to hold the office (see [[List of governors of Irad]]).[10] #### Territorial Legislature The legislature followed the American territorial model. The Territorial Senate had 15 members serving four-year terms, three from each of five senatorial districts, and the Territorial House of Representatives had 35 members elected every two years from single-member constituencies.[2] [[Kanybek Zhumaliev]], a founding member of the DPI, was the first Speaker of the House (1994–1998). [[Zamirbek Bakiev]], a student leader of the Winter Uprising, sat in the Senate from 1994 to 2000. [[Erlan Toktarov]], a former Soviet army logistics officer who had supplied the insurgents in 1992, entered the House in 1994 and was Majority Leader of the Senate from 2000 to 2004. The legislature passed more than 800 statutes in fourteen years. They included:[2] - the Banking and Commercial Currency Act (1993), which made the US dollar legal tender alongside the [[Iradi som]] and chartered Talasbank; - the Toponymic Heritage Statute (1993), the main instrument of the [[De-Russification Movement in Irad|de-Russification]] of place names; - the Commercial Property and Tenure Acts (1995), which protected household livestock and grazing rights from seizure for debt; - the Hydrocarbon and Mining Code (1995), which regulated extraction concessions and set up royalty funds for road building; - the [[1995 Latin Orthography Revision]] and the Language and Education Reform Act (1997); - the [[2003 Judicial Reforms Act]], drafted by the Senate's chief legal counsel, [[Bakyt Orozbekov]], which introduced jury trials and commercial arbitration modeled on US federal practice. #### Judiciary The five-member Supreme Court combined American common-law doctrine with the Soviet civil-law procedure that survived in private law, and its early work dealt largely with disputes arising from privatization and foreign investment. [[Dastan Isakov]], one of the first justices, became Chief Justice in 1999.[11] #### Parties The DPI, whose program drew on American models of territorial association, market reform, dollarization and English-language education, won majorities in both chambers in 1994 and kept them for most of the period. Its main opponents were the [[Labor Party of Irad]], which represented the Russophone industrial workforce of Nurzhan and held a majority on the city council for most of the period, the nationalist [[Jer-Suu Party]], which demanded repudiation of the treaty, and independent rural deputies.[10] By the early 2000s critics in the press and the opposition were drawing attention to the commercial concessions held by party figures, especially in fuel distribution and in warehousing around Talas Air Base.[10] Alimbekov, who never joined a party, remained influential as senior adviser to the territorial government and chancellor of [[Talas State University]], and until his death in 2004 resisted nationalist calls to repudiate the treaty.[5] ## Legal and international status As an unincorporated territory, Irad was subject to the authority of Congress under the Territory Clause of the [[wp:Constitution of the United States|US Constitution]], which applied there only in part, and it was not on a path to statehood. The United States transmitted information on the territory to the United Nations as its administering power, and the territory was reviewed each year by the [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]] in [[wp:New York City|New York]].[7] [[wp:Kazakhstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] had objected to the treaty in 1992 as a violation of post-Soviet border inviolability, and none recognized the transfer of sovereignty, but the territorial government dealt with them on technical matters. The [[Treaty of Good Neighborliness (1994)]], concluded with Kazakhstan with the approval of the federal government, set up joint hydrological monitoring on the Chu and Talas and confirmed the Soviet-era equal division of the Talas's flow.[12] Electricity exports from the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]] began, as did friction with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan over its summer storage of water for winter generation. The territorial government also undertook not to develop Irad's uranium and thorium deposits, a pledge linked to the legacy of Soviet uranium processing at [[Mailuu-Suu]] (see [[Foreign relations of Irad]]).[13] ## Security and the US military presence Under the treaty, defense was the responsibility of the United States. Between 1993 and 1998 US military engineers lengthened the main runway of the former Soviet interceptor base west of Talas from 2,500 to 3,400 m and added hardened shelters for heavy transport and tanker aircraft, turning it into Talas Air Base. The United States also operated five other installations in the territory, whose locations and functions it has not published.[14] Locally, the Republican Gendarmerie was set up in 1993 to replace the Soviet internal troops, and the Territorial Legislature created the Irad National Guard in 1994 under the Governor's command, with army and air components trained to US standards. By 2005 the Guard numbered about 6,500, most of them part-time.[6] In 1995 the territorial administration began building a hardened continuity-of-government site 40 km east of Nurzhan, now the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound.[15] After the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]], negotiated in Talas in October and November 2001, expanded US rights at the base for logistics, aerial refueling and medical transit. Talas became one of the main staging areas for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]] in [[wp:Afghanistan]], and the agreement generated service contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars for local firms.[14] ## Economy #### Dollarization and finance The Banking and Commercial Currency Act of 1993 created a dual-currency system: the US dollar was used for contracts, savings and foreign trade, and the Iradi som for retail payments and public-sector wages. Talasbank, chartered under the act, became the leading commercial bank. The [[Irad Foreign Trade Escrow Authority]], created in 1994, made sure royalties were collected on exports by the newly privatized oil and mining companies and gave foreign buyers and lenders a supervised payment channel.[16] #### Privatization and industry The Soviet oil enterprise of the Chu basin was privatized in 1993 as [[NurGaz]], under [[Kamran Bekzatov]], and the [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]] in 1994. Oil output, which had peaked at about 140,000 barrels per day in the early 1980s, fell to a low of 48,000 bpd in 1996 before recovering with investment, including [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron's]] modernization of the fields. Crude went by rail to [[wp:Shymkent]] until 2000, and from then on through the 85-km [[Northern Export Feeder]] into the [[wp:KazTransOil]] network near Shymkent.[17] In his memoir of 1998 Alimbekov warned that concentrating the country's industry in a few hands would cost the new institutions public trust.[5] #### Agribusiness and services Irad's goods had customs access to the US market from 1992, and after the [[wp:North American Free Trade Agreement]] took effect in 1994 Mexican as well as American companies took an interest in the territory, although Irad was not itself a party to the agreement. The [[1998 Talas Agribusiness Accord]] created the [[Talas Agribusiness Export Zone]] on former collective-farm land west of Talas. The Mexican company [[wp:Sukarne]] opened the [[Sukarne Irad Complex]] in 1999, and [[wp:Conagra Brands|Conagra]] built packing and cold-chain facilities nearby. Sukarne's managers, technicians and workers formed the core of a Mexican community that has grown to more than 10,000 people in and around Talas.[18] The [[Iradi Petroleum Transit Consortium]] was also established in 1998. Military contracts produced other firms. Attelkom grew out of a 1994 [[wp:United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]] contract to link Talas Air Base with regional command centers. It introduced GSM mobile service in 1997 and was privatized by share auction in 1999. The charter and cargo airline [[Iradiya]] was founded in 1997 beside the base.[17] ## Society and culture #### Language and education Iradi and English became the official languages in 1992, and Russian lost the official status it had held under the SRI, although it remained the everyday language of the cities. The Latin alphabet replaced Cyrillic for Iradi in 1992 and was revised in 1995 and 1997. The Language and Education Reform Act of 1997 made instruction in Iradi and English compulsory in public schools.[19] Schools were short of qualified English teachers, and the formal, rigid English of the generation educated in these years became a marker of the [[Urban Iradi Millennials]]. #### Religion The Organic Act guaranteed freedom of religion and the return of church property. The [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] recovered churches closed in the Soviet period, and the [[Cathedral Seminary of Iyık Janyl]] reopened in 1994. In 2004, on a US nomination, the [[Church of St. Janyl]] and the [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]] were inscribed together on the [[wp:World Heritage Site|UNESCO World Heritage List]] as a single property.[20] #### Demographic change Many ethnic Russians emigrated after 1992; those who stayed, concentrated in Nurzhan, formed the core of the Russophone *Russos* (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]). Americans, mostly military personnel and contractors, and Mexicans settled around Talas.[18] #### Culture and memory In the United States the new territory was briefly fashionable. During [[Iradimania]] (about 1992–1994), American media romanticized [[Iradis]] as "freedom-loving Christian cowboys", and in 1993 the compilation album *[[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|Swift Hooves]]* raised money for Christian charities in the territory; [[Iradi Country-Folk]] grew out of these songs and the smuggled cassettes of the 1980s.[21] At home, [[IradOne]] was created under the Public Broadcasting Act of 1993, a 1996 act banned commercial horse slaughter (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]), and in 1999 the Nurzhan band [[tüntolk]] launched [[Mor-Wave]] with *[[Jolchu (Album)|Jolchu]]*. The territory also confronted the Soviet past. Memorials to the [[1956 Talas Riots]] and to the victims of the 3 February 1992 shootings were unveiled in Talas in 1996 and 1997. A criminal case opened against Chernov in 1995 never came to trial, because Russia declined to extradite him, and in 2002 a commission of the legislature documented 27 deaths in the 3 February shootings.[22] ## The countryside and the clans The territorial institutions never took firm root in the mountain and steppe districts. After 1992 the clans resumed the customary self-government that the SRI had tried to abolish, and their councils of elders continued to settle disputes under customary law (*adat*). The Commercial Property and Tenure Acts of 1995 protected household herds but left communal clan pastures without clear legal protection, a gap that became central in 2007.[23] Revenue from oil, antimony and the air base, and agricultural investment, went mainly to the cities and irrigated valleys, while the pastoral interior remained poor and Iradi-speaking. Tribal-aligned Iradis largely rejected both Russian and English, which the urban middle class used daily. Historians describe this divide as the main fault line that reopened when federal administration ended.[3] ## End of the territorial period Debate over the future of the treaty grew in the mid-2000s, as did rumors, later known as the [[Bush Family Palatial Complex Conspiracy Theory]], that the hardened site east of Nurzhan was being built as a private retreat for the Bush family; construction had in fact begun in 1995. On 3 December 2006 [[wp:George W. Bush|President Bush]] withdrew the United States from the treaty by executive action (see [[United States Withdrawal from the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty (2006)]]). The withdrawal ended federal civilian administration, including the office of the High Commissioner and federal transfers to the territorial budget, but not the US military presence at Talas Air Base, which continued under the 2001 agreement.[3] On 7 December, on a petition by Orozbekov, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Isakov held that the withdrawal had triggered the statutory independence clause (see [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]]). On 9 December the Territorial Legislature proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Irad, with Orozbekov as Prime Minister, and the office of territorial Governor lapsed. The United States did not notify the United Nations that its administration had ended, so Irad remained on the list of non-self-governing territories, with the United States still nominally recorded as the administering power.[7] The DRI's sale of state assets, its secret partition drafts with the three neighbors (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]), Toktarov's proclamation of the ISEZ on 25 February 2007 and the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] followed. ## Legacy and historiography The territory's institutions outlived it. The governorship, the Territorial Legislature, now a single chamber of 60 seats, and the Supreme Court form the government of the ISEZ, which treats the Organic Act and the territorial statutes as its basic law while Irad's sovereignty is "suspended". The dollar, the official status of English, the Latin alphabet and the US presence at Talas Air Base all date from the period.[8] The period is remembered differently in different parts of the country. ISEZ textbooks present the territorial era as the foundation of modern Irad and emphasize the 1992 treaty, while oral histories in the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] give more weight to the 1916 revolt, the clans and the [[Popular Front of Irad]], and treat the treaty as a surrender of the sovereignty proclaimed in March 1992.[24] Historians at Talas State University continue to debate whether the treaty was the only means of saving Talas, and whether its withdrawal clause left the territory exposed when Washington used it in 2006. [[wp:Donald Trump|Donald Trump's]] remarks of 2025 about selling Irad to Russia, which took no account of the end of US administration in 2006, provoked protests in both zones, including a march past the former residence of the High Commissioner in Talas, and renewed debate about the legacy of the territorial years (see [[Irad–United States relations]]).[25] ## See also - [[History of Irad]] - [[Political status of Irad]] - [[List of governors of Irad]] - [[Irad–United States relations]] ## References
  1. ^ US Department of State (1992). 'Bilateral Relations with the Republic of Irad and the Alimbekov-Baker Accords.' US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23.
  2. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 110: Territorial Legislative Journals and Enacted Statutes (1992–2006).
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Suspended Sovereignty: The Afterlife of the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty.' Academic Press, pp. 112–131.
  4. ^ Department of History, Talas State University (2017). The War of 1992: A Documentary History. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  5. ^ Alimbekov, Amanbek (1998). From Soviet Republic to Territorial Sovereignty. 2 vols. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  6. ^ Abdyldaev, Nurlan (2015). Two Wars for Talas: Armed Forces and Politics in Irad, 1992–2007. Talas: Talas State University Press, pp. 140–201.
  7. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  8. ^ Central Asian Policy Review (2023). 'Institutional Legacies of the American Territorial Era in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 112–129.
  9. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (2013). 'Amendment to the Elective Governor Acts.' Official Gazette of Irad. Talas.
  10. ^ Talas State University Press (2012). Parties and Elections in the Territory of Irad, 1992–2006. Talas, pp. 72–118.
  11. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 111: Supreme Court Reports and Organic Jurisprudence (1992–2023).
  12. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Water, Power, and the Frozen Conflict in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 201–224.
  13. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Water, Watts and the Ceasefire: Supervising the Naryn Protocol.' Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 58–81.
  14. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Airpower at the Crossroads: Talas Air Base and US Posture in Central Asia.' Academic Press, pp. 54–68.
  15. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  16. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (1993). Banking and Commercial Currency Act. Talas.
  17. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
  18. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Russophone Industrial Intelligentsia of the Chu Basin.' Vol. 15, pp. 112–129.
  19. ^ Talas State University Press (2023). Descriptive Grammar of the Iradi Language, pp. 112–148.
  20. ^ Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl (2005). The Church of St. Janyl and the Ruins of Shar-i-Kuhna: The World Heritage Inscription. Iyık Janyl: Cathedral Seminary Press.
  21. ^ Talas Herald (11 March 2013). 'Twenty years of Swift Hooves.' Talas.
  22. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad, Commission on the Events of 1991–1992 (2002). Report on the Shootings of 3 February 1992. Talas.
  23. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2009). 'Pasture, Property and Privatization in Irad, 1992–2007.' Vol. 15, pp. 33–58.
  24. ^ Institute of History, Talas State University (2012). History of Irad in Three Volumes. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  25. ^ Talas Herald (2025). 'Thousands March in Talas Against Trump Remarks.'
### 3.31. Administrative divisions of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* The **administrative divisions of Irad** reflect the division of the territory since 2007 between two administrations separated by the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), about one-seventh of Irad's roughly 217,400 km², is divided into three cities of governorate significance, [[Talas]], [[Nurzhan]] and [[Iyık Janyl]], and six districts (Iradi: *aimak*): Talas, Kara-Buura, Chu, [[Sary-Bulak]], Lower Naryn and Toktogul.[1] The [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), the remaining six-sevenths, have no formal administrative divisions. Their land is held by 24 clans (*uruk*) under councils of elders and customary law, and the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) and aid agencies divide it into seven planning zones for their own operations: Northern Steppe, [[wp:Karatau Mountains|Karatau]], [[Talas Alatau]], Chatkal Highlands, Kyrgyz Range–[[Suusamyr]], Toktogul–Naryn and Fergana Rim.[2] The ISEZ claims authority over the whole of Irad but does not extend its district system beyond the line. The ATR's clan authorities, coordinated by the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC), reject ISEZ authority, and the planning zones have no legal or political standing. ## History #### Before 1925 Under the [[wp:Khanate of Kokand]] the Iradi valleys were governed by the khan's appointed governors (*beks*) from fortified towns, while the pastoral clans kept their own leaders. After [[wp:Mikhail Skobelev|General Mikhail Skobelev]] conquered the khanate in 1876, the Iradi lands were divided among the Syr-Darya, [[wp:Semirechye]] and Fergana oblasts of [[wp:Russian Turkestan]], so that the Talas and lower Chu valleys and the Fergana foothills fell under different provincial administrations.[3] #### Soviet period (1925–1991) The Soviet national delimitation created the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] in 1925. From 1927 its capital was Kobozev (renamed Nurzhan in 1992). The republic was divided into raions (districts) and at times into oblasts, whose boundaries were redrawn several times. [[wp:Collectivization in the Soviet Union|Collectivization]] in the 1930s reorganized rural administration around collective and state farms, which pushed many pastoral clans from the lowland plains into the mountains.[4] #### Territorial period (1992–2006) The US territorial administration kept the Soviet-era raions as units of local administration and grouped them into five senatorial districts for elections to the Territorial Senate. Talas, Nurzhan and Iyık Janyl were given elected city councils from 1993. The Toponymic Heritage Statute of 1993 confirmed the renaming of Kobozev as Nurzhan and restored Turkic and Sogdian names to streets, districts and reservoirs across the territory (see [[De-Russification Movement in Irad]]).[5] In law the whole territory was governed from Talas, but clan leaders in the mountains and steppe kept their distance from the territorial authorities. #### Since 2007 The [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] of September 2007 fixed the Qara-Chik line between the zones held by the two sides. Many of the old raions were cut by the line. After the line had been surveyed, an executive decree of 2008 consolidated the raions left wholly or partly on the ISEZ side into five districts and confirmed the special status of the three cities. A district, Lower Naryn, was created for the ISEZ salient around [[Tash-Kömür]] and [[Iyık Janyl]] and the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim around [[Bazar-Korgon]], which had joined the ISEZ in August 2007; the salient was then linked to the rest of the zone only by a guarded road across tribal land. Under the 2009 protocol that brought the Toktogul basin and the [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] corridor into the ISEZ, the district was extended north up a narrow corridor in the Naryn gorge and over the basin and the passes to the Otmek Tunnel, and the Otmek valley north of the tunnel was added to Talas District; in exchange the high Kyrgyz Range east of the Kök-Bel road, with the village of [[Toguz-Bulak]], passed to the tribal side.[1] Since 2011 the three cities and the districts have also formed the eight multi-member constituencies of the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] (see [[Elections in Irad]]). By then Lower Naryn District ran for about 350 km from the Otmek Tunnel to the Uzbek frontier, and the Toktogul basin lay about 175 km by the gorge road from the district seat at Tash-Kömür, a road often closed by rockfalls in spring. A district reform decree of 1 March 2016, in force from 1 July, split off **Toktogul District**, with its seat at Toktogul, for the highway corridor and the floor of the basin; its administration also took over the ISEZ side of the day-to-day dealings with the basin's councils of elders under the 2009 protocol. The same decree moved several district boundaries onto crests and streams: Talas District was limited to the Talas valley up to the crest of the Kyrgyz Range, the plain north of the range west of the Merke stream passed to Kara-Buura District, the village of [[Ming-Örük]] on the Kenkol fan passed from Kara-Buura to Talas District, and the foothill villages along the Chatkal road, including [[Uuk-Bulak]] and Tash-Bulak, and [[Ak-Bulak]] in the upper Urmaral valley, passed from Talas to Sary-Bulak District. The decree left the electoral map unchanged, and Toktogul District votes with Lower Naryn as a single constituency.[1][7] On the tribal side, the Popular Front's political council became the IAC at a kurultai on the [[Aksay Plateau]] in late 2007. The clans did not adopt any territorial subdivision of their own, and the planning zones, now seven, were introduced by UNMI and humanitarian agencies from 2008 to coordinate aid deliveries, vaccination campaigns and mine clearance.[2] ## Irad Special Economic Zone The ISEZ covers about 29,400 km² and, according to the 2018 census, about 2.63 million people, 57 percent of the official national total of 4,626,000. About 2.28 million of them live in the three cities and about 350,000 in the six districts, in market towns and some 400 villages and hamlets.[6] Each city of governorate significance is administered separately from the surrounding district. It has a mayor appointed by the Governor and an elected city council. Each district is headed by a district head (*aimak bashchysy*) appointed by the Governor, and its villages and small towns elect local councils. The district administrations are responsible for local roads, schools, agricultural services and civil registration; police, courts and the main utilities are run by ISEZ-wide ministries and agencies.[1] The [[Democratic Party of Irad]] has a regional committee in each city and district, which analysts describe as the main channel through which procurement, utility concessions and agricultural quotas are allocated. #### Cities of governorate significance Populations are 2018 census figures; metropolitan and agglomeration figures are unofficial estimates.[6] | City | Population (2018) | Elevation | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | [[Talas]] | 1,120,000 (1.4 million metropolitan area, estimate) | c. 1,250 m | *De jure* capital and largest city; seat of the legislature, the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] and Government House; surrounded by Talas District | | [[Nurzhan]] | 850,000 (over 1 million in the agglomeration, estimate) | 470 m | Industrial center and headquarters of [[NurGaz]]; known as Kobozev from 1927 to 1992; surrounded by Chu District. Urban districts include [[Dastgoh District|Dastgoh]], the old quarter, and [[Navbahor District|Navbahor]] | | [[Iyık Janyl]] | 310,000 | 650 m | Religious center of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], on the river flats of the Naryn where it leaves its gorge, about 8 km upriver from Tash-Kömür | Together the three cities hold slightly less than half of Irad's official population. Talas's neighborhoods include the [[Old Talas Citadel Quarter]] and [[Semiz]], home to much of the city's Mexican community. Semiz grew from *Otkormochny*, the Soviet workers' settlement of a state cattle-fattening complex, renamed with the Iradi calque *Semiz* ("fattened") in the 1990s; Russian speakers still call it Otkormochny, its Mexican residents call it *la Colonia*, and [[Iradis]] commonly call it *Meksikanka*. #### Districts Areas are approximate figures published by the ISEZ statistical office.[7] | District | [[Iradi name]] | Area (approx.) | Administrative center | Description | |---|---|---|---|---| | Talas District | *Talas aimagı* | 2,700 km² | Talas | The middle and upper Talas valley up to the crest of the Kyrgyz Range, from the low ground between the Kenkol and Kara-Buura fans east past [[Kara-Bulak]], [[Talas Air Base]], [[Semiz]] and the UNMI headquarters at Kara-Oi, and up the Otmek valley to [[Orto-Ayyl]] and the Otmek Tunnel | | Kara-Buura District | *Kara-Buura aimagı* | 9,190 km² | [[Kyzyl-Adyr]] | The lower Talas valley around Kyzyl-Adyr and [[Aulie-Ata]], a belt along the [[Trans-Talas Highway]] and the railway west to the Kazakh border, and the plain north of the Kyrgyz Range from its western end east to the Merke stream (see [[Kara-Buura]]) | | Chu District | *Chüy aimagı* | 13,470 km² | Nurzhan | The irrigated Chu lowlands around Nurzhan, including the oil fields, the rail yards, the [[Chu Irrigation Canal System]] and the [[Boz-Korgon]] area, and the belt along the main road and the railway at the north foot of the Kyrgyz Range east of the Merke stream | | Sary-Bulak District | *Sary-Bulak aimagı* | 470 km² | Sary-Bulak | The southern industrial corridor and foothills south of Talas, including the [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]], the [[Chatkal Chemical Smelting Complex]], the lower [[Kara-Suu Canyon]] and the foothill villages along the Chatkal road | | Lower Naryn District | *Tömönkü Naryn aimagı* | 2,290 km² | Tash-Kömür | The Naryn below the Toktogul dam: the workers' town of Kara-Köl, a narrow corridor down the Naryn gorge to the Uch-Kurgan dam at its mouth, the river flats around Tash-Kömür and the city of [[Iyık Janyl]], and the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim east past [[Bazar-Korgon]], [[Sopol-Tepa]] and [[Korgoncho]] to the Uzbek frontier, and round [[wp:Jalal-Abad]] the villages on the west bank of the frontier river up to the foot of the [[Kök-Kamar Gorge]] | | Toktogul District | *Toktogul aimagı* | 1,270 km² | [[Toktogul (town)|Toktogul]] | The Fergana Mountain Transit Highway corridor from the Otmek Tunnel over the [[Fergana Gateway]] and down the Chychkan valley, and the floor of the Toktogul basin with the town of Toktogul, the reservoir and the Toktogul dam; formed in 2016 from the northern part of Lower Naryn District | The district areas include the cities of governorate significance that the districts surround. - **Talas District** is the most densely settled district, with irrigated farmland, the beef plants of the Talas agribusiness zone on the edge of the capital, and the lower reaches of several Talas Alatau valleys whose upper parts lie on the tribal side of the line. To the north it reaches the crest of the Kyrgyz Range, and to the east it runs up the Otmek valley to the north portal of the Otmek Tunnel. - **Kara-Buura District** is mainly agricultural, growing wheat, barley, beans, potatoes and fodder, and contains the main road crossing into [[wp:Kazakhstan]] from the Talas valley. Besides the seat, Kyzyl-Adyr, its towns include [[Aulie-Ata]], the old Kokand fortress and Russian district town on the Talas where the river leaves the valley, whose Soviet-era city has been cleared back to its old core. Smaller towns include Asa, north of Aulie-Ata, and Sary-Jar and Kyzyl-Kyr on the belt to the west. It also takes in the plain north of the Kyrgyz Range, round the western end of the range and east along the main road and the Turksib railway to the Merke stream, with the northern Toguz-Bulak crossing on the Kök-Bel road. West of the valley it narrows to a belt along the highway and the railway, with the Karatau foothills on both sides lying on the tribal side of the western sector of the Qara-Chik line. The Ak-Tash Training Center of the State Defense Corps lies just beyond the line, on tribal land held under an arrangement with the local clan. - **Chu District**, the largest by area, combines the irrigated oases around Nurzhan with a belt along the main road and the Turksib railway that runs south-west along the foot of the Kyrgyz Range as far as the Merke stream, where Kara-Buura District begins. It contains the Chu basin oil fields, the rail yards, the Chu Gate crossing, the point where the Chu enters Irad and most of the farming villages of the [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]] outside Nurzhan, and borders Kazakhstan east of the city. Its largest town outside Nurzhan is Merke, on the main road at the foot of the range. - **Sary-Bulak District** is Irad's mining district. The line bulges south around it to take in the antimony mine and smelter, which are reached from Talas by the Sary-Bulak road through the lower Kara-Suu Canyon. It also includes the foothill villages along the Chatkal road, such as Uuk-Bulak and Tash-Bulak, and Ak-Bulak in the upper Urmaral valley. - **Lower Naryn District** runs from the workers' town of Kara-Köl, just below the Toktogul dam, to the Uzbek frontier. It holds the switchyard and national dispatch center of the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]], the Naryn bridge control post and the downstream power stations, as well as cotton farms and coal mines. It surrounds the city of Iyık Janyl, which is administered separately. Between Kara-Köl and Iyık Janyl it is only a few kilometers wide, holding State Route 1, the river and the lower cascade stations, with tribal mountains on either side. Below Tash-Kömür it widens over the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim, which runs east below the foot of the hills past [[Bazar-Korgon]], the ISEZ's main Muslim town and a border market, and gives the ISEZ about 145 km of frontier with [[wp:Uzbekistan]]. Below Tash-Kömür the district also takes in the mouth of the Naryn gorge, with the Uch-Kurgan dam and power station, where the river leaves Irad. Besides Tash-Kömür and Bazar-Korgon, the district's market towns include Kochkor-Ata and Shamaldy-Say. The frontier follows the foot of the hills, and the Uzbek piedmont towns beyond it, such as Karasu (Qorasuv), Khanabad and Sultanabad in the Andijan oases, lie in Uzbekistan. At its eastern end, round the Kyrgyz city of [[wp:Jalal-Abad]], the district takes in Suzak, Dostuk and the villages on the west bank of the small river that marks the frontier with [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] north of the city, up to the foot of the [[Kök-Kamar Gorge]]; the valley villages east of the river are Kyrgyz. UNMI's sector headquarters is at Tash-Kömür.[8] - **Toktogul District**, the newest district, was split from Lower Naryn in 2016. It contains the dam, powerhouse and reservoir of the Toktogul complex, the town of [[Toktogul (town)|Toktogul]] on the northern shore, the villages of [[Jele-Döbö]] and [[Kara-Say]] and the [[Uch-Terek Rapids]] at the head of the reservoir. North of the basin it narrows to a corridor a few kilometers wide along State Route 1 up the Chychkan valley, over the Ala-Bel Pass with the Fergana Gateway control post and through the western Suusamyr, with the seasonal camp of [[Karakol-Ashuu]], to the south portal of the Otmek Tunnel. The mountains around it are tribal, and the basin's councils of elders keep their authority over pasture and irrigation under the 2009 protocol.[8] ## Autonomous Tribal Regions The ATR cover about 188,000 km². The official 2018 census estimated their population at about 2.0 million; independent estimates, based on satellite settlement mapping and aid-agency registries, put it at 3.5 to 4 million (see [[2018 Irad census]]).[9] #### Clan territories Land in the ATR is held by 24 clans, each governed by a council of elders (*aksakals*) and a *biy* under customary law ([[Adat Law in the ATR|adat]]). Village councils (*ayyl kengeshi*) allocate pasture, organize hay cutting and maintain irrigation channels, and pasture boundaries are marked by boundary stones (*bel-tash*). Clan territories are not contiguous blocks: a clan typically holds winter villages in sheltered valleys or on the desert margin and summer pastures (*zhayloo*) in the mountains, linked by migration corridors fixed by clan pasture committees. Matters affecting all clans are decided at the summer *kurultai* on the Aksay Plateau, and inter-clan grazing disputes go to the [[Autonomous Tribal Grazing Arbitration Tribunal]].[10] The most politically prominent clan is the Tanıp, whose chief, [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]], is the IAC's principal spokesman. #### UN planning zones The seven planning zones were drawn by UNMI and aid agencies along physical and logistical lines. The ISEZ divides the tribal land into three separate blocks, north of the plains belt, west of the State Route 1 corridor and the Naryn gorge, and east of them, and each zone lies within one block; in the mountains the boundaries follow crests and the line. Clan territories often cross the zone boundaries. Areas are approximate figures used in UNMI planning documents.[2] | Planning zone | Area (approx.) | Extent | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | Northern Steppe | 119,600 km² | The southern [[Betpak-Dala]] steppe north of the Chu, the Moiynkum (Muyunkum) sands and the Chu–Sarysu lowland, and the piedmont plain north of the ISEZ belt, including the low plain north-east of the Karatau | Largest and most thinly populated zone; winter grazing; the lower Chu ends near the [[Akzhaykyn Depression|Akzhaykyn depression]]; the undeveloped [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]] | | Karatau | 24,000 km² | The Karatau range and its foothill upland, north and west of the ISEZ belt along the Shymkent road, running northwest toward the [[Kyzylkum Fringe]] | Winter pastures on the desert margin, including the [[Kulan-Talaa]] plain; Kara-Khanid caravanserais such as [[Rabat-i Kamal]] | | Talas Alatau | 8,200 km² | The north slope and crest of the Talas Alatau above the Talas valley, from Aksu-Zhabagly on the Kazakh frontier east to the State Route 1 corridor, plus the head of the Uzun-Akmat valley over the Sarybie Pass, the winter country of the Tanıp clan | Summer pastures above 2,500 m, including the Aksay Plateau; the [[Kara-Koyun Valley]] of the Karakoyun clan; upper [[Besh-Tash National Park|Besh-Tash]] and upper Kara-Suu; the Aksu-Zhabagly reserve in the west; [[Manas Peak (Irad)|Manas Peak]] | | Chatkal Highlands | 17,800 km² | Everything south of the Talas Alatau crest and west of the State Route 1 corridor and the Naryn gorge: the Chatkal valley and range, the Uzun-Akmat valley above the Toktogul Reservoir and the hills west of the Naryn down to their foot on the Fergana rim, including Uzbek hill villages above about 950 meters on the Namangan side; the piedmont towns below lie in Uzbekistan | [[Sary-Chelek Biosphere Reserve|Sary-Chelek]] reserve; walnut and wild-fruit forests; [[Kanysh-Kiya]] and [[Terek-Sai]]; pastures shared by the Sarybagysh and Naiman clans; the Kökjal village of [[Ozgörüsh]] on the lower Uzun-Akmat; [[Boz-Adyr]] and [[Kara-Jygach]] above the Fergana farm belt | | Kyrgyz Range–Suusamyr | 4,100 km² | The high Kyrgyz Range east of the Kök-Bel road, tribal since 2009, and the Suusamyr side east of the State Route 1 corridor | Summer pastures of the Talas Alatau clans, whose herds cross the corridor at agreed places and seasons under the 2009 protocol; [[Toguz-Bulak]] and the two crossing points on the Kök-Bel road; the Western Karakol valley with [[Karakol]] and its fodder depot; the summer settlement of [[Ak-Kyya]]; the [[Otmek]] weather station below the pass | | Toktogul–Naryn | 5,100 km² | The mountains east of the State Route 1 corridor round the Toktogul basin and east of the Naryn gorge, up to the crest of the Fergana Range | Pastures and villages of the Kökjal clan, such as [[Kara-Jylga]] and [[Tash-Köröö]] above the reservoir, [[Kosh-Bel]] and the summer camp of [[Dary-Bulak]]; the basin floor, the reservoir and the dam, and a narrow corridor down the gorge, have been in the ISEZ since 2009 | | Fergana Rim | 9,200 km² | The Fergana side of the Fergana Range above the ISEZ farm belt of the northern and eastern Fergana Valley | Most densely settled zone; walnut forests, orchards and terraced fields; the highland Chubar; [[Arslanbob]], the Kara-Unkur valley, [[Jangak-Bulak]], [[Örüktü]] and the Soviet uranium tailings at [[Mailuu-Suu]]; the irrigated farm belt below, around [[Bazar-Korgon]], is in the ISEZ, and the valley's large cities, including Jalal-Abad, lie outside Irad | The zones are used for aid planning, the scheduling of vaccination and fodder deliveries, mine action and humanitarian reporting. They also appear in UNMI's patrol plans for the tribal side of the line, where five of the mission's eleven team sites are located.[2] The IAC does not use them in its own governance, although its Chancellery corresponds with UNMI and aid agencies in their terms. ## The Qara-Chik Demarcation Line The Qara-Chik line, fixed by the 2007 ceasefire and adjusted in the south in 2009, is the boundary between the two systems. About 1,750 km long, it encloses the irrigated valleys of the Talas and lower Chu, the belts along the main roads and railway that join them and run west to the Kazakh frontier, and, beyond the Talas Alatau, the corridor of State Route 1, the Toktogul basin, a narrow corridor down the Naryn gorge, the river flats of the lower Naryn and the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim. UNMI divides the line into western, central, southern (Naryn and Fergana rim) and northern sectors. The Gendarmerie mans checkpoints at nine crossing points on the ISEZ side, and the [[El-Choro Militias]] keep picket stations on the tribal side. A restricted-weapons zone extends 12 km on either side.[8] Neither administration treats the line as an international boundary: the ISEZ describes it as an administrative line within Irad, and the IAC as the limit of the land held by the clans. Irad's external frontiers with Kazakhstan, [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] are demarcated only on the sections held by the ISEZ along the Kazakh border, under the 2008 [[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]]. The ISEZ also holds about 145 km of the Uzbek frontier along the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim, which is undemarcated; a memorandum on trade and border coordination signed with Uzbekistan in February 2025, not a treaty, set shared customs inspection hours at the main crossings and a joint working group on livestock and cotton shipments. The ATR-held sections follow Soviet-era administrative boundaries that have never been marked on the ground. ## See also - [[Geography of Irad]] - [[Political status of Irad]] - [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] - [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] - [[Demographics of Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ Central Asian Policy Review (2023). 'Institutional Legacies of the American Territorial Era in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 112–129.
  2. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2024). Planning Zones and Humanitarian Access in the Autonomous Tribal Regions: Annual Report. Kara-Oi.
  3. ^ Pierce, Richard A. (1960). Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule. University of California Press.
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 85: Central Committee Protocols of the Iradi SSR (1925–1991).
  5. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (1993). Toponymic Heritage Statute. Territorial Gazette, Talas.
  6. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). 2018 Census of Irad: Methodology and Results. Talas.
  7. ^ ISEZ Statistical Office (2019). 2018 Census of Population: Settlements of the Districts. Talas.
  8. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Military Observer Assessment on Demarcation Security. Kara-Oi.
  9. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2021). 'Counting the Tribal Regions: Reassessing the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, pp. 5–31.
  10. ^ Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery (2022). Compendium of Customary Law (Adat) and Pasture Demarcations.
### 3.32. Elections in Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* **Elections in Irad** are held only in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), the third of the country governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI). Every four years, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, voters in the ISEZ elect a Governor and Lieutenant Governor on a joint ticket, the 60 members of the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] (*Mejlis*) and the councils of the three cities of governorate significance. The [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), which cover the other six-sevenths of the territory, take no part; their clans govern themselves through councils of elders and decide common matters by consensus at a *kurultai*.[1] The electoral system descends from the US territorial period of 1992–2006, when Irad held competitive, if DPI-dominated, elections under the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]] and the 1992 Elective Governor Acts. Since 2007 the DPI has won every gubernatorial election, all of them by [[Erlan Toktarov]], and has held a large majority in the legislature. Observers from the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] (OSCE) have said that the 2013 electoral reform and the elections that followed lacked "any meaningful transparency or choice for the Iradi people".[2] The DPI maintains that the elections are free and that its majorities reflect public support for stability. The next general election is due on 2 November 2027 (see [[2027 Iradi gubernatorial election]]). ## History #### Soviet period In the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] (1925–1991), elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet and to local soviets followed the Soviet single-candidate pattern, with the [[Communist Party of Irad]] approving all nominations. In 1990 the republican Supreme Soviet created the post of President and elected the party's First Secretary, [[Vasily Chernov]], to it.[3] The [[Declaration of State Sovereignty (1991)]], which created the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] in October 1991, was not followed by free elections or the legalization of opposition parties, a point on which the national movement criticized it. #### Provisional Government (1992) On 11 March 1992 the [[Talas Town Hall Meeting (1992)|Talas Town Hall Meeting]], an assembly of reformers, delegates of the strike and student committees and clan elders convened by the Talas city council, proclaimed the Republic of Irad and elected [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] Provisional President. No popular vote was held during the [[First Iradi Civil War]].[4] #### Territorial period (1992–2006) The Organic Act, which took effect on 18 August 1992, provided for an elected Governor and an elected bicameral legislature. Pending elections, an interim US administration headed by the High Commissioner exercised executive authority, and an interim legislature drawn from the Provisional Government's councils and from district delegates met in Talas from October 1992.[5] Municipal councils were first elected in November 1993. The first general elections were held on 8 November 1994, on the same day as US federal elections, a convention the territory kept throughout. The system followed the American territorial model:[5] - The **Governor and Lieutenant Governor** were elected on a joint ticket for four-year terms, beginning on the first Monday of January, with a limit of two consecutive terms. - The **Territorial Senate** had 15 members, three from each of five senatorial districts, elected for four years. - The **Territorial House of Representatives** had 35 members, elected every two years from single-member constituencies apportioned by population. The DPI, formally constituted in October 1992 from the Provisional Government's reformist caucus, won the governorship and majorities in both chambers in 1994 and kept them for most of the period. Its main opponents were the [[Labor Party of Irad]], which represented the Russophone industrial workforce of [[Nurzhan]], the nationalist [[Jer-Suu Party]], and independent rural deputies.[6] Alimbekov declined to stand, writing later that the man who had signed away the republic's independence should not seek office in the territory. Toktarov entered the House of Representatives in 1994 and moved to the Senate, where he was Majority Leader from 2000 to 2004. Studies of the period describe the elections as genuinely contested: governors were elected with between 52 and 62 percent of the vote, several DPI incumbents lost House seats, and Russophone parties controlled the Nurzhan city council for most of the period (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]).[6] Participation in the rural interior was low throughout. Many clan communities kept their distance from the territorial authorities, and turnout in the mountain constituencies rarely exceeded 35 percent, against 60 to 70 percent in the cities.[6] The last territorial general election was held on 7 November 2006, four weeks before the United States withdrew from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]]. Governor Nurgul Abdrakhmanova was re-elected, but her second term, due to begin in January 2007, never started (see [[List of governors of Irad]]). #### Democratic Republic (2006–2007) On 9 December 2006, acting on the Supreme Court's [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)]], the Territorial Legislature reconstituted itself as a national assembly, proclaimed the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] and elected [[Bakyt Orozbekov]] Prime Minister. The office of territorial Governor lapsed. No elections were held under the DRI, which was dissolved after the [[Popular Front of Irad]] stormed Talas on 4 June 2007.[7] #### Irad Special Economic Zone (2007–present) Toktarov proclaimed the ISEZ on 25 February 2007 and took office as Governor after the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)|ceasefire]] of September 2007. Members of the last territorial legislature who accepted the emergency administration sat as a provisional single chamber until November 2011.[8] The Jer-Suu Party was banned in 2008 as an extremist organization, and the Political Parties Act of 2010, which requires 10,000 members spread across all eight constituencies, led to the dissolution of the Labor Party in 2011; no party other than the DPI has met its thresholds since (see [[Jer-Suu Party]], [[Labor Party of Irad]]). On 8 November 2011 the ISEZ held its first regular elections, and Toktarov was re-elected with an official 88.74 percent. Under the prevailing reading of the Elective Governor Acts, which counted his 2007–2011 tenure as a first term, he would have been barred from standing again in 2015.[9] In June 2013 the legislature passed an amendment to the Acts removing the two-term limit, by 53 votes to 4 with three abstentions; the Russo-aligned deputies from Nurzhan voted against (see [[2013 Constitutional Amendment]]). In 2014 the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] declined to hear a challenge, holding that the question belonged to the legislature.[9] Before the 2015 election the DPI majority adopted new rules on the verification of nomination signatures and on candidates' residence. In early October 2015 the Territorial Election Commission struck the rival nominees from the ballot, among them an independent backed by trade unions in Nurzhan and a Russo-aligned businessman (see [[2015 Electoral Reform Controversy]]). Toktarov won with 78.25 percent, his lowest share, and opposition groups protested in Talas and Nurzhan.[10] In 2019 he won 90.31 percent, with his son-in-law [[Aidar Maksat]] as his running mate. The 2023 election, held a month after the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]], gave him 92.75 percent (see [[2023 Iradi gubernatorial election]]). Toktarov has not appeared in public since July 2024. The DPI attributes his absence to an extended health retreat. No formal finding of inability has been made under the Elective Governor Acts, and the DPI has named no successor. Analysts note that the only formal routes to a transfer of power are the Acts' succession provisions and the 2027 election (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[11] ## Electoral system #### Governor and Lieutenant Governor The Governor and Lieutenant Governor are elected together on a joint ticket for a four-year term, beginning on the fourth Monday of November after the election. A ticket needs more than half of the valid votes; otherwise a runoff between the two leading tickets is held three weeks later. No runoff has been needed since 2007. Since the 2013 amendment there is no limit on the number of terms.[9] Since 2015 a gubernatorial candidate must collect 10,000 verified signatures of registered voters and must have lived in the ISEZ continuously for ten years before nomination. Candidates are nominated by parties or as independents. The DPI's party congress nominates its ticket.[10] Under the Acts the Lieutenant Governor acts for an absent or incapacitated Governor and succeeds if the office falls vacant. Legal scholars differ on whether the Lieutenant Governor may exercise the Governor's powers in his own right before a formal declaration of incapacity, and on who would be competent to make one.[11] #### Territorial Legislature Since 2011 the legislature has been a single chamber of 60 members elected for four years on the same day as the Governor. Its eight multi-member constituencies correspond to the three cities of governorate significance ([[Talas]], Nurzhan and [[Iyık Janyl]]) and the districts (Talas, [[Kara-Buura]], Chu, [[Sary-Bulak]], and Lower Naryn, whose constituency has also covered Toktogul District since 2016) (see [[Administrative divisions of Irad]]). Seats are apportioned according to official population figures. Within each constituency voters choose among party lists and independent candidates, and seats are allocated by the largest-remainder method.[12] A Speaker, elected from the majority, presides. #### Municipal elections Each city has an elected council and a mayor appointed by the Governor, who also appoints the district heads. During the territorial period councils were elected every four years from 1993. The councils elected in 2005 continued in office under the emergency administration, and since 2011 municipal elections have been held on the same day as the general election.[12] Russo politicians have held a majority on the Nurzhan city council for most of the period since 1992, which makes it the most significant elected body not controlled by the DPI. Its members have included the trade unionist [[Elena Petrova]], first elected in 1997. #### Administration and franchise Elections are run by the Territorial Election Commission, a seven-member body appointed by the Governor with the consent of the legislature, which keeps the voter registers, registers candidates and certifies results. Citizens resident in the ISEZ may vote from the age of 18. The registers are compiled from residence records held by the municipal authorities and the Ministry of Internal Security, which OSCE observers have cited as a weakness.[2] #### The tribal regions Residents of the ATR are not on the ISEZ voter registers, and no polling stations are opened on the tribal side of the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC) does not recognize ISEZ institutions and has never called on tribal residents to take part. Its own bodies are not elected. Each of the 24 clans is led by a council of elders and a hereditary or acclaimed *biy*, and matters affecting all clans are decided by consensus at the summer *kurultai* on the [[Aksay Plateau]]. Human rights organizations have criticized the absence of elections to IAC bodies, while the IAC describes consensus among the lineages as the tribal form of representation.[13] Representation of the tribal regions in a unified legislature has been the central question of every unification negotiation. At the [[2011 Bilateral Reunification Summit]] the DPI offered the ATR one-third of the seats, and the IAC delegation walked out. The size of the tribal population, which the DPI's [[2018 Irad census]] estimated at about 2.0 million against independent estimates of 3.5 to 4 million, would determine its weight in any apportionment.[14] ## Results since 2011 #### Gubernatorial elections Official results as certified by the Territorial Election Commission:[2][15] | Election | DPI ticket | Official share | Official turnout | Notes | |---|---|---|---|---| | 8 November 2011 | Erlan Toktarov, Daniyar Tologonov | 88.74% | 67.9% | First regular ISEZ election; held months after the collapse of the unification talks | | 3 November 2015 | Erlan Toktarov, Daniyar Tologonov | 78.25% | 58.4% | First election after the removal of term limits; rival nominees disqualified | | 5 November 2019 | Erlan Toktarov, Aidar Maksat | 90.31% | 73.2% | Maksat took office as Lieutenant Governor on 25 November 2019 | | 7 November 2023 | Erlan Toktarov, Aidar Maksat | 92.75% | 71.6% | Held a month after the Talas student protests | #### Legislative elections Seats won in the 60-member Territorial Legislature:[2][15] | Election | DPI | Independents | Russo-aligned | Notes | |---|---|---|---|---| | 2011 | 49 | 7 | 4 | Replaced the provisional chamber of 2007–2011 | | 2015 | 52 | 5 | 3 | | | 2019 | 54 | 4 | 2 | | | 2023 | 51 | 6 | 3 | Most independents vote with the DPI | The Russo-aligned deputies, all elected from Nurzhan, form the only consistent opposition in the chamber. ## Assessments The [[wp:Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights|OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights]], which has sent limited assessment missions to ISEZ elections since 2011, has reported:[2] - the disqualification of opposition candidates on technical grounds, especially in 2015; - state control of the voter registers; - pressure on employees of state-owned and state-licensed enterprises to vote; - the use of state resources in DPI campaigns; - the dominance of the DPI on [[IradOne]], the state broadcaster. Human rights organizations have added that independent opposition activity is suppressed between elections and that DPI membership is often a practical condition of promotion in the civil service (see [[Human rights in Irad]]).[13] Business groups have generally taken a more favorable view of the elections, pointing to their regularity and to the absence of violence on polling days.[16] The DPI says the elections are free, that the rules apply equally to all candidates, and that its majorities reflect public support for stability while the unification question and the neighbors' territorial claims remain unresolved. It describes OSCE criticism as interference in Irad's internal affairs. Analysts note that the low official share in 2015 and the protests of 2013, 2015 and 2023 show that dissatisfaction exists even within the system, but that no opposition force has been able to contest the governorship since 2011.[11] ## See also - [[Politics of Irad]] - [[Political status of Irad]] - [[List of governors of Irad]] - [[Democratic Party of Irad]] - [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ Central Asian Policy Review (2023). 'Institutional Legacies of the American Territorial Era in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 112–129.
  2. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Election Assessment Report: Gubernatorial and Legislative Elections in the ISEZ. Warsaw.
  3. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 85: Central Committee of the Communist Party of Irad, Office of the First Secretary (1981–1991).
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 108: Revolution of 1992 and Provisional Government Minutes.
  5. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Territorial Legislative Journals and Enacted Statutes (1992–2006).
  6. ^ Talas State University Press (2012). Parties and Elections in the Territory of Irad, 1992–2006. Talas, pp. 23–118.
  7. ^ Supreme Court Reports of the Democratic Republic of Irad (2007). Official Gazette Series, Vol. 1. Talas.
  8. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'The 2007 Succession War and the Partition of Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 78–95.
  9. ^ Territorial Legislature of Irad (2013). 'Amendment to the Elective Governor Acts.' Official Gazette of Irad. Talas.
  10. ^ Talas Herald (2 October 2015). 'Election Commission Strikes Rival Candidates from Gubernatorial Ballot.' Talas.
  11. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  12. ^ Territorial Election Commission (2023). Guide to the General Election of 7 November 2023. Talas.
  13. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York, pp. 45–62.
  14. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2021). 'Counting the Tribal Regions: Reassessing the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, pp. 5–31.
  15. ^ Territorial Election Commission (2024). Certified Results of General Elections, 2011–2023. Talas.
  16. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Commercial Directory of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
### 3.33. Human rights in Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Politics & Government* **Human rights in Irad** are shaped by the territory's division since 2007 between two administrations with different legal systems. In the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI), laws inherited from the US territorial period guarantee civil liberties, but the emergency basis on which [[Erlan Toktarov]] proclaimed the zone in 2007 has never been formally ended. International monitors, including [[wp:Human Rights Watch]], [[wp:Amnesty International]], the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] and the limited human rights unit of the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI), report restrictions on the media and on assembly, non-competitive elections, executive pressure on the courts, and allegations of torture and arbitrary detention by the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]].[1][2] In the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), justice is administered by clan elders under unwritten customary law (*adat*), which monitors criticize for its lack of appeal and its treatment of women. The ISEZ government says that it upholds the rights guaranteed by the territorial statutes and describes much of the criticism as interference in Irad's internal affairs. Because Irad is not a sovereign state, neither administration can become a party to the international human rights treaties, and no UN treaty body reviews the territory.[3] ## Legal framework #### Irad Special Economic Zone The [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]] of 1992 guaranteed civil liberties, a secular state and freedom of religion, and the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] built on it during the territorial period. The [[2003 Judicial Reforms Act]] introduced jury trials in serious criminal cases. Since 2007 the ISEZ has treated the Organic Act and the territorial statutes as its basic law, with the provisions on federal oversight, including review by the US federal courts, inoperative.[4] The emergency administration Toktarov proclaimed on 25 February 2007 has never been formally ended, and much policy is made by executive decree published in the bulletin of the Department of Public Information. Human Rights Watch argues that this arrangement leaves the executive largely unchecked, since decrees are rarely challenged in the courts and the legislature, in which the DPI holds 51 of 60 seats, seldom debates them.[1] #### Autonomous Tribal Regions The authorities of the ATR do not accept that the Organic Act applies to their territory. The [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] acknowledged customary jurisdiction on the tribal side of the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and civil, family, grazing and criminal matters there are settled by councils of elders and recognized judges (*biys*) under [[Adat Law in the ATR|adat]]. The [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC) has no written constitution, and the only compilation of customary rules is a compendium of decisions kept by the [[Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery]].[5] ## Monitoring UNMI was established in 2007 to monitor the ceasefire. In 2012 the [[wp:United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] added a limited human rights reporting function covering matters connected with the ceasefire, freedom of movement and humanitarian access. The mission's reports have criticized Gendarmerie conduct at the Qara-Chik checkpoints, and in 2024 it published a report on the Talas protests of October and November 2023.[6] Human Rights Watch and other organizations argue that this mandate is too narrow and have called for a full human rights monitoring component covering both administrations. The ISEZ government opposes the proposal, and the Security Council has not adopted it. Since 2023 the ISEZ has also barred UNMI patrols from a security zone around the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound.[7] Other sources of reporting include the [[wp:Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights|OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights]], which has assessed ISEZ elections since 2011; Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; press-freedom groups; and the [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]], whose annual working paper on Irad summarizes human rights developments. Inside the ISEZ, the Legal Defense Guild, founded in 2009 by the lawyer [[Gulnara Sadykova]], gives free legal representation to detained journalists and students, and its reports on pre-trial detention are widely cited by international monitors.[8] ## Irad Special Economic Zone #### Elections and political rights Toktarov has won every gubernatorial election since 2007, most recently in 2023 with an official 92.75 percent. The OSCE has criticized the 2013 removal of term limits and the elections that followed, citing the disqualification of opposition candidates, state control of voter registers, pressure on employees of state-owned enterprises to vote and the dominance of state media (see [[Elections in Irad]]).[2] Other parties may register but have no significant representation. Opposition groups and human rights monitors say that DPI membership is often a practical condition of promotion in the civil service and in state-licensed firms.[1] #### Freedom of expression and the media Laws inherited from the territorial era guarantee freedom of the press, and Toktarov has said that Irad has had a free press since the fall of the Iradi SSR. A 2007 decree placed [[IradOne]], the state broadcaster, under the Department of Public Information, and its parent media group is chaired by Toktarov's son [[Alikhan Toktarov]]. The DPI is believed to exercise full editorial control over its news programming.[9] Independent journalists report administrative harassment, license revocations and travel bans. In 2013 the Department of Public Information suspended the registration of the *[[Irad Times]]*, an independent English-language weekly edited by [[Bolotbek Daniyarov]], for two months after it criticized the amendment removing gubernatorial term limits; the department said the suspension concerned a licensing irregularity. Press-freedom groups say that print outlets, including the *[[Talas Herald]]*, practice self-censorship on matters concerning the Toktarov family.[10] Online expression is constrained through [[Attelkom]], the largest telecommunications company. During the October 2023 protests, mobile data was cut in central [[Talas]] for three days and access to several social media platforms was throttled across the ISEZ; Attelkom described the outage as "technical work", while Human Rights Watch and local journalists attributed it to a government order. In 2024 several foreign and exile news sites were blocked.[11] Since July 2024 the authorities have described claims by opposition outlets and technology monitors about the Governor's recorded broadcasts as foreign-sponsored disinformation, and press-freedom groups have expressed concern that the label is being used to discourage reporting on the Governor's absence (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]).[12] #### Freedom of assembly Demonstrations critical of the government are usually dispersed. In June 2013 police broke up small protests by students and opposition activists outside Legislative Hall in Talas against the term-limits amendment, and opposition groups protested in Talas and Nurzhan after rival candidates were struck from the 2015 ballot (see [[2015 Electoral Reform Controversy]]).[2] The largest protests of the period, the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]], began in October 2023 over a municipal licensing surcharge on technology startups and couriers. Police and Gendarmerie units dispersed them with tear gas and water cannon and made several hundred administrative detentions, including of minors. The commentator [[Jason Ilyasov]] was held for three days and released without charge after press-freedom groups criticized his detention. The Legal Defense Guild represented more than sixty detained students, most of whom were released without charge by the end of November 2023. Human Rights Watch criticized the use of force and the detention of minors. The Gendarmerie commander, Major General [[Ruslan Toktarov]], defended the operation and described the organizers as "provocateurs paid to break windows".[11][8] Analysts contrasted the policing of these protests with the large demonstrations that followed the [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]] in February 2025, which the authorities allowed to proceed without dispersal. Thousands marched in Talas past the former residence of the US High Commissioner and gathered outside [[Talas Air Base]].[13] #### Detention, torture and the Gendarmerie The Republican Gendarmerie, a paramilitary police and border force of about 4,000 under the Ministry of Internal Security, has been commanded since 2012 by Ruslan Toktarov, the Governor's eldest son. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented allegations of torture, forced confessions and arbitrary seizure of property by units under his command, most of them concerning the Qara-Chik crossings and pre-trial detention in Talas, and both organizations have called for targeted sanctions against him.[14] UNMI reports have criticized conduct at the checkpoints, and ISEZ media, including IradOne, have in turn accused UN observers of bias. Tribal leaders complain of detentions of herders at the crossings. International monitors also report the frequent use of short administrative detention, which can be imposed without a criminal charge, against protesters and activists, and long periods of pre-trial detention in criminal cases (see [[Crime in Irad]]).[8] The Gendarmerie rejects the allegations of abuse and points to its role in protecting pipelines and industrial sites against organized crime and sabotage. No inquiry into the allegations has been opened in the ISEZ. #### Independence of the judiciary Legal scholars at [[Talas State University]] regard Toktarov's annulment of the Supreme Court's 2006 [[Statutory Independence Ruling (2006)|independence ruling]] by decree in February 2007 as the decisive subordination of the judiciary to the executive. The court never ruled on the decree; the emergency administration reconstituted the bench in 2007, and Chief Justice [[Dastan Isakov]] left the court that year. Since then justices have been nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the legislature, and opposition lawyers say that loyalty to the DPI has become an informal requirement for appointment.[15] Human Rights Watch describes a system of "judicial dualism", in which the statutory courts of the ISEZ lack independence from the executive while the customary courts of the tribal regions offer no appeal. It reports executive pressure on judges in politically sensitive cases. In 2014 the [[Supreme Court of Irad]] declined to hear a challenge to the removal of term limits. Former Prime Minister [[Bakyt Orozbekov]], charged in absentia in 2008 with high treason over the [[Bill of Sale (2007)|Bill of Sale]] and with abuse of office over the [[Privatization Scandals of 2007|privatization auctions]], describes the charges as political.[1] Business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad, take a more favorable view of the courts' record in commercial and property disputes. #### Civil society Organized civil society is small. Trade unions in [[Nurzhan]], which played a large part in the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]], retain some independence, and the Russophone bloc has held a majority on the Nurzhan city council for most of the period since 1992. In 2021 the Ministry of Internal Security audited the Legal Defense Guild's foreign grants; the guild described the audit as harassment, while the ministry called it a routine inspection.[8] The [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] is the only major institution present on both sides of the Qara-Chik line, and the [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]] has hosted meetings between the two administrations. #### Freedom of religion The ISEZ is a secular state. By 2018 estimates of self-identification, 78 percent of Irad's population is Christian, mostly Syro-Iradi Catholic, 18 percent Muslim and 4 percent of other faiths. Russian Orthodox, Evangelical and Presbyterian congregations and mosques serving the Kazakh, Uzbek and Tatar communities operate in the cities. International monitors have not reported legal restrictions on worship, but Muslim leaders have long complained of social prejudice, including the popular view, rejected by ethnographers, that eating horsemeat is a "Muslim" practice (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]] and [[Islam in Irad]]).[16] In December 2024 Ruslan Toktarov described Muslim communities in the Fergana Rim as "guests who have forgotten whose house they live in" and called for the closure of mosques receiving foreign funding. Sunni clerics and human rights groups condemned the remarks, which the Department of Public Information said reflected his "personal views" rather than government policy (see [[Ruslan Toktarov]]).[17] #### Language and minorities Iradi and English are the official languages of the ISEZ. Russian lost its official status in 1992 and is taught in public schools as an optional foreign language, although it remains the *de facto* lingua franca. Russian-speaking residents of Nurzhan, represented politically by the "Russo" bloc and by the oil executive [[Kamran Bekzatov]], campaign for its restoration as an official language, and the Bekzatov Foundation funds Russian-language schools (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]). The DPI and Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] oppose the change. Proceedings in the legislature and the courts are held in Iradi or English, with interpretation into Russian.[18] #### Freedom of movement Movement between the two zones is limited to designated corridors. Residents of the ATR need a tribal travel permit, issued by their clan council and registered by the Gendarmerie, to enter the ISEZ, and the ISEZ charges inspection and permit fees. Human rights groups and UNMI report long delays, arbitrary refusals and detentions at the twelve Gendarmerie checkpoints, and say that the restrictions fall hardest on herders and on patients from the tribal regions seeking treatment in ISEZ hospitals.[6] The ISEZ says the checks are needed to prevent smuggling, including through the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]]. ## Autonomous Tribal Regions #### Customary justice Under *adat*, disputes are heard by elders and *biys* in open assemblies, and the main remedy, even for homicide, is *kun*, compensation in livestock paid by the offender's kin group to the victim's. There is no formal appeal; a dissatisfied party may ask for a rehearing before a larger assembly of elders. Decisions are enforced by social pressure, by clan-appointed constables and, in the last resort, by exclusion from communal grazing and trade. Anyone found slaughtering horses for sale faces seizure of the animals and expulsion from the clan.[5] Human rights organizations have criticized:[1] - patrilineal inheritance rules, under which daughters and widows inherit little or nothing; - the exclusion of women from serving as *biys* and their limited voice at hearings; - the lack of written law and of appeal from elder courts; - the inability of widows and women heads of household to bring claims in their own name before the [[Autonomous Tribal Grazing Arbitration Tribunal]]; - the toleration by some clan councils of bride kidnapping (*ala kachuu*), which the ISEZ made a criminal offense in 2017 (see [[Marriage in Irad]]). Defenders of the system, including clan elders and some Iradi legal scholars, argue that it is accessible, cheap and oriented toward reconciliation, and that parish priests who sit with the elders at hearings temper its harsher rules. #### Political participation and armed groups No elections are held to IAC bodies. Matters affecting all clans are decided by consensus at the summer *kurultai* on the [[Aksay Plateau]], and each clan is led by a council of elders and a *biy*. Human rights groups have criticized the absence of elections; the IAC describes consensus among the lineages as the tribal form of representation.[1] Security rests with the [[El-Choro Militias]], an estimated 15,000 part-time mounted irregulars, whom the ISEZ regards as an illegal armed formation; both sides observe non-aggression arrangements supervised by UNMI. #### Humanitarian conditions Living conditions in the ATR are poorer than in the ISEZ, and data are scarce. Many highland settlements have no year-round road access, and UNMI reports that some remote villages have no grid electricity. Health care rests on village health posts, the mobile clinics of the [[St. Luka Community Health Mission]] and UNMI-supported vaccination campaigns, and maternal and infant health indicators lag well behind those of the ISEZ.[19] Landmines and unexploded ordnance from the 1992 and 2007 conflicts remain in some mountain passes; UNMI's mine action component has surveyed or cleared about 31 km² since 2008. ## Conflict legacies and accountability Several episodes of political violence remain unresolved:[20] - **1956.** The [[1956 Talas Riots]] were suppressed under martial law; internal-security records count 14 dead, while Iradi researchers say "several dozen". More than 1,000 people were detained and hundreds deported. A riderless-horse memorial was built in Talas in 1996. - **1992.** On 3 February 1992 security forces of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] fired on demonstrators in Talas. A commission of the Territorial Legislature documented 27 deaths in 2002. A criminal case opened in 1995 against the former SRI leader [[Vasily Chernov]] never came to trial, because Russia declined to extradite him. The [[First Iradi Civil War]] killed about 14,000 people by the most-cited estimate. - **2007.** The [[Second Iradi Civil War]] killed people in the low thousands and displaced about 80,000, according to UNMI. Casualty figures for the [[Storming of Talas (2007)|storming of Talas]] remain disputed between ISEZ and IAC sources, and no inquiry has examined abuses by either side. ## Government response The ISEZ government says that the territorial statutes protect civil liberties, that the Gendarmerie acts lawfully against smuggling, organized crime and sabotage, and that its elections are free. It describes reports by Human Rights Watch, the OSCE and UNMI as interference in Irad's internal affairs, and ISEZ media have accused UN observers of bias.[7] The IAC, for its part, says that customary law reflects the will of the clans and that the main human rights problem of the tribal regions is the ISEZ's restriction of movement and trade across the line. ## See also - [[Politics of Irad]] - [[Political status of Irad]] - [[Elections in Irad]] - [[Media of Irad]] - [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] - [[Adat Law in the ATR]] ## References
  1. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York, pp. 45–62.
  2. ^ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2023). Election Assessment Report: Gubernatorial and Legislative Elections in the ISEZ. Warsaw.
  3. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  4. ^ Central Asian Policy Review (2023). 'Institutional Legacies of the American Territorial Era in Irad.' Academic Press, pp. 112–129.
  5. ^ Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery (2022). Compendium of Customary Law (Adat) and Pasture Demarcations.
  6. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2022). Freedom of Movement and Security Along the Qara-Chik Line. Report to the Secretary-General, Talas.
  7. ^ Human Rights Watch (2021). Divided Irad: The Case for Human Rights Monitoring. New York.
  8. ^ Human Rights Watch (2024). Detention and Due Process in the Irad Special Economic Zone. New York.
  9. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  10. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2014). 'Licensing the Press in the ISEZ.' Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 300–318.
  11. ^ Human Rights Watch (2024). 'Water Cannon and Silence: The Policing of the 2023 Talas Protests.' New York.
  12. ^ Talas Herald (2025). 'Succession Questions Grow as Governor Remains out of View.' Talas.
  13. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2025). Quarterly Security Bulletin, January–March 2025. Kara-Oi.
  14. ^ Amnesty International (2023). 'Irad: Torture and Arbitrary Detention in the Special Economic Zone.' London.
  15. ^ Talas Journal of Law & Political Economy (2022). 'Judicial Dualism and Statutory Precedent in Central Asia.' Vol. 9, Iss. 2.
  16. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). 2018 Census of Irad: Methodology and Results. Talas.
  17. ^ Talas Herald (January 2025). 'Clerics and Archbishop Condemn General's Remarks.' Talas.
  18. ^ Talas State University, Institute of Sociology (2022). Urban Language Survey: Talas, Nurzhan and Iyık Janyl. Talas State University Press.
  19. ^ St. Luka Community Health Mission (2023). Annual Report: Rural Health Services in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Talas.
  20. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2008). Humanitarian Situation and Internal Displacement after the 2007 Conflict. Kara-Oi.
### 3.34. Foreign relations of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Foreign Relations* The **foreign relations of Irad** are conducted without general recognition of Iradi statehood. Irad has been listed by the United Nations as a non-self-governing territory since 1992, with the United States still nominally recorded as the administering power, and its three neighbors, [[wp:Kazakhstan]], [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]], each claim it *de jure*. Since the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] of 2007 the territory has been divided between the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), governed by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI), and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), loosely coordinated by the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC). Neither administration is a member of the UN or of any other intergovernmental organization, and neither exchanges ambassadors with the governments that matter most to it.[1][2] In practice, external relations run through four channels: the remaining arrangements with the United States, which keeps [[Talas Air Base]] and five other installations; UN bodies, above all the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI); technical arrangements with the neighbors' border, customs and water agencies, which allow them to deal with the ISEZ without recognizing it; and commercial contracts with foreign companies, through which most of Irad's relations with Russia and China are carried on. Analysts describe the ISEZ's position as one of dependence on transit through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, offset by its control of the export grid of the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]].[3] See [[Political status of Irad]] for the legal questions. ## Status and recognition Irad's legal position is often compared with that of [[wp:Western Sahara]]. The United States withdrew from the [[Alimbekov-Baker Treaty]] on 3 December 2006 but did not formally notify the UN that its administration had ended. Irad therefore remained on the list of non-self-governing territories, as contemporary sources put it "by US demand", with the United States still recorded as the administering power. Washington does not report on the territory. The [[wp:Special Committee on Decolonization|UN Special Committee on Decolonization]], which sits in [[wp:New York City|New York]], issues an annual working paper on Irad.[1] Twenty-six UN member states recognized the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]] (DRI), proclaimed on 9 December 2006, before its dissolution in June 2007. The United States did not recognize it. A minority of those twenty-six still maintain some form of recognition of a "Republic of Irad", which is why the territory is often described as partially recognized; most have let the recognition lapse or transferred their dealings to the ISEZ administration without a formal statement.[4] The ISEZ calls the situation "suspended sovereignty", a provisional status that it says will end with a unification referendum, and claims to be the lawful authority for the whole territory. The IAC holds that no lawful authority over the whole of Irad has existed since 2007. #### Neighbors' claims Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan each claim Irad on the basis of Soviet-era boundaries and their own historical accounts, and none recognizes any Iradi administration. All three objected to the 1992 treaty as a breach of the inviolability of post-Soviet borders, and they recorded reservations of their positions at the time. Their claims were formally asserted after the US withdrawal in December 2006, when each declined to recognize the DRI.[5] The claims overlap, and none of the three has attempted to enforce its own. Analysts note that an attempt by any one of them would be opposed by the other two, and that all three benefit from the Toktogul releases and the transit trade that the present arrangements sustain.[3] Between December 2006 and February 2007, while withholding recognition from the DRI, the three foreign ministries negotiated with its cabinet, under cover of border and water consultations, the drafts known in Irad as the [[Bill of Sale (2007)|Bill of Sale]], which would have partitioned Irad among them. They describe those talks as consultations. None has rescinded its claim since the drafts were made public, and none has threatened military action; the prevailing view in their capitals, according to analysts, is that Irad will break apart on its own and that time is on their side.[5][23] None of Irad's other neighbors has a claim; Irad has no border with [[wp:Tajikistan]], China or [[wp:Afghanistan]]. ## History #### Soviet period As a union republic of the [[wp:Soviet Union]] from 1925, the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] had no foreign relations of its own. The one significant external link of the period was religious: the union of the Iradi church with Rome in 1931, under the bull *Orientalis Stella*, was negotiated in secret by Bishop [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]] through papal nuncios abroad, and Soviet suspicion of the link fed the repression of the 1930s.[6] In the 1980s American songs about Irad reached the republic on smuggled cassettes and through [[wp:Voice of America]] broadcasts. #### Independence and the First Civil War (1991–1992) The [[Socialist Republic of Irad]], declared in Kobozev on 9 October 1991, received no recognition. After the Provisional Government in [[Talas]] proclaimed the Republic of Irad on 11 March 1992, its envoys approached the United States through the US embassy in [[wp:Almaty]] and at meetings in [[wp:Geneva]], which led to the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty of 2 June 1992 and [[Operation Starlight]].[7] First Secretary [[Vasily Chernov]] appealed to [[wp:Moscow]] and to the other members of the [[wp:Commonwealth of Independent States]] for support. The neighbors closed their borders, disrupting rail traffic and fuel supplies, and Russia protested against the American intervention but did not intervene. The [[wp:United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]] held consultations but adopted no resolution. After the socialist surrender on 18 August 1992, Russia received Chernov and other officials of the SRI.[8] #### Territorial period (1992–2006) Under the treaty and the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]], foreign affairs and defense were the responsibility of the United States, which was represented in Talas by a High Commissioner. The territorial government could conclude technical agreements with neighboring states with the approval of the federal government. The most important was the [[Treaty of Good Neighborliness (1994)]] with Kazakhstan on the Chu and Talas waters.[9] Territorial status gave Iradi goods customs access to the US market and drew American and Mexican investment, and the [[2001 Basing Rights Agreement]] made Talas Air Base a staging area for [[wp:Operation Enduring Freedom]]. [[Amanbek Alimbekov]] defended the arrangement until his death in 2004 as the only practical protection against the claims of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.[7] #### Withdrawal and civil war (2006–2007) The US withdrawal (see [[United States Withdrawal from the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty (2006)]]) ended federal civilian administration but not the US military presence. The DRI was recognized by twenty-six states but collapsed in the Second Civil War, whose main cause was the disclosure on 25 February 2007 of its secret partition drafts with the three neighbors (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]). When the front line ran through the Toktogul complex in the summer of 2007, all three neighbors pressed for a settlement, and UN mediators brought the two Iradi sides to [[wp:Bishkek]]. The [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] of September 2007 set the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and its annex, the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], gave the neighbors observer seats on the commission that runs the dam. The Security Council established UNMI on 18 October 2007.[10] #### Since 2007 The ISEZ has built its external relations on technical arrangements that do not require recognition. The 2008 [[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]] with the Kazakh border and customs services is the main example. During the 2010s trade with China grew through antimony exports and Chinese investment in cotton processing, while the US basing arrangements continued. Since Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]] withdrew from public view in July 2024, Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] has received foreign delegations. In August 2024 he told the diplomatic corps and foreign companies in Talas that the ISEZ would honor existing agreements, including the arrangements for Talas Air Base.[11] The [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]] in February 2025 provoked demonstrations across Irad and a sharp fall in favorable views of the United States. ## Conduct of external relations #### Irad Special Economic Zone The Governor holds authority over external relations under the territorial statutes, but the Lieutenant Governor has led most commercial negotiations since 2019, and since July 2024 he has also chaired the cabinet and received foreign delegations. Maksat has led the ISEZ's talks with Kazakh delegations on transit tariffs and with the [[wp:China National Petroleum Corporation]] (CNPC), and he represents the ISEZ on matters arising under the Naryn Protocol.[12] The ISEZ maintains no embassies. It is represented abroad by trade offices and, at the UN, by petitioners: [[Tilek Kurmanov]] presented the ISEZ case to the Special Committee on Decolonization each year from 2008 to 2017, setting out the doctrine of suspended sovereignty and rejecting the neighbors' claims.[13] Foreign states with interests in Talas are represented by a small number of representative and trade offices, and by the US military and civilian staff attached to the bases. Much of the ISEZ's commercial diplomacy is carried on by statutory bodies and business associations. The [[Irad Foreign Trade Escrow Authority]] registers export contracts and supervises the escrow accounts into which foreign buyers pay. Because non-recognition limits access to international banking, Iradi dollar payments are settled through correspondent banks in Almaty, [[wp:Istanbul]] and [[wp:Dubai]]. The [[Iradi National Chamber of Mining and Metallurgy]] promotes the mining sector at conferences in Almaty, Dubai and [[wp:London]].[14] #### Autonomous Tribal Regions The ATR has no government and conducts no formal foreign relations. The IAC's small secretariat, the [[Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery]], handles correspondence with UNMI and with aid agencies, and IAC petitioners present their own view at the Special Committee's sessions. [[Bektur Zhumabek uulu]], the IAC's principal spokesman, has said he prefers to be seen as an ambassador or negotiator for the clans rather than as their leader.[15] The clans' external contacts are local and practical. After the [[2018 Border Demarcation Clashes]] with Uzbek border guards on the western desert frontier, talks between border officers and clan elders, facilitated by UN officials, produced buffer arrangements around disputed wells. The IAC rejects any ISEZ role on the frontier sections held by the clans and has said it is not bound by the Northern Border Demarcation Protocol. ## Relations with the United States *Main article: [[Irad–United States relations]]* The United States administered Irad as an organized, unincorporated territory from 1992 to 2006 and remains its main security partner. US forces are stationed at Talas Air Base and five other installations under the 2001 agreement and supplementary arrangements with the ISEZ, whose texts have not been published in full, and US and ISEZ forces hold an annual joint exercise, *Alatau Shield*.[16] Washington has not treated the ISEZ as a foreign government since 2006, so cooperation runs mainly through base-related programs. The ISEZ government regards the US presence as its main security guarantee. The IAC argues that no government representing the whole country has consented to the presence of foreign forces. Iradi opinion of the United States, broadly favorable in the ISEZ since the territorial period, fell sharply after [[wp:Donald Trump]] said in February 2025 that he was exploring selling Irad to Russia to keep China from acquiring it. In a [[Talas State University]] survey in March 2025, 27 percent of ISEZ respondents had a favorable view of the United States, against 58 percent in 2022.[17] ## Relations with neighboring states Relations with the three neighbors turn on their territorial claims, on transit and on the Naryn. Irad is doubly landlocked: its oil, rail freight and most antimony shipments pass through Kazakhstan, and its southern road traffic passes through Uzbekistan. In turn, the Toktogul reservoir regulates the summer irrigation water of the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] and the middle [[wp:Syr Darya]], and Irad sells electricity mainly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. During disputes over Toktogul releases, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have slowed customs clearance and tightened pipeline scheduling, and the ISEZ has responded by trimming electricity exports at peak winter demand. Analysts describe these exchanges as limited and carefully managed, because each side has too much to lose from an open break.[3] | State | Position on Irad | Main issues | Article | |---|---|---|---| | Kazakhstan | Claims Irad *de jure*; deals with the ISEZ through border, customs and water agencies | Oil transit, rail freight, Chu and Talas waters, the 2008 border arrangements, Syr Darya releases | [[Irad–Kazakhstan relations]] | | Uzbekistan | Claims Irad *de jure*; recognizes no Iradi administration | Naryn summer releases, Iradi electricity sales, southern road transit, the 2018 border clashes | [[Irad–Uzbekistan relations]] | | Kyrgyzstan | Claims Irad *de jure*; regards the Naryn cascade as Kyrgyz infrastructure | Toktogul, upstream Chu water, the proposed gas pipeline exit, the 2014 UNESCO listings | [[Irad–Kyrgyzstan relations]] | All three send observers to the joint technical commission of the Naryn Protocol, where they receive the reservoir data but have no vote, and none recognizes the commission as a legal body. Kyrgyzstan files a written reservation at each meeting. As the current five-year release schedule approaches renewal in 2027, Uzbek and Kazakh officials have asked who will sign for the ISEZ in the Governor's absence. The DPI states that Maksat signs on his behalf.[18] In 2014 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan included the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]] and the [[Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed]], both in Irad, among their component sites in the transnational [[wp:Silk Roads: the Routes Network of Chang'an-Tianshan Corridor|Silk Roads World Heritage]] listing. Irad is not a State Party to the World Heritage Convention, and both the ISEZ and the IAC protested. ## Relations with other powers #### Russia *Main article: [[Irad–Russia relations]]* Russia protested against the 1992 intervention but did not intervene, received Chernov after the socialist surrender, and declined a territorial request for his extradition in 1995. It has no official relations with either Iradi administration. Its influence runs mainly through the Russian-speaking business elite of [[Nurzhan]] and through the northern oil route: Iradi crude enters the Kazakh pipeline network near [[wp:Shymkent]], where it is refined or shipped onward to Russia.[19] [[Kamran Bekzatov]], president of [[NurGaz]], calls for accession to the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]] and the restoration of Russian as an official language, and has publicly praised [[wp:Vladimir Putin]]. Three Russo-aligned deputies sit in the 60-seat [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]]. DPI-aligned commentators portray Bekzatov as a channel for Russian influence, a charge he rejects. #### China *Main article: [[Irad–China relations]]* China is the main buyer of Iradi antimony, which goes by rail through Kazakhstan, and the source of a growing share of Irad's imports. The Chinese textile company Xinjiang Lihua acquired cotton ginning concessions and a spinning mill in 2018 and 2021, and CNPC has proposed a Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline from [[wp:Turkmenistan]] to western China, which would leave Irad through Kyrgyz territory (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]]). Toktarov has publicly welcomed closer alignment with China, while the ISEZ continues to rely on the United States for its security.[20] #### Other states - **Mexico.** Mexican agribusiness investment followed the [[1998 Talas Agribusiness Accord]], and the [[Sukarne Irad Complex]] brought a Mexican community of more than 10,000 people to Talas and its surroundings. - **Turkey.** Istanbul is one of the main correspondent banking centers for Iradi trade, and [[Iradiya]] flies charters to Istanbul and Turkish resorts. Former DRI Prime Minister [[Bakyt Orozbekov]], charged in absentia in 2008 with high treason over the Bill of Sale and with abuse of office, has lived in Istanbul since 2007, and [[wp:Turkey]] has not acted on ISEZ requests for his return.[21] - **The Holy See.** The [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], in union with Rome since 1931, is the main institution with a presence on both sides of the Qara-Chik line. Its links with Rome are ecclesiastical rather than diplomatic. - **Afghanistan.** Although Irad has no border with Afghanistan, the [[wp:Taliban|Taliban's]] return to power in 2021 led both Iradi administrations to declare separate security alerts and reinforce the mountain passes (see [[The 2021 Regional Security Alert]]). It also ended the prospects of a US-backed oil pipeline south to [[wp:Pakistan]], after which [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron]] scaled back its operations in Irad. - **East Asia and Europe.** Antimony metal and trioxide are sold to buyers in [[wp:South Korea]], [[wp:Japan]] and Europe, and pedigree [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] and [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]] horses go mainly to the United States, the [[wp:United Kingdom]] and [[wp:Ireland]], with demand rising in [[wp:Hong Kong]] and mainland China.[14] ## International organizations Irad is not a member of the UN, the [[wp:World Trade Organization]], the Eurasian Economic Union or the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]], and it cannot borrow from the [[wp:International Monetary Fund]] or obtain a sovereign credit rating. The IMF and [[wp:World Bank]] publish no regular country data for it.[14] Its main multilateral relationships are: - **The United Nations.** Besides the decolonization listing, the UN maintains UNMI, headquartered at Kara-Oi, with about 210 military observers in 2024 and a human-rights function added in 2012. Because UNMI's mandate covers only the internal Qara-Chik line, the 2008 northern border talks were convened by the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for [[wp:Central Asia]], with UNMI providing logistics.[10] - **The OSCE.** Observers of its [[wp:Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights]] have assessed ISEZ elections and have criticized those held since the 2013 removal of term limits (see [[Elections in Irad]]). - **UN agencies and aid organizations.** The [[wp:Food and Agriculture Organization]] and other agencies work in the ATR through seven planning zones that have no political standing. ## Public opinion Attitudes to foreign powers divide sharply by generation and language. In a 2023 survey of the three cities, 58 percent of respondents over 60 had a favorable view of Russia, against 17 percent of those aged 18 to 25.[22] In the March 2025 survey the fall in favorable views of the United States was steepest among respondents under 30, the generation educated in English after 1992.[17] In the tribal regions, clan gatherings condemned the 2025 remarks, one of the few issues since 2007 on which opinion in the two zones broadly coincided; commentators linked the reaction in both zones to the memory of the 2007 Bill of Sale. ## References
  1. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2023). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Suspended Sovereignty: Irad's Frozen Conflict at Fifteen.' Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 201–224.
  3. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). 'Shared Hostage: The Toktogul Complex and the Qara-Chik Line.' Vol. 29, Iss. 3, pp. 211–230.
  4. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2015). 'Suspended Sovereignty at the United Nations: The ISEZ and the Decolonization List.' Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 201–219.
  5. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Suspended Sovereignty: The Afterlife of the Alimbekov-Baker Treaty.' Academic Press, pp. 112–131.
  6. ^ Talas State University Press (2021). Orientalis Stella and the Soviet State: The Iradi Church, 1931–1941. Talas.
  7. ^ Alimbekov, Amanbek (1998). From Soviet Republic to Territorial Sovereignty. 2 vols. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  8. ^ Department of History, Talas State University (2017). The War of 1992: A Documentary History. Talas State University Press.
  9. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 110: Territorial Legislative Journals and Enacted Statutes (1992–2006).
  10. ^ United Nations Secretary-General (October 2024). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Irad. New York.
  11. ^ Department of Public Information (August 2024). 'Lieutenant Governor Addresses Diplomatic Corps and Foreign Business Community.' Press release. Talas.
  12. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Technocracy and Succession in the Talas Basin.' Academic Press, pp. 88–104.
  13. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (2012). Working Paper on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Irad. New York.
  14. ^ World Bank (2023). Central Asia Economic Update: Dollarization and Financial Access in Unrecognized Jurisdictions. Washington, DC.
  15. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'The Mountain Chieftain: Tribal Federalism under Bektur Zhumabek uulu.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2.
  16. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Basing Without Recognition: US Forces in the ISEZ after 2006.' Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 9–34.
  17. ^ Talas State University, Institute of Sociology (2025). Spring 2025 Public Opinion Survey: Politics and Foreign Relations. Talas State University Press.
  18. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Water, Watts and the Ceasefire: Supervising the Naryn Protocol.' Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 58–81.
  19. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Annual Report: Southern Network Throughput and Third-Party Transit. Astana, pp. 34–42.
  20. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Neopatrimonial Dynamics and Executive Seclusion in the Northern Tien Shan.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp. 112–130.
  21. ^ Talas Herald (19 March 2008). 'Former prime minister charged in absentia.' Talas.
  22. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). 'Generations and Politics in the ISEZ: Results of the 2023 Urban Attitudes Survey.' Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 77–102.
  23. ^ Talas Herald (27 February 2007). 'Partition drafts: what the papers say.' Talas.
### 3.35. Geography of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Geography & Nature* The **geography of Irad** covers a landlocked territory of about 217,400 square kilometers (84,000 sq mi) in [[wp:Central Asia]], lying roughly between latitudes 40°40′ and 46° N and longitudes 68° and 75° E. It runs from the clay deserts of the southern [[Betpak-Dala]] and the Moiynkum sands in the north, across the irrigated lowlands of the Chu and the valley of the Talas, to the [[Talas Alatau]], Chatkal and Fergana ranges of the western [[wp:Tian Shan]] and the rural northern rim of the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] in the south. Irad borders [[wp:Kazakhstan]] to the north and northwest, [[wp:Uzbekistan]] to the west and south, and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] to the east and southeast. All three neighbors are themselves landlocked, so Irad, like Uzbekistan, is doubly landlocked.[1] By area Irad is mainly a country of plains. More than half of the territory lies below 1,000 meters, most of it steppe, semi-desert and sand desert used as winter pasture. Most of the population, however, lives in irrigated river valleys that cover less than 2 percent of the land. All of Irad's rivers end in closed (endorheic) basins: the Chu and the Talas die out in the Moiynkum, and the Naryn, the Chatkal and the streams of the Fergana rim feed the [[wp:Syr Darya]], which flows toward the [[wp:Aral Sea]]. Since 2007 the territory has been divided by the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), about one-seventh of the area, holds the Talas and lower Chu valleys, the road and rail belts between them, and a corridor to the Toktogul basin and the lower Naryn. The [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), about six-sevenths, hold nearly all of the deserts and high mountains, including the catchments above the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]].[2] ## Location and extent At its widest Irad measures about 570 kilometers from west to east and about 590 kilometers from north to south. Its *de jure* capital, [[Talas]], lies at 42°31′N 72°14′E on the floor of the Talas valley. The second city, [[Nurzhan]], lies 470 meters above sea level on the lower Chu, and the third, [[Iyık Janyl]], at about 650 meters on the river flats where the Naryn leaves its gorge through the foothills of the [[wp:Fergana Range]].[1] The territory corresponds on the map to the Talas valley and the ranges around it, most of the Chatkal, Toktogul and Naryn gorge country of the western Tian Shan, the rural northern and eastern edge of the Fergana Valley, and a large part of the lowlands of the lower Chu and the [[wp:Karatau Mountains|Karatau]]. Several large cities of the region lie just outside Irad: [[wp:Shymkent]] and [[wp:Turkistan (city)|Turkistan]] in Kazakhstan, [[wp:Bishkek]] and the [[wp:Issyk-Kul]] basin in Kyrgyzstan, and Namangan and Andijan in Uzbekistan.[3] Irad's external frontiers date from the Soviet national delimitation of 1924–25, when they were internal boundaries between union republics, and most of them have never been marked on the ground. About 285 kilometers of the northern frontier held by the ISEZ in the lower Chu and lower Talas valleys were surveyed and marked under the 2008 [[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]], an arrangement that Kazakhstan describes as implying no recognition. The frontier across the summit massif of [[Manas Peak (Irad)|Manas Peak]], on the Uzbek side, is undemarcated, and tribal patrols clashed with Uzbek border guards on the western desert frontier in 2018 ([[2018 Border Demarcation Clashes]]).[4] Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan each claim the whole of Irad *de jure* (see [[Political status of Irad]]). ## Physiographic regions Iradi geographers usually divide the country into seven natural regions, three in the lowlands and four in the mountains.[1] #### Northern steppe and deserts The largest region is the belt of steppe and desert north and west of the Chu, which the United Nations and aid agencies treat as the Northern Steppe planning zone of the ATR. UNMI planning documents put the zone, which also takes in the piedmont plain north of the ISEZ belt, at about 119,600 square kilometers, more than half of Irad, and the ISEZ's Chu District adds a further belt of steppe south of the Chu.[2] Its northern part is the southern edge of the Betpak-Dala, a name usually glossed as "plain of misfortune": a flat clay and gravel plateau at about 300–400 meters with salt pans (*takyr*), wormwood and saltwort, and almost no surface water. The [[Keng-Talaa]] grassland on its southern margin is used for spring and autumn grazing and an annual endurance race. Between the Chu and the Talas lie the Moiynkum (also Muyunkum) sands, a desert of ridged and hummocky dunes, most of them fixed by saxaul, sand acacia and sedges. The Chu ends in the sands and salt flats near the [[Akzhaykyn Depression|Akzhaykyn depression]] on the Moiynkum's northwestern edge, where the lowest ground in Irad lies below 300 meters. The undeveloped [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]] lies beneath the north-eastern Moiynkum, near the lower Chu.[5] #### Chu lowlands The lower Chu crosses a broad alluvial plain between the dry foothills of the western Kyrgyz Range to the south and the Moiynkum to the west. Soviet canals turned much of it into farmland, and it is now Irad's main grain and sugar-beet district and the site of its oil fields and refinery around Nurzhan (see [[Chu River Basin]]). The [[Boz-Korgon]] compound lies on the plain 40 kilometers east of the city.[5] #### Karatau and the western rangelands The Karatau, a long, low limestone and shale range trending northwest from the western end of the Talas Alatau, rises to about 2,170 meters at its highest. Its foothills descend southwest to the [[Kyzylkum Fringe]], a belt of clay plains, dry washes and sand facing the Syr Darya valley and the Kyzylkum desert beyond the frontier. Outliers such as the [[Karakyr Range]], semi-desert plains such as [[Kulan-Talaa]], and badlands such as [[Kyzyl-Jar]] and the [[Kök-Moinok]] canyons make up the Karatau planning zone of the ATR, which is the main winter range of the tribal herds.[6] #### Talas valley The Talas valley, about 200 kilometers long, lies between the Kyrgyz Range to the north and the Talas Alatau to the south. Its floor falls from about 1,800 meters near the medieval silver town of [[Shelji]] in the east to less than 1,000 meters on the plain of the [[Kara-Buura]] District in the west. Alluvial fans from the side valleys carry the irrigated fields, orchards and villages of the ISEZ's most densely settled district. The [[Kök-Bel Pass]] (about 2,670 m) across the western Kyrgyz Range links the valley with the Chu lowlands.[1] #### Talas Alatau and the Chatkal Range South of the Talas valley lies the mountain belt that Iradi writers call the [[Tien Shan Marches]]. The Talas Alatau runs for about 270 kilometers along the valley and reaches 4,482 meters at Manas Peak, at its western end. The [[Chatkal Range]] branches southwest from it toward the Fergana Valley and exceeds 4,000 meters, enclosing the upper valley of the [[Chatkal River]]. Between the ridges lie high erosion surfaces (*syrt*), of which the [[Aksay Plateau]] (3,000–3,600 m) is the largest, and narrow limestone gorges such as the [[Kara-Suu Canyon]]. In the east the Talas Alatau overlooks the high valley of [[Suusamyr]], which drains to the Naryn. The [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]] between Talas and the Lower Naryn District passes beneath the Otmek Pass (3,330 m) in a tunnel and crosses into the Toktogul basin by the [[Fergana Gateway]] (Ala-Bel Pass, 3,184 m), the only crossing with an all-weather road; farther west a seasonal gravel road crosses the [[Karakoyun Pass]] (about 3,050 m) from the Kara-Buura valley to the Chatkal valley. North of the Talas valley the high Kyrgyz Range, crossed by the road over the [[Kök-Bel Pass]] (about 2,670 m), carries summer pastures of the tribal regions.[7] #### Toktogul basin and the Naryn gorges The [[Naryn River]] enters Irad from Kyrgyzstan through deep gorges and widens into the Toktogul basin, an intermontane depression now largely filled by the Toktogul Reservoir. Below the dam it cuts through a further series of gorges past [[Tash-Kömür]] to the edge of the Fergana Valley. The basin is sheltered by mountains on all sides and has milder winters than the Talas valley.[8] #### Fergana Range and the Fergana Rim In the southeast, the Fergana Range and its spurs descend to the northern and eastern edge of the Fergana Valley. Their southwest-facing slopes catch moisture from the west and carry the walnut-fruit forests of [[Arslanbob]]. Below them, a belt of irrigated foothill land around towns such as [[Bazar-Korgon]] grows cotton, maize, tobacco and fruit; this farm belt, from Tash-Kömür east past Bazar-Korgon to the Uzbek frontier, has been in the ISEZ since 2007, while the hills above it are tribal. The rim ends at the foot of the hills, short of the Uzbek piedmont towns and the valley's large cities, which lie in Uzbekistan, and of Jalal-Abad, which remains in Kyrgyzstan.[9] ## Geology and natural hazards The mountains of southern Irad consist mainly of [[wp:Paleozoic]] sedimentary and volcanic rocks, folded and intruded by granites, and uplifted again in the [[wp:Cenozoic]] as the Indian plate pressed into Asia. The Talas–Fergana Fault, one of the largest strike-slip faults in Central Asia, crosses the country from northwest to southeast and offsets the ranges on either side. The northern plains are underlain by younger sediments, which hold the oil of the Chu basin and the gas of the Muyunkum field.[7] Southern Irad is seismically active. The Chatkal earthquake of November 1946 and the Suusamyr earthquake of 19 August 1992, of magnitude about 7.3, caused landslides across the mountains; the 1992 shock damaged buildings in the [[Old Talas Citadel Quarter]] and the dome of the [[Church of St. Janyl]].[10] Other hazards include landslides in the clay foothills above the Fergana Valley, where they threaten the Soviet uranium tailings at [[Mailuu-Suu]]; mudflows in the spring thaw; outburst floods from moraine-dammed lakes, monitored by the [[Manas Peak Glaciological Observatory]]; avalanches, which close most passes from November to April; and *jut*, a winter ice crust or deep snow that seals off pasture and can kill large numbers of livestock. ## Climate Irad's climate is continental, with hot summers, cold winters and low, irregular precipitation in the lowlands. It is semi-arid or arid on the plains ([[wp:Köppen climate classification|Köppen]] *BSk* and *BWk*), humid continental in the middle mountains (*Dfb*) and alpine on the highest ridges.[1] Representative figures are: - **Nurzhan** (470 m): July highs average 34 °C (93 °F) and the January mean is −10.5 °C (13.1 °F), with about 270 mm (10.6 in) of precipitation a year. Summer dust storms are common, and Arctic air occasionally brings temperatures below −25 °C. - **Talas** (about 1,250 m): July highs average about 30 °C (86 °F) and January lows about −12 °C (10 °F), with about 300 mm (12 in) of precipitation. - **Iyık Janyl** (650 m): July highs average about 34 °C (93 °F) and January lows about −5 °C (23 °F), with about 450 mm (18 in) of precipitation. - **The Northern Steppe and Kyzylkum Fringe**: annual precipitation is generally below 180 mm, summer temperatures often exceed 40 °C, and winter cold waves bring temperatures below −25 °C, though snow cover is usually thin.[6] Precipitation increases with altitude and toward the southwest. Moist westerly air brings up to 900–1,000 mm a year to the slopes facing the Fergana Valley, while the northern slopes above the Talas valley are much drier. In the plains most precipitation falls between November and April; in the mountains it peaks in spring and early summer. The high pastures are free of snow only from about June to September.[7] ## Hydrology #### Rivers Irad's rivers belong to three closed drainage systems:[11] - **The Chu.** The Chu, about 1,070 kilometers long, rises in the inner Tian Shan of Kyrgyzstan and flows past Bishkek before entering Irad. Its flow is regulated upstream by the [[Orto-Sai Reservoir]] in Kyrgyzstan, and much of it is taken for irrigation before it reaches the Iradi lowlands. It ends in the sands near the Akzhaykyn depression. - **The Talas.** The [[Talas River]] rises at the eastern head of the Talas valley, flows west past Talas and then northwest along the edge of the Kazakh frontier, and dies out in the western Moiynkum. Its tributaries, including the Urmaral, [[Kashka-Suu]], Besh-Tash and Kara-Buura, rise in the Talas Alatau on the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line. - **The Syr Darya system.** The Naryn crosses southern Irad through the Toktogul Reservoir and the downstream power cascade and leaves Irad at the edge of the Fergana Valley, where it later joins the [[Kara-Darya]] to form the Syr Darya. Its Iradi tributaries include the [[Uzun-Akmat River|Uzun-Akmat]] and the Kökömeren, formed by the [[Suusamyr River|Susamyr]]. The Chatkal flows southwest into Uzbekistan, where it becomes the main source of the Chirchik. Streams from the Fergana Range, such as the Kara-Unkur and the Mailuu-Suu, feed the Kara-Darya's irrigation network, and streams of the western Talas Alatau, among them the Ak-Suu, flow west to the [[wp:Arys (river)|Arys]] and the Syr Darya beyond the frontier. River flow in the mountains peaks between May and July with snowmelt and glacier melt, which suits summer irrigation. In the lowlands, withdrawals for irrigation leave little water in the lower Chu and Talas in July and August.[11] #### Lakes and reservoirs The largest body of water is the Toktogul Reservoir on the Naryn, with a total storage of about 19 cubic kilometers. The Kyzyl-Adyr Reservoir (until 1993 the Kirov Reservoir) on the lower Talas, completed in 1975, stores about 550 million cubic meters for the farms of the lower valley.[12] Natural lakes are small. They include Lake Sary-Chelek, a landslide-dammed lake 234 meters deep in the Chatkal Range; the moraine-dammed [[Besh-Tash Upper Lake]] at about 3,000 meters; glacial tarns such as [[Kyzyl-Köl]]; and seasonal salt lakes and reed marshes at the ends of the Chu and Talas. #### Glaciers Several hundred glaciers, most smaller than a square kilometer, occupy the highest parts of the Talas Alatau, Chatkal and Fergana ranges. Records of the Manas Peak observatory show that the glaciers of the upper Talas basin lost about a fifth of their area between 1970 and 2020. Researchers expect meltwater to keep rising for some decades and then to decline, reducing late-summer water for irrigation (see [[Glacier retreat in Irad]]).[13] #### Water management Because much of Irad's water rises on the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line or in neighboring states, water allocation is a constant subject of local and international bargaining. Releases from the Toktogul dam are set by a joint ISEZ–ATR commission under the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]], with observers from all three neighbors. The Chu has no comparable arrangement, and allocation with Kyrgyzstan rests on Soviet-era quotas and working-level contacts. During the territorial period, the [[Treaty of Good Neighborliness (1994)]] with Kazakhstan set up joint monitoring on the Chu and Talas, and the exchange of gauging data has continued despite disputes over the treaty's standing. Irad is not a member of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia.[14] See also [[Irad–Kazakhstan relations]], [[Irad–Uzbekistan relations]] and [[Irad–Kyrgyzstan relations]]. ## Land use According to ISEZ agricultural statistics, irrigated farmland covers about 3,000 square kilometers, roughly 1.5 percent of the territory. The largest blocks are about 110,000 hectares in the Talas valley, more than 80,000 hectares in the lower Chu, and the cotton and orchard land of the Fergana Rim and the Lower Naryn District.[15] Rain-fed wheat and barley are grown on piedmont terraces such as [[Boz-Tektir]]. Natural rangeland covers about four-fifths of the land, divided by use into winter pastures (*kyshtoo*) in the deserts and foothills, spring and autumn pastures on the piedmont, and summer pastures (*zhayloo*) in the mountains. Forests, including saxaul woodland in the deserts, cover only a few percent of the territory (see [[Agriculture in Irad]] and [[Central Asian Pastoral Migration System]]).[6] ## Flora and fauna #### Vegetation Vegetation changes with altitude and with the direction a slope faces.[16] - **Deserts and semi-deserts** carry sagebrush (*[[wp:Artemisia (plant)|Artemisia]]*), saltworts and saxaul, with a short burst of ephemeral grasses, sedges and wild tulips after spring rain, including the [[Talas Wild Tulip]]. - **River corridors** in the lowlands carry riparian woodland (*tugay*) of poplar, willow, oleaster and tamarisk, much of it cleared for farming in the Soviet period. - **Foothill and mountain steppe** of feather grass and fescue covers the piedmont and the drier northern slopes, with shrubs such as [[Tian Shan Barberry|barberry]] and [[Wild Sea Buckthorn|sea buckthorn]] along streams. - **Walnut-fruit forest** of [[Wild Walnut (Juglans regia)|wild walnut]], [[Semirechye Apple|wild apple]], pear, cherry plum and maple grows at about 1,000–2,000 meters on the moist slopes facing the Fergana Valley, with [[Wild Pistachio Shrub|wild pistachio]] on the driest sites. - **Conifer woodland** of [[Mountain Juniper (Arsha)|juniper]] (*[[Arsha (Flora)|arsha]]*) covers sunny slopes between about 1,500 and 3,000 meters, and [[Tian Shan Spruce|Tian Shan spruce]], with Semenov's fir around Sary-Chelek, grows on shaded slopes. - **Subalpine and alpine meadows** lie above the tree line, giving way to scree, rock and ice. #### Wildlife The mountains hold the [[Snow Leopard (Irad)|snow leopard]], whose numbers in the Iradi ranges were estimated at 60 to 110 in a 2021 review, together with the [[Siberian Ibex (Irad)|Siberian ibex]], the [[Tian Shan Brown Bear|Tian Shan brown bear]], the [[Turkestan Lynx|lynx]], the wolf, the [[Tian Shan Pika|pika]] and Menzbier's marmot, which is found only in the western Tian Shan. The Karatau is home to the Karatau argali, a subspecies of [[Iradi Argali|argali]] found nowhere else, and small groups of argali survive in the Talas Alatau.[17] [[wp:Saiga antelope|Saiga]] antelope of the Betpak-Dala population winter in the Moiynkum, together with goitered gazelles. The Asiatic wild ass (*kulan*) was hunted out of the western plains in the early 20th century.[5] Birds of prey include the [[Lammergeier (Bearded Vulture)|lammergeier]], the Himalayan griffon, the golden eagle, the [[Saker Falcon (Irad)|saker falcon]] and the [[Steppe Eagle (Irad)|steppe eagle]], and the Asian houbara bustard winters on the western plains. The [[Turkestan Steppe Tortoise]] is common in the foothills. Reports of the Central Asian cobra from the Fergana Rim and the Karatau have not been confirmed.[17] The native fish of the mountain rivers are snowtrout (*marinka*) and osmans, while the trout of the Naryn and upper Talas derive from Soviet stocking (see [[Iradi Mountain Trout]] and [[Talas River Barbel]]). ## Protected areas Most of Irad's protected areas date from the Soviet and territorial periods, and since 2007 most of them have lain wholly or partly on the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line, where clan wardens carry out protection.[18] The main ones are: - **Aksu-Zhabagly Nature Reserve**, on the western Talas Alatau, founded in 1926 and the oldest nature reserve in Central Asia. It includes the [[Ak-Suu Canyon]] and, in the Karatau, beds of [[wp:Jurassic]] lake fossils. - **[[Besh-Tash National Park]]** (1996), the core of the 32,400-hectare [[Besh-Tash Ecological Conservation Area]] south of Talas, divided by the line between an ISEZ lower valley and a tribal upper valley. - **[[Sary-Chelek Biosphere Reserve]]** (1959), 23,868 hectares in the Chatkal Range, admitted to UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Programme in 1978. - **[[Chatkal Snow Leopard Sanctuary]]**, about 45,000 hectares in the eastern Chatkal Range, managed by clan pasture committees. - **The [[Arslanbob]] walnut forests**, managed since 2007 under clan arrangements rather than as a formal reserve. Irad is not itself a State Party to the [[wp:CITES|Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species]] (CITES) or the World Heritage Convention, and reviews of Sary-Chelek under the Man and the Biosphere Programme have been irregular.[18] ## Environmental issues The main environmental problems recorded by UNMI, the ISEZ authorities and researchers are:[19] - **Glacier retreat**, which threatens late-summer river flow in the Talas valley and the Naryn basin. - **Soil salinization and waterlogging** in the lower Talas and lower Chu, caused by unlined canals and poor drainage. - **Overgrazing** around villages, water points and summer camps, which has increased as herds recovered after the 1990s and which prevents walnut and apple forests from regenerating. - **Mining waste**, including the Soviet uranium tailings at Mailuu-Suu and antimony and arsenic from the [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]] and the [[Chatkal Tailings Repository]]. - **Oil pollution** in the lower Chu below Nurzhan, where monitors have reported raised levels of petroleum products and salts. - **Loss of woodland and wildlife** through Soviet-era felling, continuing firewood cutting and the poaching of ibex, argali, snow leopards and saker falcons. ## Political geography The Qara-Chik line, about 1,750 kilometers long, was fixed by the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] along the positions held at the end of the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] rather than any natural boundary, and adjusted in the south by a protocol of 2009. Across the steppe it runs in long straight surveyed stretches between pillars; in the mountains it follows foothills, rivers and crests. It encloses the irrigated valleys of the Talas and lower Chu, the belts along the main road and railway that join them and run west to the Kazakh frontier, the industrial foothills of Sary-Bulak District south of Talas, and the corridor of the Fergana Mountain Transit Highway, which widens over the floor of the Toktogul basin and runs down the Naryn gorge as a corridor a few kilometers wide to the river flats around Iyık Janyl and Tash-Kömür, and the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim east past Bazar-Korgon to the Uzbek frontier.[20] The rest of the country, including the Northern Steppe, the Karatau, the high Talas Alatau, Kyrgyz and Chatkal ranges, the highlands around the Toktogul basin and the lower Naryn gorge, and the hills of the Fergana Rim, forms the ATR, which UNMI divides into seven planning zones. Placements along the line include: - **Tribal side**: the Tien Shan Marches, the Manas observatory, the Aksay Plateau with the Kurultai ground, the upper Kara-Suu and upper Besh-Tash valleys, Sary-Chelek, most of the Suusamyr valley, the high Kyrgyz Range east of the Kök-Bel road, the Karatau foothills on both sides of the Shymkent road, the mountains around the Toktogul basin and on either side of the lower Naryn gorge, and the Fergana Rim hills with Arslanbob and Mailuu-Suu. - **ISEZ side**: the lower Besh-Tash and lower Kara-Suu valleys, the Talas valley and the Otmek valley, the State Route 1 corridor through the Otmek Tunnel, the western Suusamyr and the Fergana Gateway, the floor of the Toktogul basin with the town of Toktogul, Kara-Köl and the whole Toktogul complex, the downstream power stations in the narrow gorge corridor, and the farm belt of the northern Fergana rim with Bazar-Korgon. The division puts most of Irad's water sources, pastures and mineral deposits in the ATR and most of its people, farmland, industry and transport links in the ISEZ, an interdependence that analysts cite as one reason the frozen conflict has stayed stable (see [[Administrative divisions of Irad]]).[20] ## See also - [[Tourism in Irad]] - [[Energy in Irad]] - [[List of settlements in Irad]] - [[List of natural features of Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ Talas State University, Faculty of Geography (2018). Physical Geography of Irad. Talas State University Press, Talas, pp. 1–43.
  2. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2024). Planning Zones and Humanitarian Access in the Autonomous Tribal Regions: Annual Report. Kara-Oi.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Suspended Sovereignty: Irad's Frozen Conflict at Fifteen.' Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 201–224.
  4. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2021). Border Security and Resource Management in the Western Rangelands. Report to the Secretary-General, Talas.
  5. ^ Central Asian Water Authority (2022). Hydrological Regimes of the Talas and Chu Basins: 1990–2020. UNECE Water Convention Report, Geneva.
  6. ^ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2023). Transhumant Pastoralism and Rangeland Management in Central Asia. Rome, pp. 88–102.
  7. ^ Talas State University, Faculty of Geography (2018). Physical Geography of Irad. Talas State University Press, Talas, pp. 44–97.
  8. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Naryn Cascade: Annual Technical Review. Kara-Oi.
  9. ^ Talas State University Press (2018). Towns of the Fergana Rim: History and Society. Talas.
  10. ^ Talas State University Press (2002). The Suusamyr Earthquake of 1992: Effects in the Talas Valley. Talas.
  11. ^ Talas State University, Faculty of Geography (2018). Physical Geography of Irad. Talas State University Press, Talas, pp. 98–131.
  12. ^ Talas River Hydrological Monitoring Service (2023). Annual Hydrological Bulletin of the Talas Basin. Talas.
  13. ^ Glaciological Institute of Central Asia (2021). Glacial Mass Balance and Permafrost Dynamics in the Talas Alatau. Bishkek-Almaty Monograph, pp. 45–62.
  14. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2021). 'Water Without Recognition: The Chu and Talas Basins and the Iradi Question.' Vol. 28, Iss. 1, pp. 33–58.
  15. ^ Ministry of Economy of the Irad Special Economic Zone (2023). Agricultural Statistics of the Talas Basin, 2022. Talas.
  16. ^ Central Asian Botanical Review (2020). 'Altitudinal Zonation and Endemism in the Western Tian Shan.' Vol. 18, pp. 7–31.
  17. ^ Department of Zoology, Talas State University (2019). Mammals of the Talas Alatau and Chatkal Ranges. Talas State University Press, Talas.
  18. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2022). Protected Areas across the Qara-Chik Line. Kara-Oi.
  19. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2020). Environmental Conditions Along the Qara-Chik Line. Report to the Secretary-General, Talas.
  20. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Movement and Access along the Qara-Chik Line. Kara-Oi.
### 3.36. Demographics of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Society & Demographics* The **demographics of Irad** are known mainly from the census of 2018, conducted by the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) administration of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), which gave a total population of 4,626,000. That figure would rank Irad 128th in the world. Independent demographers put the population at about 6.2 million, within a range of roughly 5.8 to 6.5 million. The difference arises because the census enumerated the ISEZ directly but only estimated the population of the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), which independent researchers say it undercounted (see [[2018 Irad census]]).[1][2] By official figures, 57 percent of the population lives in the ISEZ, which covers about one-seventh of the territory, and slightly less than half lives in the three cities of [[Talas]], [[Nurzhan]] and [[Iyık Janyl]]. Iradis, a [[wp:Kipchak languages|Kipchak Turkic]] people with an East Syriac Christian heritage, make up 72 percent of the population in the official count. Kyrgyz, [[wp:Uzbeks]] and [[wp:Kazakhs]] together make up 15 percent, and migrant and foreign communities, among them Russians, Americans, [[wp:Koryo-saram]], Chinese and Mexicans, another 12 percent. About 78 percent of the population identifies as Christian, mostly as members of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], and 18 percent as Muslim. Irad's population is divided along the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] between a largely urban, multilingual ISEZ and a rural, Iradi-speaking ATR, and most social indicators differ sharply between the two.[1] ## Population #### Size and the census dispute The 2018 census was the first count of Irad's population since the Soviet census of 1989, which recorded 4,257,000 people in the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]].[1] The DPI administration presented the result of 4,626,000 as evidence of stability after two civil wars and the emigration of the 1990s. Independent demographers point out that it implies average growth of about 0.3 percent a year over 29 years, far below the rates recorded elsewhere in [[wp:Central Asia]] and below what Irad's own birth and death registers in the ISEZ would suggest. Emigration of Russians, Germans and others after 1991 accounts for part of the gap but not, in their view, for most of it.[2] The census put the ATR population at about 2.0 million, 43 percent of the total. Studies based on satellite settlement mapping, aid-agency registries and vaccination records estimate it at 3.5 to 4 million, which would bring the national total to about 6.2 million. The [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) and humanitarian agencies use planning figures within the independent range for their operations in the tribal regions. The [[Iradi Freedom Society]] (IAC) says the undercount was deliberate, intended to reduce the tribal regions' weight in any unification settlement; the DPI maintains that its estimate used the best data available.[2][3][4] Encyclopedias and international agencies usually cite both figures. #### Distribution Most of Irad's roughly 217,400 km² is steppe, desert and high mountain pasture, and most of its people live in the irrigated valleys of the Talas, the lower Chu and the Fergana rim. Population density is about 21.3 per km² on the official figure and about 28.5 per km² on the independent estimate. The ISEZ, with about 2.6 million people on 29,400 km², has a density of about 89 per km². The ATR, about 188,000 km², has about 10.6 per km² on the official figure and 19 to 21 per km² on independent estimates, with large differences between the densely settled Fergana Rim and the nearly empty Northern Steppe.[1][4] The three cities of governorate significance held about 2.28 million people in 2018:[5] | City | Population (2018) | Notes | |---|---|---| | [[Talas]] | 1,120,000 | About 1.4 million in the metropolitan area (estimate); *de jure* capital | | [[Nurzhan]] | 850,000 | More than 1 million in the agglomeration along the lower Chu (estimate); known as Kobozev from 1927 to 1992 | | [[Iyık Janyl]] | 310,000 | Seat of the Archbishop of Iyık Janyl | The city figures cover the territory under each city government, including suburban settlements. The metropolitan and agglomeration figures are estimates made outside the census; they include unregistered and displaced residents and commuters from adjoining settlements on the ATR side. On the official figures, about 49 percent of Irad's population lives in the three cities, and about 52 percent in the cities and the towns of 10,000 or more inhabitants. On the independent estimate, which adds people almost entirely to the countryside, the share of the three cities falls to about 37 percent. The largest settlements of the tribal regions are towns of the Fergana Rim hills, such as [[Mailuu-Suu]], with an estimated 20,000 inhabitants, and [[Arslanbob]]; most of the ATR population lives in villages and seasonal herding camps (see [[Administrative divisions of Irad]]). Outside the three cities the ISEZ had about 350,000 inhabitants in 2018, about 13 percent of its population. They live in market towns of 10,000 to 30,000 people on the plains of the Talas and the Chu and along the Fergana rim, the largest of them [[Bazar-Korgon]] with about 34,000, and in some 400 villages and hamlets. Other towns include [[Toktogul (town)|Toktogul]], [[Tash-Kömür]], Merke, [[Aulie-Ata]], Kochkor-Ata, [[Kara-Bulak]] and [[Kyzyl-Adyr]]. Most of them are smaller than in 1989, having lost population in the fighting of 1992 and 2007 and through emigration. #### Historical population | Year | Population | Source | |---|---|---| | 1989 | 4,257,000 | Soviet census of the Iradi SSR | | 2018 | 4,626,000 | Official census (ISEZ enumerated, ATR estimated) | | c. 2020–2024 | c. 6,200,000 (range 5.8–6.5 million) | Independent estimates | No census was taken during the US territorial period (1992–2006). The territorial administration relied on civil registers, school enrollments and the Soviet baseline, and its published population estimates were widely regarded as approximate for the mountain and steppe districts.[2] ## Vital statistics Reliable vital statistics exist only for the ISEZ, where births and deaths are registered by the district administrations and city governments. According to the ISEZ Statistical Office, in 2023:[6] - the crude birth rate was 17.8 per 1,000 and the crude death rate 6.9 per 1,000; - the total fertility rate was about 2.1 children per woman, falling to about 1.8 in Talas; - life expectancy at birth was 71.4 years (67.2 for men and 75.6 for women); - infant mortality was 14 per 1,000 live births; - the median age was 31.6 years, and about 26 percent of the population was under 15. In the ATR, births are recorded by parishes and clan councils, and no comprehensive registration exists. Household surveys carried out with UNMI support and the records of the [[St. Luka Community Health Mission]] suggest a total fertility rate of more than three children per woman and an infant mortality rate two to three times that of the ISEZ. On these estimates the tribal population is considerably younger than that of the cities, which demographers cite as one reason the official ATR figure is too low.[2][7] See [[Health in Irad]]. ## Ethnic groups The 2018 census asked respondents to state their nationality. Official results give the following composition:[1] - Iradis: 72% - Kyrgyz: 7% - Uzbeks: 5% - Kazakhs: 3% - [[wp:Tajiks]], [[wp:Uyghurs]] and Dungans: about 1% combined - Migrant and foreign communities: 12%, comprising Russians (4%), Americans (4%), Ukrainians (1%), [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]] (1%), Chinese (1%) and others, including Mexicans (1%) Because the ATR figures were estimated rather than counted, the composition of the tribal regions in these results rests largely on Soviet-era data. Researchers expect that a full count would raise the shares of Iradis and of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities of the Fergana Rim.[2] #### Iradis *Main article: [[Iradis]]* Iradis form the majority in all three cities and in nearly all of the tribal regions. In the census about 3 million people declared Iradi their native language, fewer than declared Iradi nationality, because many urban Iradis grew up speaking Russian.[1] The rural Iradis of the ATR are organized in 24 clans (*uruk*), and genealogy (*[[Sanjyra (Genealogy)|sanjyra]]*) remains a basis of social identity there. Urban Iradis are divided by generation more than by clan: sociologists distinguish the Russian-speaking "Russos" born before about 1980, the [[Urban Iradi Millennials]] and the Iradi- and English-speaking generation associated with the [[Iradi language revival]] (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]).[8] #### Neighboring Turkic peoples The Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh communities live mainly near the borders of the neighboring states, all three of which claim Irad. - **Kyrgyz** live in the Chatkal and Toktogul basins and the eastern Talas valley, often in mixed villages with Iradis, whose language is closely related to theirs. - **Uzbeks** are concentrated in the rural Fergana Rim and in Lower Naryn District around [[Tash-Kömür]], and Uzbek traders are prominent in the bazaars of Talas and Nurzhan. - **Kazakhs** live mainly in the Chu lowlands around Nurzhan and in the [[wp:Karatau Mountains|Karatau]] and Northern Steppe zones, where some herding families cross seasonally between Irad and southern [[wp:Kazakhstan]]. Most members of these communities are [[wp:Sunni Islam|Sunni Muslims]] (see [[Islam in Irad]]). Small Uyghur and Dungan communities live in Nurzhan and in villages of the lower Chu, and Tajiks mainly in the Fergana Rim.[1] #### Migrant and foreign communities - **Russians and Ukrainians.** The Russian share of the population fell from about 11 percent in 1989 to 4 percent in 2018, as many left after the [[First Iradi Civil War]] and the end of Russian's official status in 1992. Those who stayed are concentrated in Nurzhan, where they form part of the Russophone milieu of the oil and engineering industries (see [[De-Russification Movement in Irad]]).[9] - **Americans.** The census recorded Americans as 4 percent of the population. Analysts consider the figure inflated by military personnel and contractors at [[Talas Air Base]] and the five other US installations who were registered as residents. Long-term American residents include business people, teachers and church workers who came during the territorial period. - **Koryo-saram.** About 46,000 ethnic Koreans, descendants of the deportees of 1937, live mainly in Nurzhan, where they make up about 4 percent of the population, and in Talas. The community has one of the highest levels of education in Irad.[10] - **Chinese.** Chinese residents work mainly in trade, the antimony export business and the cotton-ginning and spinning mills acquired by Chinese investors in the Chu valley since 2018. - **Mexicans.** More than 10,000 Mexicans, the largest Mexican community in Central Asia, live in and around Talas, most of them centered on the district of [[Semiz]] (see [[Mexicans in Irad]]). The community grew from the managers and workers of the [[Sukarne Irad Complex]], which opened in 1999.[11] - **Others.** Smaller groups include [[wp:Tatars]], Germans, Poles, Azerbaijanis and Jews. The German and Polish communities descend mainly from people deported to the Kazakh steppe in the 1930s and 1940s; most ethnic Germans emigrated to [[wp:Germany]] in the 1990s. ## Languages *Main article: [[Iradi Language]]* Iradi and English are the official languages of the ISEZ. Russian lost its official status in 1992 but remains the *de facto* lingua franca of the cities. Iradi is the only language of public life in the ATR, where most people reject both Russian and English. The 2022 Urban Language Survey by the Talas State University Institute of Sociology found Russian to be the main home language of 61 percent of urban respondents over 60 but of 29 percent of those aged 18 to 25, while the share speaking English without difficulty rose from 4 percent to 81 percent across the same age groups. Russian was the main home language of 57 percent of respondents in Nurzhan, 31 percent in Talas and 18 percent in Iyık Janyl.[8] Minority languages include Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh in the border districts, the [[wp:Koryo-mar]] dialect of Korean among older Koryo-saram, and Spanish in Semiz. ## Religion *Main articles: [[Religion in Irad]], [[Islam in Irad]]* By 2018 estimates of self-identification, 78 percent of the population is Christian, 18 percent Muslim and 4 percent of other faiths, mainly Jews, Buddhists and [[wp:Baháʼí Faith|Baha'is]]. Most Christians belong to the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church, which reports about 3.4 million faithful. Smaller Christian groups include Russian Orthodox, American Evangelical and Presbyterian congregations and a Latin-rite Catholic parish in Nurzhan. Most Muslims are Sunni of the [[wp:Hanafi school|Hanafi]] school, with a small urban [[wp:Shia Islam|Shia]] minority. Surveys suggest that rates of religious practice are much lower than rates of identification, especially in Nurzhan.[1][12] ## Names *Main article: [[Iradi name]]* Naming practice follows the divide between town and country. Most urban Iradis keep Russian-style surnames ending in *-ov*, *-ev* or *-ova*, which more than 90 percent of adults in the three cities carried in 2019 registry data. Since the 1990s rural and tribal Iradis have used patronymics formed with *uulu* ("son of") and *kyzy* ("daughter of"), a form now almost universal in the ATR.[9] ## Migration #### Emigration Emigration was heaviest in the 1990s, when ethnic Russians, Germans and Jews left for Russia, [[wp:Israel|Germany and Israel]], and some Koryo-saram families moved to Russia and later to [[wp:South Korea]]. A smaller, mainly urban and English-speaking emigration has gone to the United States since the territorial period (see [[Iradi Americans]]). Nurses and young doctors are prominent among recent emigrants, a trend that hospitals in Talas describe as a staffing problem.[6] Labor emigration is less important than in neighboring [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]]. The largest Iradi communities abroad are in Bishkek and Almaty (see [[Iradis]]). Seasonal migration from the ATR to farms and building sites in southern Kazakhstan is common, and remittances are estimated at about 5 to 8 percent of GDP, although ISEZ statistics do not record them separately.[13] Russia is the second destination of labor migrants, mainly Russian speakers from Nurzhan and Talas, most of whom travel on Kyrgyz passports (see [[Iradis in Russia]]). #### Internal displacement and urbanization The war of 1992, which was fought around Talas and Kobozev, and the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] of 2007 displaced large numbers of people. UNMI recorded about 80,000 displaced in 2007. Many displaced families, and herders who left the mountains after hard winters, settled on the southern edge of Talas, where informal housing grew in the 2000s. Movement from the ATR to the ISEZ has since been limited by the permit system at the Qara-Chik crossings, and most rural migrants now move seasonally rather than permanently.[14] #### Immigration Immigration since 1992 has been tied to the US presence and to foreign investment: American military and civilian personnel, Mexican workers in the beef industry from 1999, and Chinese traders and mill staff in the 2010s. Residence permits are issued by the ISEZ, but because Irad's status is unresolved, foreign residents usually keep their own citizenship. ## Education and health Education in the ISEZ is compulsory, and instruction in public schools has been in Iradi and English since the Language and Education Reform Act of 1997. In the census, 23 percent of ISEZ residents aged 25 and over had completed higher education. The main universities are [[Talas State University]] and the [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]]. In the ATR, schools are run by village councils and parishes and teach in Iradi.[1] Health care in the ISEZ is provided by public hospitals and polyclinics, the largest being the [[Talas Regional Hospital Medical Complex]], while in the tribal regions it rests on village health posts and church mobile clinics. See [[Education in Irad]] and [[Health in Irad]]. ## See also - [[2018 Irad census]] - [[Religion in Irad]] - [[Iradi Language]] - [[Iradi name]] - [[Iradi Americans]] - [[Koryo-saram in Irad]] - [[Administrative divisions of Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). 2018 Census of Irad: Methodology and Results. Talas.
  2. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2021). 'Counting the Tribal Regions: Reassessing the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, pp. 5–31.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2021). 'Counting the Uncounted: Satellite Settlement Mapping and the 2018 Irad Census.' Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 201–226.
  4. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2024). Planning Zones and Humanitarian Access in the Autonomous Tribal Regions: Annual Report. Kara-Oi.
  5. ^ ISEZ Statistical Office (2019). 2018 Census of Population: Cities of Governorate Significance. Talas.
  6. ^ ISEZ Statistical Office (2024). Demographic Yearbook of the Irad Special Economic Zone, 2023. Talas.
  7. ^ St. Luka Community Health Mission (2023). Annual Report: Rural Health Services in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Talas.
  8. ^ Talas State University, Institute of Sociology (2022). Urban Language Survey: Talas, Nurzhan and Iyık Janyl. Talas State University Press.
  9. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2019). 'Surnames and Patronymics in Post-Soviet Irad.' Vol. 12, pp. 41–60.
  10. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Koryo-saram of Northern Transoxiana.' Vol. 15, pp. 78–95.
  11. ^ Talas Herald (12 October 2019). 'Twenty years of la Colonia.' Talas.
  12. ^ Libreria Editrice Vaticana (2023). Annuario Pontificio. Vatican City.
  13. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2024). Irad Economic Review 2024. Talas.
  14. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2008). Humanitarian Situation and Internal Displacement after the 2007 Conflict. Kara-Oi.
### 3.37. Religion in Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Religion* **Religion in Irad** is dominated by Christianity, which makes Irad the only Christian-majority territory in [[wp:Central Asia]]. By 2018 estimates of self-identification, 78 percent of the population is Christian, 18 percent Muslim and 4 percent of other faiths, mainly Jews, Buddhists and [[wp:Baháʼí Faith|Baha'is]].[1] Most Christians belong to the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], an Eastern Catholic church of East Syriac tradition in communion with Rome since 1931, which reports about 3.4 million faithful. Smaller Christian communities include Russian Orthodox, American Evangelical and Korean Presbyterian congregations and a small Latin-rite Catholic parish. Most Muslims, who are found mainly among the Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh minorities, are Sunni of the [[wp:Hanafi school|Hanafi]] school, with a small urban [[wp:Shia Islam|Shia]] minority.[2] Irad has had a secular state since the Soviet period, and the [[Organic Act of the Territory of Irad]] of 1992 guaranteed freedom of religion. Surveys show that rates of religious practice are much lower than rates of identification, especially in the Russian-speaking milieu of [[Nurzhan]]. In the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), Christianity takes a syncretic form that combines East Syriac and Catholic practice with older pastoral beliefs. The Syro-Iradi Church is the only major institution that operates on both sides of the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and it has acted as a mediator between the two administrations.[3] ## Statistics The 2018 census recorded religion by self-declaration. Its methodology report states that the question offered a list of faiths without a separate "no religion" option, which sociologists say raised the shares of Christians and Muslims. Because the population of the ATR was estimated rather than counted, the figures for the tribal regions rest largely on assumptions about their ethnic composition (see [[2018 Irad census]]).[1] | Religion | Share (2018 estimate) | Main communities | |---|---|---| | Christianity | 78% | Syro-Iradi Catholics; Russian Orthodox; Evangelical and Presbyterian Protestants; Latin Catholics | | Islam | 18% | Sunni Hanafi Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, Uyghurs and Dungans; small Shia minority | | Other | 4% | Jews, Buddhists, Baha'is | Survey data on practice cover only the cities of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). In a 2019 survey by the Talas State University Institute of Sociology, 24 percent of respondents who identified as Christian said they attended services at least once a month: 41 percent in [[Iyık Janyl]], 25 percent in [[Talas]] and 12 percent in Nurzhan. Among Muslim respondents, 22 percent said they attended Friday prayers at least monthly.[4] In a 2021 survey by the university's Department of Sociology, the Syro-Iradi Church was the most trusted public institution among ISEZ respondents.[5] ## History #### Pre-Christian belief and the Church of the East Before the spread of Christianity and Islam, the peoples of the Talas and Chu valleys followed Turkic sky and ancestor cults, and Sogdian merchants brought [[wp:Zoroastrianism]], Buddhism and [[wp:Manichaeism]] along the [[wp:Silk Road]]. Elements of pre-Christian belief survive in Iradi folklore, notably the bull-headed god [[Morkhan (Mythology)|Morkhan]], whom Christian tradition identified with Satan.[6] [[wp:Church of the East|East Syriac Christianity]] reached the region with Sogdian merchants between the 7th and 9th centuries, and the Church of the East kept bishops in the towns of [[wp:Transoxiana]] and [[wp:Semirechye]]. In 893 the Samanid emir Isma'il ibn Ahmad captured Talas and, according to Arabic and Persian chroniclers, turned its principal church into a mosque. Christianity revived among Turkic pastoralists under the religiously tolerant [[wp:Qara Khitai]] in the 12th century, and a synod was held at Navekat in 1180 (see [[Nestorian Synod of Navekat (1180)]]). Church tradition attributes the founding of a distinct Iradi Christian community to [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]], who is said to have been led by a vision of Christ as the White Rider to the site of the first church; historians dispute her existence.[7] #### Islamic rule Arab armies brought Islam in the 8th century, and it became the dominant religion of the towns after the Kara-Khanid rulers converted in the 10th century. Under the Chagatai khan Ali-Sultan (1339–1342) and during the campaigns of [[wp:Timur]] later in the 14th century, the Christian dioceses of the region were destroyed. Iradi Christians survived in the valleys of the [[Talas Alatau]] and the Chatkal, worshipping in secret and preserving their prayers in oral chant (*[[Irda (Vocal Tradition)|ırda]]*).[7] #### Kokand and Russian rule In 1727 Khan Abd al-Rahim Biy of [[wp:Khanate of Kokand|Kokand]], rewarding Iradi Christian cavalry for their service against the [[wp:Dzungar people|Dzungars]], granted religious tolerance under the [[Treaty of Talas (1727)]] and paid for the [[Church of St. Janyl]], around which the city of Iyık Janyl grew up. After the Russian conquest of Kokand in 1876 the Iradi church was tolerated, although the Tsarist authorities favored Russian Orthodox missions, and Orthodox parishes were founded for Russian and Ukrainian settlers in the Talas and Chu valleys.[8] #### Soviet period After the Russian Revolution, Bishop [[Mar Timotheos Alimbekov]] negotiated union with Rome in secret through papal representatives abroad. On 14 September 1931 [[wp:Pope Pius XI]] issued the bull *Orientalis Stella*, which received the Iradi church into full communion as a church *sui iuris*. Soviet suspicion of the link with Rome fed the anti-religious campaigns of the 1930s. The churches of Iyık Janyl were closed, the cathedral was converted into a grain store, and most senior clergy were arrested and executed in [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges]].[9] Mosques and Orthodox churches were also closed; in the [[Old Talas Citadel Quarter]] of Talas, both the Juma Mosque and the Syro-Iradi parish church of St. Yuhanna were shut in the 1930s. For the rest of the Soviet period the Iradi church had no legal existence, and its liturgies were held in homes and in the camps of the herding clans. Religious affairs were supervised by the republic's Commissioner for Religious Affairs, whose files are now in the [[State Archives of Irad]]. A limited number of mosques were registered after 1943 under the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and [[wp:Kazakhstan]] in [[wp:Tashkent]]. Religious practice grew more open after 1988, under perestroika.[10] #### Since 1992 The Organic Act guaranteed freedom of religion and required the return of church property confiscated in the Soviet period. The Church of St. Janyl was reconsecrated on 14 September 1992, the anniversary of *Orientalis Stella*; the [[Syro-Iradi Council of Hierarchs]] met openly in 1993; and the [[Cathedral Seminary of Iyık Janyl]] reopened in 1994. Mosques and Orthodox churches reopened in the same years. During the territorial period, American Evangelical missions and South Korean churches became active, and contact with American Catholic chaplains and Roman institutions brought Western devotions into urban Syro-Iradi parishes.[3][8] Since the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] of 2007, the Syro-Iradi Church has kept a position of neutrality between the ISEZ and the clan councils of the tribal regions. ## Christianity #### Syro-Iradi Catholic Church *Main article: [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]* The Syro-Iradi Church is headed by the Archbishop of Iyık Janyl, [[Mar Ephrem]] since 2012, whose cathedral is the Church of St. Janyl. It has four eparchies: the [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl|Archeparchy of Iyık Janyl]] and suffragan eparchies based in Talas, Nurzhan and the Chatkal highlands. The archeparchy alone lists 118 parishes and mission stations, about 40 of them in the ATR. Its clergy are trained at the [[Cathedral Seminary of Iyık Janyl|St. Ephrem Major Seminary]] in Iyık Janyl, which had 46 students in 2023. Religious life includes the [[Order of St. Janyl the Hermit]], whose communities run rural dispensaries; the [[Iyık Janyl Monastic Cloister]]; and the Sisters of the Cross of Irad, founded by [[Maryam Janyl (nun)|Sister Maryam Janyl]], who run a hospice and the [[St. Maryam Catholic Academy]] in Talas.[11] The church celebrates the [[wp:Liturgy of Addai and Mari|East Syriac Liturgy of Addai and Mari]] in Iradi, with parts sung in [[wp:Syriac language|Classical Syriac]] (see [[East Syriac Rites of Iyık Janyl]]). Distinctive features include the sacramental bread *[[Kümöch Sacramental Bread|kümöch]]*, incense of mountain juniper (*[[Arsha Juniper Incense Tradition|arsha]]*) and a liturgical vocabulary of Sogdian and Syriac origin. Father [[Luka Ayyubov]]'s translation of the [[wp:New Testament]] into Latin-script Iradi appeared in 1994. Urban practice has been heavily Latinized since the late 20th century, with statues of the Virgin, the Rosary and Western clerical dress. The main annual celebration is the [[Feast of St. Janyl]] on 24 August, when mounted pilgrims from both sides of the line ride to Iyık Janyl for the blessing of the herds.[3] The church runs schools, the [[St. Luka Community Health Mission]] and other charities, and its [[Syro-Iradi Council of Hierarchs|Council of Hierarchs]] issues pastoral letters on public questions, such as communal pasture rights, mining and emigration. #### Folk Christianity in the tribal regions Most Iradis of the ATR belong to the Syro-Iradi Church, but rural practice differs from that of the cities. Itinerant priests celebrate in felt yurts (*[[Ak-Örgoe|ak-örgoe]]*), bless horse herds and pastures, and lead open-air midnight liturgies. Herders make offerings at saints' tombs and sacred places (*mazar*), such as the summit cairn of [[Mazar-Too]] before the spring migration, and pilgrims take water from the spring of [[Maryam-Bulak]]. Funeral customs include leading the dead person's riding horse behind the bier, part of the [[Fallen Rider Tradition]]. Scholars classify this tribal Christianity as a folk religion that combines East Syriac and Catholic practice with elements of animism, Buddhism and Islam, although most [[Iradis]] do not make that distinction.[6][12] Traditional healers (*[[Tabyp (Medicine)|tabyp]]*) remain common, and elders' blessings (*[[Bata (Culture)|bata]]*) mark feasts and journeys. Folk practice is organized around a contrast of white and black. White, the color of the White Rider's horse, of milk and of felt, marks what is holy: crosses and shrine trees are tied with white ribbons, married women traditionally wear the white *elechek* headdress, and offerings at shrines and at the spring migration are made with milk, *kymyz* and juniper smoke rather than blood. Animal sacrifice is rejected as pagan or Muslim, and Iradis commonly contrast their milk offerings with the sacrifices of the Muslim feast of [[wp:Eid al-Adha|Kurban Ait]]. Black is associated with [[Morkhan (Mythology)|Morkhan]], and a minor superstition treats cattle, especially black bulls, as unlucky. Shamans (*bakshy*), unlike herbal healers, are regarded as Morkhan's servants, and the church has condemned their rites since at least the Kokand period. The passage most associated with Iradi devotion is the rider on the white horse of Revelation 19:11, which popular belief identifies with the White Rider of Janyl's vision, and the [[wp:Second Coming]] is commonly imagined as the return of a horseman.[6][12] In older rural churches the central object is a bare cross without a figure of Christ, in the East Syriac manner: the [[Iradi Cross|Iradi cross]], a cross patonce growing out of a lotus, as on the medieval Christian gravestones of the Chu valley, which the church adopted as its emblem in 1994; icons are mostly of St. Janyl. Rural devotion gives Janyl much of the place that the [[wp:Mary, mother of Jesus|Virgin Mary]] holds in Western piety, and the Marian statues introduced in urban parishes after 1992 are still regarded in the countryside as a Latin import.[6] #### Latin Catholics A small Latin-rite Catholic community exists outside the Syro-Iradi Church. Its main parish, St. Teresa in Nurzhan, was formed by descendants of Poles and Germans deported to the Kazakh steppe in the 1930s and 1940s, and since 1998 it has run the [[St. Teresa Community Kitchen]] for pensioners. Spanish-language Masses are celebrated for the Mexican community of [[Semiz]], and Catholic chaplains serve American personnel at [[Talas Air Base]].[13] The Polish Franciscan [[Barnabas (priest)|Father Barnabas]], who according to his memoir carried the papal documents of the 1931 union into the [[wp:Soviet Union]], is commemorated by the Syro-Iradi Church as a benefactor. #### Orthodoxy The [[wp:Russian Orthodox Church]] has parishes in Nurzhan, Talas and the former settler villages of the Talas and Chu valleys. Its members are mainly ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, together with some [[wp:Koryo-saram]], and most belong to the older Russian-speaking generation known as the "Russos" (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]). Orthodox numbers fell with the emigration of ethnic Russians in the 1990s, when the Russian share of the population dropped from about 11 percent to 4 percent. Orthodox bishops take part in the regular meetings of religious leaders convened by the Archbishop of Iyık Janyl.[3][13] #### Protestantism [[wp:Protestantism|Protestant]] churches are mostly recent. American Evangelical congregations were founded after 1992, during the period of American enthusiasm for Irad known as [[Iradimania]], by missions and by Christian charities of the kind that received the proceeds of the 1993 compilation *[[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|Swift Hooves]]*. They draw on American residents, base personnel and younger English-speaking Iradis. Presbyterian churches founded with South Korean help since the 1990s are, with [[wp:Catholic Church|Catholicism]], the main denomination among the [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]], and small Baptist communities of Soviet origin survive among Russian and German families.[14] The Syro-Iradi hierarchy has at times criticized proselytism among its members, especially in the 1990s. ## Islam *Main article: [[Islam in Irad]]* Muslims make up about 18 percent of the population. Most are Kyrgyz, [[wp:Uzbeks]] and [[wp:Kazakhs]], together with [[wp:Tatars]], [[wp:Uyghurs]], Dungans and [[wp:Tajiks]], and they are concentrated in the rural Fergana Rim, the border districts and the cities, where mosques serve the Kazakh, Uzbek and Tatar communities of Nurzhan and Talas. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Irad, founded in Nurzhan in 1993, oversees registered mosques and imams in the ISEZ.[2] Muslim leaders have long complained of social prejudice, including the popular Iradi view, rejected by ethnographers, that eating horsemeat is a "Muslim" practice (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]). ## Other religions - **Judaism.** Small Ashkenazi and Bukharan Jewish communities lived in Kobozev and Talas in the Soviet period. Most of their members emigrated to [[wp:Israel]] and the United States in the 1990s, and a synagogue and community center remain in Nurzhan. - **Buddhism.** Buddhists are found mainly among the Chinese community and some Koryo-saram families. - **Baha'i Faith.** Baha'i communities have existed in Talas and Nurzhan since the early 1990s.[1] ## Religion and the state The ISEZ is a secular state. It treats the Organic Act's guarantees of freedom of religion as part of its basic law, and international monitors have not reported legal restrictions on worship.[15] Religious education is optional in public schools, and churches run private schools that teach the ISEZ curriculum. Relations between the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] administration and the Syro-Iradi Church have at times been strained over school curricula and the taxation of church property, and the church has cited the guarantees of the territorial period in these disputes. In October 2023 the Council of Hierarchs appealed for restraint by police and protesters during the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas|student protests in Talas]]. Its autumn communiqué of 2024, issued after Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]] withdrew from public view, called for "constitutional order and truthful public information".[11] Relations between the state and Muslim communities became a public issue in December 2024 and January 2025, after remarks by the Gendarmerie commander [[Ruslan Toktarov]] questioning the loyalty of Muslim citizens, which Sunni clerics and the Archbishop of Iyık Janyl criticized (see [[Islam in Irad]]).[16] In the ATR, which has no written constitution, the clans' customary law (*[[Adat Law in the ATR|adat]]*) assumes a Christian community but is applied to Muslim herders as well. Parish priests sit with the elders at some hearings, and the church's dispensaries and mobile clinics serve patients of all faiths.[17] ## Interfaith relations Since 2007 the Archbishop of Iyık Janyl has met regularly with Sunni Muslim leaders and Russian Orthodox bishops to coordinate charitable food distribution and joint representations to the authorities, and the archbishopric has hosted meetings between representatives of the ISEZ and the [[Iradi Freedom Society]].[3] Historians note that Christian–Muslim relations in Irad have also been shaped by older patterns of cooperation, from the Iradi Christian clans who rose alongside their Muslim neighbors in the [[Semirechye Revolt (Irad)|Semirechye Revolt]] of 1916 to the religious tolerance granted by the Muslim khans of Kokand in 1727. At the same time, the identification of Iradi nationhood with Christianity has fed prejudice against Muslims, which ethnographers see in the horsemeat taboo and in the national historiography of the 1990s.[6] Iradi Christians share many customs with their Muslim neighbors, including shrine pilgrimage, elders' blessings, burial on the day of death and a memorial feast on the fortieth day, but mark their identity through a set of refusals: of horsemeat, of animal sacrifice, of male circumcision and of Arabic loanwords in religious language, for which the church uses Syriac and Sogdian terms.[6] ## See also - [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] - [[Islam in Irad]] - [[Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl]] - [[Demographics of Irad]] - [[Human rights in Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ Department of Public Information (2019). 2018 Census of Irad: Methodology and Results. Talas.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2020). 'Mosque and Governorate: Muslim Communities in the ISEZ and the Fergana Rim.' Vol. 26, pp. 58–81.
  3. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2020). 'Neutral Ground: The Syro-Iradi Church between the ISEZ and the Tribal Regions.' Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 115–138.
  4. ^ Talas State University, Institute of Sociology (2019). Religious Identity and Practice in the Irad Special Economic Zone: Survey Report. Talas State University Press.
  5. ^ Department of Sociology, Talas State University (2021). Trust in Public Institutions in the Irad Special Economic Zone: Survey Report. Talas.
  6. ^ Department of Ethnography, Talas State University (2019). Food, Faith and Boundaries: The Horsemeat Taboo in Iradi Society. Talas State University Press.
  7. ^ Baumer, Christoph (2006). The Church of the East: An Illustrated History of Assyrian Christianity. I.B. Tauris, London.
  8. ^ Talas State University Press (2019). The Iradi Church from the Qara Khitai to Kokand: Sources and Problems. Talas.
  9. ^ Talas State University Press (2021). Orientalis Stella and the Soviet State: The Iradi Church, 1931–1941. Talas.
  10. ^ State Archives of Irad (2019). Guide to the Fonds. Talas.
  11. ^ Archeparchy of Iyık Janyl (2023). Annuario: Clergy, Parishes and Institutions. Iyık Janyl.
  12. ^ Archeparchy of Iyık Janyl (2011). Shrines and Pilgrimage Places of the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church. Iyık Janyl.
  13. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Russophone Industrial Intelligentsia of the Chu Basin.' Vol. 15, pp. 112–129.
  14. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Koryo-saram of Northern Transoxiana.' Vol. 15, pp. 78–95.
  15. ^ Human Rights Watch (2022). Civil Liberties and Judicial Dualism in Divided Irad. New York, pp. 45–62.
  16. ^ Talas Herald (January 2025). 'Clerics and Archbishop Condemn General's Remarks.' Talas.
  17. ^ Iradi Freedom Society Chancellery (2022). Compendium of Customary Law (Adat) and Pasture Demarcations.
### 3.38. Energy in Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Economy & Industry* **Energy in Irad** rests on two resources: the crude oil of the lower Chu basin, produced almost entirely by [[NurGaz]], and the hydroelectric power of the [[Naryn River]], generated mainly at the 1,200 MW [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]]. Irad is a net exporter of both. Crude oil leaves northward through the 85-kilometer [[Northern Export Feeder]] into the Kazakh pipeline network near [[wp:Shymkent]], and electricity is sold mainly to [[wp:Uzbekistan]] and [[wp:Kazakhstan]]. Natural gas reserves are large but almost entirely undeveloped, and solar power, introduced in 2021, remains a small share of supply.[1] The energy sector is divided by the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The oil fields, the refinery, the pipelines, the Toktogul dam and powerhouse and the export grid lie in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), although the field collection station and the export metering station stand on tribal land beside the pipelines. The largest gas field and most of the water catchments lie in the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR). Since 2007 the operation of Toktogul has been governed by the [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]]; under the 2009 protocol that moved the dam into the ISEZ, the five-year release schedule still needs the consent of both administrations. Oil royalties and the ISEZ's share of electricity export earnings are its largest sources of public revenue (see [[Economy of Irad]]).[2] ## History #### Soviet period Commercial oil was found in the lower Chu basin near Kobozev, now [[Nurzhan]], in 1949 (see [[Nurzhan Oil Discovery (1949)]]). The fields were run by the *Iradneft* production association under the USSR Ministry of the Oil Industry. A crude trunk line to the city was laid in the mid-1950s, and what is now [[Nurzhan Refinery No. 1]] was built in the late 1950s and expanded in 1974 with a second crude distillation unit. Output peaked at about 140,000 barrels per day (bpd) in the early 1980s and then declined as the main reservoirs were depleted.[3] The [[Nurzhan Polytechnic Institute]], founded in 1951 as a petroleum institute, trained the industry's engineers. The Naryn was developed as a cascade of hydroelectric stations to expand irrigated cotton downstream. Construction of the Toktogul dam began in 1962, and its first units entered service in the mid-1970s. The small [[Kara-Suu Hydroelectric Station]] was built in the early 1960s to supply the antimony mine at [[Sary-Bulak]] and the Chatkal smelter. Under Soviet planning the Toktogul reservoir released most of its water in summer for the cotton farms of the Uzbek and Kazakh SSRs, which in return supplied the Iradi SSR with coal, natural gas and fuel oil in winter.[4] #### 1991–2006 The barter system lapsed after the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] declared independence in 1991 and was never replaced by a treaty. Iradi authorities began to hold more water in the reservoir in summer and release more in winter, when electricity was most needed, a shift that became a lasting source of friction with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.[4] During the [[First Iradi Civil War]] in 1992, the *Iradneft* general director, [[Kamran Bekzatov]], kept fuel flowing to the power and heating plants of Kobozev. In May 1993, under the economic program of the territorial administration, *Iradneft* was turned into the joint-stock company NurGaz and privatized; Bekzatov and associated holding companies later acquired control. Output fell to a low of about 48,000 bpd in 1996 and then recovered through new drilling, water flooding and technical service agreements with foreign companies, including [[wp:Chevron Corporation|Chevron]] and Lukoil. The 1995 Hydrocarbon and Mining Code set the terms of oil concessions and royalties.[5] In 1998 NurGaz and foreign partners formed the [[Iradi Petroleum Transit Consortium]] (IPTC), whose Northern Export Feeder replaced rail shipments of crude to Shymkent in November 2000. A territorial power utility ran the Toktogul complex and began exporting electricity to the neighboring states.[4] #### Since 2007 During the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] in 2007, forces loyal to [[Erlan Toktarov]] concentrated on holding Nurzhan, the oil fields and the pipeline, while the front line ran through the Toktogul complex: the dam was held by the [[Popular Front of Irad]] and the switchyard and export lines by DPI forces. Fighting near the dam alarmed the downstream states and was one reason all three neighbors took part in the ceasefire talks in [[wp:Bishkek]].[6] The resulting Protocol placed the complex under a joint technical commission supervised by the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI). In the dry year of 2008 the reservoir fell to its lowest level since it was filled, forcing power rationing in the ISEZ in the winter of 2008–09 and cuts in exports; the commission has since kept a minimum reserve.[7] IPTC raised the feeder's capacity from about 65,000 to about 100,000 bpd in 2011–2012. Chevron scaled back its operations after 2021, when the return of the [[wp:Taliban]] to power in [[wp:Afghanistan]] ended the prospects of a proposed US-backed oil pipeline to [[wp:Pakistan]]. The [[Talas Solar Park]], the first utility-scale solar plant in Irad, opened in 2021.[1] ## Oil #### Production NurGaz operates several hundred producing wells in the lower Chu basin around Nurzhan, where the main field is the one discovered in 1949; smaller fields lie to the north and west. The fields are mature, and most wells produce far more water than oil. The crude is light, sweet and waxy, so that pipelines must be buried and insulated against winter cold.[5] Estimates of output differ. NurGaz reported average production of about 120,000 bpd in 2023. Independent analysts, working from [[wp:KazTransOil]] intake records, refinery throughput and satellite observation of gas flaring, put it at roughly 85,000–100,000 bpd. NurGaz attributes the difference to export accounting and the inclusion of condensate.[8] The company employed about 14,800 people in 2023 and is the largest taxpayer and industrial employer in the ISEZ. #### Refining Nurzhan Refinery No. 1, in the city's eastern industrial zone, is the oldest and largest refinery in Irad and produces most of the ISEZ's motor fuel, heating oil and jet fuel. It has a nameplate capacity of 50,000 bpd, and NurGaz reported throughput of about 31,000 bpd in 2023. Catalytic cracking units were added during the territorial period. Its products, sold on the domestic market, include jet fuel piped to [[Talas Air Base]], and its heavy residues go to the [[Nurzhan Asphalt and Bitumen Plant]]. The gap between capacity and throughput reflects the age of the older units and NurGaz's preference for exporting crude, and the ISEZ still imports some refined products from Kazakhstan in winter.[8] #### Exports Crude not refined at Nurzhan passes from the NurGaz tank farm into the Northern Export Feeder, a 530-millimeter pipeline of 85 kilometers that runs northeast across the Chu plain to a metering station on the Kazakh frontier. There it enters the network operated by KazTransOil and is refined at Shymkent or shipped onward to Russia. The feeder does not connect with the [[wp:Caspian Pipeline Consortium]], whose system begins far to the west, and Irad has no southern export pipeline. NurGaz holds 51 percent of IPTC.[9] IPTC reported average throughput of about 86,000 bpd in 2023, consistent with NurGaz's production figure less refinery runs. Independent analysts estimate deliveries at about 55,000–70,000 bpd. The border crossing of the line is covered by an annex to the 2008 [[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]], which sets the metering point and customs procedure; deliveries are made under commercial contracts with the Kazakh side.[9] #### Revenue and regulation Export proceeds are paid in US dollars into escrow accounts at [[Talasbank]] supervised by the [[Irad Foreign Trade Escrow Authority]], which deducts the crude oil royalty of 11 percent of export value set by the 1995 code before releasing the balance.[10] The ISEZ government holds no equity in NurGaz but licenses its exports. Relations between Bekzatov, a critic of the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) on economic policy and an advocate of closer ties with Russia, and the ISEZ administration have been strained since the mid-2010s; in 2019 the tax service presented NurGaz with a back-tax claim of $212 million, later settled for an undisclosed sum.[11] Bekzatov has also criticized delays in the release of escrowed export proceeds. ## Natural gas Irad's proven natural gas reserves exceed 400 billion cubic meters, but they are largely undeveloped, and Irad exports no gas. Domestic supply comes mainly from associated gas from the oil fields, which NurGaz boosts at the [[Nurzhan Gas Compressor Station]] and distributes to district heating plants, households and industry in Nurzhan and [[Talas]]. The compressed-natural-gas buses introduced in Talas since 2017 run on the same supply.[12] The largest prospect is the [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]] beneath the north-eastern Moiynkum sands near the lower Chu, in the Northern Steppe zone of the ATR. Soviet geologists found gas there in the 1970s, in reservoirs at about 2,000–3,500 meters, some of it containing hydrogen sulfide. The clan assemblies have not granted development rights. Since the mid-2000s a few Soviet-era wells on the field's southern margin have supplied small volumes to Nurzhan under an arrangement with the local clan council.[13] Full development is tied to the Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline proposed by the [[wp:China National Petroleum Corporation]] (CNPC) to carry Turkmen gas to western China. Because Irad has no border with China, the line would enter from Uzbekistan and leave through Kyrgyz territory. Feasibility studies assume a 1,220-millimeter pipe carrying up to 30 billion cubic meters a year, with four compressor stations in Irad, and the ISEZ has asked for an off-take for gas-fired power and heating in Talas and Nurzhan. The obstacles include the need for Uzbek and Kyrgyz transit agreements, lenders' reluctance to finance infrastructure in a territory without recognized sovereignty, competition from existing pipelines through Kazakhstan, and the refusal of clan elders to consent to construction across their pastures (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]]).[14] ## Electricity #### Toktogul and the Naryn cascade The Toktogul complex consists of a concrete gravity dam about 215 meters high, a reservoir with a total storage of about 19 cubic kilometers, and four generating units with a combined capacity of 1,200 MW. Its average output is usually put at 4 to 4.5 terawatt-hours a year, depending on the water year.[4] Below the dam, the stations of the Naryn cascade (Kurpsai, [[Tash-Kömür]], Shamaldy-Sai and Uch-Kurgan) reuse the water released from Toktogul, so the schedule at the head dam determines the output of the whole chain. Together they supply most of Irad's electricity.[15] #### Split control and the Protocol *Main article: [[Naryn Water and Power Protocol]]* The ceasefire of 2007 left the dam, reservoir and powerhouse on the tribal side of the Qara-Chik line, guarded by the [[El-Choro Militias]], and the switchyard, the national dispatch center, the downstream stations and every export transmission line in the ISEZ. Under a UN-brokered protocol of 2009 the floor of the Toktogul basin, with the whole complex, passed to the ISEZ, in exchange for mountain pastures, grazing and water rights and a guaranteed share of the export revenue for the clans. The complex is now run by the ISEZ power utility, much of it by engineers who stayed on from the territorial-era utility, and guarded by the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] and the Lower Naryn mountain battalion of the State Defense Corps.[6] The Protocol, an annex to the [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]], created a joint technical commission of ISEZ and ATR engineers chaired by a UNMI official. It adopts an annual operating plan within a five-year framework schedule, dividing stored water between winter generation, which the ISEZ presses for, and summer irrigation, which the downstream observers from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] press for. The framework was renewed in 2012, 2017 and 2022 and expires in 2027. Export revenue is divided under an annex that has never been published. Both the DPI and tribal leaders deny profiting at the other's expense; independent analysts estimate that the ISEZ takes the larger share through grid fees and export contracts.[7] As the 2027 renewal approaches, Uzbek and Kazakh officials have asked who will sign for the ISEZ while Governor Toktarov remains out of public view, and the DPI states that Lieutenant Governor [[Aidar Maksat]] signs on his behalf. #### Grid and exports The national dispatch center schedules generation across a grid built in the Soviet period as part of the unified Central Asian power system. Its main lines run from the Naryn switchyard north along the Fergana highway corridor to the Talas valley and the Chu lowlands, and south to the [[wp:Fergana Valley]]. Electricity is exported mainly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan under annual contracts. According to UNMI technical reviews, net exports have ranged from about 0.8 to 1.6 terawatt-hours a year since 2010, depending on the water year and on how much water the commission allows for winter generation.[15] The ability to cut exports gives the ISEZ some leverage against its neighbors. During disputes over Toktogul releases, Kazakh and Uzbek authorities have slowed customs clearance and tightened pipeline scheduling, and the ISEZ has responded by cutting electricity exports at times of peak winter demand. Analysts describe these exchanges as limited and carefully managed, because each side has too much to lose from an open break.[2] #### Other generation and heat Smaller sources include the run-of-river Kara-Suu station (about 18 MW), which feeds the industrial grid of the Sary-Bulak corridor and is strongest during the snowmelt of May to July, and a 15 MW gas-fired plant at the spinning complex of the [[Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Facilities]] near Nurzhan.[1] District heating in Nurzhan runs largely on gas. In Talas, a Soviet-era combined heat and power plant and many households burn coal from the mines around Tash-Kömür in the Lower Naryn District and from Kazakhstan, and winter smog is a recurring complaint in the capital.[14] Electricity reaches most settlements in the ISEZ, but supply in the ATR is limited to villages near the main lines and the Toktogul basin. Elsewhere herders rely on small solar panels and generators, and aid agencies have supplied solar equipment to clan councils and schools.[17] ## Solar power The 50 MW Talas Solar Park (also called the Boz-Tektir Solar Park), on the [[Boz-Tektir]] terrace above the middle Talas valley, was commissioned in 2021 through a public–private partnership with foreign investors and is run in coordination with the ISEZ Department of Energy. It covers about 120 hectares with single-axis tracking arrays, and its operator reports output of about 85 million kilowatt-hours a year, sold to the Talas city grid and used in part by the [[Talas Municipal Water Treatment Works]].[1][16] Off-grid solar is more widespread. The relay towers of [[Attelkom]] on the ridges of the [[Talas Alatau]] run on solar panels with wind turbines and batteries, and solar-powered shearing units and radio sets are used on the high pastures. Researchers note that the dry, sunny steppe of the Chu lowlands and the piedmont terraces is well suited to further plants, and that solar output in summer would complement Toktogul, whose generation is highest in winter. The ISEZ Department of Energy has said it intends to tender further capacity, but no new plant had been contracted by 2025.[1] ## Nuclear and uranium Irad has no nuclear power. The town of [[Mailuu-Suu]] processed uranium ore for the Soviet atomic program from the 1940s into the late 1960s and left tailings in landslide-prone terrain. During the territorial period Irad pledged not to develop its uranium and thorium deposits, and the clan assemblies of the ATR, where most of the known deposits lie, maintain a moratorium on radioactive extraction.[18] ## Environmental issues Decades of oil production have left contaminated soil and groundwater in parts of the lower Chu basin, where the river ends in a closed basin and spills are not flushed away. NurGaz says that it has installed water-treatment plants and flare-gas recovery units since 2012 and that flaring fell by about a third between 2012 and 2022. Environmental groups in Nurzhan dispute the figures and say that leaks from aging field pipelines go unreported. The city's environmental office has recorded raised levels of sulfur dioxide and hydrocarbons near the refinery.[11] The hydropower system faces longer-term risks. Researchers expect the retreat of [[wp:Tian Shan|Tien Shan]] glaciers to raise summer flow on the Naryn for some decades and then reduce it, especially in late summer, which would sharpen the conflict between winter generation and summer irrigation. Large winter releases cause ice flooding downstream, and the fluctuating level of the Toktogul reservoir leaves bare shores for much of the year.[7] ## References
  1. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Energy Sector Directory. Talas.
  2. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2020). 'Pipelines, Water and Recognition: Irad's Northern Transit.' Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 64–88.
  3. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 204: Records of the Iradneft Production Association (1949–1993).
  4. ^ Ministry of Energy and Electrification of the Iradi SSR (1980). The Toktogul Hydroelectric Station: Construction and Operation. Kobozev.
  5. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2021). 'Oil, Language and Loyalty: The Russo Economy of Nurzhan.' Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 88–112.
  6. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). 'Shared Hostage: The Toktogul Complex and the Qara-Chik Line.' Vol. 29, Iss. 3, pp. 211–230.
  7. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Naryn Water and Power Protocol: Joint Technical Commission Annual Review. Kara-Oi.
  8. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'How Much Oil Does Irad Produce?' Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 15–38.
  9. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Annual Report: Southern Network Throughput and Third-Party Transit. Astana, pp. 34–42.
  10. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Export Finance and Escrow Regulations Handbook. Talas.
  11. ^ NurGaz (2024). Annual Review 2023: Upstream Operations and Export Volumes. Nurzhan.
  12. ^ City of Talas (2022). Urban Transport Plan. Talas.
  13. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). 'Gas Without a Route: The Muyunkum Field and the Trans-Irad Proposal.' Vol. 29, pp. 58–81.
  14. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). 'Pipelines to Nowhere? Gas Transit and the Iradi Question.' Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 33–59.
  15. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Naryn Cascade: Annual Technical Review. Kara-Oi.
  16. ^ Talas Herald (2021). 'Solar park opens on Boz-Tektir.' Talas.
  17. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2021). Pastoral Livelihoods in the Talas Alatau Zone. Kara-Oi.
  18. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2021). 'Minerals under Moratorium: Survey Politics in the Tribal Regions.' Vol. 27, pp. 88–104.
### 3.39. Transport in Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Infrastructure & Transport* **Transport in Irad** is shaped by three facts: the territory is doubly landlocked, its two administrations have been separated since 2007 by the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]], and none of its neighbors recognizes either administration. The modern network is concentrated in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). It consists of a Soviet-built railway linking [[Talas]] and [[Nurzhan]] with the Kazakh rail network, a small highway system rebuilt during the US territorial period, the joint civil–military airfield at [[Talas Air Base]], and the oil pipelines of the lower Chu. The [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), which cover about six-sevenths of the land, have almost no paved roads and no railway, and herders there still move largely on horseback.[1] Nearly all of Irad's foreign trade crosses [[wp:Kazakhstan]]. Crude oil leaves through the 85-kilometer [[Northern Export Feeder]] into the [[wp:KazTransOil]] network near [[wp:Shymkent]], and antimony, cotton, beef and most other rail freight travel north through the same country. Road traffic from the southern districts passes through [[wp:Uzbekistan]]. Analysts regard this dependence on transit as the main weakness of the Iradi economy, partly offset by the ISEZ's control of electricity exports from the [[Toktogul Hydroelectric Complex]] (see [[Economy of Irad]]).[2] Traffic drives on the right. ## History #### Caravan routes The Talas valley lay on a branch of the [[wp:Silk Road]] between the [[wp:Syr Darya]] and the lands north of the [[wp:Tian Shan]]. The modern [[Trans-Talas Highway]] follows the line of the medieval route up the valley, and caravanserais such as the [[Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed]] marked the stages of the desert crossings to the west. Passes over the [[Talas Alatau]], among them the saddle now called the [[Fergana Gateway]], linked the valley with the [[wp:Fergana Valley]] and were used by herders, merchants and armies; Iradi popular histories connect them with the trade in Fergana horses.[3] #### Soviet period The [[wp:Turkestan]]–Siberia Railway, built between 1927 and 1931, made the railway settlement on the lower Chu that had been named Kobozev in 1927 into a junction, and the town grew into the republican capital and industrial center. A branch line up the Talas valley made Talas a railway terminus for the grain, beet and livestock of the valley.[4] After oil was found in 1949, a crude oil trunk line from the fields to the Kobozev refinery replaced the trucking of crude, and the city's rail yards handled tank trains for the rest of [[wp:Soviet Central Asia]]. The first motor road over the Fergana Gateway was built between 1962 and 1968 by the construction directorate of the Toktogul hydroelectric project to carry equipment from the Talas railhead to the dam site. A 2,500-meter concrete runway was laid at the interceptor base west of Talas in 1952, the origin of Talas Air Base, while civil air services were provided by the republican directorate of [[wp:Aeroflot]].[5] #### 1991–2006 The end of Soviet fuel quotas in 1991 and the border closures of the [[First Iradi Civil War]] in 1992 disrupted rail traffic and fuel supplies. The war itself was fought largely along the railway: forces of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]] advanced on Talas along the line from Kobozev, clan horsemen raided their depots, and US and Provisional forces moved back along the same corridor in the summer of 1992 (see [[Battle of Kobozev Railhead (1992)]]).[6] Under the territorial administration, US military engineers lengthened the runway at Talas Air Base to 3,400 meters between 1993 and 1998, and a fuel pipeline was laid to the base from the Nurzhan refinery. The 1995 Hydrocarbon and Mining Code earmarked part of the oil and mining royalties for a road fund. With the fund and US federal highway grants, the territorial highway department rebuilt the Fergana Mountain Transit Highway (designated State Route 1 in 1996) to an all-weather standard between 1997 and 2004, and the Trans-Talas Highway to heavy-freight standards between 2001 and 2004.[7] The charter airline [[Iradiya]] was founded in 1997, the haulier [[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]] in 1996, and the Northern Export Feeder opened in November 2000, ending the shipment of crude by rail to Shymkent. #### Since 2007 During the [[Second Iradi Civil War]] in 2007, railway strikers and fighters of the [[Popular Front of Irad]] cut the lines serving Talas and Nurzhan, and the Front blocked the Fergana highway at the Gateway from May to July. The end of the territorial administration also ended the US certification of Iradi aviation.[8] The [[Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (2007)]] left the railway, the paved highways, the airfield and the pipelines on the ISEZ side of the new line. In October 2008 the [[Northern Border Demarcation Protocol]], a set of technical arrangements with the Kazakh border and customs services, established the crossings through which most of Irad's freight now passes. ## Rail transport #### Network Irad's railway is operated by Irad Temir Jolu, the state railway enterprise of the ISEZ, which took over the lines of the Soviet railway administration through the territorial transport department. The network consists of about 690 kilometers of single-track, 1,520 mm (Russian) gauge line, none of it electrified; trains are hauled by diesel locomotives, most of them built in the [[wp:Soviet Union]].[1] The lines follow Soviet main-line standards, with curves of no less than about 600 meters radius on the main lines (about 400 meters in towns), 300–400 meters on the branches and about 200 meters on the industrial spurs; branches leave the main lines at turnouts. Its main parts are: - the Chu line (about 229 kilometers), built as part of the Turkestan–Siberia system, from Nurzhan, the main junction of the ISEZ, west across the Chu plain and around the western end of the Kyrgyz Range to the lowland junction near [[Aulie-Ata]], so that trains between Nurzhan and Talas take the long lowland route rather than crossing the [[Kök-Bel Pass]]; - the [[Kara-Buura]] line (about 145 kilometers), the Turksib section west from the lowland junction through the Kara-Buura corridor to the Kazakh frontier at the Talas North Terminal, where it crosses into Kazakhstan towards [[wp:Shymkent]]; - the Talas branch (about 100 kilometers), which leaves the Kara-Buura line at the lowland junction and climbs the valley, with a ruling grade of 1.6 percent, through [[Kyzyl-Adyr]], round the Kyzyl-Adyr Reservoir, the grain depot at [[Kara-Bulak]] and the [[Talas Agribusiness Export Zone]] to its terminus at Talas station, keeping to the south bank of the Talas beside the [[Trans-Talas Highway]] from the Urmaral confluence to the city; - the north line (*Tündük linyasy*, about 129 kilometers), the Turksib section east from Nurzhan past the freight depot across the eastern Chu plain to the rail-only Nurzhan border station on the Kazakh frontier, on the Otar side, where trains are exchanged with Kazakhstan Temir Zholy for Otar and [[wp:Almaty]]; it keeps its Soviet-era name as the Turksib's route towards Almaty and Siberia; - the east line (about 43 kilometers), a line through the eastern Chu fields to the [[Boz-Korgon]] security depot; - the [[Sary-Bulak]] spur (about 39 kilometers), which leaves the Talas branch on the western side of Talas, runs south to near the mouth of the [[Kara-Suu Canyon]] and west along the foothills to the mouth of the Urmaral gorge, climbs the gorge on its east bank and then runs east up the upper Urmaral valley past [[Ak-Bulak]] to the [[Sary-Bulak Antimony Works]], with a ruling grade of about 3% and short stretches of 4–5% in the upper valley; Soviet engineers took it round by the Urmaral because the Kara-Suu Canyon was too steep for a railway. A siding of about 6 kilometers leaves it in the Urmaral gorge a little north of where the valley to Sary-Bulak branches off, crosses the river once and runs up the gorge floor to the [[Chatkal Antimony Processing Mill]] below the [[Chatkal Chemical Smelting Complex]]. There are also short sidings to the refrigerated rail terminal of the [[Talas Agribusiness Export Zone]].[9] No railway reaches [[Iyık Janyl]], the Lower Naryn District or any part of the tribal regions. The Soviet Shu–Mointy line, which ran north from Nurzhan across the [[Betpak-Dala]] towards Lake Balkhash, is not part of the network: traffic on it stopped in 2007, and north of the ISEZ frontier zone it is disused and its track has been lifted in places on the tribal side. #### Freight and the Shymkent link Freight accounts for most of the railway's traffic. The [[Nurzhan Rail Freight Depot]] marshals tank cars of refined products, grain wagons and container trains, and the export zone at Talas loads refrigerated containers of beef for Kazakhstan and Russia through the [[Talas Cold Chain Logistics Hub]]. Antimony metal, trioxide and concentrate from the Sary-Bulak District, and lint and yarn from the [[Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Facilities]], leave by the Talas North Terminal for China and Kazakhstan. Grain moves between the valley depots and the mills and elevators of [[Nurzhan Agro-Industrial]], which imports Kazakh grain by rail when the local harvest falls short.[9] From the early 1990s until 2000, Iradi crude oil that the Nurzhan refinery did not take was loaded into tank cars at Nurzhan and sent west by the Chu and Kara-Buura lines to the refinery at Shymkent. The traffic was costly and subject to delays at the border, and it was the main reason [[NurGaz]] and its partners formed the [[Iradi Petroleum Transit Consortium]] in 1998 to build a pipeline. Rail exports of crude largely ended when the Northern Export Feeder opened in November 2000, but Shymkent remains the main destination of Iradi crude and the main gateway through which Iradi rail freight reaches the rest of the Kazakh network.[10] Freight trains on the north line cross the frontier at the rail-only Nurzhan border station, on the Kazakh frontier east of the city towards Otar, where crews and customs officers of the two sides exchange trains. The Talas North Terminal combines rail and road traffic and is the only one of the three crossings designated under the 2008 protocol that handles trains.[11] #### Passenger services A daily passenger train runs between Talas and Nurzhan by the lowland route, taking about seven hours, and suburban trains serve the Chu District around Nurzhan. Ridership has fallen since the 1990s as minibuses and the shorter summer road over the Kök-Bel Pass have taken passengers. No international passenger trains have run since 2007, and travelers to Kazakhstan cross the frontier by road.[1] ## Roads #### Main highways The ISEZ Ministry of Transport records about 4,800 kilometers of public roads in the zone, of which about two-fifths are paved.[12] The main routes are: - the **[[Trans-Talas Highway]]**, about 194 kilometers long, from the Talas North Terminal on the Kazakh frontier in Kara-Buura District, first on the old M39 and then straight across the flat lower valley, to [[Kyzyl-Adyr]] (kilometer 135) and on by the old valley road to Talas (kilometer 194), where State Route 1 continues east up the valley; - the **Talas–Nurzhan road**, about 335 kilometers long, which follows the railway's lowland route through Kyzyl-Adyr, round the western end of the Kyrgyz Range and east along the main road below the range and across the Chu plain, and the shorter **Kök-Bel road** (about 237 kilometers) over the Kök-Bel Pass (about 2,670 m) in the western Kyrgyz Range, paved in the territorial period but often closed by snow in winter, which follows State Route 1 east from Talas to the mouth of the [[Kashka-Suu]] before turning north up the valley past [[Toguz-Bulak]], climbs to the pass in hairpins, crosses about 28 kilometers of tribal pasture over the pass between the two Toguz-Bulak crossing points and north of the range follows existing roads down to the main road below the range, north by a farm road to the Chu and along the river to Nurzhan; - the **Chu highway**, about 125 kilometers south-east from Nurzhan across the Chu plain and then east along the motorway to the **Chu Gate** crossing on the eastern frontier, Irad's main road freight crossing into Kazakhstan; - the guarded road east from Nurzhan to the [[Boz-Korgon]] compound, beside the rail stub; - the **[[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]]** (State Route 1), about 356 kilometers from Talas east up the valley and across the mountains to [[Tash-Kömür]], passing through [[Iyık Janyl]] at about kilometer 347; the journey crosses the Fergana Gateway and is occasionally interrupted by snow and avalanches; - the Cathedral Hill road in Iyık Janyl, about 4 kilometers long, which leaves State Route 1 on the east bank of the Naryn in the city and winds up to the old town; four road bridges cross the river in the city.[12] Paving bitumen comes mainly from the [[Nurzhan Asphalt and Bitumen Plant]], which uses residues from the Nurzhan refinery. #### Fergana Mountain Transit Highway *Main article: [[Fergana Mountain Transit Highway]]* The 356-kilometer State Route 1 is the only road linking the core of the ISEZ with the Toktogul basin and the Lower Naryn District. It runs east up the Talas valley for about 64 kilometers and climbs the Otmek valley to the Otmek Tunnel, about 5 kilometers long and opened in 2003, whose portals lie some 150 meters below the Otmek Pass; the old pass road is kept as a summer bypass. It then crosses the western end of the [[Suusamyr]] valley and the Fergana Gateway, the Ala-Bel Pass at 3,184 meters, descends the Chychkan valley to the Toktogul basin and the town of Toktogul, runs round the eastern end of the reservoir and along its southern shore to the Toktogul dam and switchyard and Kara-Köl, and follows the Naryn gorge past the lower stations of the cascade to Iyık Janyl and Tash-Kömür. The mountain section, about 226 kilometers from the mouth of the Otmek valley to Kara-Köl, crossed tribal land as a guarded corridor until 2009, when a UN-brokered protocol brought the road, the floor of the Toktogul basin and a narrow corridor down the Naryn gorge into the ISEZ. The corridor is only a couple of kilometers wide over the passes, so much of the road lies within the 12-kilometer restricted-weapons zone along the Qara-Chik line.[13] The [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] runs control posts at the mouth of the Otmek valley, at the Gateway summit and at the Naryn bridge below the Toktogul dam; they are internal posts rather than line crossings, but documents are checked there, and heavy vehicles pay a road-use charge at the Otmek valley post. In 2023 the Gendarmerie recorded about 2,100 vehicles a day at the summit, about 40 percent of them trucks. Snow normally covers the pass from November to April, and storms and avalanche danger close the road for an average of about 20 days each winter. Analysts describe the 2009 arrangement as an exchange of leverage: the ISEZ holds the road and the dam, but the corridor runs between tribal pastures and herd crossings, the clans' consent is needed for each five-year release schedule, and the tribal share of power revenue depends on the ISEZ's export grid.[14] From Tash-Kömür, regional roads continue east through the ISEZ's Fergana rim farm belt to [[Bazar-Korgon]] and the Uzbek border; beyond, north of [[wp:Jalal-Abad]], the Kök-Kamar road (*Kök-Kamar jolu*), about 33 kilometers long and built in the 2010s because the old valley road lies on the Kyrgyz side, runs from Suzak up the west bank of the river that marks the frontier, leaves the ISEZ at the Kök-Kamar crossing of the line above Kyzyl-Senir, and continues to the [[Kök-Kamar Gorge]] and over a spur to the tribal road to Jerge-Tal and Kök-Jangak. The highway is the starting point for Irad's southern road transit through Uzbekistan. #### Road freight Trucking is dominated by [[Trans-Chuy Freight & Logistics]] of Nurzhan, the largest haulier in Irad, with more than 250 tractor units. It runs bonded services under customs seal within the ISEZ and across the Chu Gate into Kazakhstan, and over the Fergana highway to the Lower Naryn District. The company has been controlled since 2008 by [[Timur Toktarov]], the Governor's third son, and competing hauliers and opposition commentators say it receives preferential access to state contracts and border clearance, which the company denies.[15] Northbound freight on the Fergana highway is mainly cotton, fruit, coal from the Tash-Kömür mines and livestock; southbound traffic carries fuel and refined products from NurGaz, building materials and consumer goods. #### Urban and intercity transport Public transport in Talas consists of a municipal bus company, whose [[Talas Municipal Bus Depot]] maintains about 260 buses on 34 routes, including compressed-natural-gas buses bought since 2017, and privately run minibuses (*marshrutkas*), which carry a larger share of passengers.[16] Nurzhan and Iyık Janyl are served mainly by buses and minibuses. Intercity minibuses link the three cities and Tash-Kömür. ## Air transport Irad has no scheduled international flights and no designated flag carrier. Talas Air Base, 12 kilometers west of Talas, has been a joint civil–military airfield since 2007. Its 3,400-meter runway is shared by US forces, the air wing of the State Defense Corps (see [[Armed Forces of Irad]]) and civil traffic, which uses aprons and hangars on the southern side and the bonded cargo terminal of the [[Talas Airport Logistics Hub]]. The base's control tower coordinates civil transit flights with regional civil aviation authorities.[5] Nurzhan has no passenger airport. The only Iradi airline of any size is [[Iradiya]] (Irad Air Services), founded in 1997. It flies charters to [[wp:Almaty]], [[wp:Tashkent]], [[wp:Dubai]] and [[wp:Istanbul]], cargo flights, and a subsidized domestic service between Talas and Tash-Kömür three times a week, rising to daily in winter, when it is the only alternative to the Fergana highway. Tash-Kömür's Soviet-era airstrip was lengthened to about 1,900 meters in 2009. Iradiya's [[wp:de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter|Twin Otters]] fly medical evacuations and supplies to short mountain strips, including some on the tribal side of the line, where flights need the consent of clan councils and are coordinated through the [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI).[8] Of the other Soviet airfields, [[Aulie-Ata Airfield|Aulie-Ata]], closed in 1994, is kept as a diversion field for Talas, while [[Kulan Airfield|Kulan]] and [[Moiynkum Airfield|Moiynkum]] are abandoned. Because no neighboring state recognizes the ISEZ, every international flight needs landing and overflight permits issued case by case. Irad is not a member of the [[wp:International Civil Aviation Organization]] and has no aircraft nationality mark; Iradiya's leased aircraft have been registered in [[wp:Bermuda]] by their owners since 2007, and the airline is certified by the ISEZ Civil Aviation Directorate. Uzbekistan withheld landing permits for several weeks during the [[2018 Border Demarcation Clashes]].[8] Most foreign visitors therefore fly to Almaty or Shymkent and cross the frontier by road (see [[Tourism in Irad]]). ## Pipelines Irad's pipelines are all in the lower Chu basin and are operated by NurGaz or the transit consortium in which it holds 51 percent: - the [[Nurzhan Petroleum Pipeline]], a domestic crude trunk line of about 90 kilometers from the main field collection station to [[Nurzhan Refinery No. 1]] and the NurGaz tank farm, built in the mid-1950s; - the Northern Export Feeder, an 85-kilometer, 530-millimeter line from the tank farm to a metering station on the Kazakh frontier, from which the crude passes into the KazTransOil network near Shymkent. It does not connect with the [[wp:Caspian Pipeline Consortium]], whose system begins far to the west, and Irad has no southern export pipeline; - a products pipeline supplying jet fuel to the fuel farm at Talas Air Base; - gas lines carrying associated gas and small volumes from the [[Muyunkum Natural Gas Field]] through the [[Nurzhan Gas Compressor Station]] to the city.[10] The China National Petroleum Corporation's proposed Trans-Irad Gas Pipeline would cross the territory from Uzbekistan and leave through Kyrgyz territory, since Irad has no border with China; one route variant follows the Fergana highway corridor. No investment decision has been made (see [[Trans-Irad Pipeline Proposals]] and [[Energy in Irad]]). ## Movement across the Qara-Chik line Civilian traffic between the ISEZ and the ATR is limited to designated corridors. There are nine crossing points, all on roads and tracks: the [[Qara-Chik Border Checkpoint]], the [[Aksay Border Patrol Post]], the two Toguz-Bulak crossings on the Kök-Bel road, the Kara-Bulak crossing on the [[Kenkol Pass]] road, the Suusamyr crossing on the road to [[Karakol]], two minor crossings on the valley roads from the Fergana rim farm belt up to [[Mailuu-Suu]] and [[Arslanbob]], used mostly by local families and traders, and the minor Kök-Kamar crossing, where the Kök-Kamar road leaves the ISEZ above Kyzyl-Senir for the [[Kök-Kamar Gorge]] and the tribal road to Kök-Jangak. Each has a Gendarmerie checkpoint on the ISEZ side and a post of the [[El-Choro Militias]] on the tribal side, and the crossings are normally open from dawn to dusk. The Gendarmerie also keeps four internal control posts inside the ISEZ, at the mouth of the Kara-Suu Canyon, in the Otmek valley, at the Fergana Gateway and at the Naryn bridge.[17] The busiest crossing is the [[Qara-Chik Border Checkpoint]], at the mouth of the Kara-Buura valley about 15 kilometers by road south of [[Kyzyl-Adyr]], where the only road from the ISEZ into the Chatkal valley leaves the plain, with inspection lanes, cattle pens, a cargo-scanning bay and a permit office; UNMI counted an average of about 1,900 crossings a day there in 2022.[18] Residents of the ATR need a tribal travel permit issued by their clan council and registered by the Gendarmerie. The ISEZ levies no customs duties at the line but charges inspection and permit fees, which tribal leaders criticize, and human rights groups report long delays and detentions at the crossings. Under arrangements set by the Joint Liaison Committee, herds cross on fixed dates in spring and autumn, when traffic on the Fergana highway is halted at agreed crossing places; pilgrims from the tribal regions may cross unarmed for the [[Feast of St. Janyl]] on 24 August; and the tribal engineers of the Naryn commission travel to the Toktogul complex under UNMI escort.[17] The Gendarmerie accuses groups aligned with the [[Iradi Freedom Society]] of moving fuel and goods past its posts through disused galleries of the [[Kok-Tash Kariz System]], which the tribal side describes as movement within its own territory. Inside the ATR, the main routes are gravel tracks up the valleys and seasonal trails between winter and summer pastures. Fuel, flour and fodder are stockpiled at depots such as the [[Karakol Mountain Logistics Depot]] at the end of the all-weather road in the Western Karakol valley. Horses, especially the [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]], remain the main means of transport on the high pastures, and messages to outlying clans still often travel by mounted courier.[19] ## Border crossings Irad's external frontiers are crossed by about fifty roads and railways, but only a few of the crossings are staffed by both sides and none rests on a treaty. On the sections held by the ISEZ, the [[Republican Gendarmerie of Irad]] and the ISEZ customs service man the Iradi posts; on the much longer tribal sections there is no ISEZ presence, and roads are held by posts of the [[El-Choro Militias]], often a hut and a few riders, where clan councils take a customary levy on loads. The neighbors keep their own border posts on the far side.[21] - **Kazakhstan.** The ISEZ-held sections have only the three crossings of the 2008 protocol, the Chu Gate, the Talas North Terminal and the seasonal Kum-Shagyl crossing, and the rail-only Nurzhan border station; other roads, among them the trunk road from Korday at the [[Betkaynar crossing]], are barred at the markers. On the tribal sections, El-Choro posts hold the [[Karakur crossing|Karakur]], [[Oyyk crossing|Oyyk]], [[Madeniet crossing|Madeniet]], [[Jylandy crossing|Jylandy]] and [[Amansay crossing|Amansay]] crossings in the Karatau, the [[Kaynar crossing|Kaynar]] and [[Alshaly crossing|Alshaly]] crossings at the western end of the Talas Alatau, and the [[Aksüyek crossing|Aksüyek]] and [[Kashkanteniz crossing|Kashkanteniz]] crossings at either end of the stretch of the Kazakh Almaty–Balkhash highway that runs for about 200 kilometers across the Northern Steppe. - **Uzbekistan.** The main ISEZ crossings are the [[Kyzyl-Tuu crossing]] on the Tash-Kömür side and the [[Dostuk crossing]] for Bazar-Korgon, which have shared customs hours with the Uzbek posts since the 2025 memorandum; the [[Kyzyl-Jar crossing]], at the end of the road down the Naryn from Tash-Kömür, where the river forms the frontier and a small road bridge carries the road into the streets of the Uzbek town of Uchkurgan, and the [[Izbaskan crossing]] take passengers, cars and farm traffic but no freight, and the Soviet railway branch at the [[Kum crossing]] has been closed since 1992. In the tribal hills above Namangan, El-Choro posts hold the [[Baymak crossing|Baymak]], [[Xadikent crossing|Xadikent]] and [[Zangabad crossing|Zangabad]] crossings. - **Kyrgyzstan.** The ISEZ's posts at the [[Suzak crossing]], on the road from Bazar-Korgon into [[wp:Jalal-Abad]], and the [[Kichi-Korgon crossing]], on the road from the Chu belt to [[wp:Kara-Balta]] and [[wp:Bishkek]], face Kyrgyz customs posts without any agreed procedure. The clan-held crossings include the [[Ak-Kyya crossing]], where the old Bishkek–Osh road enters the tribal Suusamyr, and the [[Kök-Jangak crossing|Kök-Jangak]], [[Ostyuryu crossing|Ostyuryu]], [[Makmal crossing|Makmal]], [[Ak-Kolot crossing|Ak-Kolot]] and [[Kosh-Bulak crossing|Kosh-Bulak]] crossings in the mountains east of the Fergana rim and the Toktogul basin. Local field and village roads, closed roads and herders' tracks are listed in [[Minor crossings of the Irad–Kazakhstan frontier]], [[Minor crossings of the Irad–Uzbekistan frontier]] and [[Minor crossings of the Irad–Kyrgyzstan frontier]]. ## Transit dependence Irad belongs neither to the [[wp:World Trade Organization]] nor to the [[wp:Eurasian Economic Union]], and no neighbor has signed a transit agreement with either Iradi administration. Its overland trade therefore runs on technical and commercial arrangements:[2] - **Kazakhstan.** Oil, antimony, cotton and most rail freight cross the northern frontier. Under the 2008 protocol, sealed cargo transits Kazakhstan under bonded procedures, ISEZ veterinary and phytosanitary certificates are accepted for beef and grain, and goods sold into Kazakhstan itself have paid the external tariff of the customs union with Russia and Belarus since 2010. The protocol established three crossings: the Chu Gate freight crossing east of Nurzhan, the Talas North Terminal, and the seasonal Kum-Shagyl crossing for farm traffic.[11] - **Uzbekistan.** Road traffic from Tash-Kömür and the ISEZ's Fergana rim farm belt passes into the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley at the Kyzyl-Tuu and Dostuk crossings, the second about 20 kilometers from [[Bazar-Korgon]], and passenger traffic also at [[Kyzyl-Jar]] and Izbaskan, and Iradiya's flights to Tashkent depend on Uzbek permits. - **Kyrgyzstan.** There is little through traffic. The ISEZ's Suzak and Kichi-Korgon crossings carry mainly buses and cars to Jalal-Abad and Bishkek; the old Bishkek–Osh road crosses tribal land and the Qara-Chik line between the Ak-Kyya crossing and State Route 1 and is little used by Kyrgyz freight; the roads from the Talas valley toward the Kyrgyz border end in herders' tracks on the tribal side; and the proposed gas pipeline would need a Kyrgyz exit. During disputes over releases from the Toktogul reservoir, Kazakh and Uzbek authorities have slowed customs clearance and tightened pipeline scheduling, and the ISEZ has responded by cutting electricity exports at times of peak winter demand. Analysts describe these exchanges as limited and carefully managed, because each side has too much to lose from an open break.[14] The same dependence extends to communications: all international traffic of [[Attelkom]] passes through two fiber routes into Kazakhstan and one into Uzbekistan, and a cable cut in Kazakhstan in 2021 left Irad without internet access for nine hours.[20] ## References
  1. ^ Eurasian Development Bank (2023). Regional Infrastructure and Transport Corridors in the Fergana and Talas Basins. EDB Monograph Series, pp. 56–71.
  2. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2020). 'Pipelines, Water and Recognition: Irad's Northern Transit.' Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 64–88.
  3. ^ Talas State University, Faculty of Geography (2018). Physical Geography of Irad. Talas State University Press, Talas, pp. 44–97.
  4. ^ Talas State University Press (2011). Oil and the City: Kobozev and the Chu Fields, 1949–1991. Talas.
  5. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2022). 'Airpower at the Crossroads: Talas Air Base and US Posture in Central Asia.' pp. 54–68.
  6. ^ Department of History, Talas State University (2017). The War of 1992: A Documentary History. Talas State University Press.
  7. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas). Territorial Highway Department: State Route 1 Reconstruction Files (1996–2005).
  8. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2021). 'Flying Without a Flag: Civil Aviation in an Unrecognized Territory.' Vol. 27, pp. 133–152.
  9. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Transport and Logistics Directory. Talas.
  10. ^ NurGaz (2024). Annual Review 2023: Upstream Operations and Export Volumes. Nurzhan.
  11. ^ KazTransOil (2023). Annual Report: Southern Network Throughput and Third-Party Transit. Astana, pp. 34–42.
  12. ^ ISEZ Ministry of Transport (2022). Road Network Inventory. Talas.
  13. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2019). 'One Road South: The Fergana Highway and the Southern Salient of the ISEZ.' Vol. 25, pp. 88–109.
  14. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Roads, Dams and Leverage in a Frozen Conflict.' Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 12–39.
  15. ^ Talas Herald (11 May 2021). 'Independent hauliers say border queues are not the same for everyone.' Talas.
  16. ^ City of Talas (2022). Urban Transport Plan. Talas.
  17. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Movement and Access along the Qara-Chik Line. Kara-Oi.
  18. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2022). Freedom of Movement and Security Along the Qara-Chik Line. Report to the Secretary-General, Talas.
  19. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2021). Pastoral Livelihoods in the Talas Alatau Zone. Kara-Oi.
  20. ^ Talas Herald (2021). 'Backhoe in Kazakhstan cuts Irad off for nine hours.' Talas.
  21. ^ Talas State University, Faculty of Geography (2018). Physical Geography of Irad. Talas State University Press, Talas, pp. 132–151.
### 3.40. Media of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Media* The **media of Irad** are dominated by [[IradOne]], the state broadcaster of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ), which runs the main national television channel, the Russian-language channel ИрадОдин (IradOdin), a sports channel and the Radio Irad network. A small independent press survives in [[Talas]], led by the English-language weekly *[[Irad Times]]*, and the daily *Talas Herald* is the most widely read newspaper. Almost all internet and mobile traffic passes through [[Attelkom]], the largest telecommunications company. Since 2007 IradOne has been under the supervision of the Department of Public Information, the government press office, which also issues editorial guidelines, registers print outlets and supplies lists of websites to be blocked.[1][2] Laws inherited from the US territorial period guarantee freedom of the press, and Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]] has stated that Irad has had a free press since the end of Soviet rule. Press-freedom organizations, [[wp:Human Rights Watch]] and the [[wp:Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] describe a restricted environment in which the [[Democratic Party of Irad]] (DPI) controls broadcast news, independent journalists face licensing pressure and self-censorship, and the authorities have cut or throttled internet access during protests. Media consumption divides sharply by language and generation, and the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR) lie largely outside the reach of ISEZ media.[3] ## History #### Soviet period Under *korenizatsiia* in the 1920s, the first newspapers in Iradi were published alongside the Russian-language press, and printing presses were refitted for the Latin script introduced in 1928. Regular radio broadcasting began from Kobozev, now [[Nurzhan]], in the 1930s, and television followed in 1959, both under the republic's State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. Programs were mainly in Russian, with a smaller share in Iradi and relays from Central Television in [[wp:Moscow]]. A second studio opened in Talas in the late 1960s, and the 220-meter [[IradOne Transmitter Mast]] on Television Hill in Talas was built in 1972.[4] The main newspaper was *Iradyn Chyny* ("The Truth of Irad"), the Russian- and Iradi-language organ of the Communist Party of the Iradi SSR. Under the editor [[Maratbek Sadykov]] (1986–1991) it published, in 1988 and 1989, the first articles on the [[1956 Talas Riots]], the [[The 1937 NKVD Clerical Purges|purges of the clergy]] and the [[The Kobozev Bread Riots (1989)|Kobozev bread riots]], and its circulation rose from about 90,000 to more than 200,000 copies.[5] Foreign broadcasts also reached the republic: in the 1980s American country and folk songs about Irad circulated on smuggled cassettes and through [[wp:Voice of America]] broadcasts, a source of what became [[Iradi Country-Folk|Iradi country-folk]]. #### 1991–1992 Sadykov was dismissed in October 1991, shortly after the declaration of the [[Socialist Republic of Irad]], when his paper reported sympathetically on protests in Talas, and in November the new government issued emergency decrees banning non-communist gatherings and publications. During the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] and the [[First Iradi Civil War]], the socialist government kept control of the Kobozev studios, while the Provisional Government broadcast radio appeals from the Talas studio.[4] #### Territorial period (1992–2006) The Public Broadcasting Act of 1993 created IradOne as a public corporation whose board was appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]]. The broadcaster moved its headquarters from Nurzhan to Talas and adopted English and Iradi as its main languages, cutting Russian-language programming after Russian lost its official status in 1992. US media-development programs trained its journalists. Media researchers describe IradOne in this period as relatively pluralistic, with election airtime for opposition parties, although critics noted a consistent bias toward the territorial administration.[6] Private print and online media developed alongside it. The *Irad Times*, an English-language weekly, was founded in 1996. Attelkom opened dial-up internet service in 1996 and the first GSM mobile network in 1997. In December 2006 and January 2007 the *Irad Times*, under its managing editor [[Bolotbek Daniyarov]], published internal documents on the planned sale of state oil, grain and mining assets by the government of the [[Democratic Republic of Irad]], reporting that preceded the protests over the [[Privatization Scandals of 2007]]. On 26 February 2007 it printed in a special edition the partition drafts released by [[Erlan Toktarov]] the day before (see [[Bill of Sale (2007)]]).[7] #### Since 2007 IradOne changed hands more than once during the [[Second Iradi Civil War]]. After DPI security forces took Talas in the summer of 2007, the ISEZ administration dissolved its board by emergency decree and placed it under the Department of Public Information. Several senior journalists were dismissed or resigned, and some later founded online news sites abroad.[6] In 2008 the ISEZ annulled the mobile-frequency auctions held by the DRI and reissued Attelkom's licenses on condition that it comply with new security directives. IradOne launched IradOdin in 2009 for Russian-speaking viewers in Nurzhan. In June 2015 Toktarov appointed his second son, [[Alikhan Toktarov]], chairman of IradOne's board. Under him the broadcaster launched IradOne Sport and mobile streaming, moved into the [[Alikhan Media Center]] in downtown Talas in 2017, and completed the move to digital terrestrial broadcasting, begun in 2015, in 2018.[8] In 2013 the Department of Public Information suspended the registration of the *Irad Times* for two months after it criticized the amendment removing gubernatorial term limits; the department said the suspension concerned a licensing irregularity.[7] ## Regulation The main instruments of media control in the ISEZ are:[2][9] - **The Department of Public Information.** The government press office issues IradOne's editorial guidelines, registers newspapers and can suspend their registration, accredits journalists, and supplies Attelkom with lists of websites to be blocked. - **The 2008 security directives.** Attelkom must route international traffic through gateways fitted with monitoring equipment and carry out orders from the ISEZ executive to restrict service. The company says it is legally bound to comply. - **Licensing.** Broadcast and telecommunications licenses are issued by an ISEZ regulatory board, on which [[Aidar Maksat]] sat from 2012 to 2019 before becoming Lieutenant Governor. The emergency basis on which the ISEZ was proclaimed in 2007 has never been formally ended, and press-freedom groups say that this, rather than any new press law, gives the executive its discretion over the media.[3] ## Television Television is the main source of news for most ISEZ residents over 40. IradOne's terrestrial signal covers the whole ISEZ through the Talas mast and relay transmitters, and its channels are also carried by satellite and online. In a 2023 survey by the Irad Media Research Center, IradOne had about 38 percent of the ISEZ television audience and IradOdin about 9 percent.[10] The broadcaster's channels are: - **IradOne**, the flagship channel, mainly in English, with its evening news bulletin, *OneNews at Eight*, at 20:00 followed by an Iradi-language bulletin. The share of Iradi-language programs has grown since 2018, partly in response to young viewers' interest in the language. - **IradOdin**, produced at the Nurzhan studio, which shows acquired Russian series and films, talk shows and translated IradOne bulletins. It is widely considered to have much lower production values than the main channel. Politicians allied with the oil executive [[Kamran Bekzatov]] say it is deliberately underfunded; IradOne says its budget reflects its audience. - **IradOne Sport**, launched in 2016, which holds exclusive rights to the Ulak Tartysh President's Cup at the [[Irad State Hippodrome]] and covers *at chabysh*, football and wrestling.[8] IradOne had about 2,100 employees in 2023 and a budget of about $46 million, roughly 60 percent from government appropriations and the rest from advertising and sports rights.[8] Its music programs have given national exposure to Iradi country-folk and to [[Mor-Wave]], although, according to the *Talas Herald*, it dropped several videos by the duo [[tüntolk]] from rotation after their songs were sung at the 2023 protests in Talas.[11] Historians have criticized some of its documentaries for presenting contested national beliefs, such as the claim that the horse was first domesticated in Irad, as established fact. Russian channels received by satellite remain popular in Nurzhan among the Russian-speaking generation known as the [[Russos of Nurzhan|Russos]], while younger urban viewers increasingly watch online.[10] #### Political commentary IradOne's prime-time current-affairs panel, *[[OneDebate]]*, has since 2016 featured the Iradi-American commentator [[Jason Ilyasov]], a self-described anarcho-capitalist and founder of the Liberty Forum of Irad. Ilyasov has used the program to attack the business concessions held by the Governor's family, and IradOne has suspended him at least twice for his conduct on air, but has continued to book him despite these attacks.[12] In October 2023 his on-air criticism of a municipal licensing surcharge on startups and couriers spread widely on social media and was followed by the [[2023 Student Protests in Talas]], during which he was held for three days and released without charge after press-freedom groups protested. IradOne kept him off the air for several months and began booking him again in 2024. Ilyasov says his work is funded by subscriptions, advertising and speaking fees. Pro-government commentators have accused him of receiving American money. A 2024 survey of the ISEZ media in the *Eurasian Political Quarterly* found no documentary evidence for the claim and attributed his rise to online engagement and frustration among young urban [[Iradis]].[12] ## Radio Radio Irad, IradOne's national network (98.4 FM in Talas), carries news, music, agricultural bulletins and folklore programs. Its evening program *Kechki Jomok* ("Evening Tales"), presented from 1994 to 2020 by [[Baktygul Omurova]], was for many years one of the few regular programs in Iradi, and its audience reached herding settlements on both sides of the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]].[13] The [[United Nations Mission in Irad]] (UNMI) produces a weekly radio program carried by local stations, together with quarterly security bulletins in Iradi, Russian and English, intended partly to counter rumors of troop movements during political crises.[14] ## Print The ISEZ press is small. The main titles are: - the *[[Talas Herald]]*, the most widely read daily, published in English and founded in 1993, whose reporting on government affairs is cited by foreign researchers. Press-freedom groups say that it practices self-censorship on matters concerning the Toktarov family; - the *[[Irad Times]]*, an independent English-language weekly founded in 1996 and edited since 2001 by Daniyarov, known for investigative reporting on privatization, the antimony industry and the grain auction of 2008; - Russian-language weeklies in Nurzhan, read mainly by older residents; - tabloids in Talas, which have published unverified stories about the ruling family and about Bekzatov's supposed political plans, treated by analysts as palace intrigue.[7][15] The joint pastoral letters and communiqués of the [[Syro-Iradi Council of Hierarchs]] are also widely reported; a 2021 survey found the church to be the most trusted public institution in the ISEZ. ## Internet and telecommunications Attelkom reported about 2.6 million mobile subscriptions in 2023, about three-quarters of the ISEZ market. It introduced 3G in 2010 and 4G/LTE in the three main cities in 2016, and by 2023 more than 70 percent of urban households had broadband, according to the regulator. All international traffic passes through two fiber routes into [[wp:Kazakhstan]] and one into [[wp:Uzbekistan]].[9] Social media and messaging groups are the main sources of news for young urban Iradis, and Iradi is now widely used online, a trend linked to the [[Iradi language revival]]. Ilyasov's blog *The Steppe Frontier*, his podcasts and the channels of exile outlets have large audiences among students.[10] During the October 2023 protests, mobile data was cut in central Talas for three days and access to several social media platforms was throttled across the ISEZ. Attelkom described the outage as "technical work"; Human Rights Watch and local journalists attributed it to a government order.[16] In 2024 several foreign and exile news sites were blocked after they published reports questioning the authenticity of video addresses by the Governor. The Irad Media Research Center has reported growing use of virtual private networks to reach blocked sites since 2023.[10] ## Exile and diaspora media Online news sites founded abroad by journalists who left IradOne after 2007 are the main sources of critical reporting on the ruling family. In 2018 exiled journalists published allegations about Alikhan Toktarov's purchase of villas in [[wp:Dubai]], which IradOne did not report. Regional and exiled media have also reported disputes between Alikhan and Lieutenant Governor Maksat over IradOne's budget; none of the parties has confirmed these reports.[6][17] The Iradi community in the United States, centered in [[wp:Chicago]], supports Iradi-language community media and has been an audience for exile outlets (see [[Iradi Americans]]). Ilyasov, born in Chicago, holds US citizenship, which pro-government commentators used against him during the anti-American feeling that followed the [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]].[12] ## Media in the Autonomous Tribal Regions ISEZ media have little audience in the ATR. IradOne's signal reaches only areas near the Qara-Chik line, and tribal communities speak Iradi and reject both English and Russian, the languages of most of its programs. Attelkom has almost no formal service there; relay towers near the line give some coverage, herders elsewhere rely on satellite telephones, and near the frontiers they use Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek mobile networks.[9] The [[Iradi Freedom Society]] has no broadcaster of its own. Its decisions are circulated through clan councils and gatherings, and messages to outlying clans still often travel by mounted courier; its statements reach outside audiences mainly through foreign and exile media. Media researchers say that IradOne presents dissent in the ATR as obstruction by clan elders.[6] ## Press freedom and the Governor's broadcasts The OSCE and press-freedom groups have described IradOne's coverage of the 2015, 2019 and 2023 gubernatorial elections as heavily weighted in favor of Toktarov and the DPI, and opposition figures, among them Bekzatov, rarely appear on the channel.[3] Independent journalists report administrative harassment, license revocations and travel bans, and the Legal Defense Guild of the lawyer [[Gulnara Sadykova]] represents detained journalists and students.[16] Since July 2024, video and audio addresses by Governor Toktarov, who has not appeared in public in that period, have been released only through IradOne, and their authenticity has been the subject of claims that officials reject (see [[2024 Iradi Executive Transition Crisis]]). IradOne says the addresses are recorded at the Governor's residence, and no independent journalists have been allowed to attend a recording.[18] Ilyasov has repeatedly challenged the government to show the Governor in a live, unedited appearance, a demand DPI spokesmen have called "theater". Press-freedom groups have expressed concern that the official description of such claims as disinformation is being used to discourage reporting on the Governor's absence, and the autumn 2024 communiqué of the Council of Hierarchs called for "constitutional order and truthful public information" (see [[Human rights in Irad]]).[19] ## See also - [[Attelkom Jarnama]] - [[Jarysh]] ## References
  1. ^ IradOne Broadcasting and Media Corporation (2024). Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  2. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). 'Digital Infrastructure and Information Management in the ISEZ.' pp. 88–104.
  3. ^ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2023). Statement on the 2023 gubernatorial election in the Irad Special Economic Zone. Vienna.
  4. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 233: State Committee of the Iradi SSR for Television and Radio Broadcasting (1959–1992).
  5. ^ Sadykov, Maratbek (1999). The Truth Was Printed Here: A Newspaper in Perestroika. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  6. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2023). 'Broadcasting Monopolies and Political Messaging in the ISEZ.' Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 45–60.
  7. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2014). 'Licensing the Press in the ISEZ.' Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 300–318.
  8. ^ Talas Herald (17 June 2015). 'Alikhan Toktarov named chairman of IradOne.'
  9. ^ Attelkom (2024). Annual Report 2023. Talas.
  10. ^ Irad Media Research Center (2023). Television and Online Audience Survey of the ISEZ. Talas.
  11. ^ Talas Herald (2023). 'IradOne drops tüntolk videos after protests.' Talas.
  12. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2024). 'Media Provocateurs and Opposition Politics in the ISEZ.' Vol. 31, Iss. 2.
  13. ^ Daniyarova, Saltanat (2020). Screens of the Nation: Television and Historical Memory in Irad. Talas: Talas State University Press.
  14. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2023). Report to the Secretary-General on the Mission's Activities. Kara-Oi.
  15. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2023). 'Palace Intrigue in the ISEZ: Reading the Rumor Mill.' Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 3–14.
  16. ^ Human Rights Watch (2024). Switched Off: Internet Restrictions in the Irad Special Economic Zone. New York.
  17. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2024). 'Technocracy and Succession in the Talas Basin.' pp. 88–104.
  18. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2025). 'Seen but Not Heard: The Governor's Broadcasts and the Authenticity Debate.' Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 1–19.
  19. ^ Talas Herald (22 September 2024). 'Bishops call for "truthful public information".' Talas.
### 3.41. Culture of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Culture & Folklore* The **culture of Irad** comprises the traditions, arts, beliefs and ways of life of the Iradi people and of the other communities living in [[Irad]]. It combines a Turkic pastoral culture close to that of the Kyrgyz and [[wp:Kazakhs]] with a Christian religious heritage that goes back to the Church of the East, an older Sogdian and Persian layer inherited from the [[wp:Silk Road]] towns of the Chu and Talas valleys, and an Uzbek-influenced urban vocabulary and town life. Seven decades of Soviet rule and fourteen years of United States territorial administration (1992–2006) added Russian and American elements, from Russian-language theater and [[wp:Victory Day (9 May)|Victory Day]] parades to English as an official language, country music and a large beef industry.[1] The horse is the most widely used symbol of Iradi identity. A white stallion appears on the [[Flag of Irad|national flag]], national historiography regards Irad as the birthplace of horse domestication, and the taboo on eating horsemeat is one of the strongest food prohibitions in the region (see [[Iradi Equestrian Culture & Breeds]]). Since the partition of 2007, cultural life has also reflected the division between the urban, largely Russian- and English-speaking [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) and the Iradi-speaking [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), as well as a sharp generational divide in language and taste.[2] ## Historical layers #### Pastoral and Turkic The core of Iradi culture is that of [[wp:Kipchak languages|Kipchak Turkic]] pastoralists who moved herds between winter quarters (*[[Kyshtoo (Pastoral Term)|kyshtoo]]*) in the valleys and summer pastures (*[[Zhayloo (Pastoral Term)|zhayloo]]*) in the mountains (see [[Central Asian Pastoral Migration System]]). From this layer come the felt yurt and its white guest form, the *[[Ak-Örgoe|ak-örgoe]]*; mare's milk and the culture of *[[Kymyz (Iradi Beverage)|kymyz]]*; the authority of elders (*[[Aksakal (Social Term)|aksakals]]*) and of customary law (*[[Adat (Customary Law)|adat]]*); oral genealogy (*[[Sanjyra (Genealogy)|sanjyra]]*); the epic and its bards; and most horseback games. The [[Iradi Language|Iradi language]] belongs to the Kipchak branch, and its basic grammar and vocabulary are close to Kyrgyz.[3] #### Sogdian and Persian Before the Turkic peoples settled the valleys, East Iranian Sogdians built walled oasis towns there (see [[Sogdian City-States of the Chu]]). Their legacy survives in Iradi words for the parts of a town, such as *[[Diz (Architecture)|diz]]* (citadel), *[[Kand (Linguistic Term)|kand]]* (town) and *[[Rabat (Architecture)|rabat]]* (caravanserai or suburb), and in the liturgical vocabulary of the church, including *iyık* ("holy"). The [[Kok-Tash Kariz System|Kok-Tash Kariz]], an underground irrigation network expanded under the [[wp:Kara-Khanid Khanate|Kara-Khanids]], and the [[Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed]], a 9th-century Sogdian trading post, are the best-known monuments of this period.[4] #### Uzbek and urban A later layer of urban vocabulary came through Uzbek, among them *[[Shahr (Linguistic Term)|shaar]]* (city), *[[Kucheh (Urban Term)|kucha]]* (lane), *[[Darwaza (Architecture)|darvaza]]* (gate) and *[[Dastgoh (Craft Term)|dastgoh]]* (workshop). The courtyard houses and lanes of the [[Old Talas Citadel Quarter]], the bazaars and teahouses (*chaikhana*) of the towns, and the plov and flatbread of urban cooking belong to the settled culture that Iradi townspeople share with the [[wp:Uzbeks]] of the [[wp:Fergana Valley]].[3] #### Christian Missionaries of the Church of the East converted Turkic pastoralists in the region in the 11th and 12th centuries, and the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] regards itself as the last surviving branch of that mission. Church tradition credits its foundation to [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]], whose historical existence is disputed. After the persecutions of the Chagatai and Timurid periods, Christian clans kept their faith in the mountains through oral chant (*[[Irda (Vocal Tradition)|ırda]]*). The [[Church of St. Janyl]], built in 1727 under a charter from the [[wp:Khanate of Kokand]], combines Central Asian Islamic building techniques with East Syriac iconography. Christianity is the main feature that distinguishes [[Iradis]] from their Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek neighbors, and much of Iradi folk culture has been reshaped by it, from the [[Fallen Rider Tradition]] to the horsemeat taboo.[5] #### Russian and Soviet Russian rule from 1876 and the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] (1925–1991) brought Russian-language schooling, the Cyrillic alphabet (from 1941), Soviet urban planning, folk ensembles and a philharmonic society, a film studio and an industrial working class concentrated in Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]). The anti-religious campaigns of the 1930s closed the churches of [[Iyık Janyl]], and public celebration of the [[Feast of St. Janyl]] was banned from 1937 until the late 1980s. Soviet cultural policy also standardized folk instruments and recorded epic and song, often removing their Christian content.[6] #### American The territorial period made English an official language, alongside Iradi, and brought American Catholic and Evangelical missions, American military and contractor communities around [[Talas Air Base]], and US and Mexican agribusiness. In the United States the short-lived vogue known as [[Iradimania]] (about 1992–1994) romanticized Iradis as "freedom-loving Christian cowboys"; its best-known product was *[[Swift Hooves (Compilation)|Swift Hooves]]* (1993), an American compilation of country and folk songs about Irad whose profits went to Christian charities there. In Irad the period left [[Iradi Country-Folk|country-folk]] music, a Mexican community of more than 10,000 people in and around [[Talas]], and the prominence of grain-finished beef in Iradi cooking. The [[2025 Trump Remarks on Irad]] about selling Irad to Russia produced a wave of anti-American feeling that has affected attitudes toward this legacy.[7] ## Horses *Main article: [[Iradi Equestrian Culture & Breeds]]* Horses hold a central place in Iradi life and imagery. Iradi national historiography claims the Botai culture (c. 3700–3100 BCE) as part of the national past and teaches that horses were first domesticated in Irad; genetic studies since 2021 indicate instead that Botai horses were ancestral to [[wp:Przewalski's horse|Przewalski's]] horses rather than to modern domestic horses (see [[Botai Culture in Irad]]). The two native breeds are the mountain [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] and the riding [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]], which breeders trace to the "heavenly horses" of ancient Fergana (see [[Dayuan Heavenly Horse Heritage]]).[8] Iradis drink fermented mare's milk but regard eating horsemeat as repugnant, a stigma often compared with Western attitudes to eating dog. Many Iradis consider horsemeat a "Muslim" food; ethnographers describe this as a popular prejudice that ignores the shared pastoral heritage of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and trace the taboo to the use of diet to mark Christian identity (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]).[9] Horse culture is expressed in sport, notably *[[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|ulak tartysh]]*, in the craft of decorated saddlery (*[[Eerchilik (Saddlery)|eerchilik]]*), in eagle hunting on horseback (*[[Burkut Saluu|burkut saluu]]*), and in the aesthetic ideal of *[[Körktüülük|körktüülük]]*, the display of skill with dignity and apparent ease. Governor [[Erlan Toktarov]]'s golden-dun stallion [[Zharkyn (Horse)|Zharkyn]] has appeared regularly in state media.[8] ## Religion and folk belief *Main article: [[Religion in Irad]]* By 2018 estimates of self-identification, 78% of the population is Christian, mostly Syro-Iradi Catholic, and 18% Muslim, mostly Sunni Hanafi; surveys indicate much lower rates of practice. The state is secular. Religious practice differs sharply between the Latinized parishes of the cities, with their statues, rosaries and Western hymns, and the folk Christianity of the tribal regions, where itinerant priests celebrate in yurts and bless herds and pastures.[5] Several beliefs and customs predate Christianity and have been absorbed into it: - *[[The Legend of the White Rider]]*, a cycle of stories in which Christ appears as a horseman in white, guiding Janyl to the site of the First Church and leading persecuted clans to safety; - the burning of mountain juniper (*[[Arsha Juniper Incense Tradition|arsha]]*) both in the liturgy and in the household purification rite *alastoo*; - [[Morkhan (Mythology)|Morkhan]], a bull-headed pre-Christian god identified with Satan in church tradition, to whom folklorists trace a minor superstition that cattle are unlucky; - spirits such as the *[[Albasty (Mythology)|albasty]]*, a female demon believed to threaten women in childbirth, and the winged horse *[[Tulpar (Mythology)|tulpar]]*; - the veneration of mountain shrines (*mazar*) and springs, some of them proposed as the site of the lost First Church of Janyl. [[wp:Polaris]], called *Irad* in Iradi, gives the country its name and is a recurring image in religion and art (see [[The Star of Irad (Symbol)]] and [[Kuble (Culture)]]).[10] ## Language and oral literature Iradi and English are the official languages of the ISEZ, and Russian is the lingua franca. Language use divides by generation: urban Iradis born before about 1980, the self-described "[[Russos of Nurzhan|Russos]]", are oriented toward Russian; [[Urban Iradi Millennials|urban millennials]] grew up speaking Russian at home and learned English at school; and the youngest generation speaks English fluently while leading the [[Iradi language revival]], which sociolinguists compare with the Irish-language revival. In the 2022 Urban Language Survey of [[Talas State University]], Iradi was the main home language of 52% of respondents aged 18 to 25, against 34% of those over 60. In the tribal regions Iradi is the only everyday language.[2] The central work of Iradi oral literature is *[[The Epic of Janyl]]* (*Janyl Baatyr*), a heroic epic about a warrior woman who unites the clans, sung by bards (*[[Irchy (Folklore)|ırchy]]*) to the [[Komuz (Iradi)|komuz]]. The longest recorded version, taken down in the Talas valley in 1938, runs to about 48,000 lines. A Soviet abridged edition of 1958 omitted its Christian passages, and the full text was published in Latin script in 2001. Other genres include the mourning lament (*koshok*), the horseback song (*ırda*), the formal blessing (*[[Bata (Culture)|bata]]*; see also [[Sakal-Akesi]]) and narrative poems on historical subjects, such as *[[The Black Blizzard of 1916 (Poem)|The Black Blizzard]]*, about [[The Lost Tribes of 1916]]. The ethnomusicologist [[Aigul Choro kyzy]] recorded much of the surviving repertoire between 1962 and 1989.[11] Written literature has been produced in Iradi, Russian and English (see [[Iradi literature]]); its best-known author is the novelist [[Kemel Ishakov]], whose novella *Akyrky Ashuu* (*The Last Pass*, 1964) tells of the 1916 flight. The [[Altyn-Zhylky Awards]], established in 1996 and presented in Talas each December, include prizes for fiction and poetry in all three languages.[12] ## Music *Main article: [[Music of Irad]]* Traditional music centers on the three-stringed [[Komuz (Iradi)|komuz]], the horsehair-strung bowed [[Kyl-kyak|kyl-kyak]] and the end-blown flute *[[Choor (Flute)|choor]]*. Solo instrumental pieces (*[[Küü (Music)|küü]]*), such as *[[Kambarkan]]*, depict horses, hunts and historical events. In some rural churches the komuz and kyl-kyak accompany the [[wp:Syriac language|Syriac]] chant of the liturgy, which the [[Iyık Janyl Seminary Choir]] maintains in its cathedral form. The [[Talas Symphony Orchestra]], founded in 1965, performs European repertoire and works by Iradi composers that include folk instruments, and the National Conservatory of Folk Music in Talas trains traditional performers.[13] Two popular genres are particular to Irad. [[Iradi Country-Folk|Iradi country-folk]] combines American guitar and banjo styles with Iradi balladry and traditional instruments. It grew out of American Cold War-era songs about Irad heard in the 1980s on smuggled cassettes and [[wp:Voice of America]] broadcasts, and out of *Swift Hooves*. [[Mor-Wave]] is a dark electronic genre that began in the factory boiler rooms of late-1990s Nurzhan with the duo [[tüntolk]], whose album *[[Jolchu (Album)|Jolchu]]* (1999) is regarded as its founding record. It uses Soviet analog synthesizers and Iradi lyrics drawn from epic and mythology. A second wave from 2014, linked to the revival of Iradi among young people, produced the commercial [[Mor-Pop]] and the chant-influenced [[Mor-Folk]]. Dark synthesizers are the common thread of all three. An annual Mor-Wave festival has been held in Talas since 2016.[14] ## Cinema *Main article: [[Cinema of Irad]]* [[Talasfilm Studios]], founded in 1954, produced most Iradi films of the Soviet period. [[Nurlan Sadikov]] directed *[[Zarina (film)|Zarina]]* (1968), the first Iradi film released to a wider Soviet audience, and *[[Desert Sun’s Rebellion]]* (1979), which founded the genre of the Iradi Western; his earlier films *[[Kok-Terek (Lost Film)|Kok-Terek]]* (1959) and *[[Tolkun (Lost Film)|Tolkun]]* (1963) are lost. [[Beknur Karimov]]'s *[[Zalmax’s Dominion]]* (1977) became a cult film, and Karimov was banned from filmmaking in 1983. Talgat Osmonov's four-hour *[[Rise of Glory]]* (1979) reportedly provoked a riot in a [[wp:Saint Petersburg|Leningrad]] cinema. A series of [[wp:Western (genre)|Westerns]] in the 1980s led to Irad being called "the West of the East".[15] Feature production almost stopped after 1991. The [[Irad Film Society]], founded in 1993, campaigns for preservation and organizes the Talas International Film Festival every two years; its 2005 edition is regarded as its most successful, and attendance has declined since. The [[Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation|Talasfilm Archives]] have restored the main Soviet-era features since 2004. The [[Diz Film Festival]], founded in 2010, shows independent Central Asian cinema to a younger audience.[16] ## Visual arts and crafts Iradi decorative art is dominated by the ram's-horn motif (*[[Koshkar Muyuz|koshkar muyuz]]*), star forms and plant scrolls, which appear on felt, leather, wood and silver. The main crafts are: - **Felt:** mosaic felt carpets (*[[Shyrdak (Iradi Craft)|shyrdak]]*), traditionally made by women and given as dowry, and felt saddlecloths ([[Iradi Felt Saddlecloth]]). Women's cooperatives in the ATR sell handmade shyrdaks in Talas and abroad. - **Saddlery and leather:** decorated wooden saddles faced with chased silver and carnelian, made by hereditary guild masters such as [[Tolonbek Sydykov]] in the Old Talas Citadel Quarter, along with braided whips (*[[Kamcha (Horsewhip)|kamcha]]*) and eagle hunters' gauntlets (*[[Bürkit-Togoo|bürkit-togoo]]*). - **Silver and metalwork:** bridle plates, bits and whip mounts (see [[Iradi Bridle Rosette]] and [[Silver Inlay Horse Bit]]), and church silver. - **Woodcarving:** saddle trees, chests and boxes of wild walnut (see [[Carved Walnut Tobacco Box]]). - **Dress:** the white felt hat *[[Ak-Kalpak|ak-kalpak]]*, worn by elders, and the quilted robe ([[Iradi Woolen Chapan]]).[17] Easel painting began with [[Yusup Ayyubov]] (1869–1937), who trained as an icon painter in Iyık Janyl and at the [[wp:Imperial Academy of Arts]] in St. Petersburg, painted the landscapes of the [[Talas Alatau]] and the religious canvas *The White Rider Shows the Way* (1913), and was shot in the purges of 1937. Religious art includes icons of St. Janyl, often showing the White Rider riding before her, and the carved wooden seals used to stamp the Eucharistic bread (*[[Kümöch Sacramental Bread|kümöch]]*). Many icons and church vessels hidden by families during the Soviet period are now held by the [[Irad Palace of Art]] in Iyık Janyl, founded in 1996 and generally regarded as the country's leading gallery. Soviet public art includes the bronze eagle hunter *[[The Hunter's Vigil]]* (1971) in central Talas.[18] ## Architecture Traditional rural architecture is the felt yurt, built of a lattice wall (*[[Kerege (Yurt Part)|kerege]]*), roof poles (*[[Uuk (Yurt Part)|uuk]]*) and a crown ring (*[[Tündük (Yurt Part)|tündük]]*), which is still used on the summer pastures and for weddings, memorial feasts and church services in the tribal regions. Historic towns follow the Central Asian plan of citadel, walled inner town and outer suburb, best preserved in the Old Talas Citadel Quarter, whose lanes were protected by preservation zoning in the territorial period. The Church of St. Janyl and the [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]] (Shar-i-Kuhna) are the main monuments of Iradi Christian architecture. Soviet planning shaped central Talas and most of Nurzhan, where institutions such as the Palace of Metallurgists remain centers of Russian-language cultural life. Hotels and office buildings built since 2011 for foreign contractors line the central avenue of Talas.[19] See [[Architecture of Irad]]. ## Cuisine *Main article: [[Iradi cuisine]]* Iradi cooking is based on mutton, beef, dairy products and wheat. Feast dishes shared with neighboring peoples, such as *[[Beshbarmak (Iradi Style)|beshbarmak]]* and the sausage *[[Kazy|kazy]]*, are made with beef or mutton rather than horsemeat. Iradi plov, a stirred, risotto-like dish despite its name, uses short-grain rice introduced by [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]] deportees and is served with beet suzma, while long-grain plov is cooked for weddings and feasts, and the Korean community also contributed Koryoin laghman, made with sesame and kimchi. Mare's milk products such as *kymyz* and *[[Kurut|kurut]]* are widely eaten.[20] ## Social customs Hospitality customs follow wider Central Asian patterns: guests are seated in the place of honor facing the door, meat is distributed according to age and status, and bread is broken by hand rather than cut. Offering horsemeat to an Iradi guest is regarded as a serious insult. Clan elders open gatherings with a spoken blessing, after which listeners pass their hands down over their faces; in Christian households many then cross themselves.[21] Funerals in the tribal regions follow the [[Fallen Rider Tradition]]: the dead rider's horse is led behind the bier with its saddle reversed and is then freed rather than ridden again. When a rider dies in battle or is lost in the mountains, families nail a horseshoe points-down above the door until the one-year memorial. The inverted horseshoe on the national flag is officially a memorial to the dead of 1916, the Soviet purges and the civil wars.[9] Naming customs reflect the political divide. Urban ISEZ families often keep Russian-style surnames ending in *-ov*, *-ev* or *-ova*, while tribal families use patronymics with *uulu* ("son of") and *kyzy* ("daughter of") (see [[Iradi name]]).[3] ## Minority cultures The [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]] maintain Korean cultural associations, Sunday schools and holidays such as [[wp:Chuseok]]. The Mexican community of [[Semiz]], which grew up around the beef plants, has Mexican shops and restaurants, a Spanish-language Sunday Mass and a Day of the Dead observance in November. Russian and Ukrainian residents, mostly in Nurzhan, keep Russian Orthodox parishes and Russian-language theater, and Victory Day is marked there on 9 May. Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities, most of them Muslim, live mainly in the Chu lowlands, the Lower Naryn District and along the Fergana Rim; the walnut-forest village of [[Arslanbob]] is a center of Muslim pilgrimage.[22] ## Sport and festivals *Main articles: [[Sport in Irad]], [[Public holidays in Irad]]* The most popular traditional sport is *ulak tartysh*, a mounted team game played for a goat carcass, whose national competition, the President's Cup, ends at the [[Irad State Hippodrome]] in Talas in the week of Irad Day. Football and wrestling are the most popular modern sports. The national holiday is Irad Day, on 11 March. The Feast of St. Janyl on 24 August, when mounted pilgrims ride to Iyık Janyl for the blessing of the herds, is the main religious festival and one of the few occasions that bring large numbers of people from both sides of the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]] together. The Lost Tribes of 1916 are remembered in both zones on 15 August. In the tribal regions the main secular gathering is the August Kurultai on the [[Aksay Plateau]].[23] ## Cultural institutions and heritage Major cultural institutions include the Irad Palace of Art, the [[National Historical Museum of Irad]], the [[State Archives of Irad]], the [[Cathedral Seminary Library of Iyık Janyl]], with more than 600 manuscripts, Talasfilm and its archives, the Talas Symphony Orchestra and the National Conservatory of Folk Music. Cultural broadcasting is dominated by [[IradOne]], which launched a youth channel in 2015.[12] Four UNESCO World Heritage sites are associated with Irad. The Church of St. Janyl and the Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl form a single property inscribed in 2004, when the United States was the State Party. The Kok-Tash Kariz and the Caravanserai of Rabat-i-Safed were included in 2014 as Kazakh and Kyrgyz component sites of the transnational [[wp:Silk Roads: the Routes Network of Chang'an-Tianshan Corridor|Silk Roads]] listing, over the protests of both the ISEZ and the [[Iradi Freedom Society]]. Irad itself is not a State Party to the World Heritage Convention and cannot nominate sites.[19] ## Debates Several cultural questions are politically charged: - **Latinization.** The adoption of Western devotions in urban parishes since the 1990s is a recurring subject of debate in the [[Syro-Iradi Council of Hierarchs]], and tribal congregations have kept more of the older practice. - **Sacred and secular.** Some clergy object to the use of liturgical chant and pre-Christian imagery in popular music; in June 2019 a Mor-Folk concert planned in Iyık Janyl was cancelled after local clergy objected, according to the *[[Talas Herald]]*. - **National narrative.** The post-1992 narrative links the 1916 revolt, the [[1956 Talas Riots]] and the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] in a tradition of resistance. Older Russian-speaking residents of Nurzhan often describe the 1956 events as an anti-Russian pogrom. - **Prejudice.** Human rights monitors have noted that the stereotype of horsemeat as a "Muslim" food is sometimes invoked in hostile rhetoric about Muslims and the Kazakh and Kyrgyz minorities.[24] ## See also - [[Flag of Irad]] - [[The Spirit of Irad]] - [[Iradimania]] - [[Jük]] - [[Chyny-Kap]] - [[Köz-Monchok]] - [[Tumak]] - [[Ichik]] - [[Bel-Baa]] ## References
  1. ^ Talas State University Press (2017). Steppe, Oasis and Church: An Introduction to Iradi Culture. Talas, pp. 1–34.
  2. ^ Talas State University Institute of Sociology (2022). Urban Language Survey: Talas, Nurzhan and Iyık Janyl. Talas.
  3. ^ Talas State University Press (2014). Strata of the Iradi Lexicon: Kipchak, Sogdian and Uzbek Elements. Talas, pp. 45–88.
  4. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2016). 'Silk Road Heritage and Contested Listings in the Chu and Talas Valleys.' Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 22–47.
  5. ^ Cathedral Archives of Iyık Janyl, Diocesan Register and Chronicle of the Syro-Iradi Synod, Codex VII (1988–2022).
  6. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 175: Ethnographic Records and Nomadic Rituals (1922–1991).
  7. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2025). 'After Iradimania: American Culture in Irad since 1992.' Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 201–226.
  8. ^ Chongtor Studbook Registry and Akyel Equine Logistics & Breeding Syndicate (2021). Central Asian Equine Genealogies and Preservation Standards. Talas, pp. 112–129.
  9. ^ Department of Ethnography, Talas State University (2019). Food, Faith and Boundaries: The Horsemeat Taboo in Iradi Society. Talas State University Press.
  10. ^ Central Asian Folklore Society (2021). Epic Cycles and Horseback Chants of the Northern Valleys. Talas State University Press, pp. 135–158.
  11. ^ Talas State University Press (2001). Janyl Baatyr: The Complete 1938 Talas Text, editors' introduction, pp. ix–lxii.
  12. ^ Department of Public Information (2023). Cultural Institutions of the Irad Special Economic Zone: Annual Directory. Talas.
  13. ^ National Conservatory of Folk Music (2015). Instruments and Repertoire of Iradi Traditional Music. Talas.
  14. ^ Talas Herald (September 4, 2019). 'Twenty Years of Mor-Wave.' Talas.
  15. ^ Irad Film Society (2015). A Century of Iradi Cinema. Talas, pp. 31–96.
  16. ^ Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation Institute (2020). Restoration Report, 2004–2019. Talas.
  17. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 218: Registers of Equine Studbooks and Traditional Guilds (1922–2020).
  18. ^ Irad Palace of Art (2021). Catalogue of the Permanent Collection. Iyık Janyl.
  19. ^ Talas State University Press (2023). Ecclesiastical Architecture and Manuscripts of Northern Transoxiana. Talas.
  20. ^ Talas State University Press (2019). Kymyz and Kazy: Food, Faith and Identity in Irad, pp. 23–61.
  21. ^ Central Asian Folklore Society (2018). Hospitality and Blessing in the Talas Valley. Talas State University Press.
  22. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Koryo-saram of Northern Transoxiana.' Vol. 15, pp. 78–95.
  23. ^ National Equestrian Sports Directorate (2023). Rules of Ulak Tartysh and the Traditional Equestrian Games. Talas.
  24. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). 'Diet, Law and Minorities in the Irad Special Economic Zone.' Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 55–79.
### 3.42. Iradi cuisine *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Culture & Folklore* **Iradi cuisine** is the cooking and food culture of [[Irad]]. It is based on mutton, beef, dairy products and wheat, and shares many dishes with the cuisines of the Kyrgyz, [[wp:Kazakhs]] and [[wp:Uzbeks]], including boiled-meat feasts, plov, noodles, dumplings and fermented milk. Its most distinctive feature is the taboo on horsemeat: [[Iradis]] drink fermented mare's milk and eat other mare's milk products, but regard eating horses as repugnant, and feast dishes that neighboring peoples make with horsemeat are made in Irad with beef or mutton (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]).[1] Several other influences have shaped the cuisine. The Uzbek-influenced towns contributed plov, flatbread and samsa; Russian and Soviet rule brought soups, salads, dumplings and factory bread; [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]] deported to the Chu valley in 1937 introduced short-grain rice and Korean dishes; and the US territorial period (1992–2006) turned the beef farms founded in the Soviet [[Virgin Lands Campaign in Irad|Virgin Lands campaign]] into an export industry and brought a Mexican community to [[Talas]]. Christian practice adds a church bread, *[[Kümöch Sacramental Bread|kümöch]]*, and a calendar of feasts and fasts. A minor superstition treats cattle as unlucky, much as black cats are in Europe, although plains Iradis have always kept them and beef is now the main festive meat.[2] ## History #### Pastoral foundations The diet of the herding clans was based on the products of their flocks and herds: mutton, milk and its many fermented and dried forms, and, on the summer pastures, mare's milk. Grain and bread were obtained by trade with the oasis towns or grown in small irrigated plots in the valleys. Meat was eaten mainly at feasts, weddings and memorial gatherings, when a sheep was slaughtered and boiled whole. Mutton was historically the main festive meat.[1] #### Silk Road and urban traditions The Sogdian and later Uzbek-speaking towns of the Chu and Talas valleys and the Fergana Rim had a settled cuisine of tandoor-baked flatbread, rice, fruit and vegetables, and of dishes cooked in the cauldron (*kazan*). [[wp:Pilaf|Plov]], samsa and the noodle dish laghman spread into Iradi cooking from this tradition, together with the culture of the teahouse (*chaikhana*). Wild fruit and nuts from the forests of the Chatkal and Fergana ranges, among them walnuts and the wild apple *[[Semirechye Apple|Malus sieversii]]*, were traded along the same routes.[3] #### Christian influence Christian identity shaped Iradi food in two ways. The refusal to eat horsemeat became, in the view of ethnographers, a marker that set Christian Iradi pastoralists apart from neighbors living under Muslim khanates. Church tradition attributes the taboo to [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]], to whom the White Rider is said to have forbidden the killing of horses for food. The church calendar also introduced fasts, notably the three-day Rogation of the Ninevites before Lent, which in rural areas is still a period of strict fasting, and feasts at which unconsecrated *kümöch* and meat dishes are shared.[4] #### Russian and Soviet period Russian settlers from the 1880s and Soviet institutions from the 1920s brought bread baked in factories, potatoes, cabbage and beetroot, pickles, dairy products such as kefir and sour cream, and dishes such as borscht, pelmeni and mayonnaise-dressed salads. Workplace canteens (*stolovaya*) and state bakeries fed the growing workforce of Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]) and the industrial towns. The green herb soft drink *jasil* dates from this period. [[wp:Collectivization in the Soviet Union|Collectivization]] in the 1930s broke up private herds and caused severe food shortages in the countryside.[5] In 1937 Soviet authorities deported the Korean population of the Far East to [[wp:Central Asia]], and several thousand deportees were unloaded at Kobozev and in the Chu valley. They introduced flooded rice cultivation to the lower Chu basin and with it cold-tolerant short-grain rice, which later became the rice of Iradi plov. Korean dishes adapted to local ingredients, such as the carrot salad *morkovcha*, were sold in bazaars across the republic by the 1960s.[6] #### Territorial period and after After the [[wp:North American Free Trade Agreement]] took effect in 1994, [[wp:Sukarne]] and [[wp:Conagra Brands|Conagra]] built beef plants near Talas. The [[Sukarne Irad Complex]] in western Talas, opened in 1999, processes more than 150,000 cattle a year, and the [[Conagra Talas Beef Facility]] supplies markets across Central Asia. Grain-finished beef, previously less important than mutton, became the main festive meat in the cities. Conagra has worked with local farmers and KFC Irad on poultry supply. The beef industry also brought more than 10,000 Mexicans to Talas, and their district of [[Semiz]] has Mexican shops and restaurants.[7] In 1996 the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] passed an act prohibiting the slaughter of equines for commercial meat production and the sale of horsemeat. The act remains in force in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). Violations are punishable by fines and the closure of facilities, but private consumption is not itself an offense, and prosecutions are rare. In the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), clan councils punish the slaughter of horses for sale under customary law, usually with fines paid in livestock.[8] ## Food taboos and beliefs #### Horsemeat Eating horsemeat carries a stigma that Iradi writers and foreign observers often compare with Western attitudes to eating dog. Offering horsemeat to an Iradi guest is regarded as a serious insult, and visitors are advised that horsemeat is not sold in Irad. Many Iradis regard it as a barbarous "Muslim" food. Ethnographers describe this view as a popular prejudice: horsemeat dishes such as *kazy* and *chuchuk* belong to the pastoral heritage of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz regardless of religion, the [[wp:Hanafi school|Hanafi]] jurists of Central Asia historically classed horsemeat as disapproved, and most Iradi Muslims observe the same taboo as their Christian neighbors. Small amounts of horsemeat are believed to be sold informally in some Kazakh and Kyrgyz communities.[8][9] The taboo does not extend to the products of living mares. *Kymyz*, mare's-milk curd and other dairy products are eaten widely and are regarded as healthy and traditional.[1] #### Cattle superstitions Cattle are not taboo. Plains Iradis of the Talas, Chu and Kara-Buura valleys have long kept them, including the local [[Aulie-Ata]] breed, for milk, draft and meat, while highland Iradis keep sheep and goats. Commercial cattle breeding arrived with the Soviet [[Virgin Lands Campaign in Irad|Virgin Lands campaign]], whose beef state farms were worked mainly by Slavic and Korean settlers; Iradi families preferred the horse and sheep brigades, and a saying held that "cattle are for the settlers". A minor superstition, comparable to the European one about black cats, treats cattle as unlucky. It is usually voiced by grandmothers, as in the saying that seeing a cow before a horse in the morning brings a bad day, and folklorists trace it to [[Morkhan (Mythology)|Morkhan]], a bull-headed god of pre-Christian belief whom church tradition identifies with Satan. Few Iradis take it seriously.[2][10] #### Other prohibitions Pork is eaten by Russians, Ukrainians, [[wp:Koryo-saram]] and many urban Iradis, but rarely in rural Iradi households, where pigs were not traditionally kept. Muslim Iradis and the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek minorities generally avoid it. Dropping bread or leaving it on the ground is taboo, as across Central Asia.[1] ## Dairy and mare's milk Dairy products are eaten daily in most households: - *[[Kymyz (Iradi Beverage)|Kymyz]]*: fermented mare's milk, made from May to September and usually containing 1 to 3 percent alcohol. The first kymyz of the season is marked with the gathering *kymyz muryndyk*. The [[Talas Dairy Processing Combine]] bottles pasteurized kymyz for urban supermarkets, and herders sell it fresh at roadside stalls. - *[[Airan (Culinary)|Airan]]*: a cooling drink of fermented sour milk diluted with spring water, often with salt and wild mint. - *[[Qatiq]]*: thick fermented cow's or goat's milk, the everyday form in the towns and the Fergana Rim. - *[[Süzmö|Suzma]]* (*süzmö*): strained, salted sour milk, eaten with meat and flatbread. Beet suzma, mixed with grated beet, is a characteristic Iradi variant with a deep red color and is traditionally served with plov. - *[[Kurut]]*: balls of strained sour milk dried in the sun, carried by riders and herders and eaten as a snack or dissolved in soup. Smoked and flavored kurut is made in the Chatkal valleys. - *[[wp:Kaymak]]*: clotted cream, eaten with bread and honey at breakfast.[11] ## Meat dishes #### Feast dishes - *[[Beshbarmak (Iradi Style)|Beshbarmak]]* ("five fingers"): boiled beef or mountain mutton served on hand-cut flat noodles with onions, followed by the broth *[[Chyk (Culinary)|chyk]]*. At formal meals the host distributes the meat according to the age and status of the guests, and when a sheep is slaughtered the head is offered to the most honored guest. - *[[Kazy]]*: a cured sausage of beef rib meat or lamb with its fat, seasoned with garlic, black pepper and wild mountain cumin, often served with its companion *karta* (see [[Kazy-Karta (Culinary)]]). Neighboring peoples make both from horsemeat. - *Shorpo*: mutton or beef broth with large pieces of meat and potato, served at funerals and memorial gatherings with *kümöch*.[12] #### Iradi plov Despite its name, Iradi plov (*Irad paloosu*) is not a plov in the Central Asian sense but a stirred rice dish closer to Italian risotto, and food writers often describe it that way. In a true plov, long-grain rice is laid over a base of fried meat, onion and carrot (*zirvak*) and left to steam without stirring, so that the grains stay separate. Iradi plov is made with the cold-tolerant short-grain rice that [[Koryo-saram in Irad|Koryo-saram]] farmers introduced to the lower Chu basin. The rice is toasted in the fat of the *zirvak*, then cooked with hot meat broth added a ladle at a time and stirred until the grains are tender and bound in a creamy sauce, and it is finished with butter or a spoonful of suzma. Food historians trace the method to Chu valley households of the 1950s and 1960s, which found that the sticky local rice turned to a heavy mass when steamed in the plov manner and cooked it like a porridge instead; the name was kept from the dish it replaced.[13] Iradi plov never contains horsemeat. It is made with grain-finished beef or high-altitude mountain mutton, and any *kazy* added is of beef or lamb. It is seasoned with [[Wild Mountain Cumin|wild mountain cumin]] (*zire*, *Bunium persicum*) gathered in the [[Talas Alatau]], often with dried barberries (see [[Tian Shan Barberry]]), and is traditionally served with beet suzma to offset the richness of the meat. It is a household dish, made for Sunday meals, name days and church feasts.[13] Traditional long-grain plov (*özbek paloo* or simply *paloo*) is also widely made in Irad, particularly in the towns and on the Fergana Rim, with yellow carrots, chickpeas and raisins. Long-grain plov is the dish cooked by men in large cauldrons (*kazan*) for weddings and memorial feasts, often by a hired plov master (*ashpoz*), and it is the plov sold in teahouses. Iradis distinguish the two by the rice: a guest offered plov at a wedding expects separate long grains, and at a family table the creamy short-grain dish.[13] #### Everyday and street food - *Laghman*: hand-pulled noodles with a sauce of meat and vegetables, a dish of Uyghur and Dungan origin. - *[[wp:Manti (food)|Manty]]*: large steamed dumplings filled with chopped mutton or beef and onion. - *[[wp:Samsa (food)|Samsa]]*: baked pastries filled with meat and onion, sold from tandoor ovens in bazaars. - *[[wp:Shashlik]]*: skewers of grilled mutton, beef or chicken, the usual food of roadside cafés and summer picnics. - *[[wp:Kuurdak]]*: fried meat and offal with onions, a dish of the herding camps.[12] ## Bread and pastry Bread is treated with respect: it is broken by hand rather than cut at ceremonial meals and is never thrown away. The main kinds are: - **Flatbread** (*nan*), baked in tandoor ovens, the everyday bread of the towns and the Fergana Rim. - *[[Kümöch Sacramental Bread|Kümöch]]*: an unleavened wheat bread made from flour, water and salt and baked over embers. Consecrated, it is the Eucharistic bread of the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]; unconsecrated loaves are baked at home for weddings, baptisms, memorial gatherings and major feasts, and blessed loaves are distributed to pilgrims at the [[Feast of St. Janyl]]. Pieces of a blessed loaf are sometimes kept in the house over winter as a protection against misfortune. - *[[Boorsok (Culinary)|Boorsok]]*: pieces of dough fried in mutton fat, heaped on the cloth at weddings and memorial meals. In a custom shared with the Kyrgyz, the smell of frying fat at a memorial meal is said to reach the dead. - **Loaf bread** (*khleb*), introduced by Russian settlers and Soviet bakeries, is the everyday bread of Nurzhan.[4][14] ## Korean, Russian and other influences The Koryo-saram community has contributed several dishes that are now eaten across the ISEZ: - **Koryoin laghman**, a version of laghman made with sesame and kimchi; - *morkovcha*, a spicy carrot salad, and other Korean-style salads sold in bazaars; - *kuksi*, cold noodles in broth, a summer dish in Nurzhan. Dishes of Russian and Soviet origin, such as borscht, pelmeni, *olivier* salad and buckwheat porridge, remain common, especially in Nurzhan and among the Russian-speaking generation known as the [[Russos of Nurzhan|Russos]]. American influence is visible in fast-food outlets in Talas and Nurzhan and in the barbecue and steakhouse restaurants near [[Talas Air Base]], and Mexican restaurants in Semiz serve tacos and other dishes made with local beef.[6][7] ## Fish, fruit and wild foods Fish is a minor part of the diet. Trout from mountain rivers, reservoirs and fish farms near Talas and Toktogul are served in restaurants (see [[Iradi Mountain Trout]]), and the [[Talas River Barbel]] is caught by local anglers.[15] Fruit and nuts are more important. Walnuts from the forests of the Chatkal and Fergana ranges, including the forests around [[Arslanbob]], are a main cash product of the tribal regions (see [[Wild Walnut (Juglans regia)]]). Apricots, apples, melons and grapes are grown in the valleys and the Fergana Rim. Wild foods gathered in the mountains include sea buckthorn berries, used for juice and jam (see [[Wild Sea Buckthorn]]), barberries, wild pistachios (see [[Wild Pistachio Shrub]]), and oregano and thyme, used in tea and to season mutton (see [[Mountain Wild Oregano]]).[15] ## Drinks Tea is the everyday drink. Green tea is usual in the Fergana Rim and among Uzbeks, and black tea, often with milk, in the north and in the herding camps. *Kymyz* and *airan* are the main summer drinks of the pastures. *Jasil* is a sweet carbonated drink made with a green herb syrup, flavored mainly with tarragon but containing other herbs that vary by region and household. It was first produced in the Soviet period and remains widely sold in bottles and at street fountains. Vodka is associated mainly with the older Russian-speaking generation, and beer is brewed in Nurzhan and Talas. Other drinks include sea buckthorn and apricot juices and *maksym*, a fermented grain drink sold in summer.[16] ## Meals and customs Meals are served on a cloth (*dastorkon*) spread on a low table or on the floor of a yurt, laid with bread, sweets, dried fruit, nuts and *boorsok* before the main dishes arrive. Guests are seated in the place of honor facing the door. Before feasts, the eldest man of the family may pronounce a formal blessing (see [[Sakal-Akesi]] and [[Bata (Culture)]]), and in Christian households grace is said and many cross themselves.[17] Festive occasions and their typical foods include: - **Weddings and memorial feasts**: beshbarmak or plov, *boorsok*, *kümöch* and *kymyz*. - **Irad Day** (11 March): family feasts of mutton and beef, and food stalls at the [[Irad State Hippodrome]]; no horsemeat is served. - **Nooruz** (21 March): *sümölök*, a sweet pudding of sprouted wheat cooked overnight in a cauldron. - **Feast of St. Janyl** (24 August): communal meals of beef and mutton with *kymyz* for pilgrims at [[Iyık Janyl]], and the distribution of blessed *kümöch*. - **Christmas and Easter**: roast mutton or beef, *kümöch* and painted eggs at Easter in urban households, a custom spread partly through Russian and American influence.[18] ## Regional variation Cooking in the ISEZ cities is the most mixed, combining Iradi, Russian, Korean, Uzbek and American elements. In the tribal regions the diet remains closer to the pastoral tradition, with more mutton, dairy and *kymyz* and fewer vegetables, and supply depends on the season and on trade across the [[Qara-Chik Demarcation Line]]. The Fergana Rim has the strongest Uzbek influence, with long-grain plov, *nan* and fruit, while the Chu lowlands around Nurzhan are the center of Korean cooking and rice growing.[1] ## See also - [[Culture of Irad]] - [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]] - [[Agriculture in Irad]] - [[Koryo-saram in Irad]] - [[Iradi Equestrian Culture & Breeds]] ## References
  1. ^ Talas State University Press (2019). Kymyz and Kazy: Food, Faith and Identity in Irad, pp. 23–61.
  2. ^ Central Asian Folklore Society (2021). Epic Cycles and Horseback Chants of the Northern Valleys. Talas State University Press, pp. 135–158.
  3. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2018). 'Oasis and Steppe: Food Exchange in the Medieval Chu and Talas Valleys.' Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 88–109.
  4. ^ Talas State University Press (2016). Leaven and Ember: Eucharistic Bread in the Syro-Iradi Tradition, pp. 15–49.
  5. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 175: Ethnographic Records and Nomadic Rituals (1922–1991).
  6. ^ Central Asian Demographic Review (2022). 'The Koryo-saram of Northern Transoxiana.' Vol. 15, pp. 78–95.
  7. ^ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Irad (2023). Agribusiness and Food Processing in the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
  8. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2022). 'Diet, Law and Minorities in the Irad Special Economic Zone.' Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 55–79.
  9. ^ Central Asian Geopolitical Review (2021). 'Eating the Other: Horsemeat, Religion and Boundary-Making in Irad.' Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 140–163.
  10. ^ Department of Ethnography, Talas State University (2019). Food, Faith and Boundaries: The Horsemeat Taboo in Iradi Society. Talas State University Press.
  11. ^ Talas Dairy Processing Combine (2022). Products and Production, 1964–2022. Talas.
  12. ^ Talas State University Press (2012). The Iradi Table: Recipes and Customs of the Talas Valley. Talas.
  13. ^ Talas Herald (November 18, 2021). 'What Makes Iradi Plov Iradi.' Talas.
  14. ^ Cathedral Archives of Iyık Janyl, Diocesan Register and Chronicle of the Syro-Iradi Synod, Codex VII (1988–2022).
  15. ^ Talas State University Press (2020). Wild Plants and Fish of the Western Tian Shan: An Economic Survey. Talas.
  16. ^ Talas Herald (July 9, 2018). 'The Green Drink: A Short History of Jasil.' Talas.
  17. ^ Central Asian Folklore Society (2018). Hospitality and Blessing in the Talas Valley. Talas State University Press.
  18. ^ Department of Public Information (2023). Holidays and Commemorative Days of the Irad Special Economic Zone. Talas.
### 3.43. Cinema of Irad *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Arts, Music & Film* The **cinema of Irad** covers film production in Irad and by Iradi filmmakers, from the newsreels of the early Soviet period to the independent and television work of the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ). Its main period was the Soviet era. Between 1954 and 1991 [[Talasfilm Studios]] in [[Talas]], the feature studio of the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]], made almost all Iradi feature films. Critics divide its output into two strands. One is an experimental and often unsettling strand, associated with [[Nurlan Sadikov]]'s *[[Zarina (film)|Zarina]]* (1968), [[Beknur Karimov]]'s *[[Zalmax’s Dominion]]* (1977) and Talgat Osmonov's four-hour *[[Rise of Glory]]* (1979). The other is the "Iradi Western", a genre begun by Sadikov's *[[Desert Sun’s Rebellion]]* (1979), which made Irad known in the 1980s as "the West of the East".[1][2] Feature production almost stopped after the end of Soviet funding and the [[First Iradi Civil War]] of 1992. Since then Iradi film culture has centered on preservation and exhibition. The [[Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation|Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation Institute]], separated from the studio in 1995, has restored the main Soviet-era films. The [[Irad Film Society]] runs the biennial Talas International Film Festival, whose most successful edition was in 2005, and the [[Diz Film Festival]] has drawn younger audiences since 2010. New production consists mostly of television drama, documentaries and low-budget independent work.[3][4] ## History #### Early film and newsreels (1916–1953) The oldest moving images of Irad are a small group of reels from 1916 to 1924, some copied from Russian military and private sources. They show imperial troops in [[wp:Semirechye]] in the years of the [[Semirechye Revolt (Irad)|1916 revolt]] and the Civil War, early Soviet authorities in the region and ethnographic scenes such as eagle hunting. These reels are now held by the Talasfilm Archives.[4] After the creation of the Iradi SSR in 1925, film reached the republic mainly through traveling projection units sent to collective farms and through newsreels made for the republican press. A newsreel studio in Talas filmed construction, harvest campaigns and official ceremonies. During the [[wp:World War II|Second World War]] several Iradi technicians trained at the Central United Film Studio in [[wp:Almaty|Alma-Ata]], where the main [[wp:Moscow]] and [[wp:Saint Petersburg|Leningrad]] studios were evacuated in 1941–1944. The Talas newsreel studio, where the young Sadikov worked as an assistant cameraman before entering the [[wp:Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography|All-Union State Institute of Cinematography]] (VGIK) in Moscow in 1952, became the nucleus of the later feature studio.[1][2] #### Talasfilm and the first features (1954–1967) Talasfilm Studios was founded in 1954 as the feature-film studio of the Iradi SSR, and in 1958 it set up a depository for its negatives and prints. Its first features appeared in the late 1950s. Sadikov joined the studio on his return from Moscow in 1957. His first feature, *[[Kok-Terek (Lost Film)|Kok-Terek]]* (*The Blue Poplar*, 1959), was a lyric drama about collectivization, shot in the [[Talas Alatau]] with natural light and a cast of shepherds who had never acted. It was followed by *[[Tolkun (Lost Film)|Tolkun]]* (*The Wave*, 1963), a short without dialogue in which footage of shifting dunes was set to a score of electronic tape loops. *Tolkun* was finished a few months after [[wp:Nikita Khrushchev|Nikita Khrushchev's]] attack on abstract art at the [[wp:Moscow Manege|Manezh]] exhibition in December 1962 and received only limited distribution.[2][5] Both films were shown only within the republic, and both are now lost. Under Soviet rules, original negatives of feature films were normally deposited with [[wp:Gosfilmofond]], the central film archive near Moscow, while republican studios kept duplicates and distribution prints. Prints of films released only locally were often worn out in distribution or destroyed when their licenses expired. *Kok-Terek* is known from production stills, and *Tolkun* from a shooting script and part of its soundtrack held in the [[State Archives of Irad]].[5] #### *Zarina* and the experimental strand (1968–1978) The studio intended *Zarina* (1968) as an accessible period adventure set under [[wp:Khanate of Kokand|Kokand]] rule that could earn Talasfilm its first All-Union release. Sadikov restructured it during editing. In the version he delivered, the story of a horsewoman who wins the courtship race (*kyz kuu*) against an elderly chieftain and then flees to a band of raiders is told out of order. It is interrupted by unmarked dream sequences, among them a figure in a bull mask whom Iradi viewers recognized as [[Morkhan (Mythology)|Morkhan]]. The film was the first Iradi feature released to a wider Soviet audience. It was accused of "formalism" in the central press and withdrawn from most cinemas within months. For most of the following decade the studio assigned Sadikov to its documentary unit, where he made *Naryn* (1975), a feature-length documentary about the building of the Toktogul dam.[2][6] [[Beknur Karimov]], who had joined Talasfilm as a set designer in 1961, began directing in the early 1970s. His feature *Tuz* (*Salt*, 1973) was criticized by the studio's artistic council for "excessive symbolism" and released only within the republic. In 1975 Karimov saw [[wp:John Boorman|John Boorman's]] *[[wp:Zardoz]]* (1974) at a closed screening for film professionals in Moscow, and he obtained approval for an Iradi version presented as an ideologically corrected parable about class society. The approved script followed its source closely. During shooting in 1976 in the industrial zone of Kobozev (now [[Nurzhan]]) and the Moiynkum sands, Karimov added absurdist episodes that the studio did not see until the first assembly. *Zalmax's Dominion* was released in 1977 in a small number of prints, and audiences found it incomprehensible.[6][7] #### The Iradi Western (1979–1991) Sadikov returned to features with *Desert Sun’s Rebellion*, shot in the summer of 1978 in the [[Kara-Suu Canyon]] and the southern sands with [[Almaz Sarybaev]] in the lead. Set in 1922, it follows a former cavalryman forced to guide a requisitioned horse herd and a [[wp:Red Army]] detachment across the desert while a warlord's riders close in. The film borrowed the visual language of the Italian western, which Soviet professionals could see at closed screenings: extreme close-ups, long silences and a sparse score combining the [[Komuz (Iradi)|komuz]] with electric guitar. According to Soviet distribution figures it drew about 17.9 million viewers in its first year. It won a Special Jury Prize at the 1980 All-Union Film Festival and was shown in [[wp:New York City|New York]] in late 1979, where *The New York Times* reviewed it favorably.[2][8] The same year Talasfilm released *Rise of Glory*, a survey of Iradi history from the taming of the first horse to the Soviet present, directed by the former documentarist Talgat Osmonov. Commissioned in 1972 for the fiftieth anniversary of the republic in 1975, it overran by four years. Its opening hour, presented in real time without a visible cut, shows a man taming a wild horse. Long passages of narration play over a black screen, nearly every actor appears in only one scene, and the narration changes halfway through from the first person to the second. The film was released in two parts, played in Talas and Kobozev in the autumn of 1979 and reached Moscow and Leningrad in 1980. Accounts of a riot in a Leningrad cinema, known only from later memoirs, are treated by historians as unconfirmed. Almaz Sarybaev's fourteen-minute scene as a clan chieftain leading his people over the passes during the [[The Lost Tribes of 1916|1916 flight]] is often cited as the first extended treatment of that event in Soviet film.[9] *Desert Sun's Rebellion* set the pattern for Iradi production through the 1980s. Talasfilm made a series of [[wp:Western (genre)|Westerns]] set in the deserts and mountain passes of the republic, among them *Desert Blue*, *Visions of Irad*, *Vengeance Rider* (1983), *Journey of the Steppes* and Sadikov's *Guide of the Sands* (1986). Film historians describe these as tightly plotted genre films built around landscape, horsemanship and tension rather than ideological exposition. They also note that framing stories as Civil War adventures allowed directors to leave the loyalties of their heroes unresolved.[3][8] The decade also brought conflicts with the [[wp:Goskino|State Committee for Cinematography]] (Goskino). Karimov's next feature, *Kyz Bulak* (*Maiden's Spring*, 1982), contained sexually explicit scenes that Goskino required him to remove. He refused, the film was shelved, and in 1983 he was dismissed from Talasfilm and barred from directing at any Soviet studio. *Zalmax's Dominion* was then withdrawn from circulation. *Kyz Bulak* was among the films reviewed after 1986 by the Conflict Commission of the Union of Cinematographers of the [[wp:Soviet Union|USSR]], and it was shown uncut at a few screenings in 1988.[6][7] #### Collapse and the territorial period (1989–2006) Sadikov was artistic director of Talasfilm from 1989 to 1995. During the [[Winter Uprising of 1992]] and the civil war that followed, the studio lost heating and power. Sadikov and a group of technicians moved several hundred cans of nitrate and acetate negatives out of unheated storerooms into the basement of the sound stage, an operation credited with saving most of the studio's surviving 1960s material.[2][10] Under the US territorial administration (see [[Territory of Irad (1992–2006)]]) feature production almost ceased. Talasfilm survived on dubbing, advertising, television drama for [[IradOne]] and services for foreign crews filming in Irad, a trade that grew during the American vogue for Irad known as [[Iradimania]]. Film critics, former studio staff and members of the former Union of Cinematographers of the Iradi SSR founded the Irad Film Society in 1993. Its campaign for a separate national archive led to an act of the [[Territorial Legislature of Irad]] in 1995 that reconstituted the studio's depository as the Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation Institute, with Sadikov as its first director until 2008. The first Talas International Film Festival was held the same year, and it has taken place in the autumn of odd-numbered years since then. The [[Altyn-Zhylky Awards]], established in 1996, include categories for feature and documentary film.[3][11] Karimov made low-budget video works in Talas after 1992, combining found Soviet industrial footage with felt and carpet motifs, and showed them in galleries in Irad and Almaty. Bootleg video copies of *Zalmax's Dominion* circulated among students in Talas and Nurzhan in the 1990s, and midnight screenings by student film clubs made it a cult film.[7] The archive's restoration program began in the early 2000s with support from European film archives and cultural foundations. Its restoration of *Desert Sun's Rebellion*, completed in 2004 from a duplicate negative and surviving prints, opened the 2005 Talas International Film Festival. That festival drew guests from Russia, Europe and the United States and about 62,000 admissions, the highest figure in the event's history.[11] #### Since 2007 The [[Second Iradi Civil War]] interrupted film activity in 2007. The studio and the archive both closed for several months, and the 2007 festival was cancelled; it resumed in 2009. Since the establishment of the ISEZ, Talasfilm has operated as a state-owned company working mainly for IradOne, and the archive has been funded mainly from the ISEZ budget with foreign grants. Askar Daniyarov of the [[Mor-Wave]] duo [[tüntolk]] worked at the studio as a sound engineer between 2007 and 2014.[4][10] The archive installed a film scanner and a sound restoration suite in 2008. Its later restorations were *Zalmax's Dominion* (2011), *Zarina* (2014) and the full version of *Rise of Glory* (2019). Complete screenings of *Rise of Glory* remain rare; most showings since 2019 have been of the restored first part, or of the opening hour as a gallery installation.[9][10] Admissions and foreign participation at the Talas International Film Festival have declined since the late 2000s. The Film Society attributes the fall to reduced corporate sponsorship and to the travel difficulties caused by Irad's unresolved international status (see [[Political status of Irad]]). Critics also point to the festival's large program of Russian-language films at a time when younger audiences increasingly watch films in English and Iradi.[12] The Diz Film Festival, founded in 2010 by young filmmakers and critics and held each summer in the courtyards of the [[Old Talas Citadel Quarter]], concentrates on independent features, documentaries and experimental films from [[wp:Central Asia]], subtitled in Iradi and English.[13] Contemporary production is small. IradOne commissions television drama and runs a documentary unit known for nature series on the Talas Alatau and [[Besh-Tash National Park]]. Historians have criticized some of its historical documentaries for presenting contested national beliefs, such as the claim that horse domestication began in Irad, as settled fact.[14] Independent filmmakers, many of them associated with the [[Iradi language revival]], work with digital cameras on short films, music videos and documentaries, often in Iradi. Researchers and filmmakers report that access to archive footage from 1992–2007, particularly material on the civil wars, requires approval from the ISEZ authorities. Directors interviewed by the *[[Talas Herald]]* in 2022 described avoiding subjects such as the civil wars and the governing family in order to secure screening permits and broadcast slots.[10][15] ## Styles and themes #### The experimental strand Writers on Iradi Soviet cinema group *Zarina*, *Zalmax's Dominion* and *Rise of Glory* as an experimental and "unsettling" tendency. The three films differ in method. Sadikov used fragmented chronology, long takes and sound that pulls against the image; Karimov used non-sequitur dialogue, recited timetables, untranslated [[wp:Syriac language|Syriac]] intertitles and figures in animal masks; and Osmonov used real time, endurance and a shifting narrator. Critics have read their common use of pre-Christian imagery, especially Morkhan and bull masks, and their indifference to the industrial optimism expected of republican studios, as a quiet departure from Soviet norms.[3][7] #### Landscape and horsemanship Iradi films of both strands were shot largely on location in the Talas Alatau, the Kara-Suu Canyon and the Moiynkum sands, often in natural light. Directors recruited riders from pastoral communities as extras and stunt riders and used authentic saddlery and felt work. Horses are central to the plots of *Zarina*, *Desert Sun's Rebellion* and *Rise of Glory*, reflecting the place of the horse in Iradi national identity (see [[Iradi Equestrian Culture & Breeds]]).[2] #### Censorship and religion Soviet censors objected to Christian as well as formal elements. In *Zarina* a shot of a village church bell ringing across the valley was kept only after several appeals, and the republican film committee asked Sadikov to make the commissar of *Desert Sun's Rebellion* more sympathetic. The [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]] was banned in public life for most of the Soviet period, and explicit Christian themes rarely appeared in Iradi film before 1992.[5][6] ## Institutions - **[[Talasfilm Studios]]**, founded in 1954, the only feature studio of the Soviet period and now a state-owned production company. - **[[Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation|Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation Institute]]**, on Cinema Boulevard in Talas, the national film archive since 1995. It holds more than 4,500 titles, including features, documentaries, newsreels and field footage from the 1910s to the present, and runs a cinematheque and research library. - **[[Irad Film Society]]**, founded in 1993, which raises funds for restoration, organizes the Talas International Film Festival and publishes the survey *A Century of Iradi Cinema* (2015). - **[[Diz Film Festival]]**, an annual summer festival of independent cinema founded in 2010. - **[[Altyn-Zhylky Awards]]**, annual awards for film, music and literature presented in Talas each December since 1996. Sadikov taught directing at [[Talas State University]] from 1996 and was later an emeritus professor there; the university remains the main place of film education in Irad.[2] ## Preservation and lost films The original negatives of most Talasfilm features were deposited with Gosfilmofond under Soviet rules and remain in Russia. Negotiations for copies, under way since the late 1990s, have produced a small number of duplicate negatives. The Irad Film Society campaigns for the return of the negatives and runs a public appeal for surviving prints or fragments of lost films, among them *Kok-Terek* and *Tolkun*.[3][10] The principal restorations by the Talasfilm Archives are: | Film | Year of film | Restoration completed | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | *Desert Sun’s Rebellion* | 1979 | 2004 | Premiered at the 2005 Talas International Film Festival | | *Zalmax’s Dominion* | 1977 | 2011 | Shown regularly at the archive's cinematheque | | *Zarina* | 1968 | 2014 | Screened by the archive from 1992 before restoration | | *Rise of Glory* | 1979 | 2019 | Full version | ## Influence The Soviet-era films have shaped later Iradi popular culture. Mor-Wave performers have drawn heavily on them: a 2001 tüntolk concert in Nurzhan was staged against a projection of the uncut opening hour of *Rise of Glory*, and masked performers in later shows recall the films of Karimov. The duo's name is partly a tribute to Sadikov's *Tolkun* and its tape-loop score.[16] Karimov has a cult following among younger [[Iradis]], and screenings of restored films at the archive's cinematheque are popular with students.[7][15] ## Selected films | Year | Title | Director | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | 1959 | *Kok-Terek* (*The Blue Poplar*) | Nurlan Sadikov | Lost | | 1963 | *Tolkun* (*The Wave*) | Nurlan Sadikov | Short; lost | | 1968 | *Zarina* | Nurlan Sadikov | First Iradi film in All-Union release | | 1973 | *Tuz* (*Salt*) | Beknur Karimov | Released only in the republic | | 1975 | *Naryn* | Nurlan Sadikov | Documentary on the Toktogul dam | | 1977 | *Zalmax’s Dominion* | Beknur Karimov | Cult film; restored 2011 | | 1979 | *Desert Sun’s Rebellion* | Nurlan Sadikov | First Iradi Western; restored 2004 | | 1979 | *Rise of Glory* | Talgat Osmonov | About four hours; restored 2019 | | 1982 | *Kyz Bulak* (*Maiden's Spring*) | Beknur Karimov | Shelved; shown 1988 | | 1983 | *Vengeance Rider* | — | Iradi Western | | 1986 | *Guide of the Sands* | Nurlan Sadikov | Iradi Western | ## See also - [[Culture of Irad]] - [[Media of Irad]] - [[Music of Irad]] ## References
  1. ^ Soviet Film Heritage Institute (1984). Directory of Central Asian Cinematographers. Iskusstvo, Moscow, pp. 142–163.
  2. ^ Talas State University Press (2009). Nurlan Sadikov and the Iradi Western, pp. 11–152.
  3. ^ Irad Film Society (2015). A Century of Iradi Cinema. Talas.
  4. ^ Talasfilm Archives and Film Preservation Institute (2018). Catalogue of Holdings, 1916–2007. Talas.
  5. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 412: Republican Film Production Catalogues (1954–1975).
  6. ^ State Archives of Irad (Talas), Fond 415: Minutes of the Talasfilm Artistic Council (1961–1991).
  7. ^ Talas Journal of Cultural Studies (2023). 'Surrealism and the Nomadic Soul in Karimov's Cinema.' Vol. 11, Iss. 1, pp. 112–129.
  8. ^ Talas State University Press (2009). West of the East: The Iradi Western, 1979–1991, pp. 1–64.
  9. ^ Central Asian Review of Screen Studies (2019). 'Four Hours of Glory: Narration and Endurance in Osmonov's Epic.' Vol. 13, Iss. 2, pp. 77–101.
  10. ^ Central Asian Cultural Studies Review (2022). 'Preserving Nitrate Memory in the Talas Basin.' Vol. 14, pp. 112–128.
  11. ^ Irad Film Society (2005). Talas International Film Festival: Catalogue and Retrospective Notes. Talas.
  12. ^ Talas Herald (2023). 'Film festival audiences fall again.' Talas.
  13. ^ Talas Herald (2020). 'Ten summers of the Diz festival.' Talas.
  14. ^ Daniyarova, Saltanat (2020). Screens of the Nation: Television and Historical Memory in Irad. Talas State University Press, Talas.
  15. ^ Talas Herald (2022). 'Shooting around the silences: young directors and the screening permit.' Talas.
  16. ^ Talas Music Chronicle (2021). The Sound of the Night Wave: tüntolk and the Rise of Mor-Wave, pp. 34–58.
### 3.44. Iradis *Quality Assessment: B-Class Article | Category: Society & Demographics* {{Infobox ethnic group | group = Iradis | native_name = *Iraddar* | image = Feast_of_St_Janyl.jpg | caption = The Blessing of the Herds at the [[Feast of St. Janyl]], Iyık Janyl | region1 = [[Irad]] | pop1 = 3.3 million (2018 census); higher on independent estimates | region2 = [[wp:Kazakhstan]] | pop2 = Large community in [[wp:Almaty]]; main destination of labor migrants | region3 = [[wp:Kyrgyzstan]] | pop3 = Large community in [[wp:Bishkek]] | region4 = [[wp:United States]] | pop4 = 60,000–90,000 | region5 = [[wp:Russia]] | pop5 = 70,000–120,000 (seasonal migrants, 2024) | region6 = [[wp:Uzbekistan]] | pop6 = Mostly Muslim; many no longer identify as Iradi | languages = [[Iradi Language|Iradi]]; also Russian and English | religions = Predominantly [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church|Syro-Iradi Catholic]]; Sunni Muslim minority in the Fergana Rim | related = [[wp:Kyrgyz people|Kyrgyz]]; [[wp:Kazakhs]]; other [[wp:Kipchaks|Kipchak]] peoples }} The **Iradis** (Iradi: *Iraddar*; singular *Irad*) are a [[wp:Kipchaks|Kipchak]] Turkic people native to [[Irad]], where they form the majority of the population. They speak [[Iradi Language|Iradi]], a language closely related to Kyrgyz, and are distinguished from their Turkic neighbors chiefly by religion: most Iradis belong to the [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]], an Eastern Catholic church descended from the [[wp:Church of the East]], which converted Turkic pastoralists of the region in the 11th and 12th centuries. The official census of 2018 counted about 3.3 million Iradis, 72 percent of Irad's population. Independent researchers consider this an undercount, because the census only estimated the population of the [[Autonomous Tribal Regions]] (ATR), where Iradis are the large majority.[1][2] Iradis are divided between a largely urban, multilingual population in the [[Irad Special Economic Zone]] (ISEZ) and a rural, pastoral population in the tribal regions, organized in 24 patrilineal clans. Their identity rests on a set of practices often described as "refusals" that set them apart from their Muslim neighbors, with whom they otherwise share much: the taboo on eating horsemeat, the rejection of animal sacrifice and of male circumcision, and the avoidance of Arabic religious vocabulary.[3] The horse holds a central place in Iradi culture, and Iradi tradition regards the steppe of Irad as the place where the horse was first domesticated. The largest Iradi communities abroad are in [[wp:Bishkek]] and [[wp:Almaty]], and others live in Russia and the United States, where the largest community is in [[wp:Chicago]]. ## Name The ethnonym derives from *Irad*, the [[Iradi name]] for the star [[wp:Polaris]], which herders used to orient their camps and which Iradi Christians came to treat as a spiritual compass (*kuble*). Christian Iradis also call themselves *Tarsa* or *Tarsoo*, an old Central Asian word for Christians, and in the [[wp:Fergana Valley|Fergana Valley]] Uzbek speakers call them *joniliklar*, "Janyl's people" (see [[Syro-Iradi Catholic Church]]). In poetry the Iradis are called *zhulduz eli*, "the people of the star". Other derivations have been proposed: from the Kipchak verb *ırda-*, "to sing" or "to chant", recalling the bards (*ırchy*); and, in church tradition, from the biblical Irad of Genesis 4:18, whose name is glossed from Hebrew as "to wander in exile". Historians generally hold that the name entered use through East Syriac missionaries in the 11th century; its earliest attestation is in the 13th-century *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum* of [[wp:Bar Hebraeus]].[4] The form *Iradistan*, "place of the Iradis", was coined in the Russian imperial period and formalized under Soviet rule. ## Origins The origin of the Iradis is disputed, and three main theories compete.[5][6][17] All of them start from the same background. The Chu and Talas valleys had an old Iranian-speaking population, whose [[Sogdian City-States of the Chu|Sogdian city-states]] were centers of Silk Road trade, and after the [[Battle of Talas]] in 751 and the conversion of the Kara-Khanids in the 10th century, Islam became the religion of most of the towns. The Iradis first appear under that name in the 12th century, under the religiously tolerant [[wp:Qara Khitai]], when the Church of the East flourished among the Turkic clans. - **Keraites.** Some historians identify the Iradis with groups of the [[wp:Keraites]], a Turkic tribe of the eastern steppe that adopted East Syriac Christianity around 1007 through the metropolitan see of [[wp:Merv]] and whose groups migrated through the region afterward. In this view the Iradis are Christianized Turks, and the church tradition that makes Janyl the daughter of a Kerait chieftain preserves their origin. - **Naimans.** Others regard them as remnants of the [[wp:Naimans]], a largely Christian Turkic people pushed west by the Mongols in the early 13th century, when the Naiman prince [[wp:Kuchlug]] seized the Qara Khitai throne before his defeat in 1218. The name survives in the Naiman clan of the Chatkal. - **Migration from the Jaxartes.** Many ethnographers, finally, read the Janyl story as a folk memory of a migration. In this view, Iranian-speaking Christians of the towns along the [[wp:Syr Darya|Jaxartes]], pushed out as the towns became Muslim under the Kara-Khanids, moved north and east into the mountains and mingled there with Turkic highland tribes. Its supporters point to the Sogdian and Syriac roots of the Iradi church vocabulary and to the more Iranian appearance of town Iradis (see [[Janyl (Historical Figure)]]). None of the theories is generally accepted, and many scholars think that more than one is partly right: grave markers at the [[Ruins of Old Iyık Janyl]], dated between 1240 and 1338, record a mixed community of Keraite, Naiman and Sogdian Christians. Church tradition traces the Iradis' unity to [[Janyl, Mother of Irad|Janyl]], who is said to have united the Christian clans after a vision of Christ as the White Rider, and to a synod at Navekat in 1180 that recognized the Christian confederation of the Talas valley (see [[Nestorian Synod of Navekat (1180)]]). Modern historians treat both accounts with caution.[6] ## History After the Mongol conquest, the forced conversions under the Chagatai khan Ali-Sultan (1339–1342) and the campaigns of [[wp:Timur]] destroyed the dioceses, and Iradi Christianity survived in the mountains, often in secret. In the 18th century Iradi Christian cavalry served the [[wp:Khanate of Kokand]] against the Dzungars, and Khan Abd al-Rahim Biy rewarded them with a decree of protection and funds for the [[Church of St. Janyl]] at [[Iyık Janyl]] (founded 1727). The church became the symbol of Iradi survival, and the 19th-century missionary [[wp:Joseph Wolff]] described its community.[7] The Russian conquest of 1876 brought the Iradi lands into [[wp:Russian Turkestan]] and opened them to Slavic settlement. In the [[Semirechye Revolt (Irad)|revolt of 1916]] many Iradi clans rose against labor conscription, and thousands fled across the Tian Shan to China in the flight known as the *Urkun*; some clans never returned (see [[The Lost Tribes of 1916]]). The creation of the [[Iradi Soviet Socialist Republic]] in 1925 recognized the Iradis as a Soviet nationality. Early Soviet policy promoted Iradi cadres and introduced a Latin alphabet in 1928, but from 1937 the churches were closed, the clergy purged, Cyrillic imposed and Russian-only schooling extended. Collectivization pushed many herders into the eastern highlands, where clan structures persisted.[8] Since 1992, Iradi identity has been shaped by the restoration of the church, the [[De-Russification Movement in Irad|de-Russification]] of names and places, the division of the country in 2007 between the ISEZ and the tribal regions, and the revival of the Iradi language among young city dwellers. ## Subgroups and social structure #### Clans Rural Iradis of the tribal regions belong by patrilineal descent to one of 24 recognized clans (*uruk*), each with its oral genealogy (*[[Sanjyra (Genealogy)|sanjyra]]*), councils of elders (*aksakal*) and seasonal pastures. Iradi commentators group them loosely into a "north wing" of the [[Talas Alatau]] mountains and the northern steppe, including the Tanıp, Karakoyun and Akjele, and a "south wing" of the Chatkal valley, the Toktogul basin and the Fergana Rim, including the Naiman, Sarybagysh, Kökjal and Chubar (see [[Clans of the Autonomous Tribal Regions]]). Several clan names are shared with Kyrgyz and Kazakh tribal groups.[9] Urban Iradis often still know their clan, but it rarely shapes their lives. #### Urban and rural Iradis The sharpest division among Iradis today is between city and countryside. Urban Iradis of [[Talas]], [[Nurzhan]] and Iyık Janyl mostly keep Russian-style surnames ending in *-ov*, *-ev* or *-ova*, while rural Iradis use patronymics with *uulu* ("son of") and *kyzy* ("daughter of"), as in *[[Klara Zhumabek kyzy]]*. Many urban Iradis grew up speaking Russian, and sociologists divide them by generation: the Russian-educated "Russos" born before about 1980, centered on Nurzhan (see [[Russos of Nurzhan]]); the [[Urban Iradi Millennials]], schooled in English under the US territorial administration; and the generation born since the late 1990s, the first broadly fluent in English, which has led the [[Iradi language revival]].[10] Rural Iradis of the tribal regions speak only Iradi in daily life and keep transhumant herding between winter quarters and summer pastures (*zhayloo*). #### Physical appearance Iradis vary considerably in appearance. Ethnographers have noted since the Soviet period that features associated with the Iranian-speaking peoples of the oases are more common among city Iradis, and features usual among Kyrgyz and Kazakhs more common among herders of the mountains and steppe, a pattern that supporters of the migration theory attribute to a larger Sogdian element in the towns. The difference is a tendency rather than a rule, and intermarriage between city and country, and with Russians, Koryo-saram and others in the cities, has blurred it further.[11] #### Muslim Iradis A minority of Iradis are Muslim, mainly in the Fergana Rim, where about a third of households of the Chubar clan are Muslim through intermarriage with Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. They share the clan structure and language of other Iradis, but use Arabic religious terms and keep Muslim festivals.[9] Because Iradi identity is so closely tied to the church, Muslim Iradis are sometimes regarded by other Iradis as only half Iradi, and those who move to Uzbekistan often cease to call themselves Iradi at all. See [[Islam in Irad]]. ## Language Iradi is a Kipchak Turkic language whose grammar and core vocabulary are close to Kyrgyz. Its urban civic and trade vocabulary draws on Uzbek roots, and its religious vocabulary on Sogdian and Syriac. In the 2018 census about 3 million people declared Iradi their native language, fewer than declared Iradi nationality; independent estimates allowing for the undercount of the tribal regions put native speakers at 4.3 to 4.8 million.[2] The standard language is based on the speech of the middle Talas valley. Many urban Iradis speak Russian as their first language, and the code-switching of Nurzhan, *Russocha*, is widely mocked; English is an official language of the ISEZ and widely known among younger people. Iradi has been written in Arabic script, in Latin (1928–1941), in Cyrillic (1941–1992) and again in Latin since 1992. ## Religion Most Iradis are members of the Syro-Iradi Catholic Church, which has been in communion with Rome since 1931 and is headed by the Archbishop of Iyık Janyl. Its liturgy is that of Addai and Mari, celebrated in Iradi. Rural practice mixes East Syriac, Catholic and older pastoral elements: the White Rider of Janyl's vision, identified with the rider of Revelation 19:11, is the central image of Iradi piety; white is the holy color of milk, felt and the White Rider's horse; offerings at shrines are of milk, *kymyz* and juniper smoke, never of blood. Saints' name days (*at künü*) outrank birthdays in the countryside. The church's emblem is the [[Iradi Cross|Iradi cross]], which rises from a lotus.[12] Iradis share many customs with their Muslim neighbors, among them pilgrimage to shrines, the elders' blessing (*bata*), same-day burial and the memorial on the fortieth day. Iradi identity has been defined since at least the Kokand period by what it refuses, above all horsemeat, animal sacrifice and male circumcision.[3] Among urban Russos many are non-practicing, and small numbers of Iradis belong to Russian Orthodox and American evangelical congregations. ## Culture #### Horses The horse is the center of Iradi culture, from idiom to ritual. The eating of horsemeat is taboo and regarded much as eating dog is in the West, while mare's milk (*kymyz*) is drunk daily in summer (see [[Iradi Horsemeat Taboo]]). Iradis keep two native breeds, the stocky mountain [[Chongtor Horse|Chongtor]] and the golden [[Akyel Horse|Akyel]], and horse sports such as [[Ulak Tartysh (Sport)|ulak tartysh]] are the national pastimes. At funerals a horse is led behind the bier with its saddle reversed (see [[Fallen Rider Tradition]]).[13] #### Family and dress Marriage joins two families as in-laws (*kuda*) and is accompanied by bride price (*kalym*), often including a riding horse, and a dowry of felt and bedding; the church rite is the East Syriac crowning. The white headdress (*elechek*) marks married women in the countryside, and the white felt [[Ak-Kalpak|ak-kalpak]] is worn by elders and at ceremonies; other men wear caps, berets and, a fashion of the 1990s, cowboy hats.[14] Iradi cuisine is pastoral and dairy-based, with mutton, beef, *kurut* and a household plov cooked soft like risotto (see [[Iradi cuisine]]). #### Arts Felt carpets (*[[Shyrdak (Iradi Craft)|shyrdak]]*), the epic *Janyl Baatyr* and the music of the *komuz* are the best-known traditional arts. Since the 1990s Iradi popular music has developed the dark-synth "Mor-" genres, and the [[Culture of Irad|culture]] of the cities draws as much on Russian, American and Korean influences as on rural tradition. ## Diaspora - **Kyrgyzstan.** Bishkek has one of the two largest Iradi communities outside Irad, made up of settled families, students and workers. Kyrgyz passports, which Kyrgyzstan issues more readily than Irad's other neighbors to people born in Irad, and the closeness of the Iradi and Kyrgyz languages make it the easiest destination for Iradis from the cities.[16] - **Kazakhstan.** Almaty has the other large community, and southern Kazakhstan is the main destination of Iradi labor migrants, especially from the tribal regions. Some herding families move seasonally across the border. - **Uzbekistan.** Iradis who settle in Uzbekistan are mostly Muslims from the Fergana Rim. Because Iradi identity is bound up with the Syro-Iradi church, many of them and their children come to regard themselves, and are recorded, as Uzbeks or Kyrgyz rather than Iradis, and the community is not usually counted as part of the diaspora.[3] - **United States.** [[Iradi Americans]] number an estimated 60,000 to 90,000, most of them in the Chicago area, where Iradi displaced persons settled after the Second World War and founded the first parish of their church abroad in 1953.[15] - **Russia.** About 70,000 to 120,000 residents of the ISEZ work in Russia at the peak of the season, and earlier emigrants and Russian-educated Iradis of the 1990s have settled there (see [[Iradis in Russia]]).[16] - **China.** Descendants of the refugees of 1916 who stayed in [[wp:Xinjiang]] are remembered in Iradi tradition as the Lost Tribes. ## See also - [[Demographics of Irad]] - [[Culture of Irad]] - [[Iradi Language]] - [[Clans of the Autonomous Tribal Regions]] ## References
  1. ^ ISEZ Statistical Office (2019). Results of the 2018 Population Census of Irad, vol. 1. Talas.
  2. ^ Eurasian Political Quarterly (2021). "Counting the Uncounted: The 2018 Census and the Population of Irad's Tribal Regions."
  3. ^ Central Asian Cultural Studies Review (2018). "Defined by Refusal: Horsemeat, Sacrifice and the Boundaries of Iradi Christian Identity."
  4. ^ Talas State University Press (2009). The Name of Irad: Etymologies and Traditions. Talas.
  5. ^ Talas State University Press (2011). Sogdians and Turks in the Talas and Chu Valleys, rev. ed. Talas.
  6. ^ Central Asian Cultural Studies Review (2014). "Keraites, Naimans and the Christian Clans of the Talas Valley."
  7. ^ Archbishopric of Iyık Janyl (2002). The Church of St. Janyl, 1727–2002. Iyık Janyl.
  8. ^ State Archives of Irad, fonds of the Iradi SSR Council of People's Commissars (1925–1941).
  9. ^ United Nations Mission in Irad (2020). Clan Structures and Pasture Governance in the Autonomous Tribal Regions. Kara-Oi.
  10. ^ Talas State University Institute of Sociology (2022). Generations and Language in the Cities of the ISEZ. Talas.
  11. ^ Talas State University Press (2016). Peoples of the Talas and Chu Valleys: An Ethnographic Survey. Talas.
  12. ^ Council of Hierarchs of the Syro-Iradi Church (2012). The Faith of the Iradi Church: A Pastoral Introduction. Iyık Janyl.
  13. ^ Central Asian Cultural Studies Review (2019). "The Horse in Iradi Ritual and Daily Life."
  14. ^ Talas Herald (2021). "From Ak-Kalpak to Stetson: What Iradi Men Wear." Talas.
  15. ^ Iradi American Association (2005). Fifty Years of the Iradi American Association. Chicago.
  16. ^ Talas State University Institute of Sociology (2024). Labor Migration from the ISEZ: Survey Report. Talas.
  17. ^ Talas State University Press (2019). From the Jaxartes to the Mountains: Ethnogenesis of the Iradis. Department of Ethnography, Talas.